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Answers for the first fu
(what causes seasonal effects .') are accumulating
for the stock market anomalies. However, these
answers may not ultimately prove to be correct.
For example, there is a tax selling hypothesis
which attempts to explain high January rates of
return, the January Effect, in common stocks.
This hypothesis is losing favor in the face of ev-
idence that the January Effect is found in coun-
tries with markedly different tax laws. There is
another hypothesis that attempts to explain the
January Effect by asserting that mutual fund
managers move into riskier-smaller stocks in
January in order to increase the expected return
on their portfolio and thus increase their expect-
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Seasonality-Size Effects
and REIT Efficiency
REITs or Real Estate Investment Trusts are
closed-end investment companies that bridge the
gap between stock markets and real estate mar-
kets. Since shares in these companies are traded
on stock markets, they might be expected to ex-
hibit seasonal rate of return anomalies that are
similar to those of corporate stock.
REIT price and return data is the only ready
continued on page 2
NEW ADVISOR
\^ii^les Hill was recently ap-
pointed to the ORER Advis-
ory Committee. He is Exec-
utive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer of
the Chicago Federal Home
Loan Bank.
ORER MOVES
The College of Commerce
and Business Administration
is providing the ORER with
renovated facilities which
will also consolidate all the
real estate faculty in one lo-
cation. The new suite of of-
continued on page 4
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source of real estate prices and returns based on
nearly continuous trading. Therefore, one source
of inefficiency commonly attributed to real estate
markets, infrequent trading, should be absent
from REIT prices and returns.
There are basically two types of REITs: mort-
gage REITs and equity REITS. As the names
suggest, the portfolios of mortgage REITs con-
sist primarily of mortgages, while the portfolios
of equity REITs consist primarily of equity posi-
tions in real estate projects. At first glance, one
might suspect that the equity REITs are riskier
and have higher expected returns than the mort-
gage REITs. But the reverse is the case. Even
though, it might seem as if an equity position
would experience more variabihty than a mort-
gage position, it may be that something like in-
terest rate risk has made the mortgage position
riskier in recent years.
There are large differences in seasonal effects
between large and small REITs and between equi-
ty and mortgage REITs. Figure 1 shows the sea-
sonal patterns in rates of return for the largest
and smallest mortgage REITs, whereas Figure 2
shows the same information for equity REITs.
The January Effect exists for only the small
mortgage and equity REITs. The January Effect
for small mortgage REITs is almost 6.5 percent-
age points above that for equity REITs. Howev-
er in both the case of mortgage REITs and the
case of equity REITs, the January rates of return
are so substantial that it would seem possible to
invest in small REITs in January and invest in
government securities for the rest of the year in
order to make a return well above what could be
considered normal.
The implication of these results is that the
REIT market is inefficient. One might invoke
the standard explanations for the stock market
January and Size Effects to explain REIT January
and Size Effects. However, the validity of the
agency argument may be questioned. It is
unclear that mutual funds are heavily involved in
the REIT market.
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Thisfirst issue of the ORER LETTER was produced as a pilot issue. The editor
and graphic designer of this issue was Peter F. Colwell, the ORER Professor of
Real Estate. In addition, all but one of the pieces in this issue were written by
Peter Colwell. The exception is "Building Activity in Peoria" which was written
by William R. Bryan, Chairman of the Department of Finance, and Matthew
Maher, Research Assistant
.
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Housing Market Efficiency
Efficiency in the housing market would be sug-
gested by a lack of substantial seasonal effects in
the rate of return for housing. If higher than nor-
mal rates of return were expected in any particular
month, sellers would be influenced ... as would
buyers ... to adjust the timing of their transac-
tion. This speculative activity would drive out
the above normal returns associated with the tim-
ing of house sales if the market were efficient.
Therefore, substantial seasonal effects in the
housing market would be indicative of inefficien-
cy in that market. Also, if seasonal effects in the
housing market look like those found in the
stock market, the conventional explanations
would be called into question. That is, it would
be difficult to argue that either the tax selling hy-
pothesis or the agency problem could explain,
say, a January Effect in the housing market. If
these explanations prove to be inadequate, and it
is beginning to look as if this is the case, the
mystery of these seasonal effects would deepen.
Figure 1 shows the seasonal rates of return in
one urban area. The highest rate of return is for
January. But in addition to a January Effect, it
appears as if there is a peak in the rate of return at
the beginning of each quarter. The question that
arises is whether there is anything like this quar-
terly effect in the stock market.
Figure 2 shows the seasonal rates of return for
middle-size firms on the New York Stock Ex-
change. The similarities and the differences be-
tween die New York Stock Exchange and the
housing market are clearcut between Figures 1
and 2.
The principal difference is that the rates of re-
turn in the NYSE are systematically higher than
the rates in the housing market. One reason for
this is that the housing market rates of return
measure only appreciation whereas the NYSE
rates of return measure appreciation and income
(that is, dividends). If one were to impute in-
come to the owners of housing, the rates of re-
turn to housing ownership would be increased.
The principal similarity between housing mar-
ket and NYSE rates of return appears to be the
quarterly effect. That is, besides the well-known
January effect, there is a peak approximately at
the beginning of each quarter. The one exception
is that this effect for the NYSE lags the effect in
the housing market by one month for the fourth
quarter only.
Figure 1
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The implication of the similarities of the housing market seasonal rate of re-
turn pattern with the NYSE seasonal rate of return pattern is that, if one explana-
tion is to handle both patterns, it will have to be a new explanation. As of the
present, this is a great mystery in the fields of finance and real estate.
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Rho Epsilon Activities
The Spring 1987 schedule of activities for Rho
Epsilon was very full. Rho Epsilon is a nation-
al real estate fraternity with a busy chapter at the
University of Illinois. With a student member-
ship of approximately 80, there was substantial
interest in the eleven formal Rho Epsilon activi-
ties during the spring semester.
The topic of the first meeting of the semester
was brokerage. Craig Bayless, Vice President
and Branch Manager at Cushman and Wakefield,
spoke on the subject of commercial brokerage on
February 3.
On February 10, the topic was syndications
and acquisitions. The speaker was Michael
Herzberg, Senior Vice President of JMB Real-
ty-
Commercial leasing was the topic of the third
meeting of the semester. A Leasing Agent with
Rubloff Inc. - Office Properties Group, Andrew
Davidson spoke on leasing issues at the Febru-
ary 24 meeting of Rho Epsilon.
The March 3 meeting focused on Institutional
Investments. The speaker was Jerry Garren, a
Vice President in production at Metropolitan
Life.
The meeting of March 24 examined areas of
Real Estate Regulation. The speakers were
Dennis Bennett and Kevin O'Connell
from the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago.
A field trip to Chicago was held on March 27.
Fifteen students and Roger Cannaday, the fa-
culty advisor, visited three businesses. Howard
Walker was the host at Olympia and York.
The discussion centered around development. At
Harris Trust, the host, John Rutledge, dis-
cussed real estate loans and portfolio manage-
ment. Lunch was provided by Harris Trust.
Lastly, Jared Shiaes, at Shlaes & Company,
discussed real estate consulting with the Rho Ep-
silon group.
On April 7, Commercial Development was the
topic of the Rho Epsilon meeting. Richard
Hanson, President of Stein and Company, was
the speaker on this topic.
The second field trip of the semester was an
overnight trip to Indianapolis on April 10 and
11. The trip was sponsored by Metropolitan Life
with Fred Lieblich and Michael Schack as
the hosts. Twelve students and two faculty advi-
sors, Roger Cannaday and Phil Rushing,
attended. The purpose of the trip was to visit re-
cent Metropolitan real estate developments in the
Indianapolis area.
The third field trip of the semester was a
luncheon sponsored by the Chicago Chapter of
the Society of Industrial and Office Realtors.
The Vice President, Alan Berggren, chaired
the program which was focused on Summer In-
ternships. Six firms with positions available
were represented and 12 students attended who
were looking for internship positions. Steve
Podolsky, President of the SIOR Chapter, pre-
sented the U of I representative, Roger Canna-
day, with a check for $1,500 for tiie SIOR
Scholarship at the U of I.
On April 21, Corporate Real Estate was the
principal topic of the Rho Epsilon meeting.
James T. Schaefer, Corporate Director of
Real Estate for Beatrice Foods, was the speaker.
After the presentation, an election was held for
the Fall 1987 Officers of Rho Epsilon. Mi-
chael Fine was elected President. Jayne Ro-
manchek was elected Vice President, and
Scott Rubin was elected Secretary. Alissa
Schneider was elected Treasurer.
The last Rho Epsilon meeting of the semester
was held on May 6. The topic was Mortgage
Banking. The speaker was Jay Strauss,
Chairman of the Board of Focus Financial
Group. Thanks were given to the Spring 1987
Officers who did a fine job: Carie Karnezis,
Dale Cooney, Teresa Connors, and Rich
Frosser the outgoing President, Vice President,
Secretary and Treasurer, respectively.
Rho Epsilon Thriving
Rho Epsilon membership at the University of Il-
linois is near its all-time high. Total new mem-
bership reached 62 during the past academic year.
This is very close to the peak of 65 new mem-
bers during the year 1984-85. Although records
are not complete.the 1983-84 academic year ap-
pears to have been the low point for Rho Epsilon
membership.
The previous high membership year was 1979-
80. There were 50 new members that year, up
from 45 in each of the two previous years and 32
in the 1976-77, the inagural year of the current
charter.
continuedfrom page 1
fices is in 304 David Kinley
Hall. The Director's office,
an outer Secretary's office,
and a conference room along
with four faculty offices will
be part of this suite.
6 NEW PAPERS
So far this year, six new
manuscripts have been pub-
lished as ORER Papers. The
first of these is a study of
REITs (Real Estate Invest-
ment Trusts) as contingent
claims by Park and Rushing.
Next, a paper by Sunderman,
Cannaday, and Colwell ana-
lyzes the market value of as-
sumption financing. The
third of this Spring's papers
concerns real estate price
bubbles and was written by
Scott. The fourth paper is
by Thomas and Reskin and
is about occupational change
and sex integration in real
estate sales. The fifth of
these papers deals with the
capitalization of taxes and
public service benefits across
jurisdictions. The sixth and
most recent ORER Paper is
about the real estate impacts
of tax reform and was written
by Follain, Hendershott, and
Ling.
These, and other ORER
Papers can be obtained free
of charge by requesting them
from the ORER. The ad-
dress is on page 8.
continued on page 5
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Enrollments Build in Real Estate
Enrollment in the introductory real estate course,
Fundamentals of Real Estate, has grown steadily
for all but one of the last six years. During the
1981-82 academic year, enrollment was 201 stu-
dents in all sections. This year enrollment is 439
in all sections. The only pause in the growth
was in the year 1984-85 when there were 350 stu-
dents enrolled, two fewer than during the previous
year.
The number of sections of the course has also
grown steadily over the past six years. From a
low of six sections offered in 1981-82, there were
ten sections offered during 1986-87. The only
setback in this history of growth was in 1983-84
with six, one fewer than the previous year. This
history of growth in the number of sections re-
flects an increasing committment of resources to
the real estate area by the College of Commerce
and Business Administration.
Unfortunately, the increased resources have not
kept pace with demand. Class size soared during
the first couple of years of this period. Since
then it has plateaued out at a higher level. Figure
1 shows that the past seven years began with
Figure 1
Class Size in "Fundamentals"
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class size of about 33.5 and ended with size at
43.9, a more than thirty percent increase.
At some stage, it may become necessary to
move to a lecture-discussion section format.
Professor Colwell, ORER Professor of Real
Estate, has said that "ideal class size for the in-
troductory course is approximately 25 to 30 stu-
dents. A lecture-discussion section format might
achieve enrollments of 25 students per discussion
section with a lecture of about 200 students.
The impact from the student perspective is
mixed. Smaller discussion sections make for
better interaction, but the large lectures allow for
less interaction."
Another perspective has been expressed by Pro-
fessor Bryan, Chairman of the Finance Depart-
ment. He said "We ought to consider the impact
of increased service at the introductory level on
the remainder of the course offerings in the real
estate area. Going to a lecture-discussion section
format in the first real estate course may free up
teaching resources so that we can improve the
upper division course offerings. We have had to
do this in other areas within the Finance Depart-
ment. It could happen to real estate."
Spring and Fall Course
Offerings
Beyond the five sections of the introductory real
estate course, the Department of Finance offered
three other real estate courses for the Spring 1987
semester. These three courses were Real Estate
Investment, Real Estate Financial Markets, and
Real Estate and Urban Land Economics, a survey
class at the graduate level.
There are four sections of the introductory
course scheduled for the Fall 1987 semester. In
addition, the Legal Environment of Real Estate,
Urban Real Estate Valuation.Urban Economics,
and Real Estate and Urban Land Economics are
also scheduled.
This basic pattern is repeated each year with
few changes. The introductory or survey courses
are offered each semester. Otherwise, courses are
not repeated during the academic year.
New courses have not been added for a number
of years. However, there is some interest in an
undergrad development course and a grad real
estate finance course.
2 IBR ARTICLES
The Illinois Business Re-
view published two articles
which were sponsored by the
ORER. In the February
1987 issue of the IBR,
Schnare wrote about the
measurable decUne in resi-
dential segregation in
Chicago but thought it a
"dubious achievement" given
the larger declines elsewhere
in the nation. The April
issue of the IBR contains an
article by Cannaday, Stunard,
and Sunderman on
assessment uniformity of
Chicago condominiums.
FOLLAIN PRESENTS
In recent months the Director
of the ORER, Jim Follain,
has made presentations to
several groups: the National
Tax Association, the
American Real Estate and
Urban Economics
Association, and a group of
the Home and Housing
Economists associated with
the U of I Extension
Service.
He has also met with the
staff of the National
Association of Realtors® to
discuss ways in which
ORER and NAR might work
more closely together.
COLWELL SPEAKS
In January 1987, Peter
Colwell, the ORER Profes-
sor of Real Estate, presented
continued on page 6
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CARL WEBBER - PROFILE & INTERVIEW
Michael Hoeflich, U ofI Professor ofLaw, calls
Carl Webber "a superb real estate lawyer." Dean
Peter Hay of the U ofI College ofLaw calls him
"afirst rate lawyer . . . technically superb " and
"very insightful and sensitive to policy issues. "
Carl Webber is the most recent addition to the
real estate faculty at the University ofIllinois.
He will teach the Legal Environment ofReal
Estate class in the Fall 1987 semester.
Carl is an Urbana-based attorney specializing in
real estate law. He has a 1966 bachelors degree
in businessfrom Northwestern University. After
afour year stint in the Navy, he went to law
school at the U ofI graduating in 1973.
He has been very active in professional service.
He has been a member of the U of I College of
Law Board of Visitors since 1980 and a member
of the Illinois Bar Association Real Estate Sec-
tion Council since 1983. He has served both as
Secretary and as President of the Champaign
County Bar Association. Last year he became an
American Bar Foundation Fellow, having been
an Illinois Bar Foundation Fellow since 1984,
and this year he began as a lecturerfor the Illi-
nois Bar Association in Continuing Education.
Professor William Bryan, Chairman of the De-
partment ofFinance at the U ofI says, ". . the
Finance Department isfortunate indeed to have
such an accomplished lawyer teaching our real
estate law class." Carl will have the academic
rank ofAdjunct Professor ofFinancefor his Fall
1987 teaching assignment.
ORER: What is it that brought you to the real
estate area?
CW: I've always enjoyed real estate. Its not just
land and buildings, but it reflects a community's
health and potential. When I was a young boy,
my father would often say "Let's go for a drive,"
and we would drive around Urbana-Champaign.
He would continually comment on what was de-
veloping and on what might be coming. I
couldn't believe how much time he would spend
on such "boring" things as storm water or the
distance to the sanitary treatment plant. I would
be thinking only of what a development would
look like. But in real estate, there is so much
that doesn't meet the eye. To get the job done,
you had better make sure it drains!
It is a challenge in real estate to work with so
many people: lenders, land owners, planners, de-
velopers, tenants, and on and on. Even a basic
transaction, such as working with people on the
house they want to live in, is challenging and
enjoyable. Real estate is a unique amalgam of
things you can touch, along with the human as-
pect of the community.
ORER: What sort of problems do you face in
your real estate practice?
CW:One problem is the unknown. It also
makes things interesting. A current project in-
volves a client purchasing property to start a
small business. It involves the neighboring
land owner for an easement, the neighboring
tenant for a license, another neighbor for a site
line, the lender for financing, regional planners
for a formal report, and the city for a conditional
use permit. It started out to be simple (many
do). The seller, imknown to us, merely leased
the neighboring property. The title report
showed an easement benefitting the neighboring
property, which the seller didn't recall. The sell-
er had the obligation to obtain a release of the
easement, but couldn't, since the owner was in-
accessible "on the Continent for the summer."
Through a guarantee, a license, and an adjust-
ment in the price, we sorted it out and closed on
time.
Another problem is inertia. Institutions often
don't like to change their position. A transac-
tion might appear to be beneficial to all, but it
still may be difficult to get things moving. To
move, someone has to make a decision, and the
record will show who did. A decision maker is
more often looked upon as being to blame when
a problem comes from a recent decision, than
when it simply is a result of the status quo tak-
ing its toll. It is risky to decide; sometimes the
decision isn't made.
ORER: Have you ever worked with insurance
companies?
CW: We worked for two and a half years putting
together a recent transaction. One party had to
receive approval of their insurance company
lender. They had been unwilling to make the
contact until everything else was finished.
Time kept creeping on. At last we finalized
everything and were allowed to request their in-
surance company lender's approval a week or ten
days prior to the scheduled closing. We called
the insurance company and they said that they
continuedfrom page 5
a research proposal on func-
tional obsolescence to the
Homer Hoyt Advanced Study
Institute. He will be
completing this study and
presenting it to the Institute
next January. Professor
Colwell will become a Fel-
low of the Institute.
CANNADAY & R41c
Roger Cannaday, Associate
Professor in Finance and a
specialist in the area of ap-
praisal, is currendy both
writing a paper on R41c and
organizing a session on the
topic for this December's
American Real Estate and
Urban Economics Associa-
tion Meetings in Chicago.
The paper will demonstrate
how to provide required mar-
ket support for adjustments
in the sales comparison ap-
proach. The session will in-
volve regulators, academics,
and practicing appraisers.
ADVISORS ADVISE
Three major decisions came
out of the May 14 meeting
of the ORER Advisory
Committee. A grant was
made to Louis Scott to study
the changing gap between
mortgage interest rates and
other long-term interest
rates. It was decided that the
Advisory Committee should
hold a one day retreat to de-
velop a strategic plan for
ORER. The Committee
will further consider the pos-
sibility of the ORER organ-
izing a conference on hous-
ing finance policy.
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vere sorry but they were "in the middle of an
ludit and couldn't consider anything new for at
east six weeks." With two and a half years into
he project and interest rates going up rapidly, we
were told that the loan commitment would be
»ood only for a day and a half more. Everyone
jvas set for the closing except for the insurance
ompany who wouldn't talk to us. The only
iiing to do was to hop on a plane, go to their
lome office, and just hope that 1 find someone.
was dropped off by the taxicab in front of this
skyscraper. I didn't have a name of a person or
5ven of a department. Finally I got in to see a
very junior person who had started working there
about a month and a half before. He was a nice
guy, but was unwiUing to make a decision on
the matter. I tried to get him to get me in to see
the Division Manager, who could actually make
a decision. The young man tried, but couldn't
get the manager's attention. He was "in a meet-
ing all day." The matter was at a standstill.
That day was the last chance to finahze the deal
involving this rather large transaction. As we
were sitting in the young man's office, someone
peeked in and said "Hi John, how are you
doing?" The response from the young man was
'Fine, George, how are you this morning?"
'George" was the first name of the person I need-
jd to see. I figured I had one chance. I started
talking about as fast as I have ever talked. I
soon found that "George" went to the University
of Illinois and knew of our project! A break. He
was willing to commit himself enough that the
other organizations were willing to take a
chance. The transaction closed. Sometimes a
little luck helps; so did the University of Ilhnois
contact!
ORER: Recently, you have been involved in
drafting a pre-annexation agreement for a new
subdivision. What implications does it have for
a city Uke Urbana that hasn't had a new subdivi-
sion in many years?
CW: We have just finished Eagle Ridge. I
think that we will find that a new subdivision or-
dinance for Urbana will be very similar to the
pre-annexation agreement which we negotiated.
There have been a number of issues raised about
the contents of a new subdivision ordinance. We
agreed upon: no park land set-aside, PVC tile for
sump pump drainage, yard lights required in the covenants, street width comparable
with surrounding communities, allowance of an identification gate which might
otherwise fall under the zoning ordinance as a sign, extended cul-de-sac length, ful-
fillment of requirements for through streets, no requirement for half streets on the
edge of the subdivision and a detention pond.
ORER: What do you feel is the most interesting real estate project in which you
have been involved in recent years.
CW: The expansion of the Urbana Jumer's was probably the most interesting. It
involved a UDAG, a Tax Increment financed parking deck, and the city of Urbana
guaranteeing the industrial bonds for a three million dollar expansion. In discuss-
ing this project with city finance people, they quickly recognize the industrial reve-
nue bonds and respond, "Oh yeah, we have those too. The city issues them,
right?" When I ask if in their case the city has the responsibihty to pay off the
bonds if the business doesn't, their response is "Of course not." Here the city has
that potential risk. For Urbana to take on that responsibility, of course, indicates a
tremendous commitment to its downtown.
ORER : Your work on developing the law of warranties of habitability has been
called "inspired litigation" by one real estate scholar? To whom do you turn if you
buy a problem condo from a developer who goes belly up?
CW: Don't buy a condominium unit from a developer who might go belly up! If
the developer is weak, normally, you would not be able to recover from the sub-
contractors, unless you fall under some Umited exceptions. In Illinois, by showing
that the contractor is insolvent, you may be able to hold the sub-contractors, but
the definition of "insolvency" is currently still being defined by the courts. A neg-
ligence theory against the sub-contractors will likely survive if in addition to the
defects in the construction, there is significant other damage or personal injury.
Generally, there is no claim in negligence for economic damages, and a buyer has
to rely on a contract action. The problem is, of course, that a buyer doesn't nor-
mally have a contract directly with the sub-contractor. In a recent case, we were at-
tempting to show personal injury to allow the negligence action against the sub-
contractor. We presented proof of mold allergy in the child of one resident of a
condominium. The concept under this theory may not have originally included a
claim of a mold allergy, but might have more likely anticipated a two-by-four hit-
ting someone on the head! But the mold allergy was, indeed, a physical injury.
The original trial judge found that any physical injury was enough, since there
were no cases indicating just how much was needed. The Appellate Court said that
the mold allergy of one child in a large building is not enough personal injury to
allow a negligence count. At this point in the case, there are now eight people
suffering from mold allergy. Because of procedural rules, that additional informa-
tion could not be brought to the Appellate Court prior to the last determination.
Now it is likely that the issue will go back to the Appellate Court with these addi-
tional indications of personal injury. We will see if that changes things. When
you are on the edge, and this is on the edge, it is always an interesting issue to see
how far courts will go.
ORER: Thank you for allowing us the opportunity to interview you, and welcome
to the faculty.
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Building Activity in Peoria Figure 1
PEORIA & ILLINOIS BUILDING PERMIT VALUE
In comparison to the State of Illinois, residential
building permit activity in the Peoria MSA has
been sluggish over the last five years. This is il-
lustrated in Figure 1. Since the Figure goes back
to 1970, it is possible to contrast the last five
years with an earlier period. Note that between
1970 and 1981 the levels of building activity in
Peoria closely resemble those of the state.
The Peoria MSA (which includes Peoria, Taze-
well and Woodford Counties) fully participated in
the residential building boom of the 1970's. Also
as typical of the rest of the state, Peoria saw per-
mits decline dramatically during the sharp reces-
sion and high interest rates of 1980 and 1981.
However, the Peoria MSA's building permit ac-
tivity, especially multi-family, has declined since
1982, in contrast with the strong rebound for the
state as a whole.
Since population, income and employment in
the Peoria MSA are expected to remain relatively
stable in 1987, it is unlikely that residential per-
mit activity will change dramatically in 1987.
However, preliminary figures for 1987 suggest
that Peoria may have experienced some improve-
ment so far this year. No doubt, this improve-
ment can be attributed to the low interest rates of
the Winter and early Spring.
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Are Mortgage Bankers Hedged?
rhe stability of the nation's mortgage originat-
ng institutions is important for the stability of
nortgage lending. When interest rates are vola-
ile, lenders can fail, and the system can fail to
leliver the needed mortgage credit. If there are
;tabilizing factors for mortgage banking firms,
uid for savings and loans, which are behaving
nore and more like mortgage bankers, the atten-
ion and analysis of the industry should be fo-
cused on these factors.
Fortunately, mortgage bankers are hedged
igainst interest rate movements to some extent
is a result of the natural course of their busi-
less. They have in their portfoUos assets whose
k'alues move in opposite directions in response
to interest rate movements. The value of the
mortgage banking firm is stabilized by this nat-
ural portfoho composition, although the precise
isset mix that provides the most stable firm val-
ue is not yet clear.
Mortgage bankers make money in a number
of ways. They initiate real estate loans, borrow-
ing short-term to cover these loans while the
loans remain "warehoused" in their portfolios.
They sell loans in the secondary market, earning
a premium when the interest rate at which a giv-
en loan can be sold is lower than the rate at
which it was originated. They can earn fees by
servicing loans (i.e. collecting and disbursing
funds) that they or others have originated. They
can even buy and sell residential loan servicing
contracts in the open market Finally, they can
earn fees for various services they perform in
packaging deals.
This analysis focuses on two items in the
mortgage banker's portfolio: warehoused loans
and service contracts. Consider how the values
of these items change as interest rates move.
Warehoused loans generally are relatively long-
term instruments; financial analysts would note
their long "duration." Duration is a measure of
the extent to which a financial instrument de-
clines in value as interest rates rise. The longer
the duration, the larger the decline in value. Be-
cause warehoused mortgages are essentially long
duration instruments, their values are very inter-
est sensitive.
Service contracts operate differently. As inter-
est rates rise, the probability that a loan will be
prepaid declines. Prepayment for refinancing
purposes, which causes much of the prepayment
activity, increases as interest rates fall and de-
creases as interest rates rise. This link between
interest rates and prepayment is very important
in valuing service contracts, for if a loan is pre-
paid, the associated servicing contract becomes
worthless. On the other hand, the value of a ser-
vice contract rises if the probability of prepay-
ment declines. Such an investment is essential-
ly an annuity whose uncertain term is dependent
on interest rate movements. If rates rise, the
term declines; if rates fall, the term increases.
Service contracts, then, can be said to have nega-
tive duration. Over some range, the value of a
service contract rises as market interest rates
rise.
Combining these two effects, we see that if
interest rates rise, the mortgage banking firm
suffers a loss on the part of its portfolio com-
mitted to warehoused loans, while it realizes a
gain on the service contract portfolio compo-
nent The net effect depends on the relative pro-
portion of service contracts to warehoused loans
held in the portfolio.
Mortgage interest rates rose rapidly in the
spring of 1987. Many mortgage bankers were,
at that time, speculating that rates would soon
fall. This speculation induced them to hold
more warehoused loans than they normally
would. As a result, they suffered large capital
losses when rates instead rose. Reports in the
financial press at the time painted a bleak picture
of the industry's experience. Apparently no one
thought to value the offsetting gains that mort-
gage bankers realized on their loan servicing
continued on page 2
FOLLAIN STEPS
DOWN
Jim Follain, who has served
as Director of the Office of
Real Estate Research since
August of 1984, will step
down at die end of the 1987-
88 academic year. He will
assume his duties as a pro-
fessor of finance on a full-
time basis, to devote more
time to scholarly research.
Follain has worked to expand
ORER's role within the Uni-
versity. Seminars organized
by Follain, the research that
he has conducted and encour-
aged, and his participation in
academic organizations and
conferences have enhanced
recognition of ORER on na-
tional and even international
levels. Follain will continue
his affiliation with ORER,
particularly in the areas of
conducting and evaluating re-
search.
The search for a successor is
in progress.
NEW ADVISOR
Gary Clayton was i-ecendy
appointed to the Office of
Real Estate Research Adviso-
ry Committee. He is the
new Executive Vice Presi-
dent of the Illinois Associa-
uon of Realtors®.
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Researchers Add 8 Papers to ORER Paper Series
Since publication of the previous ORER Letter,
eight new manuscripts have been published as
ORER papers. These bring the total, since the
Series' inception in January of 1985, to 54. The
first of the new papers is Rushing's case study of
an apartment investment The second is Garrigan
and Luft's analysis of using options on Treasury
Bond futures to hedge commercial borrowers' in-
terest rate risk. The third of these new manu-
scripts is Coveny's paper on traits that real estate
brokers should consider in selecting productive
sales staffs. The fourth entry is Follain's explana-
tion of recent developments in the secondary mort-
gage market. It is followed by Lee's discussion of
economic analysis of shopping centers, based on a
literature review. A study by Blackley and Fol-
lain, the sixth paper in this series, utilizes demo-
graphic and housing price data from the 1970's to
analyze differential rates of home ownership in 34
large metropolitan areas. Dokko, Edelstein, and
Urdang provide the seventh paper, which addresses
whether loan terms other than interest rates (e.g.,
down-payment percentages) have a major impact
on the effective demand for housing. Finally,
Gardner, Kang, and Mills analyze changes in the
economy and housing market of the Bloomington-
Normal, Illinois area following the decision by
Diamond-Star Motors to locate there.
A review of one recent paper follows. Abbreviat-
ed versions of others may appear in coming issues
of the Illinois Business Review. You may ob-
tain a single copy of the complete version of any
paper in the series at no cost by writing to
ORER.
SHOPPING CENTER ISSUES
It is comforting to note that some of our own
buying behavior, such as paying a higher price to
avoid travel costs, or, conversely, bypassing con-
venient outlets in favor of lower prices or better
variety, are in fact based on sound economic prin-
ciples. Kangoh Lee provides this assurance in pa-
per #51, "The Economics of Shopping Centers:
A Literature Survey." Lee discusses issues, from
tax bases to shopper habits, addressed in studies
over the past 60 years. To build a foundation for
further research, the author cites studies from the
academic literature in urban economics, micro eco-
nomics, geography, urban planning, and even
marketing.
Lee first discusses shopper behavior and the location decisions of developers and
tenants. Both topics relate to expected travel distances. Yet consumers must con-
sider not only time and travel costs, but also prices and variety, along with costs
of storing large purchase quantities, to maximize overall satisfaction. Studies
note that consumers may use different criteria for judging single and multiple pur-
pose shopping trips. The demand-determined consumer decision is contrasted with
the supply-based location decision. Classical central place theory (which states
that sellers establish small dispersed monopolies) fails to explain why firms may
in fact locate near each other to better compete. Variations on the theory do allow
for hierarchies of central places (e.g. regional vs. neighborhood centers) and the
combining of specialty and anchor stores in one central place. Planning can help
guard against excessive competition in these locations; leases may even contain
protective clauses. Lee discusses whether certain attributes can make even attrac-
tively located centers unattractive for shopping, whether competition helps or
hurts sales, and how population and wealth affect sales.
The work considers the opposing interests of developers (who build new cen-
ters), business groups (who may favor protecting existing centers), planners (who
face the traffic problems), and government (which wants added tax and employ-
ment bases but not added service expenditure). The final section lists and de-
scribes soiu"ces of information on shopping centers.
The piece is interesting in that it discusses many topics, such as growth/
decline/revitalization, that readers have observed in their own communities. It is
instructive to note that the points addressed by analysts are largely those (in-
comes, tax/service tradeoffs) which the reader would expect to have an impact
Mortgage Bankers (continuedfromfirst page)
contracts. Those mortgage bankers whose portfolios are heavily invested in ser-
vicing contracts should have done relatively well. Thus while certain mortgage
bankers might indeed be troubled by rising rates, the industry as a whole is rela-
tively protected.
Recognizing the negative duration of service contracts, or of similar assets (like
interest-only strips and REMIC reserves), does not diminish the formidable prob-
lems of valuation and portfolio management. Some of the best work in this area
is currently being done by large New York-based investment bankers such as Salo-
mon Brothers, Goldman Sachs, and Drexel Bumham Lambert
ORER Letter is a publication of the Office ofReal Estate Research at the Uni-
versity ofIllinois at Urbana-Champaign. Current plans callfor the Letter to be
published quarterly. The editor is Peter F. Colwell and the managing editor of
this issue is Joseph W. Trefzger. Robert Rich and James Follain contributed
"As the U.S. Goes, So Goes Illinois." The other material was written by Col-
well and Trefzger. Others associated with ORER provided informationfor the
Letter and assisted with writing and editing. Single copies of the letter are avail-
able at no cost to the subscriber. To subscribe to the ORER Letter, or to obtain
other information concerning the activities of the Office ofReal Estate Research,
write to ORER, University of Illinois. 304 David Kinky Hall, 1407 W. Gregory
Drive. Urbana, Illinois 61801.
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Rho Epsilon Activities
The 1987 fall semester found the University of Il-
linois chapter of Rho Epsilon busy with recruit-
ing, fund-raising, administrative, and professional
activities. Forty-six new student members and one
new faculty member were added to the roster, this
exceptional result set a single-semester recruiting
record for the chapter and left the spring member-
ship roll with approximately ninety participants.
An October field trip to the Chicago area includ-
ed visits by Professor Cannaday and eighteen stu-
dents to Inland Realty and the real estate divisions
of MeQ-opoIitan Life and Travelers Insurance, all
three of which are located in Oak Brook.
Executives at Inland made presentations on the
firm's activities, including sales, acquisitions,
mortgage lending, property management, asset
management, securitization, and syndication.
Metropolitan Life managers spoke on acquisi-
tions, mortgages, asset management, and real
estate development Metropolitan also arranged
lunch for the tour group.
At Travelers, students toured the firm's offices.
A regional vice president and representatives of the
real estate investinent division spoke on various
real estate related activities of the firm.
The chapter members thank their hosts at the
three firms, Jonathan Stein, Ralph DePasquale,
and Mark Witt, respectively. Appreciation is also
expressed to the program arrangers and speakers,
some of whom are graduates of the U of I real
estate program.
The chapter arranged for visits to campus by
seven outstanding speakers. All provided valuable
career information and insights into their speciali-
zations.
On September 14, U of 1 graduate Mike Jaffe, a
partner with Trammel Crow's San Antonio office,
spoke on property development, with an emphasis
on the development of shopping centers.
First Interstate Mortgage Corporation (St.
Louis) Vice President Wendy Timm, a 1977 U of
1 graduate who served as treasurer of Rho Epsilon
in its charter year, spoke September 29 on the top-
ics of mortgage banking and real estate appraisal.
Jeff Davis, a 1975 U of 1 graduate, is president
of Cambridge Realty Capital in Chicago. On Oc-
tober 6 he discussed mortgage banking with the
Rho Epsilon membership.
On October 20, Matt Kimmel, who manages
the Real Estate Appraisal Division in Arthur An-
dersen's Chicago office, spoke to the chapter on
commercial real estate appraisal.
H. Ellsworth Jones, President of Chicago's
chapter of Uie Institute of Real Estate Manage-
ment, spoke October 27 on property management.
The Senior Vice President of Coldwell Banker
in Chicago, Mark Donahue, visited campus on
November 10 to speak on commercial brokerage.
The final speaker of the semester was 1979 U of
I accountancy graduate Kevin Maxwell, former Di-
rector of Real Estate Marketing for Prudential Re-
alty Group in New York, who is now with the
firm's Chicago office. His December 1 presenta-
tion covered institutional participation in commer-
cial mortgage loans.
Individuals who served as chapter officers during
the 1987 fall semester are:
Michael Fine
Jayne Romanchek
Alissa Schneider
Scott Rubin
President
Vice President
Treasurer
Secretary
Those selected in the November elections to
lead the chapter in the 1988 spring semester are:
Alissa Schneider
Scott Rubin
Liz Barca
Tom Paul
President
Vice President
Treasurer
Secretary
The Office ofReal Estate Research commends the
officers and members ofRho Epsilonfor their
many successes. Wefurther commend the many
dedicated professional people who have helped the
chapter to achieve its goals. Professor Roger
Cannaday serves as advisor to the organization.
FOLLAIN REPORTS
During the January Triannual
Meeting of the Illinois Asso-
ciation of Realtors®, Direc-
tor Jim Follain reported to
the lAR Executive Commit-
tee and the lAR Administra-
tive Committee on the state
of ORER.
ALUMNI LUNCHEON
ORER sponsored a luncheon
for U of I real estate alumni
at the Chicago Yacht Club
on November 6. Seventy at-
tendees met for lunch and
heard Donald Rundblom of
Morgan Stanley, himself a U
of I graduate, speak on com-
mercial mortgage-backed se-
curities. Thanks to Gene
Stunard for arranging for the
use of the club. The next
alumni luncheon, also to be
held at the Chicago Yacht
Club, will be on April 22,
1988.
SPECIAL IBR ISSUE
The February edition of the
Illinois Business Review
(IBR) is devoted solely to
ORER and real estate issues.
ORER normally provides
one article for each IBR;
however, this special issue
opens with an article on re-
cent ORER activity, and
continues with short ver-
sions of ORER Papers and
research articles. To sub-
scribe to IBR, which is pub-
lished by the University's
Bureau of Economic and
Business Research, send a
written request to Brenda
Brooks at ORER.
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Real Estate Scholarships
A number of scholarsliips are available exclu-
sively to real estate students. Sponsors are pri-
vate foundations or professional organizations, or
firms or individuals active in real estate. In
some cases there are restrictions based on the stu-
dent's place of residence or the school attended.
Several awards are restricted to University of
Illinois students. These scholarships include the
Morgan L. Fitch Scholarship, a Rosenberg Real
Estate Equity Funds Fellowship, and a Society
of Industrial and Office Realtors® Scholarship.
The Morgan L. Fitch Scholarship is adminis-
tered by the Illinois Real Estate Educational
Foundation. Juniors, seniors, and graduate stu-
dents are eUgible for the award, which carries a
minimum grant of $2,000 for an academic year.
The number of Fitch Scholarships varies; two
were awarded for 1987-88. This award was esta-
blished by the family of the late Mr. Fitch, a U
of I graduate and nationally prominent Chicago
Realtor®.
Minority students pursuing graduate study are
given priority for a Rosenberg Real Estate Equi-
ty Funds Fellowship. The number of awards
given each year varies. The fellowship provides
an impressive $5,000 for meeting the student's
educational expenses. Awards are made possible
by gifts from Uie Rosenberg Funds, which man-
age pension investments in commercial real
estate.
The most outstanding student in the Universi-
ty's undergraduate real estate program, as selected
each year by the real estate faculty, receives a
$1,500 scholarship from the Chicago chapter of
the Society of Industrial and Office Realtors®.
Another group of scholarships is restricted to
students attending colleges or universities in Il-
linois. This group includes the Robert Cook
Scholarship and other awards administered by the
Illinois Real Estate Educational Foundation.
The number of annual awards varies, and awards
may range in value from $500 to $1,500. Ap-
plicants' career plans and financial needs are giv-
en consideration.
Two scholarships are restricted to Illinois resi-
dents; recipients need not attend schools in Illi-
nois. These are the Thomas F. Seay Scholarship
and the Northwest Suburban Board of Realtors®
Scholarship, both of which are available to gradu-
ate or undergraduate students.
The Thomas F. Seay Scholarship provides a
minimum of $2,000 per year. The number of
awards each year varies. This scholarship, admin-
istered by the Dlinois Real Estate Educational
Foundation, has been established by Mr. Seay, a
nationally prominent Chicago Realtor®.
The members of the Northwest (Chicago) Sub-
urban Board of Realtors® provide two $600
awards each year to students whose families reside
within the Northwest Suburban Board's territorial
jurisdiction.
A final group of scholarships is available with-
out regard to student residence or school location.
These are provided by professional groups or indi-
viduals with nationwide constituencies.
The Shidler Group, a nationwide real estate in-
vestment firm, sponsors an annual essay competi-
tion on real estate topics. The winner, selected
from undergraduate and graduate entrants, earns a
hefty $10,000 award. A $5,000 second-place and
five $1 ,000 third-place prizes are given as well.
The American Institute of Real Estate Apprais-
ers, through its Research and Educational Trust
Fund, provides a number of awards to undergrad-
uate ($2,000) and graduate ($3,000) students every
year.
Each year the Society of Real Estate Appraisers
awards ten $1,000 scholarships to graduate or un-
dergraduate students.
The American Society of Real Estate Counse-
lors provides two or three $I,500-$2,000 scholar-
ships annually to students pursuing master's de-
grees in real estate.
Several Herbert U. Nelson Memorial Fund
Scholarships are awarded each year to graduate or
undergraduate students . These $500-$ 1,000
awards were established by the National Associa-
tion of Realtors® to honor its longtime Execu-
tive Vice President.
Finally, prominent real estate author Bruce Har-
wood provides $400 scholarships to undergraduate
or graduate students; 36 such awards were given
in the 1987-88 academic year.
More complete information on all these schol-
arships, and application forms, are available
through the Office of Real Estate Research.
COOK HONORED
Robert E. Cook's term on
the ORER Advisory Com-
mittee ended in August
Cook, the former Executive
Director of the Illinois Asso-
ciation of Realtors®, was in-
strumental in the creation of
the Office of Real Estate Re-
search, and he served on the
Advisory Committee for
many years. In an October
30 ceremony. Dean John
Hogan of the College of
Commerce and Business Ad-
ministration presented Cook
with a plaque in recognition
of his many contributions to
ORER. Cook is now presi-
dent of Cook-Witter, Inc. in
Springfield.
AWARD RECIPffiNTS
Congratulations to the fol-
lowing University of Illinois
students, who have been
awarded real estate scholar-
ships, as described in the
Scholarships article on this
page, for the 1987-88 aca-
demic yean
Anna Hagemaster - Rosen-
berg Real Estate Equity
Funds Fellowship
Pamela Neven - Morgan L.
Fitch Scholarship
Alissa Schneider - Morgan
L. Fitch Scholarship
Michael Fine - Real Estate
Educational Foundation
Scholarship
Amy Bajadek - Society of
Industrial and Office
Realtors® Scholarship
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Interview With Philip Rushing
Philip Rushing is an Adjunct Professor ofFi-
nance at the University ofIllinois. He earned a
PhD. in Economics from the U of I in 1971.
His writings have appeared in numerous publica-
tions, including the Appraisal Journal and the
Southern Economic Journal. Rushing is also an
active real estate investor and consultant.
How did you get into real estate? Accidentally.
I was a research economist in international eco-
nomics at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
and was not particularly happy. A friend from
Champaign came out to see me and asked if I'd
like to invest in an apartment building in Cham-
paign. I was just in the right frame of mind at
that point to say, "Yeah, I'll do that."
Was that first investment a big investment?
Half a million dollars, and it required scraping to-
gether every penny I could find, plus hocking
anything of value I had, plus leaning on every-
body I knew who had money, to get the down
payment. We made the investment. Not know-
ing one thing about real estate, I became the
building manager and started immediately collect-
ing rent and fixing toilets.
What was your next step? I got back into aca-
demia. I began teaching part-time in the eco-
nomics department while still managing the
building. My next investment was a duplex.
My wife and I lived in one side and rented the
other side, for about a year and a half. I was able
to refinance at that point, take my initial invest-
ment out, rent both sides, and purchase a home.
Right now I'm involved in the ownership of 5
different residential projects, and I own one com-
mercial buUding with some land. The residential
projects contain roughly 200 units. I also man-
age a complex for another investor.
What sorts ofproblems do you confront? I
talk to my resident managers regularly, to see
what problems have come up. There are always
problems; somebody didn't get a security deposit
back or something was deducted that they didn't
think should have been. I meet with these ten-
ants or talk with them on the phone, to try to re-
solve matters. I go through all the bills. The
secretaries actually pay the bills, but I sign the
checks, and I balance the check book each month
so I'll know what's going on. I also send a
monthly income and expense report to the owner
of the building I just manage. I've hired people
todo things like collecting rent, fielding com-
plaints, and filling out work orders. We have 2
full-time maintenance men and one part-timer,
so I'm relieved of a lot of tedious, day-to-day
things. I don't usually get involved unless
there's a problem.
Of course, I'm always involved in the finan-
cial end, making sure the mortgages get paid,
the bills get paid, the rents get deposited. The
interesting problems are really those of invest-
ing, divesting, financing, and refinancing.
We're constantly doing that sort of thing.
There's a property that we are attempting to
both refinance and sell; it's listed with a broker
now. If we refinance first we'll try to find fi-
nancing suitable to pass along to a buyer.
How did you get involved in teaching real
estate? When I purchased the first duplex, it
occurred to me that real estate management
would become a valued skill in Champaign-
Urbana. I wanted to start a management compa-
ny, but an attorney informed me that to manage
property for somebody else you have to be a
broker. I figured since I had 8 years of college
and a PhD I could just take the licensing test
But I learned I had to take 2 real estate courses
first. So I came to the University and took Pro-
fessor Colwell's class, which was my introduc-
tion to formalized real estate education. I subse-
quently took [former U of I] Professor Sirmans'
appraisal class and then got my broker's license.
Colwell and Sirmans knew I was teaching eco-
nomics, and asked me to teach a real estate
class. So I literally went from one side of the
desk to the other in about 2 semesters.
You have often said student housing in Cham-
paign is overbuilt. Yet you've continued to ac-
quire properties. How do you reconcile your
words with your actions? The market can be
overbuilt, yet if the price of a property is re-
duced enough to allow attractive returns even at
a high vacancy rate, then it's a good investment.
And if the vacancy rate ever goes down, then it's
a great investment. I'm not sure there's a con-
crete definition of when the market's overbuilt.
It is certainly more "overbuilt" now than it was
5 years ago. There's been constant building of
apartments. But the University has announced a
policy of no enrollment growth, so sooner or
continued on page 6
ORERATAREUEA
U of I faculty affiliated with
ORER were active partici-
pants in meetings of the
American Real Estate and
Urban Economics Associa-
tion (AREUEA), held Dec.
28-30 at the Chicago Hyatt
Regency. Director Jim Fol-
lain, who is First Vice Presi-
dent of this preeminent aca-
demic real estate association,
was Program Chairman. He
was responsible for planning
and coordinating presenta-
tions of, and critical discus-
sions of, 90 scholarly real
estate papers. Follain also
presented a paper on rent ad-
justments in a session on
rental housing. ORER Pro-
fessor Peter Colwell presided
in a session on real estate de-
velopment, and was a dis-
cussant in a session on urban
amenities. Finance Depart-
ment Chairman William
Bryan was a discussant in a
session on mortgage finance.
Roger Cannaday presented a
paper on market adjustments
in an appraisal session, and
was a discussant in a session
on housing prices. Jan
Brueckner presided in a ses-
sion on dynamic real estate
markets, and was a discuss-
ant in a welfare economics
session at related Economet-
ric Society meetings. Other
University of Illinois faculty
who participated in the
AREUEA meetings were
K.C. Chen (presented a paper
on REITs), Larry DeBrock
(presented a paper on real
estate brokerage), and J. Fred
Giertz (was a discussant in a
real estate investment ses-
sion).
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later supply has to adjust to demand. I kept
thinking it would happen sooner. Now, for the
first time I can remember, there are vacancies on
campus. The campus vacancy rate had been zero
since I'd become involved, but it's now, I'd say,
3%. We're signing leases later into the fall se-
mester than we did previously. Perhaps a student
moves in with 3 roommates, then finds after the
semester's started that there are still efficiencies
or one-bedrooms available at bargain prices. Off
campus, a unit can stay vacant an entire semes-
ter. There's a turnover in this town between se-
mesters, then one at the end of spring, and then
another one in August. I think we're going to
see the rental cycle, even on campus, starting
earlier. We plan to start renting in February of
'88 for August 15 occupancy; we didn't used to
start until about a month later.
The campus landlords with vacancies are now
offering 9 1/2 month or even semester leases.
They're giving all kinds of concessions short of
lowering rents, so in effect they are lowering
rents. We charge now for parking spaces, but
parking may become free. We have coin laun-
dries, but laundry facilities may become free.
I'm thinking of cutting the usual one month se-
curity deposit to a half month. That puts more
risk on us, but it's something we might have to
do. We brain storm. We're thinking of every
kind of marketing tool, including maid service.
The market used to encourage the owner to do
very little, but those days are gone. It's getting
to be Uke any other business. You have to mar-
ket your product and make it attractive. Owners
who don't do that are going to be left out.
Is there any sense in time sharing? Some insti-
tutions systematically send employees here to
school, especially in the summer. We do that
with our Notre Dame property. Our student leas-
es there are 9 1/2 months, in line with competi-
tion, so a lot of units are vacant as soon as finals
have ended. When the town gets crowded during
graduation week we rent a few apartments to par-
ents on 3 day leases; it's worked out fine. Par-
ents know they're not getting a hotel with tow-
els, sheets, that sort of thing. They're happy
with the arrangement, since otherwise they'd
have to stay in surrounding towns far from cam-
pus.
Do you try to separate different rental popula-
tions? It may not work out to have undergradu-
ates next to a researcher here to use the supercomputer. One of our 3 Notre Dame
buildings is set aside for graduate and law students. That's usually a quiet building,
so we've segregated to that extent. Usually we give people a choice among 2 or 3
vacant units.
I'd like to hear about some of the more interesting "wrinkles" in deals you've made.
A deal we did in Urbana has about as many wrinkles as you could think of. Dan
[Hamelberg] and I bought 36 units next to some vacant land, and a 5-year option
on the vacant parcel. After about 2 years, the person who sold the option asked if
we'd like to exercise it early. We negotiated, and paid 55 cents on the dollar. We
got the land, but Dan and I knew nothing about development, so we enlisted a third
partner with construction and development experience. Dan and I had the job of
managing new apartment units to be built. We sold the 36 units next door. The
third partner sold a percentage of his interest, so we added a few more partners. As
we proceeded, we were hit by higher interest rates, higher lumber prices, higher
everything. We were running out of construction financing, and putting in more
of our own money. We called a person who had been wanting to invest with us.
He had a group of fairly run-down houses around town, with a combined market
value of roughly $100,000. A group interested in the houses bought one of our
still-vacant lots for $100,000 and then traded the lot to the new investor. He then
contributed the lot as his $100,000 share in a new partnership. This was the first
time I had ever done a three-way, like-kind exchange. So with our new capital we
continued construction. By the time we finished the last phase, we had 92 units.
The original plans called for 160.
We stopped mainly due to high interest rates. It was a good stopping point any-
way. Due to some capital needs of my own, I had been selhng litde pieces of my
share. Though I had contributed additional dollars at times, the sales caused my
ownership to fall from 33% to 25%, 20%, and now 13%. One partner wanted to
take some money out before construction was completed. The bottom line is that
a share in a partnership like that is not very marketable. We said, "We don't want
to buy your share, but we're perfectly willing for you to sell it." There has been
no cash distribution so far because so much debt is involved. We have a fairly
large first mortgage, a second mortgage to one of the partners, and a side note that
we're paying down in pretty good chunks right now. There were substantial tax
benefits for everyone involved.
Tell me about your consulting. People call wanting to know the value of a prop-
erty, or wanting to know whether a piece they're thinking of buying is appropriate
or whether this is the best time to sell. I try to spend enough time to give a con-
sidered opinion. I like doing the analysis.
People wonder what to do in an overbuilt market. It's my feeling that real estate
is a local phenomenon. Somebody from another area could come here and say,
"Three percent vacancy? That's not overbuilt." But real estate is unusual in that, if
a building is not successful, it does not just go away. It continues to be used as an
apartment building or an office building, and the price just drops. Somebody with
staying power can hang on until the market turns around. You see life cycle stud-
ies in which a very good rental market becomes somewhat overbuilt, then becomes
glutted, then at some point recovers. I've often wondered if that applies to the local
student rental market. I'm not so sure it does, because the demand component, at
least right now, is not growing. And if you did get an overbuilt market, I'm afraid
it would just stay overbuilt for a long time and prices would drop, and some peo-
ple, unfortunately, would take a real loss.
continued on page 7
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Rushing Interview (continuedfrom page 6)
We actually have two different rental markets
here in town: the well-defined campus rental
market and the market for everything else. They
have different problems. Off campus we have
more constant turnover, and more collection
problems. People who lose their jobs just leave;
that's one way to get out of a lease. In the stu-
dent market, though, you have that extra little
hold. Through the parents it's easier to track
someone down, and often the parents will pay.
Notre Dame University is a very close-knit, fam-
ily type of organization, and it will not issue
grades to students who owe money to apartment
owners. So we try hard to be a good neighbor to
the university. We got some bad press recently
about noisy parties. Since the police can't al-
ways respond, we've begun calling the fire depart-
ment. We got the idea from the Champaign Fire
Department, which goes out to Bradley's [night
club] to enforce the occupancy limit. We had the
fire department at Notre Dame state an occupancy
limit for each unit They looked at one apart-
ment, they're all the same, and a fireman said,
"Well, it's about twenty." So we have a little
sign posted in each unit now, "Occupancy Limit:
20." If there's a big party, we call the fu« depart-
ment, and they clear people out
Do you have particular academic interests? I'm
a late-comer to computers, but recently I've been
developing data bases, and adapting software to
do what I want. Also, I'm looking forward to
teaching a new class. Real Estate Investment, be-
cause that's an area where I have a lot to say. I'm
going to have students do case studies of my own
properties. They'll actually get some hands-on
experience, analyzing my original purchase deci-
sion and deciding whether the investment has
been a good one. When it actually comes down
to putting your money on the line, how do you
make that decision? Students can learn about
number crunching and can get computer printouts
listing internal rates of return for 20 years under
all sorts of assumptions. But when it comes
down to whether you get your checkbook out or
not, other things must come into the analysis,
primarily risk. I want to deal with that aspect
One important risk issue, I would think, is diver-
sification, and yet your own portfolio strikes me
as not highly diversified. My partner and I are
diversified by being on two different campuses,
and I have one off-campus residential project and
the commercial property. I recently bought some fmancial instruments, including
some mutual fund shares right after the crash. I agree, I'm not terribly diversified.
I'm more diversified than a lot of real estate investors, though.
Outlook Days
The Office of Real Estate Research recently sponsored two days of seminars address-
ing economic and financial issues that will affect the Chicago and U.S. real estate
markets in the coming year. University of Illinois faculty members associated with
ORER, and several nationally prominent representatives of the real estate industry,
spoke to the large groups in attendance both days. The agenda was designed to ap-
peal to professionals in the brokerage, lending, planning, and investment fields.
The program on the fu-st day, January 12, was held at the Oak Brook Hills Hotel
and Conference Center. The keynote speaker was M. Danny Wall, Chairman of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Wall spoke on problems in the savings and loan
industry. He noted that the Board's goal over the next year is to merge or sell one
problem association per week. The Board will enlist the assistance not only of
healthy U.S. savings and loans, but of foreign investors as well. John Tuccillo,
Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the National Association of Real-
tors®, spoke on housing demand in the coming century. ORER Director Jim Fol-
lain spoke on the impact recent tax law changes will have on the real estate environ-
ment. ORER Professor Peter Colwell spoke on price movements in nonresidential
segments of the Chicago real estate market. Professor Philip Rushing spoke on in-
vesting in real estate through a limited partnership.
The January 13 program was held at Chicago's Ambassador West Hotel. A lun-
cheon keynote address was given by Elizabeth Hollander, the Planning Commission-
er for the City of Chicago. She discussed a new ordinance that promotes manufactur-
ing districts in the city through the restriction of residential activity. She also
addressed recent speculation that Chicago might sell some low income housing pro-
jects to developers, noting that any such sale would have to be conditioned on devel-
oper plans for providing new low income housing within the city. David Shulman,
Director of Real Estate Research for Salomon Brothers in New York, provided his
views on the Chicago market's outlook. Jared Shlaes, a principal with Pannell,
Kerr, and Forster in Chicago, spoke on real estate activity in Chicago. Professor
Roger Cannaday discussed property tax assessments in the city. Professors Jim Pol-
lain and Peter Colwell repeated their presentations of the previous day.
ORER was very pleased with this series of presentations. Response from the in-
dustry was quite favorable; over 100 attended the first day's program, and approxi-
mately 70 were in attendance on day two. All of the speeches, and particularly the
keynote addresses, were well received, and the attendees asked many probing ques-
tions. Written evaluations that were submitted by those who attended will help us
in planning future events of this nature.
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As the U.S. Goes, So Goes Illinois
People have a tendency to believe construction ac-
tivity in a particular area is dominated by local
market conditions. Often this is true; however,
the importance of economic forces that affect the
entire nation should not be ignored. The accom-
panying graph, which demonstrates this point,
displays changes in construction activity for the
U.S., Illinois, and Cook County.
In the graph, the percentage change in the num-
ber of single-family construction permits per dol-
lar of real income serves as an index of single-
family construction activity. For the most part,
the U.S., IlUnois, and Cook County indexes
move closely together. Such movement suggests
that the forces that affect all parts of the country
also have a strong local effect Indeed, the corre-
lation between each pair of indexes is approxi-
mately 90%. The major difference is that Cook
County and Illinois indexes tend to be more vola-
tile than the U.S. index.
A similar situation exists with respect to mul-
ti-family permits, although the correlations are
not as strong. This has been especially true in
the 1980's, when multi-family property construc-
tion in Illinois and Cook County has shown
much more volatility than that of the nation.
Clearly, the experience of the 1980's demonstrates
that, although the trends in U.S. construction ac-
tivity are usually a good guide to what is happen-
ing in Illinois, they need not always be.
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Flight/rom Quality
Real estate professionals who have participated
in markets with downturns in demand have ex-
perienced flights to quality. When available
space is abundant, prices and rents fall, encour-
aging property users to move to higher quality
parcels, since they can do so without sustain-
ing significant rent increases. Vacancies be-
come unevenly distributed across the quality
spectrum, with lower quality units experienc-
ing much higher vacancy rates as property us-
ers move to higher quality. A question that
market participants may wish to consider is
whether there is a flight/row quality as the
market recovers.
The observation that there has been a flight
to quality in some markets, especially office
markets, has driven developers to ever greater
heights of ostentation. There used to be high
quality. A, buildings and not-as-high quality,
B. buildings (and certainly other categories of
quality lower than B). In a market in which
many high quality properties are for rent, what
had formerly been viewed as A quality can
come to be seen as no longer good enough.
Imported marble, the extensive use of walnut
woodwork, and long lists of other luxury fea-
tures all contribute to the creation of an even
higher quality A+ category.
Admittedly, the flight to quality results, to
some extent, from long-run changes in the
composition of ownership for office properties.
Such large institutional investors as insurance
companies and pension funds (and perhaps for-
eign investors to some extent as well) may in-
crease the real estate holdings in their portfoli-
os. The risk/return tradeoffs faced by these
investors encourage them to invest in A-i-
properties, on which they need not earn spec-
tacular returns.
This shift to high quality properties would
tend to raise the natural (i.e. long-run equilibri-
um) vacancy rates for the highest quality prop-
erties, and throughout the office market to a
lesser extent. But is it not possible that the
market might instead respond in a different
short-run manner? Is the flight to quality a
ratchet that will turn in only one direction?
Can there be no end to developers' attempts to
drive quality higher and higher?
Indeed there will be an end. Prices and rents
will be driven upward as cycles move forward
and the economy adjusts to bring about a re-
covery in office markets. Although there
would be an absolute increase in demand for all
types of properties under such a scenario, there
would in fact be a greater relative increase in
the demand for B buildings than for A build-
ings. That is, the vacancy rates (and other
measures of distress) should decline more radi-
cally in the lower quality buildings than in
their high quality competitors. As rents in
general rise, tenants become more sensitive to
rent differentials, and many of those who are
able to move to other quarters favor the cheaper
rents in B buildings. Since the markets have
come to accept the term "flight to quality" to
describe the effect of reduced demand, the be-
havior of property users as the market recovers
can be termed a "flight/ram quality."
This line of analysis suggests that B build-
ings are more volatile invesunents, and there-
fore more risky investments, than A buildings.
One generally expects that riskier investments
carry with them higher expected rates of return
over the cycle. Therefore, if a purchaser were
able to time investments in B buildings to cor-
respond to upswings in the market, it would be
possible for that investor to ride the flight
from quality and earn very atU"active rewards.
Of course, the ultimate ascendance of B build-
ings relative to A buildings will have an im-
pact on the market's longer term functioning.
The same developers who were pushing quality
features to previously unattained levels will
once again reconsider their strategies, and will
begin building lower quality units.
PROPOSAL DATES
Individuals or groups who
would like for the Office of
Real Estate Research to con-
sider funding their research
proposals should take care to
submit all materials in time
for the next Advisory Com-
mittee meeting. Considera-
tion of research proposals is
part of the regular business
conducted at each meeting of
the ORER Advisory Commit-
tee. Proposal materials
should be submitted by Janu-
ary 1, April 1, and August 1,
for discussion at the February,
May, and September meet-
ings, respectively.
SPRING ALUMNI
LUNCHEON
ORER sponsored a luncheon
for University of Illinois real
estate alumni on April 22.
Seventy-one attendees met for
lunch at the Chicago Yacht
Club and heard Charles Palm-
er of The Palmer Group speak
on investing with a Japanese
partner. Thanks to Gene Siu-
nard, who again arranged for
the use of the club facilities.
The next alumni luncheon,
also to be held at the Chicago
Yacht Club, is tentatively
scheduled for November 4,
1988. More definite informa-
tion will be provided in the
next issue of the ORER Let-
ter.
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Advisory Committee's Jack Hamer Dies
Those associated with the Office of Real Estate
Research were saddened by the April 25 death
of Advisory Committee member Jack Hamer
of Naperville. Hamer served on the committee
from its inception in 1981. For more than 30
years, Hamer was an active participant in real
estate activities in the Chicago suburban area.
His businesses, operating under the Hamer
Holding Group umbrella, were involved in the
brokerage, building, development, and mort-
gage lending fields. Hamer was also prominent
in Realtor® professional activities. He was a
member of three suburban Boards of Real-
tors®, and held office or served on important
committees at the local, state, and national lev-
els. Notably, Hamer served as President of the
Illinois Association of Realtors® in 1983, and
was named the state's Realtor® of the Year in
1985.
The holder of bachelor's and MBA degrees
from the University of Michigan, Hamer was a
strong advocate of education in Illinois. He
served on the Real Estate Educational Founda-
tion committee that actively worked to create
the Office of Real Estate Research, and became
a strong supporter of the work of the Universi-
ty in general and ORER in particular.
A plaque honoring Jack Hamer and his contri-
butions to ORER hangs in the ORER suite at
the University.
Director Jim FoUain to Syracuse
The Winter 1988 edition of ORER Letter an-
nounced that James R. Follain had resigned as
ORER Director, and would be assuming full-
time duties as Professor in the University's
Department of Finance. However, Follain re-
cently accepted the position of Chairperson of
the Department of Economics at Syracuse Uni-
versity in New York. Follain had been an As-
sociate Professor of Economics at Syracuse
prior to accepting the ORER Director position
in August of 1984.
Follain has accomplished much during the
four years that he has directed ORER. The
ORER Paper Series that he began early in
1985 has grown to 63 issues. He has orga-
nized seminars designed to bring real estate ac-
ademics and professionals together to address
major issues. Notable examples have been a
conference on tax policy that attracted many na-
tionally prominent speakers, and a series of
Outlook Days that featured important partici-
pants in the Chicago real estate market sharing
their views on issues affecting the region.
Under FoUain's leadership, ORER emerged
from status as a division of the University's Bu-
reau of Economic and Business Research to be-
come a separate entity within the College of
Commerce and Business Administration. He
arranged for the Office to obtain the suite in Da-
vid Kinley Hall, which helps preserve ORER's
separate identity and allows for the consolida-
tion of all real estate faculty offices in one area.
Follain assumes his new duties at Syracuse in
August. An interview with Follain, addressing
his views on a number of timely real estate top-
ics, appears on page 5.
William Bryan to ORER Helm
William R. Bryan, currently Chairperson of
the University's Department of Finance, will
become the new Director of the Office of Real
Estate Research on August 15.
Bryan has had a long and distinguished in-
volvement with ORER. He was instrumental
in the Office's creation, helping to conceive
the idea for such a research and educational or-
ganization. He worked closely with the Real
Estate Educational Foundation and the Illinois real
estate community to design an organizational
structure and arrange for funding. Bryan was an
original member of the Advisory Committee, and
has served on the committee in recent years.
He will continue to serve as Finance Department
chair along with fulfilling his ORER duties.
SPONSORSHIP FOR
ORER LETTER
Some readers have expressed
an interest in helping to spon-
sor the ORER Letter. Assis-
tance of this nature from the
Illinois professional real
estate community would cer-
tainly be appreciated.
The names of sponsoring
firms and individuals would
be prominendy noted in each
issue. Contributions would
be used to defray costs of pro-
duction and printing of four
annual issues, and of distribu-
tion to those on the mailing
list (4,500 current circula-
tion). Four or five sponsors,
each contributing $5,000 an-
nually, would provide an ideal
level of funding. Anyone in-
terested in participating in the
sponsorship program, or de-
siring additional information,
should contact ORER.
COLWELLAWARDED
GRANT
The Homer Hoyt Advanced
Studies Institute has awarded
ORER Professor Peter Col-
well $10,000 to support the
first year of his research pro-
ject: "Toward a Simulation of
Urban Land Markets." The
project, which may continue
for up to 5 years, concerns the
development of microcom-
puter-based models of land use
and land values for a prototyp-
ical city. The Institute is a
foundation dedicated to re-
search in real estate and urban
land economics, named in
honor of Dr. Hoyt, a pioneer
in urban land analysis and au-
thor of the book, 100 Years
of Land Values in Chicago.
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Rho Epsilon Activities
The campus chapter of Rho Epsilon conducted
a Spring 1988 program filled with activities de-
signed to assist both graduating seniors and re-
turning students in building strong career foun-
dations. The chapter was once again successful
in attracting top quality speakers, and in arrang-
ing field trips to the offices of important real
estate oriented firms.
The first professional activity of the semester
was held on February 9. A wine and cheese
party was followed by a presentation by Craig
Bayless, Senior Vice President of Cushman and
Wakefield in Chicago. Bayless spoke on com-
mercial real estate brokerage.
A professional event on February 23 featured
two University of Illinois alumni as speakers.
Carolyn Brett (who served as Rho Epsilon
president in the Fall of 1985) and Bill Barry,
both of Lincoln Property in Chicago, discussed
the development of office properties with the
membership.
Two more former Illini spoke to the chapter
on March 8. Carie Kamezis (Rho Epsilon
president in Spring 1987) and Jim Gallagher,
both with the Asset Advisory Group at La
Salle Partners, shared their views on commer-
cial real estate investments with the students.
On March 16, Rho Epsilon participated in a
joint activity with the Real Estate Financial
Markets course. The combined group was ad-
dressed by Michael Herzberg, Senior Vice Pres-
ident of JMB Realty. The discussion topic was
JMB's purchase of Cadillac Fairview Properties
in Canada. That purchase, at over S4 billion,
was the largest single real estate transaction in
history.
Yet another University graduate, Roberta
Matlin, spoke to the organization on April 12.
The topics addressed by Madin, an Executive
Vice President at Inland Real Estate, were real
estate invesunents and career opportunities.
Lauralee Martin, an Executive Vice President
with Heller Financial in Chicago, visited cam-
pus on April 26. She spoke to the chapter on
real estate finance and career opportunities.
The final speaker of the semester was Larry
Lund, Assistant Vice President of Arthur Ru-
bloff & Company. Lund expanded on his topic
of Real Estate Asset Management with exam-
ples, particularly in the retail sector, from De-
U-oit's Renaissance Center.
Two field trips and a Chicago area luncheon
finished the semester's professional program.
Ten students and Professors Roger Cannaday
and Gary Eldred visited Chicago on April 8.
The group toured IBM's facility and the famed
Wrigley Building. Presentations were made by
IBM's Real Estate Division and by Scribcor,
Inc.'s Property Management Division.
On April 25, thirteen students and Professor
Cannaday attended the Summer Intern Lun-
cheon sponsored by the Chicago chapter of the
Society of Industrial and Office Realtors®.
The luncheon was held at the Fountain Blue
Restaurant in Des Plaines. Each year at this
event, SIOR members interview students for
internship positions that provide summer in-
comes and valuable professional experience.
An April 29 trip to St. Louis was attended
by eight students. Professor Eldred, and Profes-
sor Phil Rushing. In the morning they toured
Metropolitan Life's Metropolitan Square site
with the building contractor, McCarthy Broth-
ers Construction Company. The project is a
major office development in downtown St.
Louis. Following the tour were presentations
by Metropolitan's Real Estate Division and by
Turley Martin Company, which serves as leas-
ing agent for Metropolitan Square. Afternoon
activities were a tour and presentation by the
Sansone Group, which develops and owns re-
tail properties; and a tour and manager's pres-
entation at the Doubletree Hotel. The group
thanks Metropolitan for arranging this trip.
Recruitment activities resulted in the adding
of 25 new student members and Professor Gary
Eldred to the roster. The Spring semester end-
ed with 119 active student, faculty, and hono-
rary members, an all-time high.
Elections for Fall 1988 officers were held on
April 19. Those who will serve are:
Tom Paul President
Bob Koys Vice President
Fran Gardner Treasurer
Paul Lesser Secretary
ORER commends the officers and members of
Rho Epsilon for their many successes. We
further commend the many dedicated profes-
sional people who have helped the chapter to
achieve its goals. Professor Roger Cannaday
serves as advisor to the organization.
CANNADAY IN
WINDY CITY
Professor Roger Cannaday
will spend the first half of the
summer in Chicago as a Vi-
siting Associate Professor in
the Deparunent of Finance at
De Paul University. His pri-
mary activity will be teaching
a graduate level course in real
estate appraisal. Cannaday is
also writing a history of the
U of I real estate program.
Readers with information to
conu-ibute should contact him
through the ORER office.
CHICAGO DATA
PROJECT APPROVED
Funding has been provided to
ORER by the Homer Hoyt
Advanced Studies Institute to
develop a data base on the
Chicago real estate market.
The primary focus will be on
office properties.
The goal for the first year of
the project is to produce a sur-
vey and inventory of available
published data. The results
will form the basis of a data
book. The data book will in-
clude the data or a description
of the data, along with a de-
scription of the collection
procedures. In addition, atten-
tion will be given to longer
term goals. One of these
goals is to develop an inven-
tory of available but unpub-
lished data. Finally, there
will be an emphasis on the
identification of added data re-
quirements and the develop-
ment of original data from
private and public sources.
Readers who have, and are
willing to share, information
of this nature should contact
the ORER office.
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Nine New ORER Papers Available
The number of works in the ORER Paper Ser-
ies has grown to 63. There have been nine
new entries since the Winter 1988 edition of
ORER Letter. The first of these recent addi-
tions is Follain and Ling's study of inflation's
impact on home ownership, both before and af-
ter the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The second pa-
per is Chicoine and Giertz's analysis of the lack
of uniformity in Illinois property tax assess-
ment caused by overlapping county and town-
ship jurisdictional responsibility. The third of
the new manuscripts is Chen and Tzang's de-
scription of the sensitivities of mortgage and
equity real estate investment trusts to changes
in short-term and long-term interest rates. In
the fourth paper, Cannaday uses statistical anal-
ysis to estimate proper adjustment values for
comparable properties in residential appraisals.
The fifth of the new entries is Colwell's theo-
retical analysis of functional obsolescence,
with regard to residential property, technologi-
cal equipment, and human capital. Sixth is
Frankel's study of the degree to which the posi-
tive economic impact and negative noise im-
pact caused by a nearby airport combine to in-
crease or decrease a home's value. Seventh is
the latest ORER Mission Statement and Stra-
tegic Plan. In the eighth new entry, DeBrock
develops a theory of the effects that multiple
listing services, in which agents compete for
listings but cooperate in selling, have on
agents' compensation and behavior. The final
new entry is Follain, Lea, and Park's paper on
the use of Treasury futures in hedging mort-
gage interest rate risk.
A review of two of the papers follows. An ab-
breviated version of the Frankel paper will ap-
pear in an upcoming issue of the Illinois Busi-
ness Review. 5ingle copies of any Paper in
the series are available at no cost to those who
send written requests to ORER.
VALUE UNIFORMITY ANALYZED
In most areas of the United States, the ad valo-
rem property tax constitutes a major compo-
nent of local government revenue. Yet almost
as widespread as the levy's use is its criticism
for being unfairly administered. Our own state
provides a case in point. Illinois law dictates
that nonfarm real estate be assessed at one third of its market value. EquaUzation
factors determined at the state level are designed to help assure that a given jurisdic-
tion will not be assessed at such artificially low levels that area residents pay un-
reasonably low taxes. Yet policies administered at the state level can not correct
for another potential problem: lack of uniformity in assessments within a jurisdic-
tion. A complicating factor of the current system that some critics feel leads to a
lack of uniformity is that many Illinois homeowners' assessments are influenced
by two local governmental units, county and township. In ORER Paper # 56,
"Uniformity In A Dual Assessment System," U of I Agricultural Economics Pro-
fessor David L. Chicoine and Economics Professor J. Fred Giertz discuss the uni-
formity problem. Chicoine and Giertz, who both hold appointments as well with
the University's Institute of Government and Public Affairs, build a model that
suggests approaches for improving uniformity and fairness in the taxation system.
The authors note that in some areas of the counu-y, assessment reforms have fo-
cused on eUminating overlapping dual (county and township) assessment systems.
The resulting consolidation has reduced the number of assessing districts in some
states dramatically. The authors question, however, whether available evidence
supports the validity of eliminating dual systems. They analyze uniformity
through a coefficient of intra-area dispersion, which measures the degree to which
observed sales prices deviate from prices that would be expected given assessed val-
ues. Their hypothesis is that many variables and attributes, not simply the exis-
tence of a dual system, affect this coefficient. Its value might be significantly im-
pacted by, among other factors, housing stock characteristics, the degree of training
provided to assessment personnel, the degree of sophistication of the taxpaying
populace, the dollar level of taxes in a given area, and the number of townships
under a county supervisor's authority in a dual system. Data for the analysis are
taken from an earlier survey of Illinois assessment professionals conducted by the
authors, and from Census Bureau and Illinois Department of Revenue statistics.
Illinois is well suited to serve as a basis for such a study, since 84 of its counties
have dual assessment systems and 17 do not. (Cook County has yet a third assess-
ment/taxation system; data for Cook are not included in the study.)
The results of the statistical analysis used in the study provide evidence that uni-
formity in assessments is indeed enhanced by better trained assessment personnel,
better educated taxpayers (who are more willing to initiate an appeal), higher actual
tax levels (more can be gained through a successful appeal), and assessment juris-
dictions with populations large enough to provide meaningful transaction data.
Surprisingly, the results indicate that dual assessment systems provide greater,
rather than less, uniformity than systems administered strictly at the county level.
However, the dual system functions best if there are relatively few townships for a
county supervisor to coordinate.
A NEW APPROACH TO FUNCTIONAL OBSOLESCENCE
Hedonic theory is utilized, in ORER Paper #59, to identify and provide insights
into the components of functional obsolescence. Hedonic theory relates selling
prices to characteristics of complex commodities, including housing. Hedonic, de-
rived from Greek, means pleasure-seeking. Yet hedonic relationships do not neces-
sarily represent demand (the consequence of pleasure seeking) alone. Hedonic func-
tions embody elements of both demand and supply.
Prior to "Functional Obsolescence and an Extension of Hedonic Theory: Housing,
(continued on page 7)
ORER Letter Pages
Interview with James R. Follain
Jim Follain has served as Director of the Office
ofReal Estate Research since August of 1984.
He earned a Ph.D. in Economicsfrom the Uni-
versity of California at Davis in 1976. Follain
is a prolific writer and researcher with interests
in many aspects of real estate. He has pub-
lished articles in a wide range of scholarly and
professional journals, and has served on a num-
ber ofnational and international panels address-
ing housing policy and other real estate issues.
ORER Letter took advantage of one last oppor-
tunity to hear the thoughts of this respected ac-
ademician. The views he expressedfollow.
On tax reform: My work has focused on how
taxes affect minimum rents needed for real
estate investments to be profitable. Determin-
ing factors are actual and forecasted levels of
rents, tax benefits, and interest rates. We found
that the minimum rent, which is a theoretical
construct really, probably increased after tax re-
form. The expected result would be reduced
construction and, ultimately, an increase in
rents, maybe of about 10%. Now I'm looking
at historical information back to the 1960's on
how rents have adjusted to changes in factors
that would alter that minimum rent. It's hard
to work with data from periods earlier than
that, because the income tax rates were so low.
We've found that rents on comparable proper-
ties, adjusted for depreciation, have held fairly
constant in real terms (adjusting for the general
price level) over the past 20-25 years. There
was a modest decUne in real rents during the
1970's, probably less than 1% per year. Then
there was a little more than modest rise in real
rents in the 1980's, perhaps 1-2% per year.
On the other hand, if you beUeve in the rele-
vance of this minimum rent concept, you see a
different result. One factor the minimum rent
depends on is expected inflation, and we've had
very volatile inflation rates. So this minimum
rent level has jumped around a lot, whereas ac-
tual price level adjusted rents haven't moved
much at all. If you believe in the models that
generate minimum rent estimates, or believe in
the power of tax reform, you'd expect to see
rent volatility. Instead you see construction
volatile and rents relatively stable. So tax re-
form seems to have an impact on construction,
but doesn't seem to have much effect on rents,
at least over the short run. Maybe over a long
period it will. So now we're trying to figure out more precisely what tax reform
does, and out of this has come a better understanding of the potential impact of tax
reform. Reform is probably not something that gets translated into rents very quick-
ly. Construction is more sensitive to changes in tax law and interest rates.
Another part of tax reform that is interesting is the capital gains tax rate. You may
see the rate lowered in the next year or so. How will real estate be affected? The tax
rate on real estate capital gains is pretty modest anyway, and even under the new law
real estate gets preferential treatment because of the deferral of tax until property is
sold. This deferral applies to other investments as well, of course. But under the
new law, the likely holding period for real estate is even longer than it was before re-
form. Given that the typical holding period is considerably longer than those for
stocks and bonds, the preferential treatment for real estate is still substantial. With a
20 year holding period, on a present value basis the capital gains tax rate is pretty
low; before reform it may have been as low as 5%. Tax reform increased capital
gains tax rates, but the longer holding period increased the value of the payment de-
ferral as well. Individual tax rates are also lower. So the overall impact of tax re-
form on capital gains has hardly changed for the typical real estate investor. There is
a tradeoff, in which the higher tax rate and longer holding period offset, or maybe
more than offset, the preferential gain treatment and shorter holding period under the
old law. Pressure for decreasing the capital gains tax rate has come from brokers and
venture capitalists; this is surprising since research suggests such a move could hurt
venture capital and other risky investments. Of course, any decrease in the capital
gains rate would be in connection with an increase in the highest marginal tax rate,
to maybe 38%. So I think capital gains tax rates will fall, but the lowering will
have less impact on real estate than on other kinds of assets. In that sense, the rela-
tive advantage of real estate is probably hurt if capital gains rates are decreased.
One promised benefit of tax reform was to end loss-generating investments with no
economic justification. It may not have ended such practices, but it's helped. Real
estate is still favored relative to other investments, because property doesn't wear out
over 27.5 years. Though the depreciation benefit has certainly declined, it is still rel-
atively favorable, compared to an ideal world. So there's still a form of subsidy to
real estate investments. But the main reason there's been improvement is because
tax rates are lower; there's less to gain by generating tax losses. In the short run,
I'm sure that for many investors the passive loss limitations are a nightmare. There
are 250 pages of new regulations, defining various kinds of passive activity. It's just
ridiculous. But over the long run, we don't think that passive loss limitations will
be a major deterrent to investment. Lower tax rates are definitely the key.
On housing policy: I've been in Washington twice this year for housing conferenc-
es. NAR, FHLMC, and NAHB sponsored a home ownership conference, and there
were several housing policy sessions at the AREUEA meetings. I feel the stage is
set for renewed interest in housing policy and home ownership, especially in low in-
come housing. Two major reports in the past year have discussed ways to improve
the quality of low income housing. But the whole issue has been neglected. I'm not
saying we have a more serious problem than 10 years ago, but rather that we haven't
done a very good job of monitoring the situation. We just don't know much about
what has happened to the quality of housing occupied by low income Americans.
Tax reform included a new credit to stimulate low income housing investment.
But most people I've talked to - investors and people at FNMA - are convinced the
credit won't generate much investment. And there's not much new federal govern-
ment construction activity. Clearly the level of subsidized low income housing is
(continued on thefollowing page)
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nothing like we had in the early to mid 1970's.
We don't know whether housing is being pro-
vided by some other source. The ratio of rent
to income paid by certain groups of Ameri-
cans, say female-headed households, is increas-
ing. But it's not clear whether that's a housing
problem or an income problem; you have to
look at both numerator and denominator.
What is clear is that we don't understand in
any formal sense the nature of the problem be-
cause we haven't had the desire to spend money
on housing research. The homeless could be
the tip of a very bad iceberg, or could just be a
very unusual group that needs special help. If
they have drug problems or mental illness, we
can't view them as typical consumers who re-
spond rationally to prices. Maybe economic
growth has solved a lot of these problems, but
how can we know without more research?
Most people who study the problem strongly
favor the housing voucher as a solution. Un-
fortunately, there hasn't been enough money to
support an extensive voucher program. I don't
feel it's Ukely to ever become a full-fledged en-
titlement program, but I can imagine large in-
creases in the early 1990's targeted at low in-
come families, maybe replacing some con-
struction programs that are fading out anyway.
It's hard to say whether providing money for
specific programs is the path to take. At a
minimum, we need to find out how serious the
problem is, and whether the low income tax
credit is going to work. If it isn't, then is that
the end of federal housing assistance? If we're
getting out, then let's make that clear. If we
say that we're still in it, because of a tax credit
that doesn't work, then in fact we're out of it.
We need to be more clear about what we're try-
ing to accomplish. You hear cries from a lot
of groups, more than you were hearing 10
years ago, about the low income housing situ-
ation. My gut feeling is that homelessness
has escalated into a very serious problem. I
can't be sure, but I'm more inclined to believe
it than I was a few years ago. The fact that
things have gotten worse during a major
growth period flies in the faces of those who
say the answer is to increase the pie. The gov-
ernment was heavily involved in housing in
the 1970's, and growth was down. Clearly the
programs weren't working the way we had ex-
pected. But now after several years of great
growth, and almost a dismantling of federal
housing construction, the issue is whether
we've gone too far in neglecting the problem.
An interesting issue on home ownership is
that for the first time there's a restriction on
tax deductibility of mortgage interest. Borrow-
ers can still deduct interest on up to $1 million
in debt, so the restriction certainly isn't severe.
But now that the principle is established in the
law, you can talk about restricting the interest
deduction and raising the highest tax rate.
There's nothing wrong with subsidizing home
ownership. What I've never understood is why
we should pick up a higher percentage of the
cost for the wealthy than for lower income
people. I hope the door is open for tightening
the interest restriction, so the wealthy don't
pay a lower after-tax price for a dollar's worth
of housing than middle income people do.
On secondary mortgage markets: Future real
estate mortgage and equity markets will be
more like traditional securities markets. As
we further deregulate banks, and price deposit
insurance more accurately, the cost advantage
that banks and S&L's enjoy over investment
bankers will diminish. We see excellent ex-
amples of this in the secondary market for
home loans, in which FHLMC and FNMA
dominate, and can provide money at a lower
price than the S&L that holds loans it origi-
nates. To understand that market, you have to
know how financial seciu'ities are valued.
We study secondary mortgage market devel-
opments in the Real Estate Financial Markets
course. We look at problems of valuing mort-
gages and valuing real estate equity invest-
ments with and without debt. What we find
very helpful are modem financial economics
and the role of option pricing; we use option
pricing theory in valuing mortgages. It's very
different from the traditional approach of com-
puting present values of payments over an ar-
bitrarily chosen holding period, maybe 10-12
years. This newer approach works pretty well.
Consider that the spread between rates on 10-
year Treasuries and mortgages varies considera-
bly; it's ranged from 100 to 300 basis points
over the past 3 years. The spread moves pretty
closely with the market's assessment of vola-
tility; when rates are most volatile, the spread
seems to be largest. That relationship is com-
pletely consistent with option pricing theory,
which states that the option to prepay on a
mortgage increases in value the more the un-
certainty of future interest rates. We also use
the option model to look at refinancing.
(continued on thefollowing page)
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Computers, Faculty, etc.," by ORER Professor Peter F. Colwell,
hedonic theory was limited to considering groups of housing charac-
teristics produced new at a normal profit. No prior theory priced
older bundles that may have once been profitable to produce but no
longer are. Appraisers call such bundles functionally obsolete. The
hedonic model presented is simplified to focus on the functional ob-
solescence. The simplifying assumptions are that all housing con-
sumers are alike and all housing producers are alike. These imply
that only one type of new house will be produced. All others would
be functionally obsolete to a degree. Some types of functional ob-
solescence are curable (i.e. profitable to cure); others are not. Costs
to cure are introduced with the simplifying assumption that such
costs are proportional to the extent of the cure. Assuming other-
wise might be interesting, but would greatly complicate the theory.
Arbitrage equilibrium, the concept which provides for price deter-
mination in the range of curable functional obsolescence, indicates
that the asking price of a functionally obsolete commodity should
exceed what buyers would pay if they could not cure the functional
obsolescence. In this context, arbitrage might relate to individuals
buying properties that embody obsolete features, ciuing to the ex-
tent profitable, and reselling the properties. Economic theory re-
quires that there be only normal profit associated with this activity.
A higher price would eliminate above-normal profit that could other-
wise come from buying, curing the obsolescence, and reselling.
In the range of incurable functional obsolescence, commodity pric-
es are determined by the expenditures on the commodity characteris-
tics that would hold consumer satisfaction constant. If it were oth-
erwise, some consumers would be better off than others, and less
favored consumers would buy or sell the house or other commodity
to gain improved positions. This action would raise prices on under-
valued commodities while driving down overvalued items' prices.
The lesson is that the hedonic function reflects the supply side (i.e.
costs to cure) over the range of curable functional obsolescence,
while it reflects the demand side over the mcurable range. Only
with new houses or other new commodity bundles do we find that
the hedonic function can be a blend of the demand and supply sides.
A special case is investigated in which all of a characteristic must
be removed in order to cure functional obsolescence. This situation
requires that prices actually be lower for commodities which display
more of this characteristic over a certain range.
One practical consequence of this study is to suggest shapes for he-
donic (price-characteristic) relationships estimated in future empirical
research. In general, researchers should consider the possibility that
prices rise and then fall as the presence of a given characteristic in-
creases. Under some conditions, prices might exhibit even more
complex patterns, possibly falling, rising, and falling again as the
quantity of the characteristic increases.
The paper is quite technical, but its results will become applicable
to a wider audience. The ultimate use of the results can be to pro-
vide appraisers with a theoretically defensible list of the components
of functional obsolescence, and to provide users of statistical valua-
tion methods with suggestions on the shapes of relationships be-
tween price and physical property characteristics.
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I've changed the coverage considerably since the first time I
taught that course. As I've written on the topic, gained new
insights myself, I've had the class develop software to use in
refinancing decisions. We look at tax rates, expected holding
periods, transaction costs. This year we developed a program
that allows for a possible reduction in future interest rates.
The hardest part is incorporating option pricing; that's why it's
the part most analyses ignore. Interestingly, in an analysis
that ignores the option, we find that if the rate differential be-
tween the borrower's contract rate and the current market rate is
50 basis points, and he plans to keep the home at least 5
years, it is probably justifiable to refinance. We spelled out
the arguments in ORER Paper #28. We recognize 50 points
as a minimum bound, because the model doesn't consider the
possibility of falling rates. Taking that possibility into ac-
count, we find that the differential needed to justify refinancing
rises by 100 basis points, into a 150-200 point range for a 5-
year holding period. It's interesting that 200 points was the
old rule of thumb. I'm not saying we should all follow that
rule now. First, there is no single rule that everyone should
follow; that argument from the earlier paper certainly hasn't
changed. Second, 200 is at the upper end of the range. But
the required differential certainly rises when you account for the
expected future path of interest rates. It is essential to consider
the option to refinance when interest rates can vary by 15-20%
per year. The updated findings will be published this summer.
The class also spent time rating commercial mortgage-backed
securities. Investors buying these need to know the risk, just
like bond buyers ask how S&P rates an issuer. Mortgages are
more complicated, though, because the "rating" is a function
of underlying real estate, covenants, and underwriting stan-
dards. This kind of rating is really in its infancy; the class fo-
cused on how far short the industry falls of where it would like
to be. About all it can do now is analyze whether cash fiows
would cover worst-case scenarios, clearly a very limited view
of possible outcomes. If they wouldn't, then the mortgage
banker must protect investors with covenants or other meas-
ures. We haven't faced this problem with traditional mortgage-
backed securities, because of GNMA's implicit, or in some
cases explicit, government guarantee. But with commercial
mortgage-backed securities, or those backed by larger sized res-
idential mortgages, there aren't GNMA guarantees. It's fun to
address a new issue like this in the classroom setting.
Parting comments: We've just completed the strategic plan-
ning process for ORER. I hope that sets the stage for another
period of growth. I know Bill Bryan and Peter Colwell will
continue to do an excellent job in advancing ORER's interests.
I've really enjoyed my 4 years here. It's been a wonderful ex-
perience. 1 learned a great deal and met a lot of really nice peo-
ple. My position as Director gave me the opportunity to in-
teract with many outstanding professionals in the real estate
business community; that was very rewarding.
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Chicago Property Values Stable
The values of non-residential properties have
essentially remained steady in the Chicago area.
During the twelve month period ending in May
of 1988, nominal property values showed
slight upward and downward movements, but
did not move on a net basis in any discernible
direction. Therefore, property values adjusted
for inflation would have declined, though by
only a slight percentage. These points are ex-
amples of the information that is beginning to
emerge concerning the impact tax reform and
the depressed market for corporate equity will
have on real estate markets. Early indications
are that the final results will not bear out the
predictions of the "gloom and doom" fraternity.
The Office of Real Estate Research staff, led
by ORER Professor Peter Colwell, has con-
ducted an ongoing project to analyze and track
non-residential property values in the Chicago
area. Four property types are being examined
in the project: office buildings, retail stores,
commercial land, and industrial land. The raw
data for this project comes from Real Estate
Data, Inc. of Chicago. The computerized raw
sales data are manipulated to isolate systematic
movements in sales prices through time, while
holding a number of physical and locational
features constant. The results are fairly uni-
form across the four property types. No syste-
matic pattems have emerged during the period
of study.
However, curious similarities have been
found between commercial land values and
store values during April of this year. Both
property types experienced significant upward
movements in prices. Only time will tell
whether this observation results from a coinci-
dence, or whether such upward movement in-
deed portends a bright near term future for
these, and perhaps the other property types, in
the region. After the vacillations of recent
months, and in the face of steady if moderate
real estate inflation, it certainly would not be
surprising if more coherent price movements
were to emerge.
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COMMITTEE TERMS
EXTENDED
The ORER Advisory Commit-
tee terms of Lydia Franz and
David Rittmiller have each
been extended for two addition-
al years. Franz, from Barring-
ton, first served on the com-
mittee in 1981. Rittmiller,
from Peoria, joined the com-
mittee in 1985.
STUDENT HONORED
A U of I senior has been rec-
ognized for academic achieve-
ment by both the American In-
stitute of Real Estate Apprais-
ers and the Society of Real
Estate Appraisers. Sean Can-
naday, a finance major with a
real estate concentration, was
one of only 12 undergraduates
chosen nationwide by the In-
stitute and 10 students honored
nationwide by the Society in
those organizations' recent
scholarship competitions.
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Fairness in Condominium Assessment
Roger E. Cannaday
Condominium assessment procedures used in
nany jurisdictions may result in unfair distri-
bution of property taxes among condominium
unit owners, leaving some over-taxed and oth-
rs under-taxed. Since appeals are not likely to
be symmetrical (the over-taxed may appeal,
whereas the under-taxed probably will not),
taxing jurisdictions may even be collecting
less tax revenue than they would if assess-
ments were more accurate.
The practice of assessing a condominium
complex as a whole, rather than valuing each
unit individually in the manner followed for
detached homes, is a key aspect of the assess-
ment procedure used in such cities as Chicago.
Under this type of system, each unit owner
pays a share of the total tax for the complex.
A unit owner's share is based on the owner's
declared percentage of ownership. Such a sys-
tem does not necessarily lead to unfair assess-
ments. However, a question of fairness arises
when owners' declared percentages do not accu-
Irately reflect their units' current market values.
The method used to estimate ownership per-
centages varies. One method is based on prices
at which units originally sold, while another
simply measures unit square footage as a per-
centage of total size of the complex. Such
methods are obviously based on assumptions
that units with equivalent interior amenities are
equivalent in value and that factors influencing
value are unchanging over time.
Yet recent research has shown that units in a
complex may vary significantly in market val-
ue due to a variety of factors that were not ne-
cessarily taken into account when the units
first sold. This variation holds even for units
with equal size and identical layout, located on
the same floor of a particular condominium
complex. A key factor causing the values of
such units to vary is view. For example, two
units on the same floor of a high rise building
on Chicago's lakefront may differ in value by
tens of thousands of dollars, depending on the
particular views of Lake Michigan. In other
locations, golf course or ocean views have in-
fluenced condo values in a like manner.
If declared percentages of ownership do not
reflect unit market values, then assessing a
complex as a whole guarantees unfair tax dis-
tribution among owners. Assume, for exam-
ple, that annual re-assessment of a complex is
based on values indicated by a few recent sales,
as may typically be the case. Three possible
scenarios would be: 1) the set of recent sales
is reasonably representative; 2) mostly lower
priced units have sold recently; and 3) mostly
higher priced units have sold recently. Further
assume that declared percentages of ownership
are higher than would be dictated by cuirent
market values for lower priced units, while de-
clared percentages are lower than the market
would indicate for higher priced units. (Per-
haps the more desirable units sold first, at rela-
tively low prices, before the complex gained
favor and all unit values rose accordingly.)
Under the first scenario, with representative
sales, total tax collected would be approximate-
ly correct, but owners of lower priced units
would pay more tax than their fair share, while
more expensive units would be under-taxed.
Under the second scenario, in which mostly
lower priced units have sold, the total tax levy
would be less than it should be. Owners of
higher priced units would pay even less than
under the first scenario. Owners of lower
priced units would pay less than under the first
scenario, but would possibly still pay more
than they should because of the distortion in
declared ownership percentages. Under the fi-
nal scenario, in which units that have sold are
in the higher price range, the total tax collected
would be more than it should be (unless a suf-
(continued on thefollowing page)
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IBR SUBSCRIPTION
Because ORER now has a
regular pubUcation, short ver-
sions of ORER Papers will
not generally be published in
future editions of the Illinois
Business Review (IBR).
Further, Illinois residents on
the ORER mailing list will
no longer automatically re-
ceive IBR. IBR is available
fi^ee of charge to anyone who
sends a written request to the
publisher. ORER Letter read-
ers who wish to continue re-
ceiving the IBR should con-
tact: Bureau of Economic and
Business Research, 428 Com-
merce West, 1206 S. Sixth
Street, University of Illinois,
Champaign, IL 61820.
ALUMNI LUNCHEON
There will be a luncheon in
Chicago forU of I real estate
alumni on Friday, Nov. 4.
Yukio Ohshima of Rubloff
will speak on "The Japanese
Perspective on Investment in
U.S. Real Estate." The pres-
entation should be an interest-
ing follow up to Charles
Palmer's spring talk. A cash
bar will be available; socializ-
ing and networking are en-
couraged. A special page in-
serted in Letters addressed to
U of I alumni contains details
and reservation information.
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ficient number of appeals were upheld). Own-
ers of lower priced units would pay even more
than under the first scenario. Owners of higher
priced units would pay more than under either
of the other scenarios, but would still possibly
pay less than their fair share. Of course, an ex-
ample could be constructed that causes owners
of higher priced units to be treated more unfair-
ly than owners of lower priced units.
A taxing authority could improve assess-
ment procedures, without drastically changing
the practice of valuing a complex as a whole,
through the use of a price index. Such an in-
dex would allow the number of sales used as
the basis for re-assessment to be increased, by
allowing for the adjustment of sales prices for
time, so that all dollar figures would reflect
market conditions on the same date (the "as-of
'
date of the re-assessment, such as January 1
each year in Illinois). Sales over a period of
even several years could be used, thereby in-
creasing the probability that data utilized in
estimating the value of the complex would be
representative of the values of all units.
Of course, improved estimates of declared
ownership percentages would make for even
fairer assessments. For example, if declared
percentages actually reflect current market val-
ues of units, there will be a fair allocation of
taxes among unit owners regardless of whether
sales used to estimate the complex value are
representative. The question arises as to who
is responsible for improving estimates of de-
clared percentages. If a taxing jurisdiction
leaves it to owners of individual units to see
that their complex fairly computes percentages
of ownership, then each complex must take in-
itiative to develop improved methods of esti-
mation. Appropriate action could include the
use of a price index.
Alternatively, local taxing authorities could
adopt procedures for estimating unit values in-
dividually, just as they do for single family de-
tached homes. These procedures might include
multiple regression, with such factors as date
of sale and view included among other physical
and locational variables that influence value.
Roger E. Cannaday is an Associate Professor
of Finance at the University of Illinois, spe-
cializing in real estate, and a Research Asso-
ciate with the Office ofReal Estate Research.
New ORER Advisors
Dean John Hogan of the University's College
of Commerce and Business Administration
has named two new members to the ORER
Advisory Committee. They are Jerry Perlow,
a Realtor® from Evanston who was instru-
mental in the creation of ORER; and Don Ur-
sin, an Oak Brook Realtor® who serves as
President of the Illinois Real Estate Educa-
tional Foundation. Their three-year appoint-
ments will begin on October 6, 1988.
New Fee Instituted
As in the past, an individual request for one
copy of a single ORER Paper will be filled
without charge. However, because of the
high costs of copying and mailing, the Office
of Real Estate Research must institute a new
policy of charging a fee for multiple copies of
papers. If an individual or organization writes
or phones ORER requesting multiple copies
of a particular paper, or single copies of more
than one paper, the Office will charge $3 for
each additional copy or each additional paper.
U of I Real Estate
Program History
Professor Roger Cannaday is writing a history
of the real estate program at the U of I. He re-
quests assistance in the form of information
from any reader with material to contribute.
In particular, there is a need for better coverage
of the period from the mid 1950's, when Pro-
fessor Bob Harvey fu-st established a major in
real estate, until the late 1970's, when Profes-
sors Colwell and Cannaday joined the faculty.
Of particular interest would be information
on officers and activities of the initial Rho
Epsilon chapter. The chapter was chartered in
the mid 1950's; later the charter was dropped
and the organization was inactive prior to
gaining a new charter in 1977. Also of inter-
est are anecdotes involving past or current real
estate faculty members or teaching assistants.
Former faculty and doctoral students will be
contacted for information on the program it-
self, though former undergraduate and masters
students are encouraged to provide such infor-
mation as well. Anyone with material to sub-
mit should contact Professor Cannaday at the
ORER office.
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SCHOLARSHIPS
AWARDED
Three students from the Uni-
versity of Illinois real estate
program have been awarded
scholarships for the 1988 -
1989 academic year by the Il-
linois Real Estate Educational
Foundation. All are finance
majors with a concentration
of studies in the real estate
area. Two are continuing stu-
dents, while the third is a re-
cent graduate who plans to
pursue further s&idies.
The Morgan L. Fitch Scholar-
ship was awarded to Robert
Koys. Koys, a senior from
Riverside, Illinois, will serve
as vice president of the cam-
pus chapter of Rho Epsilon in
the coming Fall semester.
The Thomas F. Seay Scholar-
ship was awarded to Alissa
Schneider. Schneider is a
Spring 1988 graduate from
Skokie, Illinois, who served
as president of Rho Epsilon.
She will be working toward a
master's degree in real estate
at the University of Wiscon-
sin at Madison.
A Real Estate Educational
Foundation Academic Schol-
arship was awarded to Sean
Cannaday. Cannaday is a sen-
ior from Champaign, Illinois.
The Office of Real Estate Re-
search commends these stu-
dents for their academic excel-
lence.
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New Papers Added to ORER Series
Summer is traditionally the slow time in the
academic world. Those who complete papers
in the spring and fall may spend summer pur-
suing research, attending conferences, holding
visiting professorships, and taking vacations.
Nevertheless, five papers have been added to the
ORER Paper Series since publication of the
Spring ORER Letter. These additions bring
the total number in the Series to 68.
The first new entry is Paper # 64, Eldred's
discussion of cosdy yet avoidable mistakes that
real estate investors and developers have made.
Paper # 65 is Oltmans, Chicoine, and Scott's
review of indexes used in monitoring farm land
values in Illinois. The next manuscript is Pa-
per # 66, Brueckner and Follain's study of the
effects that borrower preferences and expecta-
tions regarding variable rate mortgages have on
housing demand. Paper #67 is Taylor's study
of minority housing in Chicago. The last of
the new entries in the series is Paper #68, Can-
naday's systematic framework for analyzing the
income- approach to valuation. The Cannaday
paper is reviewed below. A shortened version
of the Eldred paper appears on the following
page as the first entry in the ORER Letter Ser-
ies. Abbreviated versions of the work by Olt-
mans, Chicoine, and Scott; and that produced
by Brueckner and Follain; will appear in up-
coming editions of ORER Letter.
A Systematic Look at the Income
Approach
For many decades, the present value of future
returns has been accepted by investors as a ba-
sis for valuation, and such an income-based ap-
proach has been considered an appropriate way
to value real estate. Yet the income approach
to property valuation can be confusing to ap-
praisal clients, students of valuation, and even
appraisal professionals. One problem is, of
course, that the more advanced applications in-
volve sophisticated financial concepts.
Another problem, though, is that the numer-
ous income valuation techniques are typically
presented in a manner that lacks consistency
and organization. For example, the most re-
cent texts of the American Institute of Real
Estate Appraisers and the Society of Real
Estate Appraisers in some instances classify equivalent techniques in very different
general categories. Professor Roger Cannaday of the University of Illinois Depart-
ment of Finance presents a possible remedy for the latter problem in ORER Paper
#68, "A Systematic Framework for Alternative Methods of the Income Approach."
The classification scheme presented is based on the author's observation that while
some income approach techniques presented in appraisal texts are based directly on a
discounting of expected future returns, not all are. The techniques that are discussed
in the appraisal literature can be classified into three general categories.
Cannaday looks first at discounted cash flow based methods, those which follow
explicitly from the economic rationale for the income approach. These methods in-
volve direct computation of the present value of expected future income. Theoretical
models generally utilize after-tax income, whereas techniques used by practitioners
often rely on before-tax income. A defensible estimate of market value can be based
on the marginal investor's before-tax or after-tax income; the discount rate used in
capitalizing the higher pre-tax income is simply set at an appropriately higher level.
The methods that Cannaday classifies under the discounted cash flow heading may
appear on the surface to differ considerably from one another and from the basic
present value equation. Yet he shows that such techniques as the various EUwood
methods, a Band of Investment method. Capitalization in Perpetuity, and the various
Physical Residual methods are simply refinements of the more general model. The
refinements consist of incorporating additional simpUfying assumptions beyond the
simplifying assumptions of the basic model, which include end-of-year cash flows
and a constant discount rate. For instance, the income stream can be permitted to re-
main level or to change by a constant rate or dollar amount; the property's value can
be assumed to remain constant over time or to change by a targeted amount; transac-
tion costs can be included or omitted; debt can be included or omitted; and the hold-
ing period assumed can be finite or infinite. The various methods discussed are pre-
sented in both narrative and equation form. The equations serve to highlight the
effects that successive changes in assumptions have on the various models.
The second grouping involves definitional methods. The author shows that the
equation supporting such a method must by definition be true, because algebraic
simplification results in identical single terms remaining on both sides of the equa-
tion: value = value. Three general techniques classified in this group are the several
Financial Component Methods, the Debt Coverage Method (which utilizes only
lender-based criteria), and the Steele Method (which incorporates both lender and
equity investor criteria). Though the origins of these methods are definitional, the
justification for their practical application may be empirical.
The fiiial grouping encompasses the Empirical Methods. These techniques, such
as the well-known Gross Rent MultipUer method, are based on an assumption of
simple Unear relationships between gross or net income and value, based on past
observed transactions. Though both conceptually and computationally simple, Em-
pirical Methods are defensible only if the observed relationships on which they are
based have been found consistently to predict arm's length sales prices.
Cannaday provides many interesting insights into appraisal theory and the manner
in which it has developed. He notes, for example, that techniques dating from the
1930's were developed in computational form (easy to compute, but difficult to fol-
low logically) rather than in more abstract conceptual form (intuitively appealing,
but difficult to compute manually), to facilitate computations in the pre-electronic
environment Information is drawn from popular texts and major articles, including
some of the author's own previous work. The paper serves as both a thought-
provoking approach to new classification techniques and a solid review of the in-
come property valuation methods currently in use.
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The Most Costly Mistakes in Real Estate
Gary W. Eldred
In the past, a shortened version ofa research pa-
per in the ORER Paper Series has been pub-
lished in each edition of the Illinois Business
Review. However, because the Office ofReal
Estate Research now has its own more special-
ized publication, short versions ofORER Pa-
pers will henceforth appear in the ORER Letter.
Copies of the short versions which appeared in
the Illinois Business Review, known collective-
ly as the ORER IBR Series, are still available
through ORER. The following short version of
a recent ORER Paper, and those that will appear
in future issues of this publication, will be
known as the ORER Letter Series.
This past decade has been a busy time for pro-
moters of real estate schemes promising quick
riches with little or no risk and little or no
money down. Unfortunately, countless naive
followers of these promoters have spent count-
less dollars on books, tapes, and seminars with-
out building fortunes. Yet not just the naive
have suffered disappointment; even sophisticated
institutional investors have suffered major real
estate losses in recent years. During the recent
past, aggregate losses in real estate development
and investment have set new records. Leading
banks, savings and loans, syndicators, and de-
velopment companies, as well as thousands of
smaller scale entrepreneurs, have lost tens of
billions of dollars in a medium that the unini-
tiated often view as low-risk: real estate.
Many people explain these losses with refer-
ence to the "real estate cycle." But closer exam-
ination shows that losses were often caused by
mistakes that could have been avoided through
better planning and analysis. The following
siunmary ofORER Paper #64 examines data
obtained through interviews with more than 200
real estate practitioners working throughout the
United States. The purpose of the paper is to
classify and discuss the various types of mis-
takes encountered. The project that culminated
with this paper was undertaken to help the read-
er who agrees that it is better to be wise by the
misfortunes of others than by one's own.
Mistake #1 : Ill-Defined Purpose. One popu-
lar writer has called real estate a "money ma-
chine." Yet real estate is best viewed as a prod-
uct or service, which can compete in the market
only if it fills consumer needs. Greed can be an
investor's downfall. Successful developers are usually people who approach their
activities with vision and passion. Their concern is what they can achieve, rather
than how much money they might make.
Mistake #2: The "Investment" Fallacy. Too many people have equated real
estate investment with a more passive "buy low, sell high" investment in such as-
sets as stocks, gold, or stamps. They have failed to recognize the time, talent, and
work that must go into maintaining and enhancing a property's value. Such peo-
ple may realize that their homes are investments, and they take care to devote prop-
er attention to upkeep. Yet they fail to understand that income and value of "in-
vestment" properties are largely the fruits of imaginative and capable management.
Mistake #3: Faulty Location Analysis. Everyone knows the key to successful
real estate development select a good location. Yet developers sometimes assert
that they have secured favorable location without considering the two basic factors
that determine the attractiveness of a location. First is accessibility. The property
must be close to neighborhoods or services that the targeted population, rather than
the developer, wishes to be close to. Accessibility also relates to required time for
travel to work or other destinations, at the relevant hour of the day.
The second aspect of location is environment. A location's desirability is great-
ly affected by such factors as crime rate, zoning, and quality of govemment servic-
es. A property may be too close to unpleasant or dangerous industrial activity, or
may be served by one city's municipal services but another city's school district
Mistake #4: Faulty Site Analysis. Topography, soil characteristics, and water
runoff often cause serious problems. A group of investors in the Southwest spent
more than a million dollars over several months to design and arrange financing for
a development. Before closing the loan, the lender required a soil test The inex-
pensive test showed that the site, a former railroad yard, was contaminated with a
90 year buildup of oil and hazardous chemicals, rendering it unsuitable for the pro-
posed residential use. Another investor completed a "dream home" in a wooded lo-
cation near a stream, only to find that the stream floods the site every spring.
Mistake #5: Faulty Property Analysis. Investors invite catastrophe by failing
to thoroughly examine all physical aspects of property improvements, including
size, structural stability, and mechanical systems. In one instance, lack of famil-
iarity with a purchased building led an investor to believe that all space would be
net rentable square footage, whereas the unusual floor plan resulted in a significant
amount of unusable space. Other parties have suffered losses by relying on "ball-
park" estimates of rehabilitation costs or by purchasing multi-unit buildings after
seeing only "representative sample" units carefully selected by sellers. In addition,
as with location analysis, an important aspect is to satisfy actual consumer needs
rather than the developer's unsubstantiated guess as to what the market desires.
Mistake #6: Misjudging Demand. Developers have faced costly setbacks by as-
suming that customers existed without undertaking adequate market analysis. A
major development contained an exclusive retail area designed to attract shoppers
from executive ranks in the adjoining commercial center. High-income executives,
however, with demanding work schedules, tend to shop during leisure hours near
their subiu^ban homes. Clerical workers, who might shop during lunch or break
periods, can not afford upscale store prices. The developer of a suburban condo-
minium project learned the hard way that families in that locale wanted detached
houses and singles preferred to rent. Others have faced losses by assuming that in-
dustrial growth would create an abundance of high-paying jobs and a resulting de-
mand for expensive homes, or by failing to note employers' plant-closing plans.
Mistake #7: Misjudging Supply. When evaluating supply, an investor may
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take too narrow a view of a property's compe-
tition. Much can be lost if a developer or pur-
chaser fails to consider that a commercial
building's competition can be located in dis-
tant geograpliic areas, and can even be a differ-
ent property type. One developer thought he
had found a profitable market niche in provid-
ing lower cost office space in an otherwise up-
scale market. Yet a surplus lowered rents of
prestige office space to a point at which ten-
ants shunned cheaper, more functional proper-
ty. (See "Hight/rom Quality," ORER Letter,
Spring 1988.) Another developer refused to
pre-lease a building under construction, feeling
assured that an office space shortage and esca-
lating rents would continue. He failed to rec-
ognize that profit potential in an underbuilt
market would attract competitors; by the time
the building was completed, the shortage of
space had become a shortage of tenants.
Mistake #8: Faulty Financial Analysis.
Financial analysis involves financial statement
analysis and analysis of costs. It is never wise
to accept as factual an income statement pre-
pared by a property seller or the seller's agent
Prepared income statements fi'equently omit or
understate expenses, overstate potential rental
income while understating likely vacancies, or
match low prior year expenses with high fu-
ture income projections. The prudent investor
constructs a new income statement, using as
input current market conditions, experience of
similar properties, and common sense. Every
aspect of a reconstructed statement should be
checked and checked again; even computational
errors have proven costly.
Faulty cost analysis is most frequently a
problem with properties needing renovation or
remodeling. Yet the investor faces a paradox:
while sound cost estimation is essential, accu-
racy is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
Reasons include hidden damage not found until
work has begun; planning difficulty caused by
the need to schedule work in the proper se-
quence; inflation during the project period; and
strikes or materials shortages. Careful inves-
tors design contingency plans for handling the
cash shortages that result from higher interest
costs and delayed receipt of revenues.
Mistake #9: Buying Cash Short. Those
who buy without adequate cash range from in-
experienced attendees of "no money down"
seminars to experienced investors who fail to
recognize the continuing need for cash after a
transaction closes. Though not easy, it cer-
tainly is possible for someone with no down
payment to buy a property. The problem is
that a property for which a seller offers financing assistance may require exten-
sive work, and therefore extensive cash, after purchase. In addition, if a seller is
providing financing assistance, the property may be overpriced.
Mistake #10: Capital Driven Development. Projects should be market driv-
en, not capital driven. Lenders, for example, can suffer losses in their quest to
attract business from major developers. Developers, in turn, may come to be-
lieve that past successes assure future success. They can use profits and equity
from earlier projects to arrange favorable financing and begin construction on
new projects, even in overbuilt markets. To avoid problems of capital driven in-
vestment, both lenders and developers should ask such questions as: Can the
market absorb the project proposed, and will it serve market needs? Have the de-
veloper's past successes actually been with property types different from that
proposed? Does the developer's own capital base consist largely of other real
estate projects? Could their values be overstated on financial statements? Are
the projects geographically diversified and liquid? The problems caused by capi-
tal driven development can be seen in the overbuilding of multi-family buildings
in the 1970's and the glut of urban office properties in the 1980's.
Mistake #11: Faulty Deal Making. No two deals are alike, and actions that
prove favorable in some negotiations could prove disastrous in others. Still,
there are two rules that should always be followed. One is to put first things
first Activities involving low costs and short turnaround times may provide
critical information on the advisability of progressing to costlier project phases.
An inexperienced developer bought a costly parcel, and ctfter the expensive pur-
chase commissioned an inexpensive engineering study which revealed site grad-
ing problems that made the planned development unfeasible.
A second rule is to avoid "tough guy" negotiating. Trying to wring every
possible concession from the party on the other side of the transaction can be
counterproductive. A condominium developer had sold the individual dwelling
units and most of the common areas while retaining title to the recreational fa-
cilities, which he in turn leased to the homeowners' association for the residents'
exclusive use. At lease renewal, the developer, certain that he had the upper
hand, offered the association the choice of paying a four-fold rental increase or
sharing the pool and tennis courts with the general public on a fee for use basis.
However, the developer had forgotten that the association owned the land around
the recreational area and could deny access to any outside user. The residents ne-
gotiated a new rental that was 50%, rather than 400%, of the prior year's level.
Mistake #12: Misunderstanding the Government Approval Process. Persons
or groups with political influence can affect the value or use of a property.
There are 3 areas in which investors can face unusual difficulty. First is the pri-
vate lawsuit. A factory owner gained an injunction against construction of an
upscale residential development; he feared that nearby affluent homeowners
would eventually take steps to limit his firm's activity. Even parties without af-
fected property have sued based on environmental impact to halt development.
Second is the degree of minute detail inherent in the approval process. Hostile
outside parties may be able to stop development by locating a seemingly innoc-
uous oversight on the developer's part.
Finally, though written laws apply, issues of politics and personality can have
an impact. Those who enforce rulings possess some discretionary power, and by
acting more slowly or quickly can delay or facilitate a project's approval.
Real estate entrepreneurs should not let the fear of making mistakes block
their opportunity to achieve. But neither should they ignore the mistakes of
others. As Santayana noted, those who will not learn from the mistakes of the
past are condemned to repeat them.
At the time this paper was written, Gary W. Eldred was a Visiting Associate Profes-
sor ofFinance at the University ofIllinois. He is now a member of thefinance fa-
culty at the University of Virginia's Mclntyre School.
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Director William Bryan Discusses Economy, ORER
Professor William R. Bryan assumed the du-
ties ofDirector of the Office ofReal Estate
Research on August 15. He also continues to
serve as Chairman of the University's Depart-
ment ofFinance. Bryan, a native ofMuncie,
Indiana, began his career in education as a pub-
lic school teacher after earning a degree in Eng-
lish and historyfrom Ball State University.
He later served as a training officer in the Unit-
ed States Air Force. Following military ser-
vice, Bryan began his doctoral studies in eco-
nomics at the University of Wisconsin at
Madison. Upon completing the PhD. in
1960, he joined the staffof the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, serving eventually as sen-
ior economist. Bryan came to the University
in 1966 as an Associate Professor ofFinance,
and has been with the Department ofFinance
since that time, though he took a leave to
spend the 1970-71 academic year in Washing-
ton, D.C. as an assistant to the Treasury De-
partment's Director ofDebt Analysis. He was
promoted to Professor in 1971.
In his capacity as Finance chair, Bryan
played an active role in the creation of the Of-
fice ofReal Estate Research, and he has served
for many years on the ORER Advisory Com-
mittee. Bryan's research interests cover many
areas. He has studied the value ofhuman capi-
tal, and has served as a consultant on issues of
personal injury and business losses. Another
area is the measurement offiscal policy, par-
ticularly through a measure Bryan calls the
Balanced Budget GNP. Bryan, who also serves
as editor of the Illinois Business Review,
views himself as a business economist, who
follows economic developments with an eye
toward providing useful currerU information to
decision makers. Thefollowing interview ad-
dresses his views on the current state of the
economy and the role of ORER.
We're bombarded with talk of thefederal bud-
get deficit. Do you feel that members of the
real estate community, as voters and market
participants, should pay close attention to this
measure? I have not been overly concerned
about the federal budget deficit I'm not con-
cerned either with its actual size or with the
fact that it has been persistently large. The
reason that these do not worry me is that over
the years I have become fascinated by opposites. Some of the first things you learn
in economics relate ultimately to a host of truisms. One such truism is that deficits
and surpluses across the economy always sum to zero. So an observation that one
sector of the economy is in a deficit situation, is at the same time an observation
that other sectors are experiencing surplus. Therefore, if there are persistent negative
effects on the one hand, there must be just as persistent a set of positive effects on
the other.
Which sectors are benefiting? In the current accounts, surplus units are the
household sector, which is always in surplus; the business sector, which is some-
times in surplus, sometimes in deficit, but is currendy in surplus; and the state and
local government sector, which over the past decade has moved heavily into the sur-
plus category. Finally, the international sector has a current account deficit and a
funds account surplus. Over the past 3 years or so it has accumulated a heavy sur-
plus in the funds account, which it turns out is the mirror image of the current ac-
count deficit. Any time you look at the international sector's funds account posi-
tion, which is to say its position as a borrower or a lender, you're seeing the mirror
image of its current account position, its position as a net importer ft'om, or net ex-
porter to, the U.S.
It's quite another matter to talk about politics. There is the issue of government
entities, whether their powers be local, state, or federal in nature, making spending
decisions without at the same time considering taxes. That issue is a political mat-
ter and not an economic matter. My feeling is that spending and taxation decisions
should not be separate. It is necessary for state and local spending decisions to be
closely tied to decisions on how projects are going to be paid for. At the federal lev-
el, the coordination of spending and taxes is less critical, but it is nonetheless impor-
tant as a political matter over reasonably long periods, perhaps ten years. We should
be concerned if ten years pass and the Administration and Congress continue to un-
dertake expenditures that bear little relationship to the underlying set of receipts.
What about trade deficits? Those concerned with trade as a general issue should
actually be asking a different question. I feel we should ask whether people in vari-
ous countries are doing what they are most capable of doing. If they are, then consu-
mers as a group, worldwide, get the highest amount of output for the given resource
use. The world has to allocate its limited productive resources effectively. Since I
believe that, I favor trade policies that are based, to the degree possible, on relative
efficiency in production. Therefore, I'm willing to accept any resulting deficit or sur-
plus as a natural consequence of optimal policies. But I also believe that nations
have to compete on a level playing field, and there are certainly charges that Ameri-
can firms face impediments in reaching markets in some countries, such as Japan.
Foreign government intervention in various countries tilts the playing field in ways
that encourage their exports and discourage imports of our goods. The U.S. should
resist implementing any type of policy that would, in the end, result in a suboptimal
allocation of goods, and we should discourage other countries from using such tac-
tics.
I'm not particularly concerned about the current account deficit in the balance of
trade, to which you referred. Recall that, in my view, the key to understanding is of-
ten to look at the opposite side, and that in this case the opposite is a capital account
surplus. But something else is important here. In some sense there are not any real
choices. If foreigners decide to build up their holdings of dollar denominated assets,
and in the process shift real resources to this country, the mechanism by which that
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shift occurs is that we import more than we
export. It's just like when we shift real re-
sources from the Rust Belt to the Sun Belt in
our country; the mechanism by which that
shift in real resources occurs is that the Sun
Belt imports more than it exports. In a funda-
mental sense we cannot know what is cause
and what is effect. We can't always know
whether our deficit in the current account is
caused by the surplus in the funds account, or
whether the funds account surplus is caused by
the current account deficit
Foreigners are investing in productive capac-
ity that will benefit us in future periods.
When the foreigners shift real resources to our
part of the world, or, more importandy in
terms of the magnitudes involved, when U.S.
citizens decide that they want to slow the rate
at which they shift resources to other parts of
the world, the result is expanded productivity
here. It would be a completely different matter
if the U.S. were simply profligate, if we were
greedy in our use of current account resources.
If that were the case the borrowing would rep-
resent a foreign bailout. If that were the case,
then we might have reason to be concerned
about the deficit But even someone with this
belief would be misplacing concern by focus-
ing on the deficit. Of more concern should be
our profligate ways.
What should we befollowing with regard to
the money supply and interest rates? One
historical issue to consider is how we ought to
go about discussing monetary policy. Most of
the talk about "monetary policy" is actually
talk about interest rate developments. People
look at the results, rather than the causes, of
monetary policy. Yet even with interest rates,
we ought to be looking at a more general ques-
tion involving the cost of credit
In my view, monetary policy involves what
happens to a collection of financial instru-
ments called "money." In evaluating monetary
policy, I tend to pay a lot of attention to
what's happening to something called the
"monetary base." The monetary base is some-
thing the Federal Reserve can actually control
over reasonably extended periods of time. The
monetary base connects itself to the various
M-l's and other monetary aggregates through
the applicable multipliers. I'm very traditional
in terms of monetary theory, in that I pay so
much attention to the money supply. I look at
quantities, rather than at interest rates, credit
developments, or whether markets are easy,
tight, resilient or cautious.
Real estate people, in the broadest sense,
have major concerns about one type of re-
source use. That involves, of course, the
physical buUding of dwelling structures and
workplace structures. This type of resource al-
location is a central issue in any economic
system. Attached to that important allocative
decision are some institutions, some markets,
some marketing procedures, and some govern-
ment regulations. So those of us who are in-
terested in real estate must also have an inter-
est in that whole range of activities: the
marketing of final products; the markets with-
in which the allocative decisions are permitted
to occur; and the government institutions,
laws, and regulations within which activity
proceeds; as well as the technical side and the
imaginative side of the real resource allocation
itself. Real estate market participants qualify
as having a pretty broad range of interests.
What general plans do you have in your new
role as ORER Director? First, it's impor-
tant to look at the past The Office of Real
Estate Research has fostered some important
real estate research over the past few years, and
it's important that the research thrust be con-
tinued However, my chief focus will be, at
least initially, on the public information and
public service side of our mission. I want to
develop ways to communicate with our consti-
tuency through such means as conferences,
news releases, and increased real estate data de-
velopment activity, in addition to the type of
research conducted in the past It's important
for us to know, for example, the level of hous-
ing starts in the state's major metropolitan are-
as, and the mortgage lending terms available.
We should strive for widespread dissemination
of our output with a view toward improving
public understanding of real estate issues and
developments. We can provide news agencies
around Illinois with information such as
graphs, charts, and short news stories that they
can report locally.
Communities need objective information on
what is happening in their real estate markets,
and I feel that we can play an important role in
providing it In doing so we can also heighten
the public's awareness of the existence of
ORER. When any real estate issue arises in
Illinois, whether it affects one community
only or involves a broader issue such as gov-
ernment regulation of financial institutions,
we want people to think of the Office of Real
Estate Research as a source of information.
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Peoria Rebounds
The Peoria Metropolitan Statistical Area ap-
pears to be maintaining its recent construction
growth after many years of unusually low ac-
tivity. The area has also been unusual in that
for 14 of the last 18 years, total non-residential
construction value exceeded that of single-
family home construction. Perhaps 8 of the 18
years would be more typical for the state.
The accompanying graph includes actual data
through 1987 and projections for 1988 (actual
current year data are available only through
July). An analysis by ORER Professor Peter
Colwell in the February, 1988 Illinois Busi-
ness Review, using incomplete 1987 figures
then available, indicated a recovery underway.
The 1987 totals and 1988 projections reflected
in the graph show recent home and non-
residential property construction greatly exceed-
ing the 1986 totals, reaching the highest levels
of recent years. An improved picture for such
property types is not surprising in a "Rust
Belt" community with a manufacturing-based
economy, given that recent exchange rates have
favored exports by American firms.
Multi-family permit values, however, fell in
1987 to levels even below the low 1986 fig-
ures, and appear to be headed even lower in
1988. This pattern, which appears to hold for
the entire state as well, was a predicted out-
come of changes in the treatment of income-
producing property under 1986 tax legislation.
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Highest and Best Use:
Is it a Micro or a Macro Concept?
Peter F. Colwell
Highest and best use is commonly defined
as that use which results in the highest
land value. Yet land use is truly optimal
when total benefit, not simple value, is
maximized. By what process does this
true optimization occur?
The micro application of the highest
and best use doctrine (i.e., the market pro-
cess) does not generally produce, nor does
it follow from, the maximum land value
in a macro sense. Macro and micro values
cannot both generally be maximized at the
same time. Individual property owners, in
seeking highest and best use, may correct-
ly attempt to maximize the values of their
parcels. The market process in which
each owner attempts to maximize individ-
ual parcel value tends to equate the values
of land to all potential land users. If land
is allocated so that prices for parcels with
equivalent physical and locational features
are equal regardless of the land use, then
there is no advantage in converting land
from one use to another (i.e., the alloca-
tion of land is stable). However, the total
value for all land is not, in general, maxi-
mized by the same process through which
individual parcel prices across land uses
are maximized.
The ideas above may appear counter-
intuitive. Indeed it is the conventional
wisdom that maximizing the values of in-
dividual parcels should result in the max-
imization of total land value. Yet this
conventional wisdom is based on a fallacy
of composition, which is the mistake of
assuming that what is true of the part (mi-
cro) must be true of the whole (macro).
The fallacy of composition may drive
some planners to incorrectly seek highest
and best use in a macro sense, maximiz-
ing the total value of land in a communi-
ty. Emotionally loaded terminology
seems to foreclose on the possibility of
debate; who would argue that the "highest
and best" use is not desirable? Of course,
once it is established that the objective of
highest and best use in the micro sense
differs from the objective of highest and
best use in the macro sense, it indeed be-
comes sensible to argue that one or the
other is not desirable.
Efficiency is an objective that is so-
cially desirable. The most efficient allo-
cation of land can be defined as the alloca-
tion which maximizes total social or
community benefits. This magnitude is
greatest when the sum of total land value
and consumer surplus is maximized.
While the meaning of total land value is
obvious, the term consumer surplus may
be a little less familiar. In general eco-
nomic usage, consumer surplus is the dif-
ference between the higher prices particu-
lar buyers would be willing to pay and the
lower market-clearing price at which
transactions actually occur. In real estate
terminology, consumer surplus is the dif-
ference between investment value of a
project to an individual investor and mar-
ket value. Investment value places a ceil-
ing on what the investor is willing to
pay. Market value, on the other hand, is
the amount the investor can expect to
pay. The difference between these two
value concepts is an economic benefit
which accrues to the investor. This bene-
fit is an example of consumer surplus;
one might call it investor surplus.
As suggested, the market mechanism
can generally be relied upon to produce
maximum community benefits, rather
than simply maximum land value, al-
though there are exceptions not dealt with
in this essay. Community benefits are
{continued on page 2)
RUNDBLOM JOINS U of I
FINANCE STAFF
Donald Rundblom will join the De-
partment of Finance as a Visiting Lec-
turer in the coming Spring semester.
Rundblom is an expert in mortgage
lending, mortgage backed securities,
and the secondary mortgage market.
He has held positions with major lend-
ing institutions in Chicago and with
First Boston and Morgan Stanley on
Wall Street. He will teach the Real
Estate Financial Markets course.
Rundblom is a 1975 graduate of the
University of Illinois real estate pro-
gram. He also earned an M.B.A. from
Loyola University of Chicago in
1983. He has served as chairman and
vice chairman of Mortgage Bankers
Association of America committees
that studied innovative lending meth-
ods for income properties. Rundblom
has returned to Champaign-Urbana to
form a company engaged in commer-
cial property lending and development
An interview with Rundblom ap-
pears on page 8.
WATCH FOR INSERTS!
ORER has begun using inserts in the
ORER Letter to provide readers with
more timely and effective delivery of
important materials. The previous
Letter contained an insert for alumni
on the fall luncheon. This edition
contains two inserts, a Real Estate
Outlook Days registration form and a
form for providing current contact in-
formation. When each new issue ar-
rives in the mail, please check to see if
there is a dated insert on an upcoming
event.
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maximized when land prices are equalized
across land uses, an occurrence realized
when users seek the highest and best use
in a micro sense. Almost without excep-
tion, it takes government intervention in
the form of zoning to produce an ineffi-
cient allocation which maximizes total
land value, the highest and best use in the
macro sense. Zoning has the ability to
restrict the quantity of land allocated to
certain users, and thereby to maintain dif-
ferent land prices. It is sometimes possi-
ble for zoning to be used to achieve total
land value maximization, because value
maximization in the macro sense general-
ly requires that the prices of land to the
various users be unequal.
It is as important in the arena of land
use as in the arena of income taxation that
there be a level playing field. If one ac-
tivity is favored over another by govern-
ment policy, resources are wasted. Zon-
ing that favors the expansion of residen-
tial activity, at the expense of so-called
lower uses, can produce an inefficient al-
location of land.
A Numerical Example
Consider a community with 2,400 acres
available for private use. There are only
two types of land users in this communi-
ty: residential and commercial. It is sig-
nificant that the time interval considered
for possible reallocation is the long run.
Under a long-run analysis, highest and
best use should be the use of a parcel or a
community that maximizes land value dis-
regarding any improvements in place and
any costs of demolition. Thus, the argu-
ment in this essay is most relevant to a
community that is undergoing develop-
ment for the first time.
The Demand for Land
Table I shows the demand/price relation-
ships for both residential and commercial
users of land in the community. (Residen-
tial and commercial demand are assumed
independent; the commercial uses might
attract clientele from adjoining communi-
ties.) At an extremely high uniform price,
such as $55,000 per acre, no developer
would seek land for any use. At the some-
what lower price of $44,000, some land,
though only 200 acres, could be profitably
used in commercial endeavors. Only be-
low a price of $31 ,000 would residential
development become at all attractive.
Successively lower prices would result in
successively higher demand for both com-
mercial and residential acreage; at prices
below $22,000, users would seek more
land than the market could supply. There
is only one allocation of exactly 2,400
acres which can occur at an equivalent
price for both residential and commercial
land. This allocation is 1,800 acres to res-
idential use and the remaining 600 acres to
commercial use, with an accompanying
price of $22,000. Higher prices would
(continued on page 3)
PRICE/ACRE ACRES IN
RESIDENTIAL
$55,000
$44,000
$33,000
$31,000
$30,000 200
$25,000 1,200
$24,000 1,400
$23,000 1,600
$22,000 1.800
$21,000 2,000
$20,000 2,200
$19,000 2,400
$11,000 4,000
$ 6,200
ACRES LN
COMMERCIAL
200
400
436
454
545
564
582
6QQ
618
636
654
800
1,000
ACRES ALLOCATED
200
400
436
654
1,745
1,964
2,182
2.400
2.618
2,836
3,054
4,800
7,200
COLWELL ATTENDS
NATIONAL MEETINGS
ORER Professor Peter Colwell attended
national meetings held in Washington,
D.C. on September 29 and October 1.
The first meeting was a Research
Roundtable on real estate data. The
topic of the conference, sponsored by
Indiana University's Center for Real
Estate Studies, was computerized sourc-
es of real estate information. Represen-
tatives of the F.W. Dodge company and
other organizations presented an over-
view of the construction and economic
data that firms make available on tape
or through time sharing services. The
participants also discussed real estate in-
formation networks that have been de-
veloped by the Homer Hoyt Institute
and Indiana University.
The second meeting was the annual
conference of the American Real Estate
Center Directors and Chairholders Asso-
ciation. The meeting program covered
a wide range of topics, including hous-
ing affordabiUty, real estate investment,
and environmental issues. Members of
the Association are those who hold en-
dowed real estate chairs at major univer-
sities and those who direct academic,
governmental, or professional real
estate research centers.
ONLY THE NAME HAS
CHANGED
ORER Secretary Brenda Brooks is now
Brenda Bishop. The change occurred on
September 24, when Brenda married
Paul Bishop, a doctoral candidate in the
University of Illinois Department of
Economics.
ORER Letter extends congratula-
tions to the happy couple, and encour-
ages readers to note Brenda's name
change in their correspondence with the
Office.
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result in too few buyers, while lower
prices would attract an abundance of po-
tential purchasers whose bidding would
drive the price up. Parties who buy at
the $22,000 market price, but would
have been willing to pay more, receive a
consumer surplus.
The Allocation of Land
Table 2 identifies combinations of alloca-
tions that use all 2,400 acres of developa-
ble space, such as the allocation achieved
at a $22,000 uniform price (the micro
based optimum) in Table 1 . Table 2 re-
sults, however, are not limited to cases
of uniform pricing. Indeed, the optimal
macro appUcation requires that the price
of commercial land ($33,000) be higher
than that of residential land ($21,(XX)).
Note that total land value is maximized
at $55.2 million, with an allocation of
2,(XX) acres to residential and 400 acres to
commercial. Note further that the high-
est and best use in the micro sense (with
a total land value, as shown in Table 2,
of only $52.8 million) does not reflect
the same allocation as highest and best
use in the macro sense.
The question that arises now is which
of the two allocations identified as high-
est and best is higher and better, the mi-
cro based (1,800 acres residential; 6(X)
acres commercial) or the macro based
(2,000 acres residential; 4(X) acres com-
mercial). Table 3 answers this question
by measuring total community benefits
for the allocations shown in Table 2.
^M^^^H1^^^^^^^^^
ACRES IN ACRES IN TOTAL CONSUMER TOTAL
RESIDENTIAL
1,400
COMMERCIAL
1,000
LAND VALUE
$33,600,000
SURPLUS*
$32,400,000
COMMUNITY
BENEHTS
$66,000,000
1,600 800 $45,600,000 $24,000,000 $69,600,000
1,800 600 $52,800,000 $18,000,000 $70,800,000
2,000 400 $55,200,000 $14,400,000 $69,600,000
2,200 200 $52,800,000 $13,200,000 $66,000,000
2,400 $45,600,000 $14,400,000 $60,000,000
The allocation, as shown in in Table 3,
that generates the greatest total of com-
munity benefits is 1,800 acres to residen-
tial and 600 acres to commercial. This is
the market allocation, in which individual
owners seek to maximize the values of
their land until there is no longer an ad-
vantage in changing the allocation. The
result is the highest and best use in the
micro sense, not in the macro sense.
Thus, the micro concept of highest and
best use produces the most efficient allo-
cation of land and the greatest quantity of
total community benefits. The highest
and best use in the macro sense produces
an inefficient allocation and less than the
maximum total of community benefits.
Conclusions
The highest and best use in a micro sense
generally produces a distinctly different al-
location of land from that which could be
termed the highest and best use in a ma-
cro sense. Only the micro based highest
PRICE/ACRE
RESIDENTIAL
$24,000
$23,000
$22,000
$21.000
$20,000
$19,000
ACRES IN
RESIDENTIAL
1,400
1,600
1,800
2.000
2,200
2,400
PRICE/ACRE
COMMERCIAL
$
$11,000
$22,000
$33.000
$44,000
$55,000
ACRES IN
COMMERCIAL
1,000
800
600
m.
200
TOTAL
LAND VALUE
$33,600,000
$45,600,000
$52,800,000
$55.200.000
$52,800,000
$45,600,000
and best use makes sense in terms of the
efficiency of land use. Yet some practi-
tioners may not appreciate this rule.
Zoning can be used to reduce the alloca-
tion of land to the so-called lower uses,
thereby driving the price of residential
land down and the price of land allocated
to the other uses up. While this may
have the effect of raising the value of
land, it will also have the effect of lower-
ing the total community benefits because
of the reduced consumer surplus at higher
transaction prices. There is a simple test
that one can apply to any community. If
land which is undistinguished in terms of
its location has a higher price in so-called
lower uses than in the so-called higher
uses, it is likely that local zoning is mis-
allocating land in terms of efficiency.
* Consumer surplus is halfof the differ-
ence between the price at which buyers
enter the market and the lower market
clearing price, multiplied by the appropri-
ate number ofacres. The difference is
halved because the average price that buy-
ers would be willing to pay is the mid-
point of the range of highest to lowest
(market-clearing) price. For example,
computations of consumer surplus totals
at the micro and macro optimum levels,
as shown in Table 3, are:
[1.800 ($31,000-$22,000)]l2 +
1600 ($55,000422,000}]12 =
$18,000,000
[2 ,000 ($31 ,000-$21 ,000)]/2 +
1400 ($55,000-$33,000)]l2 =
$14,400,000
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Busy Semester for Rho Epsilon
A carefully planned fall program allowed
the U of I Rho Epsilon chapter to add a
record-setting 50 new members to the
roster, and to take advantage of many op-
portunities to learn about careers and
build contacts with employing organiza-
tions.
On September 8, the chapter partici-
pated in a Career Forum with other stu-
dent organizations in the Department of
Finance. Many firms participated in the
Forum, held in the Ballroom at the Illini
Union. Among the representatives were
Neil Young, who manages the Rose-
mont office of the Commercial Broker-
age Division of Grubb & Ellis; and U of
1 alumnus Ralph DePasquale, a former
Rho Epsilon president who is now with
the Real Estate Investments Division of
Metropolitan Life.
The first meeting of each academic
year features as speakers members of the
real estate faculty. On September 20 the
first regular 1988 - 89 meeting of the
chapter was held. Professors Roger Can-
naday, Peter Colwell, and Philip Rush-
ing spoke to the members on the real
estate program, the topics covered in par-
ticular courses, and career opportunities.
Rho Epsilon members were among
those invited to interview for positions
with two major accounting and consult-
ing firms that visited campus during the
last week of September. Arthur Ander-
sen and Company interviewed some of
the members of the chapter for positions
in the organization's real estate appraisal
division. Laventhol and Horwath inter-
viewed graduate students for positions in
the firm's real estate consulting division.
JMB Realty visited campus on Sep-
tember 30. The firm, which employs a
number of graduates of the University of
Illinois real estate program, was inter-
viewing accounting majors for positions
in the organization.
Professor Cannaday, the chapter advis-
or, sponsored a social for the member-
ship at his home on October 6. The in-
formal setting gave members of the
chapter the chance to interact with real
estate faculty members, some alumni of
the real estate program, and some hono-
rary members of the chapter fi-om the lo-
cal professional community.
Two representatives of Coldwell Bank-
er Commercial Real Estate Services in
Oak Brook spoke to the chapter on Octo-
ber 1 1 . Sales Manager Todd Caruso and
broker Bill Ellwood discussed various as-
pects of commercial real estate brokerage
and office leasing with the membership.
A field trip was held on October 14.
Professor Cannaday and nineteen members
of the chapter visited two organizations in
Chicago. In the morning, the group met
with John Rutledge at Harris Trust and
Savings Bank. Rutledge, a Vice President
of the bank who is also an Illinois alum-
nus, spoke to the group about advising
pension funds on real estate investments.
In the afternoon, the Corporate Real
Estate Services division of RUBLOFF
made presentations to the students. The
program was coordinated by Mark Dona-
hue, President ofRUBLOFF Corporate
Real Estate Services.
Hyatt Development Corporation visit-
ed campus on October 25. Daniel Azark,
an architecture graduate of the Chicago
campus of the University, discussed the
development of hotels, particularly in re-
sort areas.
On November 15, Prudential Realty
Group spoke to the chapter on career op-
portunities. U of I real estate alumnus
Kevin Maxwell, Director of Real Estate
Financing, and Bill Mankivsky, an Ap-
praisal Analyst, discussed Real Estate An-
alyst positions available to bachelor's de-
gree holders, and positions in acquisitions
and sales for MS and MBA graduates.
The final meeting was scheduled for
December 6. The members were to hear
Donald Rundblom, President of the Mort-
gage Banking Division of the Atkins
Group, discuss the role of Wall Street in
real estate finance. Elections and a pizza
party were to follow.
Those who served as officers in the fall
semester are:
Tom Paul
Bob Koys
Fran Gardner
Paul Lesser
President
Vice President
Treasurer
Secretary
50 ATTEND FALL
ALUMNI LUNCHEON
The sixth semiannual ORER luncheon
for University of Illinois real estate
alumni was held at the Chicago Yacht
Club on November 4. The speaker
was Mr. Yuki Ohshima of RUBLOFF,
who presented "A Japanese Perspective
on Investment in U.S. Real Estate."
More than fifty U of I graduates now
working in the real estate field attended.
Special thanks go to Gene Stunard,
who once again arranged for the alumni
to have the use of the Yacht Club.
The next luncheon is tentatively
scheduled for April 1989. It is also
possible that a future luncheon will be
held in a downstate location more con-
venient to alumni outside the Chicago
area. More information, including a
registration form, will be included in
the Winter 1989 ORER Letter.
BRYAN ADVISES GENERAL
ASSEMBLY COMMTITEE
ORER Director William Bryan is serv-
ing as an advisor to a committee
formed by the Illinois General Assem-
bly. The committee, under the direc-
tion of State Representative Wyvetter
H. Younge, is investigating the munic-
ipal financial difficulties of East St.
Louis and the surrounding area.
Bryan's role is to advise the committee
members on financial and economic
matters.
PAPER ADDED TO SERIES
The sixty-ninth entry has been added to
the ORER Paper Series since publica-
tion of the previous ORER Letter.
Copies of "Microfoundations of a
Mortgage Prepayment Function," by
James R. FoUain, Louis O. Scott, and
Tai-Le Yang are available from the
ORER office.
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Outlook Days Address Chicago Market Issues
For the third straight year, the Office of
Real Estate Research has arranged a ser-
ies of presentations on the outlook for
the real estate market. The Real Estate
Outlook Days program for 1989 will be
held on Tuesday, January 10 and Wednes-
day, January 11.
The theme of the series of presenta-
tions will be "Real Estate Under the New
Administration." While one of the
speakers will present his topic on both
Tuesday and Wednesday, others will
present on only one of the two days.
Therefore, an individual interested in at-
tending may wish to register for one of
the two days or for both days.
The Tuesday session, to be held in
Oak Brook at the Oak Brook Hills Hotel
and Conference Center, will be jointly
sponsored by the Office of Real Estate
Research and the Illinois Association of
Realtors®. The keynote speaker will be
John Tuccillo, who serves as Chief
Economist for the National Association
of Realtors®. The other Tuesday speak-
ers and their topics will be:
Donald Rundblom, a Champaign mort-
gage banker who until recendy worked
with Morgan Stanley in New York,
speaking on the impact of environmental
hazards on property values.
Alan Reichert, a Professor of Finance at
Illinois State University, speaking on lo-
cal and national economic activity's im-
pact on regional housing prices.
ORER Professor Peter Colwell, speak-
ing on "black holes" and non-residential
property sales in Cook County.
The Wednesday session, to be held at
the Ambassador West Hotel in Chicago,
will be jointly sponsored by the Office of
Real Estate Research and the Chicago
Board of Realtors®. The keynote speaker
will be Charles Hill, Executive Vice Pres-
ident of the Federal Home Loan Bank of
Chicago. Hill will speak on the future of
housing finance. Others presenting on
Wednesday, and their topics, will be:
ORER Director William Bryan, provid-
ing an economic forecast for 1989.
Alan Reichert, repeating the program he
will present at the Tuesday session.
In addition, there will be a panel dis-
cussion directed by ORER Professor Pe-
ter Colwell.
The registration fee for the Tuesday
session in Oak Brook is $40. The pro-
gram is scheduled to begin at 1:00 P.M.
and to end at 5:00 P.M. Those who at-
tend Tuesday's session are also invited to
a reception following the presentations.
The registration fee for the Wednesday
sessions at the Ambassador West is $75.
The presentations are scheduled to com-
mence at 10:00 A.M. and to end at 2:00
P.M. A hght lunch will be provided.
Anyone wishing to attend both the
Tuesday and Wednesday sessions can reg-
ister for the two days at a cost of SI 00.
A special Real Estate OuUook Days
registration insert has been included in
this issue of the ORER Letter. To regis-
ter, please complete the left-hand portion
of the insert and return it with your pay-
ment to the ORER office.
Questions on registration, or on the
program, should be directed to Brenda
Bishop at ORER.
Postal Procedures Delay ORER Letters
Many ORER Letter subscribers have in-
formed the Office of Real Estate Research
that their copies of the newsletter are not
delivered in a timely fashion or are, in
the most extreme cases, not delivered at
all. Timely delivery of the quarterly let-
ter is very important to ORER and to
readers, particularly when the letters con-
tain announcements or registration mate-
rials for upcoming events.
For example, copies of the Summer
1988 issue sent to alumni contained an
inserted registration notice on the fall
alumni luncheon, held on November 4.
ORER delivered the letters to the campus
mailing center in late September, and
readers in some areas, especially down-
state and the Chicago suburbs, reported
receiving copies by the first week of Oc-
tober. However, some readers, particular-
ly in Chicago, had not yet received their
copies in the first week of November. The
problem became apparent through a lack of
registrations for the luncheon a few short
days before its scheduled date.
Many who had attended earlier lun-
cheons were notified through a heroic
phoning effort by ORER Secretary Brenda
Bishop and the officers of Rho Epsilon.
Yet the calls reached some too late for oth-
er important plans to be changed. The re-
sults were unexpectedly low attendance and
a number of disappointed graduates.
The reason for the delay has since be-
come clear. Fourth class, bulk-rate mail
can remain at the post office for six weeks
or more before delivery. Perhaps in less
populous downstate and suburban areas,
the delay over first class delivery time is
not significant, whereas in Chicago an
overwhelming volume of mail necessitates
patience with regard to bulk rate items.
ORER is, as befits a research organiza-
tion, studying the problem. A possible
solution is to send some or all issues to
some or all readers by costlier first class
mail. For example, the current issue was
sent first class to all readers because of im-
portant materials on Outlook Days.
Readers can assist in the effort to bring
about more effective delivery. First, they
can make sure that ORER has correct ad-
dress and company affiliation information.
(An insert for that purpose is included in
this issue.) In addition, they can notify
the Office of future address or company af-
filiation changes. (The telephone cam-
paign uncovered many individuals who had
moved to new firms.) Finally, they can
encourage colleagues who think they are
on the mailing list but are not receiving
the Letter to send current address, phone,
and company information to ORER.
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ARMs and the Demand for Housing
Jan K. Brueckner and James R. FoUain
This second entry in the ORER Letter
Series is an abbreviated version ofORER
Paper #66, "ARMs and the Demandfor
Housing." Interested readers can obtain a
copy of the longer version of the paper
through a written or telephoned request to
the Office ofReal Estate Research.
Introduction
Since its introduction in 1981, the ad-
justable-rate mortgage (ARM) has be-
come an integral part of the housing fi-
nance system in the United States. The
ARM share of conventional mortgage
loan originations has ranged between
twenty and seventy percent since 1983,
indicating a remarkably rapid acceptance
and popularization of this new mortgage
instrument. Evidence to date shows that
the ARM share is primarily determined
by the level of interest rates and the
spread between the rate available on
fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and the
ARM rate.
Despite our growing understanding of
the factors affecting the FRM - ARM
choice made by borrowers, there is little
evidence concerning the effect of a bor-
rower's mortgage type on his demand for
housing. Accounts in the popular press,
however, implicidy assume that ARMs
stimulate the demand for housing. It is
frequently argued that this stimulus has
prevented a collapse of the housing mar-
ket during periods of high interest rates.
In the absence of a careful empirical
study, however, these claims have been
largely unsupported by hard evidence.
The Study
The goal of ORER Paper #66, "ARMs
and the Demand for Housing," is to pro-
vide such evidence by estimating an em-
pirical model of housing demand condi-
tional on mortgage choice. The study
uses a large national data set containing
observations on individual real estate
transactions. By applying econometric
techniques to this data, we can see how
the value of the house purchased by a
borrower is affected by the mortgage inter-
est rate paid (the FRM rate for borrowers
obtaining fixed-rate loans, and the ARM
rate for borrowers obtaining adjustable-
rate loans). In addition, we can see how
the value of the house depends on the gen-
eral level of housing costs in the area and
on borrower characteristics such as in-
come and family size.
The econometric results allow us to ad-
dress several important questions: Do
ARM borrowers consider future ARM
rates in formulating their housing de-
mands? Do borrowers who obtain ARMs
purchase more or less housing than fixed-
rate bortowers at typical interest rates?
What is the effect on aggregate housing
demand of changes in the ARM share over
the interest rate cycle? Answers to these
questions are relevant in evaluating the
popular claims about the impact of
ARMs on the housing market
Sample Data
The principal source of data for the analy-
sis is the Residential Mortgage Finance
Panel Survey conducted quarterly by the
National Association of Realtors®. Each
quarter, the NAR asks a sample of real
estate salespeople for details of their most
recent residential transactions. The survey
includes information on mortgage terms,
characteristics of the borrower and house-
hold, and features of the property. The
present study employs results of the quar-
terly survey from its inception in 1984
through the fourth quarter of 1987.
Although the full data set includes in-
formation on 6313 transactions, the sub-
sample actually used in the analysis con-
tains only 1701 observations. Most of
the observations are excluded because cer-
tain features of the transactions indicate
that the borrowers might have lacked free-
dom to choose between adjustable-rate and
fixed-rate mortgages with typical features.
For example, a transaction is obvious-
ly not included in the subsample if the
loan is not an ARM or an FRM. Simi-
larly, if the loan term is less than 20
years or greater than 30 years, the transac-
tion is considered atypical (as with a 15-
year FRM) and is excluded. Cash sales
and transactions involving seller financ-
ing are excluded from the sample, as are
sales involving second mortgages, bal-
loon mortgages, or interest rate buy-
downs. Of course, observations with
missing information on the variables in
question can not be included.
Also excluded from the subsample are
transactions with mortgages in excess of
$2(X),0(X). This exclusion is in response
10 the survey's inexact measurement of
income. Income is reported in ranges; j
the highest range is "above $100,(XX),"
and all incomes in this range are assigned
the value of $125,(XX). Since this figure
is likely to substantially understate the
incomes of households with the largest |
observed loan balances, such households I
are deleted firom the sample.
A final excluded category involves any
transaction financed with a Federal Hous-
ing Administration (FHA) insured or Vet-
erans Administration (VA) guaranteed
loan. This category alone accounts for
more than 10(X) of the observations delet-
ed from the sample. Most of these trans-
actions involve borrowers in the middle
income ranges. There are several justifi-
cations for the FILVVA exclusion.
First, since neither the Federal Hous-
ing Administration nor the Veterans Ad-
ministration offered ARMs until the end
of 1987, an FHA or VA bortower in the
sample could not have had the option of
choosing an ARM. Second, FHA and
VA loans typically carry loan-to-value ra-
tios in excess of 90 percent. The FHA
and VA mortgage programs thus help to
solve the "downpayment" problem faced
by many households, but are unable to
provide much reUef for borrowers facing
the "qualification" problem, in which
mortgage payments exceed 28 percent of
income. (This result is unfortunate,
since ARMs seem particularly well-suited
to the latter group of borrowers.)
Exclusion of FHA and VA households
from the subsample properly limits the
focus of the study to those borrowers un-
likely to be constrained in their choices
by a lack of downpayment. Transactions
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financed by conventional (not FHA or
VA) loans with loan-to-value ratios ex-
ceeding 95 percent are excluded as well,
since the borrowers are likely to have
faced downpayment problems in obtain-
ing financing.
The Environment
It is interesting to explore the overall
pattern of housing activity during the
sample period. Do overall macroeco-
nomic trends suggest that the 1984-1987
period is a useful interval for study? The
answer appears to be affirmative, with
several aspects of the sample period indi-
cating that the empirical results of the
study are likely to be quite meaningful.
First, the 1984-1987 period was a
time of substantial activity in the na-
tion's housing market. A total of 12.5
million new and existing dwelling units
were sold during the period; this total
equals approximately one fourth of all
owner-occupied housing units in exis-
tence at the end of 1983. The level of
transaction activity, which rivaled that of
the housing boom of the late 1970's,
makes it clear that the period of the study
was not one of thin markets in which ab-
errations could dominate.
Second, inflation during the period
was low and relatively stable, with no
year showing a Consumer Price Index in-
crease of more than 4 percent. Although
housing prices tended to increase slightly
more than the CPl toward the end of
1987, the constant-quality housing price
index reported by the Census Bureau in-
creased by little more than 1 1 percent
from the end of 1983 to the beginning of
1988. The environment was therefore
one in which the effects of inflation on
the housing market were minimal.
Third, mortgage interest rates varied
dramatically over the period. The FRM
rate declined from a high near 13.2 per-
cent in late 1984 to a low of about 9.1
percent in the spring of 1987, and the
ARM rate showed similar variability. In
addition, the spread between FRM and
ARM rates was quite volatile during the
sample period, ranging from a high of
206 basis points to a low of 62 basis
points over the period. The wide varia-
tion in both the level of rates and the
FRM-ARM spread should allow accurate
measurement of the effects of these varia-
bles on mortgage choice.
Finally, the share of ARMs in the con-
ventional mortgage market also displayed
substantial volatility over the period. The
sample share, which is computed through
a three-month moving average of monthly
ARM shares (weighted by the number of
observations) tends to be slightly lower
than the ARM share found in a 1985-
1987 Federal Home Loan Bank Board
study. ARMs accounted for roughly two
thirds of all conventional loans at the be-
ginning and again at the end of the period.
In the intervening years, however, the
ARM share fell as low as 25 percent.
Since the interval thus includes periods of
both high and low ARM popularity, the
validity of the study is likely to be high.
Results
Answers to the questions discussed earlier
are as follows. First, analysis of the data
shows that ARM borrowers pay attention
to indicators of future interest rates in de-
ciding how much housing to buy. In par-
ticular, when the prevailing FRM rate is
high relative to the ARM rate (when the
"spread" is high), ARM borrowers cut
back on the sizes of the houses they pur-
chase. The reason is that a large FRM -
ARM spread signals that future ARM
rates are expected to be high (since the
FRM rate is a predictor of future short-
term interest rates). The ARM borrower
seeks protection from payment shock that
would result from ARM rate increases by
buying a smaller house.
An additional finding is that under typ-
ical interest rate conditions, a given indi-
vidual will purchase 12 percent more
housing if an adjustable rate mortgage is
obtained than if the loan carries a fixed
rate. This result shows that ARMs do in
fact stimulate the demand for housing, as
popular accounts have alleged. An impli-
cation of this finding is that consumers
and the housing industry both benefit
from the presence of ARMs in the mar-
ketplace. House sizes are larger than they
would be in a world where only fixed rate
mortgage loans were available.
The fact that borrowers with ARMs
buy larger residences also has important
implications for the nature of the housing
cycle that accompanies the general busi-
ness cycle. For example, it has been ob-
served that because of changing afforda-
bility, new borrowers prefer ARMs when
interest rates are high but move into
FRMs when interest rates fall. Since, as
indicated above, ARM borrowers buy
more housing, it follows that borrowers
are motivated to shift toward the high-
demand financing mode (ARMs) as rates
rise. The shift to ARMs moderates the
decline in overall demand caused by high-
er interest rates; demand falls by less than
it would if adjustable-rate fmancing were
not available. In effect, ARMs reduce the
need for downsizing home purchases dur-
ing periods of high interest rates.
The reverse occurs as interest rales
fall. With borrowers shifting toward the
low-demand financing mode (FRMs) as
rates fall, the stimulative effect of lower
interest rates is dampened. The availabil-
ity of adjustable-rate loans therefore
makes the housing market more stable
than it used to be, with overall demand
falling by less at interest rate peaks and
rising by less at interest rate troughs. In
addition to their stabilizing effect on
house sizes, ARMs also stabilize the
market by mitigating the "postponement"
effect. ARMs permit buyers who would
otherwise postpone home purchases to
stay in the market during periods of high
interest rates.
In summary, the availability of adjust-
able rate mortgages has both stimulated
and stabilized the housing market. Aver-
age houses purchased are larger than they
would be in an FRM-only world, and va-
riation in housing demand is less over the
interest rate cycle than it was before the
introduction of ARMs. This new mort-
gage instrument has thus benefited both
consumers and producers in the housing
industry.
Jan K. Brueckner is Professor ofEconom-
ics at the University ofIllinois at Urbana-
Champaign. James R. Follain served as
Director of the Office ofReal Estate Re-
searchfrom August 1984 until August
1988. He is now Professor of Economics
and Chairman of the Department ofEco-
nomics at Syracuse University.
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Donald Rundblom Discusses Mortgage Markets, U of I
Donald Rundblom has an extensive back-
ground in the mortgage lending and mort-
gage-backed securitiesfields. Infact, he
could be called a pioneer in the area of
commercial loan securitization. His own
story, to a great extent, parallels the de-
velopment of the secondary mortgage
markets over the past several years.
A native of Wheaton, Illinois, Rund-
blom began his collegiate studies as afo-
restry major at the University ofMonta-
na. But c^ter a year, Midwestern roots
and career considerations led him back to
Illinois and to the real estate concentra-
tion in the Urdversity ofIllinoisfinance
program. While still a U ofI student,
Rundblom became involved in property
management and real estate development.
Upon graduation in 1975, Rundblom
began a series of career steps that have
taken himfrom traditional corporatefi-
nance to mortgage lending to thefore-
front of Wall Street's involvement in
mortgage-backed securities. In Septem-
ber of this year, Rundblom left the fast-
paced New York lifestyle behind and re-
turned to Illinois toform a commercial
mortgage banking firm with Champaign
businessman Clint Atkins. Rundblom
will also teach the University's course in
Real Estate Financial Markets in the
coming semester.
ORER Letter spoke with Rundblom
on his career, past andpresent; on the
real estate and mortgage markets; and on
his instructional undertakings.
How did your real estate career take
shape? I got a good start from my
course work at the University. Karl
Guntermann was in charge of the pro-
gram, Jerry Wagner taught investment,
and Austin Jaffe was a T.A. And while I
was in school I managed student apart-
ment complexes for Norrick and Morrow.
During the two school years and sum-
mers I was there I progressed to looking
at deals they were putting together and
doing demographic research.
I wanted to work in real estate when I
graduated, but the job market was still
suffering from the 1973-74 recession.
Brunswick Corporation interviewed on
campus, and I accepted a position in their
corporate finance department. It was an
interesting job, analyzing the credit of
companies Brunswick dealt with. And
while it wasn't really what I wanted to do,
the job brought me into contact with
mortgage bankers Salk, Ward, and Salk.
I worked with them on a bond issue they
underwrote for Brunswick to finance con-
struction of bowling alleys.
In June of 1976 Salk asked me to join
their organization. That was the start of
my career in commercial mortgage bank-
ing. They were then one of Chicago's
premier mortgage bankers; many success-
ful Chicago mortgage bankers got their
start working for Salk. I began as a loan
analyst, doing everything from appraisals
to demographic studies on financing deals
senior partners were putting together for
institutional cUents. A year after joining
the firm, I graduated to loan officer. My
job was to contact developers who needed
financing for commercial, industrial, and
multi-family projects, and then place the
loans with various correspondent lenders.
I left Salk in 1978 to become a loan
officer with Banco Mortgage, which later
became Norwest Mortgage and is now
GMAC Mortgage. My duties still in-
volved commercial mortgage banking,
though I had more autonomy. But by
1979 I saw a cloud on the mortgage bank-
ing horizon. I felt rates might go above
10%, and I didn't see how you could do
deals at 10% rates. So I accepted a posi-
tion, which I held for almost five years,
at Talman Federal in Chicago, supervis-
ing origination of commercial, industrial,
and multi-family loans. I was responsi-
ble for procurement, bringing in new
business. I saw myself as a mortgage
banker working for a captive portfolio.
Our operation was very successful.
When I joined Talman, assets were about
$2.3 billion. A series of mergers with
other S&L's, some of them billion dollar
institutions themselves, took the level to
about $6.5 billion. Unfortunately, rates
went quite high, and the portfolios of the
acquired S&L's had a lot of loans at very
low rates. Under "purchase accounting,"
assets were marked to their current market
values. The difference from par was put
into goodwill and amortized over forty
years. It kept thrifts technically solvent
and in business.
Rates finally started to rally, that is to
move downward, allowing us to recognize
some profit and to do some balance sheet
restructuring. Thrifts had begun more ac-
tive asset-liability management; they
didn't want to hold long-term loans fi-
nanced by short-term deposits. To better
manage its portfolio, Talman began, as
did many thrifts, to sell loans in the sec-
ondary market. I was in charge of the
commercial portfolio; it had a value of
probably $250 million.
Selling these discounted loans was my
first exposure to Wall Street. In 1982
Talman worked with First Boston and
Salomon Brothers in structuring some
early forms of commercial mortgage-
backed securities. Selling a couple of
hundred million dollars' worth of some of
the first commercial mortgage-backed se-
curities to other institutions and to Wall
Street really developed my interest in the
field of securitization.
In the summer of 1983, Fannie Mae
contacted me about running their new
multi-family mortgage operation out of
Washington; they had just received HUD
approval to buy non-insiu^ed multi-family
loans in the market. They decided I was
too young for that position, so they hired
me to run the Midwest operation.
Over the next few months we got ap-
proval for a Midwest loan servicer and put
some loans on the books. But then at the
end of 1983, after I'd been with Fannie
Mae less than six months. First Boston
invited me to join their operation in New
York to trade commercial whole loans.
Fannie Mae was a very interesting place
to work, but Wall Street was a career
move I couldn't pass up.
At First Boston I started an operation
to trade commercial loans and other real
estate related products. This was during
the period when the market for whole
loans, both residential and commercial,
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was really developing. I was involved in
trading at First Boston for close to two
years. Then Morgan Stanley offered me
the chance to get into the actual structur-
ing of securities. I accepted a position in
the mortgage products group within their
Fixed Income department I worked on
structurings with insurance company cli-
ents and with our real estate department,
known initially as Brooks Harvey and
now as Morgan Stanley Realty.
Morgan Stanley Realty people were
the classic brokers and mortgage bankers
on high profile transactions. When they
had a large scale project and wanted a sec-
uritized transaction so they could commit
to the developer, they worked with me
and with the Fixed Income department.
The mortgage products group handled a
number of investment banking activities,
including mortgage finance, commercial
mortgage-backed securities, strips, collat-
eralized mortgage obligations (CMOs),
AA-rated pass throughs, and other asset-
backed transactions, such as securities
backed by car loans or airplane leases. I
was involved in those activities from
1985 until I came back to Champaign.
What could lure a Wall Streeter back to
the prairie? The opportunity to work
with a long-time friend, Clint Atkins, did
the job. Clint has many business inter-
ests, including Hobbico, Herr's in Dan-
ville, and his accounting, insurance, and
real estate operations. It's great to be
employed by someone who supports the
University the way Clint does; he's will-
ing to let someone coming in to build
one of his new businesses take lime for
activities on campus. He's been very
supportive of my plans to teach a course.
Clint hired me to start a commercial
mortgage banking firm, and to run his
new real estate acquisitions program.
We'd like to eventually operate nation-
wide, but we're starting in the Midwest
because of the importance of property
management. While we're putting to-
gether the infrastructure of this firm, it
would be difficult to effectively manage
an apartment complex in San Diego.
For now, we see remarkable potential
here, in a community at the crossroads of
three Interstates and within a few hours
of Chicago, St Louis, and Indianapolis.
I think youll see continued growth in
Champaign-Urbana, particularly in ware-
housing and distribution. The economy
is stable, because of the University and a
diversified group of other employers.
We want to start out buying existing
properties instead of developing. I know
the insurance industry, which has fol-
lowed a portfolio strategy of owning both
mortgages and equities. We think the
equity component is starting to turn over,
and that's good for us; it's the type of
high quality product we definitely want to
consider. We've got the mortgage bank-
ing firm to do our leveraging, and we'll
provide our in-house expertise to other
people. I'm not sure that the area has yet
attracted its fair share of capital. By ap-
proaching life insurers and other major in-
stitutions, I feel we can introduce a new
element of competition that will benefit
developers in Central Illinois.
What are your activities with the Mort-
gage Bankers Association? The Mort-
gage Bankers' Association of America is a
tremendous trade organization. People
don't realize how many different types of
fums are involved. In addition to mort-
gage bankers, commercial banks and
S&L's are major members. Insurers, pen-
sion fund advisors, and Wall Street fums
are also active participants. MBA is split
into two segments, residential and com-
mercial. The Association's biggest com-
mittee is the income property committee.
As one of four vice-chairmen of that com-
mittee, I'm in charge of overseeing a
number of subcommittees, including the
securitization and secondary markets sub-
committee and the environmental sub-
committee. The environmental area is
extremely important right now. Hazard-
ous wastes and asbestos are having a ma-
jor impact on lending practices and loan
purchasing.
Lenders face tremendous liability expo-
sure. For example, a lender in Maryland
foreclosed on a property and was held li-
able for toxic waste cleanup. So now be-
fore lenders foreclose and take title they
investigate their liability. A cleanup
could easily cost more than the market
value of a property. Or consider a build-
ing built in the early 1970's with asbes-
tos. There are lenders that will not lend
on properties with asbestos problems,
even midtown Manhattan properties. Re-
moval costs can be extraordinarily high;
think how that affects property value.
This is a major issue that we've barely
begun to uncover.
Which other mortgage market develop-
ments should we befollowing? We've
only scratched the surface on where the
secondary markets are going to go. No
longer are lenders assuming that loans
will be held to maturity in their portfoli-
os. Institutional investors are certainly
looking at commercial lending for pur-
poses other than their own portfolios. A
couple of insiu^ers are looking to originate
commercial mortgage loans to use as col-
lateral for CMO's. Although there is a
lull at the present, I think capital market
firms will continue to be committed to
this area.
By definition, every loan a mortgage
banker makes is to be sold. Lenders that
make loans conforming to Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac standards look to Wall
Street to hedge risks and make a continu-
ing market in their newly-created securi-
ties. Wall Street is very important for
residential mortgage bankers, and is be-
coming imfxjrtant to the commercial mar-
ket. During the past eighteen months a
tremendous flow of funds has become
available for long-term commercial mort-
gages, particularly from insurers flush
with cash. Yet the real estate market na-
tionwide has been seriously overbuilt.
There isn't the same quantity of quality
assets to lend on that there once was.
Securitization of new loans over the
past few years hasn't been as strong as it
was in the immediately preceding period.
There's been so much competition among
lenders for a finite supply of products that
spreads have been driven down to a point
at which it's difficult to make money do-
ing commercial securitization on new
originations. I view these thin spreads as
a short-term phenomenon, though it's
hard to say when the trend will change.
The Morgan Stanleys and First Bostons
try hard to find arbitrage possibilities, but
the spreads just haven't been there. There
was a big bang a couple of years ago
about commercial conduits being formed
(continued on page 10)
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to channel originations into securities to
be sold worldwide. It hasn't occurred, be-
cause traditional lenders, especially insu-
rance companies, have become so aggres-
sive in lending on quality properties that
it's not profitable to package the loans
into securities. Money can't be made on
thin spreads, given the cost of rating agen-
cies, registration, credit enhancement, and
underwriting.
On the residential front, you can see
why sometimes there aren't many CMO's
available in the market; many different
dealers watch every tick of the market, and
as soon as there's an arbitrage possibility
they hit it. Morgan Stanley had three pro-
fessionals at computers, working every
coupon of every mortgage-backed security
available. If a price change of two or
three 32nds gave us an arbitrage and we
could make a deal, the CMO was brought
to market immediately.
Insurance company motivations are
changing. They're more careful about as-
set-liability mismatches on their balance
sheets, and they can now work with a
whole new group of assets. Commercial
loans were seen as illiquid five years ago,
whereas now, because of rating and credit
enhancement, they are assets that can be
managed. That's why I'm bullish long
term, though over the next year there may
not be a lot of activity. In the 1970's,
people felt the same way about Ginnie
Maes, when they weren't a major compo-
nent of the capital market. Now any loan
not made for portfolio purposes can be put
into a Ginnie if it's new VA or FHA, into
a Fannie or Freddie security dej)ending on
underwriting and statutory loan limits, or
into a AA pass-through if it's a non-
conforming loan. ARMs and bi-weekly
loans are being securitized now, not just
long-term, fixed rate mortgages.
Asset-backed transactions will continue
to grow substantially, especially in light
of the new risk-adjusted capital require-
ments that institutions insured by the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation will be
applying to loan portfolios by 1991.
This system will cause commercial bank-
ers to behave more like mortgage bankers,
making decisions on risk in relation to
capital requirements put forth by FDIC.
Traditional lenders will probably continue
to be the biggest originators of all types
of loans, but they'll manage their balance
sheets much more effectively.
What are your plans in your new role as
instructorfor the Real Estate Financial
Markets course? Teaching isn't com-
pletely new to me. I've done a lot of
speaking on securitization through the
Mortgage Bankers Association and Na-
tional Council of Thrifts. And I'll give a
Mortgage Bankers Association seminar in
New York this year, as I have for several
years. I'll review new trends in the indus-
try, the deals that were done, and the deals
that didn't go through and why.
Students who study real estate can
build very promising futiu^es. A good un-
derstanding of real estate and securities
should open career options far beyond the
traditional fields of brokerage, lending,
and development. That's why the course
should blend practical aspects of real
estate and capital markets with the more
theoretical aspects. We'll have a basic
textbook, plus a lot of additional materi-
als that I'll get from the industry. Wall
Street produces a lot of tremendous re-
search. Morgan Stanley and other dealers
have agreed to provide us with research
publications, which will be a valuable ad-
dition to the text
My experiences will certainly in-
fluence my approach to the class. You
don't really know real estate lending until
you're forced to foreclose on a property
that you made the loan on and thought
was terrific collateral; we'll cover that as-
pect. One of the last things I worked on
at Morgan Stanley was the seciuitization
of home equity lines of credit. How do
you securitize a loan that can be out for
six months or ten years? Wall Street has
developed methods for structuring unique
securitizations, such as credit card loans
and lines of credit. We'll spend time on
the structuring of securities like these.
With experience in everything from
structuring commercial mortgage-backed
seciuities to originating huge commercial
loans that were later securitized in the
capital markets, and knowing the motiva-
tion behind the design of CMO's and
strips, I can share a lot of useful informa-
tion with students. I can tell them what
the actual thinking is on Wall Street.
U OF I FACULTY
ACTIVE AT AREUEA
Several University of Illinois faculty
who work actively with ORER will
present papers or serve as session lead-
ers or discussants at the 1988 meetings
of the American Real Estate and Urban
Economics Association (AREUEA).
ORER Professor Peter Colwell will
present a paper on the value of non-
residential property in Chicago, and
will also be a presenter in a session on
the economics of architectural design.
In addition, he will serve as a discuss-
ant in sessions on real estate brokerage
and the analysis of real estate returns.
Professor Roger Cannaday, an
ORER Research Associate, will preside
in a session on property taxes, and will
present a paper on the relationship be-
tween brokerage firm activity and local
economic activity.
Another ORER Research Associate,
Professor Jan Brueckner, will serve as a
discussant in sessions on lu-ban struc-
ture and land rents, housing markets,
and property valuation.
Professor Larry DeBrock of the De-
partment of Economics will present the
results of his study, "The Effect of
Multiple Listing Services on Residen-
tial Real Estate Broker Behavior." The
results have been published as Paper
#62 in the ORER Paper Series.
Finance Professor Louis Scott
,
ORER Research Assistant Tai-Le
Yang, and former ORER Director Jim
FoUain will present a paper (ORER
Pap)er #69) that they co-authored on
mortgage loan prepayments.
Professor Yoon Dokko of the De-
partment of Finance will present a co-
authored paper on the optimal design of
mortgage instruments.
Professor Phelim Boyle, a visiting
faculty member in the Department of
Finance, will present a co-authored pa-
per on mortgage loan defaults.
The meetings will be held December
28-30 in New York City.
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Self Reports of Motivation:
How Useful Are They in Predicting Sales Performance?
Vicki F. Hensler and Samuel E. Krug
Although it has been defined in different
ways, "motivation" has consistently
emerged as a fundamental variable in ex-
plaining behavior. Yet motivation
sometimes receives less attention than it
merits, due to a perceived difficulty in
measuring it reliably. We have studied a
new instrument designed to predict moti-
vation's impact on job performance. The
instrument is SPECTRUM (Braskamp
and Maehr, 1985), a self-report question-
naire that measures four factors believed
to affect motivation: Recognition, Ac-
complishment, Power, and Affiliation.
The topic is motivation's impact on per-
formance of real estate salespeople.
The sample consists of the full-time
salespeople employed for more than a
year at eight residential brokerage firms
in three Midwestern cities. Objective
performance data were obtained directly
from managers of the agencies. The data
consists of the number of listings, num-
ber of sales, and dollar sales volume, all
for the same 12 month period. We meas-
ured the effectiveness of SPECTRUM by
comparing its predicted results with the
three actual measures of performance.
Correlations between SPECTRUM
predictions and actual performance are
statistically significant, meaning that re-
lationships between self-reported motiva-
tion and subsequent performance is too
strong to be explained by coincidence
alone. The results suggest that internal
motivation is a stronger predictor of suc-
cess than are either the overall woric cli-
mate of the salesperson's agency or the
opportunities available in the job.
One method for interpreting the data is
to observe differences in measured scores
between those with more than $3 million
in sales and those who sold less than
$500,000 during the period of the study.
On the Power scale, for example, top
performers scored on average at the 86th
percentile, while low performers scored
on average at the 32nd percentile.
Brokers may tend to base hiring deci-
sions primarily on interviews, which of-
ten provide invalid results. More valid
measures, such as responses to the
SPECTRUM questionnaire, would result
in the hiring of more productive salespeo-
ple. Firms that are yet more selective can
achieve results even better than those real-
ized using SPECTRUM alone. For ex-
ample, a firm might combine our validity
results with productivity data from a 1986
study by Follain, Lutes, and Meier.
Using combined results, we estimate
that a firm hiring only one out of ten ap-
plicants could achieve an average increase
in sales of $3,814 per new salesperson
per year. Even a less selective firm, hir-
ing nine out of ten applicants, would
achieve a gain of $697 per new agent.
The impact is even more significant in
terms of total firm profits. First, higher
productivity should continue through the
years of employment. Since, in our sam-
ple, average length of employment with a
broker was four years, the total per person
productivity impact during a salesperson's
tenure could range, in non-discounted
terms, from $2,788 to $15,256. Second,
the typical firm in the study by Follain
et. al. employed 16 or 17 agents. There-
fore, productivity gain per person should
be multiplied by total sales agents. De-
pending again on selectivity, total gain
could range from $46,000 to $260,000.
Motivation appears to be a critical
factor in predicting behavior in general,
and in predicting real estate salesperson
productivity in particular. The results of
this study demonstrate that self reports of
motivation are useful predictors of objec-
tive performance measures. In particular,
the results show that a self-assessment
questionnaire, which should take only 15-
20 minutes for the applicant to complete,
can add dramatically to salesperson pro-
ductivity and the firm's bottom Hne.
Vicki F. Hensler is Coordinator of the Job
Placement Office at Parkland College. Sa-
muel E. Krug, PhD., is President of Met-
riTech, Inc. Copies ofa longer paper on
this topic are available at no costfrom
MetriTech, 111 N. Market Street, Cham-
paign. IL 61820, Phone (217) 398-4868.
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Diamond-Star Spurs Building Activity
Production at Diamond-Star has directed
the nation's attention to Bloomington-
Normal. The accompanying graph, based
on reported data through September of
1988 and on projected data through the end
of the year, shows total property values
reflected in new construction permits.
An interesting, if somewhat obvious, ob-
servation is the extraordinary 1986 non-
residential building activity. It comes as
no surprise that permits for Diamond-Star
construction were issued that year.
There is a less obvious, and more inter-
esting, point. The economic activity that
accompanied plant construction brought
the value of new single-family homes
built, in nominal dollars, to a level ex-
ceeding that of 1977, the previous historic
high. While other areas have rebounded
since the early 1980's downturn, few Illi-
nois markets outside the Chicago and St.
Louis metro areas have surpassed levels
reached under the favorable market and in-
terest rate conditions of the late 1970's.
Multi-family construction, however,
has not experienced an increase. Such a
pattern parallels recent experience in other
areas, following 1986 tax law changes. It
will be interesting to note the degree to
which multi-family activity increases as
support industries, staffed by less well
paid individuals, move into the area.
McLEAN COUNTY CONSTRUCTION PERMIT VALUES
Millions of Dollars
72 74
Multi-Family
76 78 80
Single-Family
82 84 86 88
Non-Residential
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The Economic Impact of Property
Tax Incentives
Joseph J.
1 recent years, localities have relied to an
icreasing extent on property tax incen-
ives as economic development tools,
rhe desirability of using such incentives
may be evaluated through an analysis of
the resulting financial flows to firms and
to various levels of government.
Past research has focused on the in-
fluence of the property tax on firms' loca-
tion decisions. It has failed to specify the
exact conditions under which firms open,
expand, or relocate operations based on tax
incentives; or receive subsidies despite
lack of tax influence on location deci-
sions. Most studies have found that prop-
erty tax levels are not significant in deter-
mining firms' initial locations, and do not
cause firms to relocate in other metropoli-
tan areas. However, a consensus may be
building that lower tax rates or lower as-
sessed values can induce firms to move
within metropolitan areas; several studies
show an inverse relationship between tax
rates and the level of business activity.
A locality seeking to attract businesses
may offer property tax abatements (re-
bates), permitting firms locating in the
area to pay reduced taxes for a period of
years. Alternatively, under tax increment
financing (TIF), a firm pays its full prop-
erty tax but receives other governmental
benefits for locating in a TIF district. TIF
is a newer economic tool, which has been
the subject of little research to date.
Tax Abatement and the Firm's
Location Decision
A firm strives to maximize, over the long
run, the discounted expected value of its
after-tax profits. Because location can in-
fluence factors that determine both out-
flows (land, labor, and transportation
costs; property and income taxes) and in-
Chinn
flows (sales revenues and tax abatements),
each firm must include location in its
profitability analysis.
Local governments know that firms
undertake such analyses, and may offer
property tax abatements to entice firms to
locate in their jurisdictions. Such offers
are not, of course, without risk for gov-
ernmental units. In offering tax abate-
ments, a taxing authority must consider
three possible outcomes and the respective
impacts on the locality.
Case I: An established firm relocates
to the area only because of tax reduction;
without the tax abatement it would earn
more profits in an alternate location. The
greater the disadvantage that the location
would otherwise present, the greater the
tax incentive the local government must
provide to an entering firm. Yet abate-
ment in this case is not a "zero-sum"
game, with recipients gaining the full val-
ue given up by donors; it is a "negative-
sum" game. The firm does not receive
the full benefit of abatement, because it
pays income tax on added profits, thereby
transferring part of the local largesse to
state and federal coffers. Society also suf-
fers a loss, because the tax incentive caus-
es the firm to bypass the optimal loca-
tion.
Assume, for example, that a firm ex-
pects pre-tax profit of $1 million if it lo-
cates in the optimal city, but of only
S900,0(X) in the local jurisdiction. A lo-
cal tax abatement program, however, re-
duces the firm's property tax, and increas-
es its profits, by $250,000. Assume
further that the firm faces 40% combined
state and federal income tax rates. By ac-
cepting the incentives, the firm earns an
extra $150,000 in pre-tax profit, $60,000
(continued on page 2)
ALUMNI LUNCHEON
SCHEDULED FOR APRIL
There will be a luncheon in Chicago
for U of I real estate alumni on Friday,
April 21. Gene Stunard has again
arranged for the use of the Chicago
Yacht Club facilities. A cash bar will
be available, and Roger Cannaday is
arranging for a luncheon speaker. The
special insert in Letters addressed to
alumni contains details and reservation
information.
COLWELL JOINS WEIMER
FACULTY, lAR COMMITTEE
ORER Professor Peter F. Colwell has
been appointed to the faculty of the
Weimer School of the Homer Hoyt
Advanced Studies Institute (HHASF).
Through its Weimer School, the Hoyt
Institute grants postdoctoral fellow-
ships to promising scholars in the real
estate and urban economics field. Each
researcher in the program completes a
project under the guidance of a faculty
advisor. Those who serve as Institute
faculty are senior members of the pro-
fession and fellows of the HHASI.
Colwell has also been appointed by
Illinois Association of Realtors® Pres-
ident William Cahill to serve as a Di-
rector of the Illinois Real Estate Edu-
cational Foundation (REEF) and as a
member of its Scholarship Commit-
tee. The Illinois Real Estate Educa-
tional Foundation provides and admin-
isters scholarships, and promotes edu-
cational programs in academic institu-
tions and within professional organiza-
tions. Colwell will serve on the com-
mittee through the 1989 calendar year.
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Tax Incentives
(continuedfrom thefirst page)
of which is paid as income tax. Cost to
the community, however, of generating a
$150,000 benefit is $250,000. Societal
loss of $100,000 results from a "success-
ful" tax abatement program; that amount
of value is lost to society through subop-
timal land allocation.
The community, of course, expects net
long-term benefits. Most states limit
abatement periods by statute to ten years,
and localities expect to receive full ad val-
orem taxes thereafter. Yet the firm earns
positive income in that location only
with tax incentives, and the more gener-
ous the abatement, the more likely it is
that the firm could benefit by moving to
the optimal location (or to a new jurisdic-
tion offering incentives) after the abate-
ment period. Tax abatement, then, bur-
dens society not only with financial loss,
but also with disruption, as it increases
the likelihood that firms will frequently
relocate.
Case II: The firm receives an abate-
ment, but would have located in the area
even without incentives. Since it is im-
possible for a local government to distin-
guish between firms that would locate in
the area even without tax relief and those
that would require incentives, all firms en-
tering the area (or expanding) receive
abatements. A study using Ohio data de-
termined that a substantial majority of
abatements are given to firms that would
not have required them. The result is a
transfer of resources from local jurisdic-
tions to firms, and to the state and federal
governments through income tax collec-
tions. Strangely, though, there is no net
loss to society under such circumstances.
Assume that a firm expects pre-tax
profit of $1.1 million, even without tax
incentives, if it locates in the optimal lo-
cation; but of only $1 million in the sec-
ond-best location. Tax abatement in the
optimal location reduces the firm's proper-
ty tax, and increases profit, by $250,000.
By locating in the optimal area and receiv-
ing an abatement from that community,
the firm earns an extra $250,000 in pre-
tax profit, $100,000 (again assuming
40%) of which is paid as income tax.
Since it costs only $250,000 to generate a
$250,000 total benefit, there is loss to the
local community, but no societal loss.
Yet the result is still a negative-sum,
rather than zero-sum, game. Tax abate-
ment programs place high administrative
costs on both the jurisdictions that estab-
lish them and the firms that participate.
Case ID: A newly created firm locates
in the area, or an established firm in the
area expands, only because of tax abate-
ment However, if a new firm or an ex-
panded operation could have been profita-
ble (shown by positive net present value)
without tax incentives, it would already
have been established somewhere. If the
new firm or expanded operation shows a
positive net present value only with tax
abatement, then a new firm or expansion
has been created which otherwise would
not have been viable. A later removal of
the tax subsidy would, presumably, cause
the new firm or expanded operation to fail.
It is inefficient to channel scarce money to
firms that, absent subsidies, show nega-
tive net present values.
Is TIF the Solution?
Firms relocating in tax increment financ-
ing districts pay full ad valorem property
taxes. The (perhaps indirect) benefit to re-
locating firms is that the incremental tax
paid on the value of new property (or pro-
ceeds from bonds sold in anticipation of
increased tax revenue) is allocated to pub-
lic-purpose redevelopment uses. State
laws typically require that TIF be offered
only in blighted areas, but statutes provide
different definitions of blight.
The benefit of TIF is that it can im-
prove the economic efficiency of an area.
Such a favorable result is possible, how-
ever, only if redevelopment expenditure is
for infrastructure improvement that truly
benefits the entire community. If the
"pubhc purpose" use of TIF funds is to
prepare parcels for sale at reduced prices to
private developers (land "write-downs"),
the result to the community is the same as
that provided by tax abatement. Yet in ei-
ther case, taxes may be shifted from other
taxing districts to TIF jurisdictions.
Land write-downs are designed to foster
developments which would otherwise not
be undertaken. Developers benefit by buy-
ing properties from the public sector at
discounted prices (of up to 100% in cases
of total write-downs). Though a firm de-
veloping property for its own use can re-
ceive a write-down, professional develop-
ers are the typical recipients. If a goal of
local tax policy is to attract new business
to the area, TIF is less desirable than tax
abatement, unless developers share TIF
,
benefits with end-user firms. I
A sharing of the subsidy can be ana-
lyzed in a manner similar to that of prop-
erty tax abatement. A firm will only lo-
cate in the TIF district if expected after-
tax profits with the subsidy are higher
than they would be in other locations. A
firm locates based on a land write-down if
the combined value of the write-down
plus the expected pre-tax profit in the ju-
risdiction exceeds expected profit in the
otherwise-optimal location. In this situa-
tion, inefficiency in the form of a net so-
cietal loss occurs for the same reason
(suboptimal allocation) as that which oc-
curs under tax abatement. Revenue that
the government foregoes is not property
tax, but rather the discounted value of the
land write-down given the firm.
Of course, a firm would locate in the
TIF district if that location promised
higher profit, even without subsidy, than
other locations. If the government pro-
vides a land write-down to such a firm,
there is a transfer from the local jurisdic-
tion but not a net societal loss. The re-
sult is similar to that in the Case II tax
abatement situation discussed above.
Firms making location decisions must
consider two main differences between tax
abatement and land write-downs. First,
abatement increases profit on a yearly op-
erating basis, whereas a write-down reduc-
es initial capital costs (unless the write-
down causes an end-user to pay reduced
periodic rent to a developer, in which case
the write-down has the same effect as tax
abatement). Second, a tax abatement
goes directly to the end-user firm. If a
write-down benefits the real estate devel-
oper, at best only a portion of the sub-
sidy goes to the end-user, so tax abate-
ment is of more value to the end-user
firm than is a write-down. Therefore,
there is greater likelihood that new firms
will locate in the area because of abate-
ment than because of write-downs. Of
course, if an end-user acts as its own de-
veloper, then the value of a write-down is
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equivalent to that of a property tax abate-
ment, assuming the costs to the public
sector are the same.
Potential Tax Shifting With TIF
With TIF, there can be an effective tax
shift from other taxing districts to the
municipal district in which TIF is prac-
ticed. A shift occurs unless 100% of the
increase in the tax base (total assessed
value of all properties) is caused by IIF-
related expenditures. If inflation or ordi-
nary market forces increase assessed val-
ues, a tax shift ensues. Taxes can be
shifted either from other taxing districts
within the municipality practicing TIF or
from districts outside the municipality.
Tax shifting is possible because the
TIF district collects tax on all increases
in assessed property values in excess of a
base year value. Property taxes, then,
shift from school, park, and sanitation
districts to the general municipal taxing
district. To the extent that tax district
boundaries cross city boundaries, taxes
are shifted from residents of other munic-
ipaUties and the county. The county dis-
trict extends beyond municipal bounda-
ries, and in many areas school, park, and
sanitation districts cross municipal
boundaries. If a school district encom-
passes portions of several municipalities,
an especially large tax shift is possible
because school district millage rates tend
to be substantially higher than municipal
millage rates. Generally, the tax shift
from one city to another (inter-city) is
more of a policy concern than the shift-
ing of taxes among districts within the
TIF municipality (intra-city). Inter-city
transfers hold more potential for abuse,
because the municipality in which an in-
tra-city transfer occurs is accountable to
its own residents.
As noted, intergovernmental tax shifts
occur to the extent that property values
are increased by inflation and market forc-
es, rather than by llF-financed develop-
ment Land write-downs for develop-
ments that would have located in the
district even without incentives also
cause tax shifts. Administrators of some
TIF districts attempt to define their dis-
tricts' borders to include sites whose
owners have committed to additional con-
struction. Construction, and an attendant
increase in the jurisdiction's values, will
occur after base year valuations are estab-
lished. Added tax revenues attributable to
higher total values accrue to the TIF mu-
nicipality, though the TIF incentives did
not cause the added investment.
The amount of actual tax shifting de-
pends on various taxing districts' bounda-
ries and millage rates. If TIF is to be ef-
fective, the shift should clearly be toward
economically decUning areas. Unform-
nately, evidence suggests that TIF pro-
grams do not yield desired results. An
important study involving Milwaukee and
nearby communities in Wisconsin (a state
that has made extensive use of TIF) deter-
mined that areas gaining the most from
TIF were smaller communities experienc-
ing rapid growth. Large, declining cities
seem to have the least potential to gain
from TIF programs.
TIF Infrastructure Improvements
TIF does carry the potential to correct a
market imperfection that typically cannot
be handled through other government ac-
tion. Infrastructure projects that are not
supported by user fees are usually fi-
nanced with general obligation bonds,
backed by the issuing municipality's full
faith and credit and repaid through proper-
ty tax collections. If a project financed in
such a manner does not increase the local
tax base enough to provide debt service
on the bonds, then the local jurisdiction
must raise added revenues by increasing
either property tax rates or sales tax rates.
A market imperfection exists when a
municipality does not undertake an infra-
structure project which would provide a
positive net present value to society. The
municipal taxing district receives only a
portion of the benefits (higher property
taxes from an increased tax base) while
incurring all the costs; other taxing dis-
tricts receive benefits but pay none of the
costs. A municipahty facing intra-city
and inter-city transfers would undertake a
project if additional taxes accruing to vari-
ous taxing units in the municipality ex-
ceeded the tax outflow to other municipal-
ities. If there is loss of tax revenue to
areas outside the district, the project
creates some degree of positive externali-
ty. TIF can possibly correct for such a
problem by allowing the municipality to
benefit fi^om taxes that would otherwise
accrue to other taxing districts.
Assume that a city expects expansion
of its road system to result in increased
economic activity. The accompanying
rise in real estate values will increase
property tax revenues over the next 30
years; the present value of the exj)ected
revenue increase is $1.2 miUion. The
present value of the project's costs is $1
million. The municipal tax district re-
tains 30% of all real estate taxes collect-
ed, and 75% of the taxes are collected by
taxing districts within the city. A cost/
benefit analysis yields the following re-
sults:
1) The municipal district, which over-
laps city limits, retains only $360,000
(30%) of the $1.2 million benefit, but in-
curs the entire $1 million cost, realizing a
net present value of -$640,000.
2) The city residents receive only
$900,000 (75%) of the $1.2 million ben-
efit, but incur the entire $1 million cost,
realizing net present value of -$100,000.
3) Society receives the entire $1.2 mil-
Uon benefit, so though it incurs the entire
$1 million cost, it still realizes a positive
$200,000 net present value.
The project is not undertaken because
there is a negative net present value to
both the municipal district and the city.
However, such large positive externalities
exist that the project should be undertaken
for the benefit of society. TIF can possi-
bly correct the problem, because it pro-
vides for the municipal taxing district to
retain all incremental taxes generated from
higher real estate values. Yet there are
potential leakages; TIF-financed projects
might raise property values beyond the
district's borders, and a TIF system can
collect the increment only during a statu-
torily limited time period.
The positive externality problem of
general obligation bond financing may
explain the neglect of the nation's infra-
structure system in recent years. Such
neglect is unfortunate; government sur-
veys have shown that firms in virtually
all industries not only weigh the availa-
bility of public works facilities heavily in
their location decisions, but weigh such
availability more heavily than the exis-
tence of tax or other financial incentives.
(continued on page 10)
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Officers Elected,Cannaday Honored
The campus chapter of Rho Epsilon com-
pleted its 1988 fall semester activities
with the election on December 6 of new
chapter officers. Those who were selected
by the membership to serve in the 1989
spring semester are:
President: Brigid Mattingly, a junior
in LAS from Chicago
Vice President: Kathryn Sawyer, a
senior in CBA from Lincolnshire
Secretary: Linda Paolella, a junior in
LAS from Arlington Heights
Treasurer: Lisa Pertile, a senior in
CBA from Western Springs
The Office of Real Estate Research con-
gratulates these individuals.
Another Rho Epsilon activity not pre-
viously reported was the honoring of fa-
culty advisor (and ORER Letter proofreader
extraordinaire) Roger Cannaday at the fall
Alumni Luncheon in Chicago. The chap-
ter officers presented Cannaday with a
commemorative plaque in recognition of
his years of service. Many alumni attend-
ing the luncheon had served as officers in
Rho Epsilon under Cannaday's guidance.
Professor Cannaday has been advisor
since 1979, and has in that time built the
chapter into one of the most active student
organizations on campus and one of the
most active Rho Epsilon chapters in the
nation. U of I was honored as the out-
standing chapter nationwide in 1983-84,
and Cannaday was named outstanding fa-
culty advisor nationally in 1985-86. With
more than 100 active student members, the
U of I chapter is the largest of the nation's
30 Rho Epsilon organizations.
Ursin Named Realtor® of Year
Office of Real Estate Research Advisory
Committee member Don Ursin of Oak
Brook has been named 1989 Illinois Real-
tor® of the Year by the Illinois Associa-
tion of Realtors®. Ursin, a past president
of lAR who has served on the Committee
since September of 1988, is President of
Coldwell-Banker Residential Real Estate
Services of Illinois. He will be honored at
a June banquet in Springfield.
Outstanding Students Recognized
Two seniors majoring in finance with real
estate concentrations have received
Society of Industrial and Office Realtors®
(SIOR) Scholarships for academic year
1988-89, and an alumnus of the program
has been recognized in a prestigious dis-
sertation competition.
The SIOR Scholarship recipients are
James M. Hanson of Hinsdale, a Decem-
ber 1988 graduate, and Todd H. Casper of
Naperville, who plans to graduate in May
1989. The scholarship has been awarded
by the Chicago SIOR chapter each year
since 1984-85. SIOR presents the schol-
arship to the undergraduate student(s) se-
lected by a committee of the real estate fa-
culty as the most outstanding in the
University of Illinois real estate program
during the previous academic year. The
basis for selection includes the student's
performance in the program, other real
estate related activities, and indication of a
commitment to a career in the real estate
field. Previous SIOR scholarship recip-
ients have been Ed McMahon, Fabio
Baum, Patricia Kungie, and Amy Bajadek.
Mark Sunderman, who earned B.S.,
M.S., and Ph.D. degrees in Finance at the
U of I and is now an Assistant Professor
of Finance at the University of Wyoming,
earned second-place honors in the 1988
AREUEA Dissertation Competition.
Sunderman, whose doctoral studies were
concentrated in the real estate area, re-
ceived the honor for his dissertation, enti-
tled "The Value of Mortgage Assump-
tions." The annual competition is jointly
sponsored by the American Real Estate
and Urban Economics Association and the
Homer Hoyt Advanced Studies Institute.
U of I TAKES HONORS
The Journal of the American Real
Estate and Urban Economics Associa-
tion (AREUEA) is a widely recognized
academic publication in the real estate
and urban economics field. In an arti-
cle in the Fall 1988 issue of the Jour-
nal, J. Sa-Aadu of the University of
Rorida and James Shilling of Louisia-
na State University rank researchers and
institutions by the number of authored
articles that have been pubUshed in the
Journal during its fifteen year history.
Rankings of individuals are present-
ed for both the entire 15-year period and
the most recent 5-year period, while in-
stitutions are ranked for the 15-year
period and the three most recent 5-year
intervals. Individuals at the University
of Illinois, and the institution as a
whole, rank among the leaders over the
15-year period. Over the most recent
five years, however, U of I faculty and
the University rank at the top.
In unadjusted rankings, ORER Pro-
fessor Peter Colwell, with six articles,
is the author most published in the
Journal during the 1983-1987 period.
ORER Research Associates Roger
Cannaday and Jan Brueckner also show
outstanding performance, with
Cannaday tied for third place (four arti-
cles) and Brueckner tied for fifth (three
articles). In adjusted rankings, with au-
thors receiving only proportional credit
for co-authored articles, Brueckner
ranks first over the most recent period,
Colwell ties for second, and Cannaday
ties for seventeenth place.
The University of Ilhnois ranks first
in total articles contributed over both
the 15-year period and the most recent
5-year period, though it ranks only
20th in the 1973-1977 period and is
not ranked in the 1978-1982 interval.
Graduates of the University who
now serve with other institutions also
fare well in the rankings; U of I gradu-
ates as a group rank second over the
15-year period and third over the most
recent five years.
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Conference Attendees Learn Market Outlook
On Tuesday, January 10 and Wednesday,
January 1 1, the Office of Real Estate Re-
search presented its third annual series of
Real Estate Outlook Days presentations.
The Tuesday program, held at the Oak
Brook Hills Hotel and Conference Cen-
ter, was jointly sponsored by ORER and
the Illinois Association of Realtors®.
Speakers were William Bryan, Universi-
ty of llUnois Finance Department Chair-
man and Director of the Office of Real
Estate Research; Alan Reichert, Profes-
sor of Finance at llUnois State Universi-
ty; Peter Colwell, ORER Professor of
Real Estate at the University of Illinois;
and John Tuccillo, Chief Economist for
the National Association of Realtors®.
Bryan provided a forecast of the- 1989
economy and housing finance environ-
ment Reichert presented results of hous-
ing market research he has conducted.
Colwell discussed non-residential property
sales in the Chicago area. Tuccillo's dis-
cussion of the housing outlook in various
sections of the U.S. included a prediction
of upward interest rate movements, while
Bryan had forecast a downward trend.
The Wednesday program, held at the
Ambassador West Hotel in Chicago, was
jointly sponsored by ORER and the Chi-
cago Board of Realtors®. The speakers
were WilUam Bryan of the U of I; Alan
Reichert of Illinois State University;
Charles Hill, Executive Vice President of
the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago;
and Christine Williams and Jacques Gor-
don, who serve respectively as Vice Presi-
dent and Director of Research for Real
Estate Research Corporation.
Bryan presented the economic forecast
that he had provided on the previous day.
Reichert again discussed the results of his
housing market research. Hill discussed
the history of mortgage lending in the
U.S., the present state of the market, and
expected future developments. Gordon
and Williams presented their firm's view
of the outlook for various segments of
the Chicago area real estate market.
Presentations such as Real Estate Out-
look Days contribute to the fulfillment of
the public service mission of the Office
of Real Estate Research. The Office
plans to sponsor additional events similar
to Outlook Days. Suggestions from
ORER Letter readers on locations and
topics would be welcome.
Policy on Reprinting Articles
Individuals or organizations wishing to
make further use of ORER Letter articles
may reprint portions of articles, or entire
articles, without seeking express permis-
sion from the Office of Real Estate Re-
search. However, ORER insists that
those who do reprint materials adhere to
the following procedures:
1) The ORER Letter must be named as
the original source of publication,
and the Office of Real Estate Re-
search at the University of llUnois at
Urbana-Champaign must be identified
as the original publisher.
2) Reprints of articles that have been
published under the names of authors
must identify the authors. Many
ORER Letter articles written by the
editorial staff do not identify authors;
in such cases only the ORER Letter,
and not specific authors, need be iden-
tified.
3) The text of reprinted material should
not be altered in any way.
4) Publications provided to paying sub-
scribers may reprint ORER Letter ar-
ticles if they follow the other restric-
tions listed herein. However, reprints
of ORER Letter articles may not oth-
erwise be sold.
5) A partial reprint should be identified
as an excerpt from a longer piece, and
readers should be informed that the en-
tire text is available from the Office
of Real Estate Research or through
the reprinting organization.
6) A copy of any reprinted material, and
information on the publication or oth-
er medium in which it has appeared,
must be sent to Office of Real Estate
Research Director William R. Bryan
at the address listed with editorial in-
formation on page 11.
The restrictions listed herein may be
amended in the future at the discretion of
the Director of the Office of Real Estate
Research. Any such amendment will be
reported in a future issue of the ORER
Letter. Readers with questions on the
policy may contact the Office.
Any individual or organization can regu-
larly receive the quarterly ORER Letter
without charge, but a photocopied reprint
of an out-of-print earlier issue carries a $3
charge.
JRER Issue Addresses
Brokerage Topics
The real estate brokerage industry is the
topic of a recent issue of the Journal of
Real Estate Research. The Journal's Sum-
mer 1988 issue, a special edition spon-
sored by the National Association of Real-
tors®, contains articles on a number of
brokerage topics. Among topics addressed
are the effect of licensing requirements on
complaints against sales agents; commis-
sion rates and broker incomes; franchising
and other factors affecting selection of real
estate agents; agency theory and related lia-
bility issues; and new services offered by
brokerage firms.
The Journal ofReal Estate Research is
the quarterly publication of the American
Real Estate Society (ARES), an associa-
tion of real estate specialists in academics
and industry. Reprints of the issue are
available for $15. Anyone who joins the
ARES can receive a complimentary copy
of the special Summer 1988 issue; the
$40 annual dues include the cost of a 1989
Journal subscription. Send payment for
the brokerage issue, or for membership in
the ARES, to Dr. Theron Nelson, Depart-
ment of Finance, University of North Da-
kota, Grand Forks, ND 58202-8233.
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Farmland Price Indexes: Issues and Alternatives
Arnold W. Oltmans, David L. Chicoine, and John T. Scott, Jr.
The third entry in the ORER Letter Series
is an abbreviated version ofORER Paper
# 65, "Farmland Price Indexes: An Eval-
uation ofAlternativesfor Illinois, 1975-
1984. " Any interested reader can obtain a
copy of the longer version of the paper
through a written or telephoned request to
the Office ofReal Estate Research.
Introduction
The last 20 years have produced a "boom
and bust" cycle in the U.S. farmland
market. The slow but steady apprecia-
tion rates of the 1960's gave way to dou-
ble digit annual rates in the 1970's.
Nominal farmland values peaked in 1981
at more than four times their 1971 lev-
els, and then plummeted during the next
6 years by 50% or more. Illinois farm-
land values appear to have risen faster
and to a higher peak, and then to have
fallen more rapidly, than values in the
U.S. as a whole. Recent evidence indi-
cates a firming of land values in 1987
and modest increases in 1988.
Such rapid change has important pub-
lic and private policy implications. To
assess changes in value, analysts fre-
quently use price indexes. The U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture has published an
annual Index of Farmland Values for in-
dividual states since 1912. Although the
USDA index is widely used, concern ex-
ists about its basic nature and statistical
reliability. For example, the index is
based on a survey of opinions and obser-
vations from individuals knowledgeable
about farm real estate, rather than on a
direct analysis of actual sales price data.
Previous research at the University of
Illinois reveals substantial differences be-
tween the USDA index and average price
indexes based on actual Illinois sales
data. Furthermore, there appear to be
important differences in price changes
over time among regions of the state.
These differences could have important
implications for researchers who use
broad-based statewide indexes in location-
specific micro applications.
The research summarized here applies
hedonic index modeling techniques to II-
^^B^^l£'\^ ^^M^Si III
1984 (1975 = base year)Yearly Index Measures of Illinois Farmland Prices, 1975
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Hedonic 100 121 171 199 222 230 243 229 224 210
USDA 100 125 170 187 220 242 260 239 218 213
Average-A 100 125 181 218 237 247 260 262 197 206
Average-B 100 124 180 214 241 256 269 245 196 223
Figures for years other than 1975 indicate percentage increases over 1975 values. Arith-
metic index A includes parcels of 10 or more acres; B includes parcels of 20 or more acres.
linois farmland. Hedonic, or quality ad-
justed, indexes overcome arithmetic index-
es' inability to control for differences in
quality characteristics of land parcels sold
over time. Little prior work has applied
hedonic techniques, long used successfully
in urban price analysis, to farmland mar-
kets. This study analyzes a representative
slice (1975-1984) of the recent "boom and
bust" cycle in lUinois farmland to explore
the applicability of hedonic models to
farmland markets and to more rigorously
analyze the issues of regional differences.
The Study
The data include 43,932 sales of farm par-
cels of 5 or more acres, involving more
than 2 million total acres, between 1975
and 1984. The information is available
through Real Estate Transfer Declarations
submitted, as required by law, to the Illi-
nois Department of Revenue. Annual
farmland turnover rates during that period
ranged from less than .5% in 1982 to
more than 1.5% in 1979. Organization of
the data into 9 size-of-parcel categories re-
veals a definite inverse relationship be-
tween price per acre and size of parcel,
during both years of price decline and
years of price appreciation. While the
largest number of sales is of 5-9 acre
tracts, the next largest concentration is in
the 80-159 acre category, which also ac-
counts for the most acreage (approximate-
ly one third of the total). The number of
sales peaked in 1979 for all categories,
though prices peaked in 1981 for larger
tracts and in 1982 for smaller tracts.
Per acre prices for parcels of 5-9 and
10-19 acres, for which the presence of
homes and farm buildings and the transi-
tion to urban use tend to dominate selling
prices, were more erratic over time than
prices for larger parcels. Year to year dif-
ferences in price behavior and in percent-
ages of total acreage sold in the various
size categories render an "average price of
farmland" figure nearly meaningless. For
example, the 1982 average per acre sales
price for 20-39 acre tracts was $2,125,
while the average for 160-319 acre tracts
was $1,667. By 1984, the average for
the former category had increased to
$2,482, while that for the latter category
had fallen to $1,544. Tract size differenc-
es and quality differences reduce the relia-
bility of simple average or weighted aver-
age arithmetic price indexes.
Hedonic price index models decompose
the value of a complex commodity into
the values of quality sub-components.
Application to real estate usually in-
volves statistical analysis, in which
sales price is explained by measures of
quality. The influence of quality meas-
ures can be separated from the influence
of pure price changes, thereby allowing
for a "constant quality" price index,
which estimates the price that would pre-
vail if there were no variation over time
in characteristics of sold properties. A re-
searcher may test several alternative he-
donic models in the search for the one
that best measures market performance.
In the present study, four urban real
estate hedonic models that seem particu-
larly adaptable to the farmland market are
applied to 1975-1984 lUinois sales data.
ORER Letter ORER Letter Series Page 7
The results of one model, which aggre-
gates the sales data over all years and in-
cludes a variable to measure the effect of
pure price changes over time, are espe-
cially interesting. Because information
in transfer declarations is limited, only
five of the many of quality characteristics
that influence farmland value can be in-
cluded in the analysis. The five are:
1) Parcel Size. The model assigns a
negative value to this variable, indicating
that price per acre declines, at a decreas-
ing rate, as the size of a parcel increases.
2) Soil Productivity Rating. The posi-
tive value of this proxy measure of land's
income potential coincides with the in-
tuitive notion that price per acre should
increase as soil quality increases.
3) Improvements. The positive value of
this variable coincides with the intuitive
notion that the presence of buildings on
a tract should result in a higher price.
4) Distance to Market Centers. Con-
trary to expectations, no consistent effect
of location relative to major grain market
centers is observed. This finding may re-
sult from the state's well-developed trans-
portation system, which renders location
a minor factor with little impact on
farmland prices at the more general level.
5) Distance to Major Urban Centers.
Location factors measuring the influence
of Chicago, of cities with populations in
excess of 50,000, and of cities with pop-
ulations of 10,000-50,000, are signifi-
cant. Higher sales prices attach to farm-
land parcels closer to the urban fringe.
Controlling and accounting for the
above quality differentials in the hedonic
equation enables the time variable to cap-
ture pure price changes. The results of
this hedonic price index, and comparable
figures from other index measures, are
presented in Table 1.
The hedonic and USDA indexes show
extremely close patterns of change, except
for a higher 1981 peak value in the
USDA index. The arithmetic indexes in-
dicate that price appreciated more rapidly
earlier in the time series, before peaking
in 1981 or 1982. While the hedonic and
USDA indexes indicate nearly identical
steady price declines after 1981, the arith-
metic indexes show a severe price decline
in 1983 followed by a price increase in
1984, a result contrary to most observa-
tions about the 1984 farmland market.
The USDA and hedonic indexes appear
to provide the more reliable measures of
farmland market prices. The average in-
dexes suffer from built-in weaknesses,
such as an inability to control for quality
differences in sales, and they provide a
less clear portrayal of the 1982-1984 peri-
od. Though the hedonic model has the
strongest conceptual base among the mod-
els considered, the performance of the
USDA index is very similar to that of the
hedonic index. The hedonic index thereby
partially exonerates the USDA index from
certain criticisms.
The most important comparisons,
however, may not be among alternative
statewide index measures. The degree of
similarity in price behavior among re-
gions within a state is also important.
Table 2 Usts the hedonic index values for
seven regions in Illinois, with the regions
defined by their most common types of
farming activities. Regional index figures
are compared to each other and to hedonic
and USDA statewide indexes.
^M 1 1H^H^MM^B 1 ^^B^B
Regional Hedonic Indexes of Illinois Farmland Price s, 1975-1984 (1975 = base year)
Region 1975 1976 1977 IS>78 1 979 1980 1981 1982 198 3 1984
1. Mixed Livestock 100 122 173 207 235 245 280 246 24 5 245
2. Dairy 100 114 143 1 67 194 201 216 172 19<) 197
3. Livestock & Grain 100 121 175 1 86 214 244 251 235 18<) 172
4. Cash Grain 100 118 159 1 81 196 191 204 169 16 i 165
5. General Farming 100 118 159 1 73 199 216 205 224 18') 175
6. Wheat, Dairy, Poultry 100 118 167 200 225 226 245 248 24 7 212
7. Mixed Farming 100 124 172 2 01 238 248 267 253 25(3 237
Statewide (Hedonic) 100 121 171 1 99 222 230 243 229 22^i 210
Statewide (USDA) 100 125 170 1 87 220 242 260 239 21 i 213
The substantial variation among re-
gional index measures seems to exclude
both the hedonic and USDA statewide in-
dexes as good indicators of price changes
within particular regions. Throughout
the ten year period of the study, the state-
wide indexes consistently overestimate
price movements in the northeastern dairy
and truck farming region, the east-central
cash grain region, and the west-central
general farming region. Statewide meas-
ures are reasonably accurate for the north-
western mixed livestock region, the west-
em Uvestock and grain region, and the
southeastern mixed farming region from
1975 to 1980, but they provide results
inconsistent with actual price behavior
observed in the regions from 1981 to
1984. Even in the southwestern wheat,
dairy, and poultry region, for which the
statewide indexes provide reasonably ac-
curate measurements over the ten year
period, there are substantial 1982 and
1983 differences.
Conclusion
Price index users should know how the
indexes are designed and what the indexes
represent Even the "best" price index,
when constructed as a statewide measure,
should be used with caution in micro ap-
phcations involving specific situations,
local markets, or individual properties.
Significant differences in price behavior
can exist among regions within a state.
Substantial work in the application of
hedonic models to the farmland market re-
mains to be done, but continued efforts
can yield important insights into factors
affecting farmland prices and maricet be-
havior. Hedonic indexes foster progress
toward better value measures and, possi-
bly, measures with short-run predictive
capabiUties to overcome time-lag prob-
lems associated with historic data.
Arnold W. Oltmans is a doctoral candi-
date in Agricultural Economics at the
University ofIllinois at Urbana-Cham-
paign; David L. Chicoine is Professor of
Agricultural Economics and Head of the
Department ofAgricultural Economics;
and John T. Scott, Jr. is Professor ofAg-
ricultural Economics.
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Commissioner Ronald See on Regulation
Ronald See has served as Illinois Com-
missioner ofReal Estate since his ap-
pointment by the Director of the Depart-
ment ofProfessional Regulation in
1983. See brings to the job a thorough
understanding ofreal estate brokerage and
the legislative process. He owned a
Springfield brokeragefirmfrom 1976 un-
til he became Commissioner, and while
an active broker he chaired the Illinois
Association ofRealtors® Legislative
Committee. See is a Director of the Na-
tional Association ofReal Estate License
Law Officials (NARELLO). He also has
a strong interest in education. A graduate
of Southern Illinois University, he serves
on the Advisory Committee for the Uni-
versity of Illinois Office ofReal Estate
Research and on an Educational Testing
Service committee that designs standard-
ized real estate examinations.
ORER Letter asked See to share his
views on the past, present, andfuture of
real estate regulation.
What are some of the problems, and
some of the unusual situations, that you
face in carrying out the regulatoryfunc-
tion? One problem area is communi-
cating the regulatory responsibility to the
90,000 active and 35,000 inactive Illi-
nois license holders. It is very difficult
to keep that many people informed on
the requirements of the law. We also
have to provide that constituency with
accurate information and with prompt re-
sponses to inquiries and problems. For-
tunately, the Real Estate Division of the
Department has an excellent office staff.
Our people have a variety of backgrounds
and perspectives that mesh together well.
We do encounter "truth is stranger
than fiction" situations. Uninformed
people make strange decisions, no matter
how well-intentioned they may be. Ours
is an enforcement agency, so we neces-
sarily deal with people who have prob-
lems, and in some cases our efforts to
protect the public exacerbate the prob-
lems of these people. So it's not always
fun; we deal with human frailty every day
as part of the operation. In one case, a
licensee was presented with a buyer's
$129,000 personal check at a closing.
When the seller refused to accept that per-
sonal check, the broker offered to place
the buyer's check in escrow and write the
seller a new check. The seller knew the
broker's check would be good, and agreed
to accept it. The buyer's check bounced,
but the broker, of course, had to honor
his check. The house finally sold six
months later for $86,000. The broker not
only was out the $43,000 difference, but
also incurred more than $20,000 in legal
fees. A seemingly innocent act at closing
had far-reaching ramifications; the broker
was devastated by what happened.
In another case, a broker accepted a
$5,000 cash earnest money payment from
the wife of a prospective buyer. The wife
liked the property and wanted her husband
to think he was paying $5,000 less than
the actual price, and therefore asked the
broker to keep the payment a secret from
her husband. The broker agreed to the re-
quest and put tiie money in a home safe.
The wife later contacted the broker, say-
ing tiiat her husband had a gun and would
kill her if she didn't get the $5,000 back.
The broker, wisely I think, returned the
money, but was sued by the sellers for re-
turning earnest money paid in connection
with the sale of their property. The brok-
er was forced to pay part of the $5,000 to
the sellers, and incurred substantial legal
fees. In addition, the broker was disci-
plined by the Department, for not deposit-
ing earnest money in an escrow account
and for being involved in a situation in
which a buyer was kept in the dark regard-
ing his ti"ansaction.
How has the regulation of real estate
salespeople and brokers evolved? Soci-
ety regulates various institutions because
of potential abuse. The scope of regula-
tion tends to broaden over time, because
as society changes there develop new
technologies and schemes to harm the
public. In its preamble, the lUinois li-
cense law provides our office with a two-
edged mandate: one is to evaluate the
competence of those who enter the profes-
sion, the other is to protect the public.
Our activities must serve to meet those
two objectives. Still, the best regulation
is a-ansparent; it protects the public with-
out placing onerous burdens on licensees.
They should be able to conduct business
without constantly worrying about gov-
ernment paperwork and regulations.
The specific language in the law con-
tinues to expand. For example, when
regulation was first undertaken, real estate
transactions and financing were simpler.
There was no "creative financing;" buyers
either paid cash or obtained fixed-payment
mortgages. Within the past 15 years,
we've seen the introduction of graduated
and variable payment mortgages. The
competitive environment has changed as
well, for example with guaranteed sales;
and the changing laws of agency continue
to place more responsibility on brokers.
These concepts did not exist 30 or 40
years ago, and the licensing law has been
adapted to the changing marketplace.
The Illinois license law is not a per-
petual document; a sunset provision caus-
es the law to die a natural death periodi-
cally if the legislatiu^e does not reinstate
it. That's true of all licensed professions
in the state, and it's a good system be-
cause it allows us to stop regulating
some groups. If few practitioners remain
in a field or if there is little potential for
abuse, as in the case of those who shoe
horses, regulation is not cost effective.
Real estate brokerage continues to be reg-
ulated, because the benefit to the public is
felt to be greater than the cost bome by
licensees. If the cost effectiveness test is
met, the next question is whether a better
system could be designed to accomplish
the same goals without licensing.
We are currently in the sunset year.
The law took effect on January 1, 1984;
it will expire on January 1, 1990 if action
is not taken. We certainly feel that the
law will be reinstated, and since our de-
partment would administer any new law
we'll encourage legislation that addresses
some issues that have not been included
before. The Illinois Association of Real-
tors®, as an industi^ group witii an inter-
est in the legislation, also has a task force
working on provisions the Association
would like to see in the law.
ORER Letter Interview Page 9
What are some of the issues youfeel the
law should address? As regulators, we
feel that the auctioning of real estate
should be a licensed profession. Auc-
tioning has never been specifically dis-
cussed in the law, so we're bound by a
1930's court decision holding that when
real estate is sold at "public cry" in Illi-
nois, the license law does not apply.
That view is outdated. If someone ap-
proaches an owner to discuss the sale of
real estate, signs a contract under which
payment is earned for accomplishing the
sale, advertises the property, conducts an
auction, holds earnest money, assists in a
closing, and is paid for all these services,
that person is practicing real estate in its
truest form, and should be held to the
same standards as anyone else who ob-
tains listings and locates buyers.
There has been resistance to licensing
requirements in the past by some auc-
tioneer organizations. But at this point I
think a majority of those who auction
real estate in Illinois already hold licens-
es. There may be pockets of resistance,
but I think most of the auctioning com-
munity will support our efforts. It is
important to protect the buying public
by clarifying auctioneers' responsibilities
and the standards to which they should be
held. Government has to do what it can
to create a level playing field for all prac-
titioners, and to assure the public that the
person who auctions real estate is held to
the same requirements as other agents.
Another area we would like to bring
under the licensing umbrella is appraisal.
Attempts to license appraisers will not
be without controversy, though we have
tried to address the concerns of the indus-
try in designing licensing regulations.
I've been directly involved in drafting a
model appraisal bill with NARELLO.
We feel we have a strong model bill, one
that addresses both the public interest and
the interests of major appraisal organiza-
tions. While the bill provides for licens-
ing with entry level standards, after the
Ucense is awarded the appraiser must
meet significant education and experience
requirements to become certified. Our
model corresponds to federal guidelines;
the Office of Management and Budget has
recommended that government agencies
dealing with real estate fmance utilize
only appraisers certified under a standard
procedure. That requirement alone would
remove from the business those unwill-
ing to progress beyond licensing to be-
come certified. There is no particular seg-
ment of the appraisal business that we
feel needs more regulatory attention than
others, and I think it will be difficult to
achieve some of the loftier goals we
would like to pursue in regulating ap-
praisers. But the professional organiza-
tions have been unable to control some
abuses, and not because they have not
tried. They lack major tools that our of-
fice can bring to bear.
First, private groups are not immune
from lawsuits, and may shy away from
cases that should be investigated. Our of-
fice can proceed without fear of being
sued. Second, professional associations
must obtain evidence to support discipli-
nary action without the power of subpoe-
na. We have that power in our investiga-
tive and disciplinary process. Finally,
with licensing we could revoke a person's
right to practice. An offending appraiser
certainly pays a price when stripped of a
professional designation, but under cur-
rent law that person can still legally work
as an appraiser and continue the abusive
activity. Loss of the license, on the other
hand, would remove the individual from
the profession. With these three powerful
tools, I feel that we can provide a strong
deterrent to conscious acts of improper
practice in appraisal.
Another area may be even more con-
troversial. Bank trust or farm manage-
ment departments sometimes locate buy-
ers for properties the banks manage, and
charge fees for doing so. Our department
views that activity as the unlicensed prac-
tice of real estate, and we want these or-
ganizations to obtain corporate brokerage
licenses and follow rules by which other
brokers are bound. Bankers obviously do
not agree; some say we can't regulate
them because they already answer to so
many other government agencies. I
spoke on this issue last year at a meeting
of the American Society of Farm Manag-
ers and Rural Appraisers. Some of the
members are bankers, and of course they
took issue with the Department's view.
But we recently filed, and won, a suit
against a banker for this practice. I'm
speaking to the Society again next
month; it will be interesting to see
whether members' views have changed.
Would mandatory post-licensing educa-
tion make regulation easier? The De-
partment is philosophically opposed to
additional regulation, including mandatory
education, unless it is strongly justified.
The experience of other jurisdictions caus-
es me a lot of apprehension; Wisconsin
and some other states have adopted man-
datory education and later dropped it. So
while professional education is a fine
idea, I could support a mandatory program
only if it were administered under very
strict guidelines. You can lose your fer-
vor for continuing education when you
look at the administrative issues in-
volved. What is a reasonable amount of
classroom time to require? Twelve hours
every two years is a common standard.
Our office would have to analyze multiple
documents for every one hour class or
seminar attended by every licensee. If li-
cense holders put off school until just be-
fore license renewal, in January of odd-
numbered years for salespeople and even-
numbered years for brokers, it would be
impossible to handle the paper crunch.
There would also be immediate pres-
sure to expand the number of approved
providers of education credits. Each year
20,000 people take the license exam and
therefore must complete an approved edu-
cational program; if we added the 90,000
current license holders to the system, we
would be bombarded by providers of edu-
cational programs, which we would have
to scrutinize. Some states have up to
10,000 "educational institutions" provid-
ing continuing real estate education. In
Iowa, an individual who sells real estate
computer software got the demonstration
of his programs approved for continuing
education credit, and he charges people for
attending what is essentially his sales
pitch. Should continuing education be re-
quired in Illinois, sponsors like that who
wish to be approved will not get a sym-
pathetic ear if I am Commissioner. What
they are providing is not what real estate
education should be.
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Tax Incentives
(continuedfrom page 3)
The findings suggest that localities
may achieve more success in economic
development through infrastructure im-
provement than through tax abatement or
other business subsidies. Yet increased
infrastructure expenditure is likely only if
externality problems can be controlled.
A municipal taxing district must be al-
lowed either to retain most of the finan-
cial benefit resulting from infrastructure
improvements or to pass some of the
costs along to other taxing bodies that
share the benefits. Tax-increment fmanc-
ing allows for more of the benefits to be
retained by the municipal taxing district
Conclusion
Under any of the circumstances considered
in the above analysis, property tax abate-
ments are shown to provide negative re-
sults to society. Society could benefit
from federal laws restricting the use of
property tax abatement programs. Tax
increment financing holds more promise
as a tool of economic development,
though tax shifting problems can result.
Shifting might be reduced through index
ing, which would permit the base year tax
base to increase by the rate of inflation.
Other possible improvements in the use
of TIF might include permitting expendi-
tures on infrastructure only, allowing af-
fected taxing districts some control over
expenditures, and establishing stricter
guidelines for creating TIF districts.
Joseph J. Chinn is a master's degree can-
didate in the Department ofUrban Plan-
ning at the University of Illinois. He
completed this paper as a student in the
graduate real estate course offered through
the University's Department ofFinance.
Peter
In a society without laws, ownership is
nothing more than the ability to use prop-
erty until a more powerful party termi-
nates that use by force. Fortunately, the
U.S. is a land where law rather than force
rules. The ultimate benefit of ownership,
where law prevails, is the right to receive
residual income and other residual values.
There certainly may be other attendant
benefits, such as the right to use, al-
though owners routinely assign rights of
use to other parties through leases.
Yet vocal critics in this country, from
businesspeople to legislators, have attrib-
uted much greater importance to the con-
cept of ownership in bemoaning the pres-
ence of foreign purchasers in the U.S. real
estate market. They note that the British,
Canadians, Dutch, and, particularly, the
Japanese (with abundant capital but little
available real estate) purchase income pro-
ducing buildings at record prices in U.S.
cities, and fear that America is being sold
away. Are their concerns well-founded?
We suggest that they are not. There
are two reasons why we should welcome
foreign purchases of U.S. income produc-
ing real estate. The first is the nature of
the ownership right, and the second is the
economic benefit that accrues to both the
real estate market and the nation's econo-
my as a result of foreign purchases.
One of the first lessons in any intro-
ductory real estate course is that real estate
Foreign Ownership:
Is it a Cause for Alarm?
F. Colwell and Joseph W. Trefz
ownership, because of the immobiUty of
the asset, involves a bundle of rights.
The rights are protected, but also limited,
by federal and, more directly, local laws.
Among the Umitations are taxation, emi-
nent domain, and the pohce power.
Through the police power, local gov-
ernmental units have instituted rent con-
trols on income producing residential
property in several cities. Notable exam-
ples have been New York City and Berke-
ley, California. The owners of affected
buildings, who are in many cases vocal,
visible, and voting local citizens, are un-
able to curb rent controls when the major-
ity of the local population favors them.
Certainly we can not expect that foreign
owners would fare any better in limiting
voters' control of their investment returns.
(The recognition that rent control can be
enacted by unhappy citizens should not be
equated with an advocacy of its use.)
In other words, if parties without the
ability to vote were to control a high per-
centage of an area's income producing real
estate (residential or commercial), and
were to attempt to use that control to the
detriment of the local economy, the citi-
zenry could simply legislate away the
owners' residual returns by enacting rent
control statutes (or perhaps levying added
taxes on real estate ownership, or even
taking property under eminent domain).
Foreign purchasers' fortunes are clearly
ger
tied to those of local owners, who have
greater ability to influence land use issues.
Foreign interests, then, have no incentive
to become the majority landowners in a
jurisdiction. The problem, to the extent
that a problem may exist, is self correct-
ing. In buying U.S. real estate, knowl-
edgeable foreign investors show confi-
dence in a system in which the protection
of property rights limits political risk.
Foreign purchasing power also benefits
local real estate markets. Well-meaning
parties who worry that property may be-
come priced beyond the reach of American
buyers would nevertheless likely state that
an owner should be allowed to sell for the
highest possible price. We would not
strengthen our real estate markets by as-
suring buyers that their artificially low
purchase prices would be matched by arti-
ficially low future resale prices resulting
from restricted ownership.
Finally, the inflow of foreign purchas-
ing power benefits our nation's economy.
For example, Americans buy Japanese
consumer products, and use them in the
U.S. to enhance the quality of life. The
Japanese, on the other hand, buy U.S. real
estate, and have no choice but to leave the
property here for the benefit of domestic
users. In addition, the foreign owners'
dollar-denominated residual returns may
well be spent on more dollar-denominated
American goods.
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The New Homelessness
Peter F. Colwell
What is the new homelessness? It is not
just more of the old homelessness. The
new homeless are not all single, white,
male alcoholics sleeping in Sidd Row
doorways. The new homeless are not
simply the ranks of mental patients re-
leased over the past two decades, swollen
by this generation's seriously mentally
ill. The new homeless have been de-
scribed as including "younger men, wom-
en with children, working adults, the eld-
erly, and the disabled. Much of this new
population, of course, represents the ato-
mized elements of shattered families -
jobless young men addicted to drugs and
unmarried women on welfare."
This description is offered by William
Tucker in "America's Homeless: Victims
of Rent Control," published in the Janu-
ary 12, 1989 Heritage Foundation Back-
grounder. In a follow-up to his Septem-
ber 25, 1987 article in the National
Review, Tucker develops powerful expla-
nations for homelessness in America. Of
equal importance is his debunking of
some of the conventional wisdom sur-
rounding the homelessness problem.
Tucker's most startling claim is that
the presence of rent control explains
twenty-seven percent of the variation in
homelessness across metropolitan areas.
Such a finding seems particularly useful
because, if correct, it suggests that a sim-
ple solution to a large portion of the
homelessness problem would be the
overturning of rent control. Tucker char-
acterizes rent control as "nothing but an
attempt by sitting tenants to shift their
housing costs to outsiders and future ten-
ants." He states that "if homelessness is
going to go, rent control is going to
have to go first."
The conventional explanations of
homelessness debunked by Tucker include
unemployment rates, poverty rates, and
the supposedly low levels of public hous-
ing production. He asserts that various
government regulations are actually caus-
ing the new homelessness. In addition to
rent control. Tucker points particularly to
exclusionary zoning regulations. Tucker
believes that finding a solution will in-
volve "fmding ways to discourage local
municipalities from using zoning and
growth controls as a cost-free way of im-
proving local property values at the ex-
pense of outsiders seeking housing."
There are some problems with
Tucker's work. First, it utilizes HUD
homelessness data that in some cases de-
fies intuition. This data problem is one
to which Tucker readily admits. Second,
his interpretation of his statistical work is
a bit cavalier. A close examination of
Tucker's statistical results reveals that va-
cancy rales explain about half as much of
the problem as rent control does, and va-
cancy rates have been found to be closely
related to rent control.
So is rent control or low vacancy the
culprit? Tucker argues that when the two
variables are used together to explain
homelessness rates, the vacancy rate is
not statistically significant, and that rent
control is therefore the real determinant
While Tucker's position may be difficult
to defend, there certainly is no evidence to
support the opposite view; rent control is
not off the hook. Finally, Tucker's spec-
ulation about zoning and growth controls
is interesting, but his speculation is not
supported by his research.
Thought for the Day
Because of the belief that a property's lo-
cation is a unique feature, courts are will-
ing to force recalcitrant sellers to specifi-
cally perform on contracts: to sell prop-
erties they have agreed to sell. An award
of monetary damages alone is not consid-
ered adequate compensation, because no
amount of money can compensate for the
loss of a unique property. Yet under emi-
nent domain proceedings, the government
takes property that is presumably unique,
and the Constitution suggests that "just
compensation" provides adequate rehef to
the individual from whom it is taken.
ORER Letter
is published quarterly by the
Office of Real Estate Research
at the University of Illinois
Urbana-Champaign
Copyright 1989
WiUiam R. Bryan, Director
Peter F. Colwell, Editor
Joseph W. Trefzger, Associate Editor
Address correspondence to:
Brenda L. Bishop
304-G David KiiUey Hall
1407 W. Gregory
Urbana, XL 61801
ORER Advisory Committee
William R. Bryan
ORER Director,
Chairman, Department of Finance
University of Illinois
Gary L. Clayton
Executive Vice President
minois Association of Realtors®
Peter F. Colwell
ORER Professor of Real Esute
Professor of Finance
University of Illinois
Lydia T. Franz
Senior Vice President
Koenig & Strey
Charles M. HiU
Executive Vice President
Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago
Jane H. Leuthold
Associate Dean
College of Commerce and
Business Adnunistralion
University of Illinois
Gerald N.Perlow
Treasurer
Illinois Association of Realtors®-
President
Gerald Perlow Realtors®
David A. Rituniller
Sales Associate
Traders Realty Corporation
Ronald L. See
Real Estate Commissioner
State of nUnois
Donald J. Ursin
President
Illinois Real Estate Educational Foundation;
President
Coldwell Banker Residential Real
Estate Services of Illinois
ORER Letter Illinois Real Estate Markets Page 12
New Housing Costs Pass $100,000 Mark
The average price of a newly-built home
in Illinois now exceeds $100,000. U.S.
Census Bureau data on the estimated cost
of construction for which permits have
been issued show the state's average home
construction cost to be approximately
$101,500. Because this figure does not
include land cost, the overall cost of buy-
ing a new home is even higher.
Of course, the weighted average of
$101,500 is heavily influenced by higher
costs in the populous Chicago metropoli-
tan area. New home construction costs in
a six-county region of Cook, Du Page,
Kane, Lake, McHenry, and Will Counties
average $108,300; the DuPage average of
$1 19,200 is the highest in the state. Yet
the average cost computed for a sample of
heavily populated Illinois counties outside
the Chicago area (Champaign, McLean,
Macon, Madison, Peoria, St. Clair, San-
gamon, and Winnebago) is a much lower
$74,300, and costs in other areas, particu-
larly some southern counties, are lower
still.
Unfortunately, neither the Census data
nor other available information explains
why there are differences among regions.
Builders may face higher input costs in
the pricier areas, but perhaps they are con-
structing larger houses in these localities
as well.
Cost of Building a New House in Illinois, 1979^
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Voluntary Association and the Life of the City
David T. Beito
ORER Letter generally publishes original
articles written by individuals at the
University ofIllinois or by others asso-
ciated with the Office ofReal Estate
Research. The following article, howev-
er, is a reprint ofa portion ofan article
which appeared in the Fall 1988 Humane
Siudies Review. The ORER Letter edito-
rial stafffelt that readers wouldfind the
paper interesting and informative, particu-
larly the historical references to Chicago
and St. Louis and the implication that
government action may have served to
crowd out private voluntary action.
ORER Letter thanks the Institute for
Humane Studies and Dr. David Beitofor
consenting to the reprinting. The entire
piece, which contains historical informa-
tion dating to medieval Europe, is availa-
blefrom the Institute for Humane
Studies, George Mason University, 4400
University Drive, Fairfax, VA 22030.
Because ORER Letter has omitted the in-
troductory section, the firstfootnote in
the presentation below corresponds to the
fourthfootnote in the longer paper.
\
Urban history offers concrete examples of
the vitality of voluntarism as an organiz-
ing principle, from medieval Europe to
twentieth century America. The emerg-
ing world civilization may give birth to
an even greater and more prosperous ur-
ban life, nurtured on voluntarism and lib-
erty. In what follows I hope to introduce
the reader to a few of the exciting insights
offered by urban history and to the tre-
mendous opportunities it offers for trans-
forming our world.
Urban Development in America
The most influential book in American
urban history of the past thirty years re-
mains Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of
Growth in Boston, 1870-1900 (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1962) by Sam Bass Warner, Jr. Warner's
views are generally hostile to the free
market. In fact, Warner made a point of
faulting "successive generations of Amer-
icans who, by their unwillingness to
move beyond the confines of private land-
ownership, have produced today's disor-
dered, inhumane, and restricted city."4
Despite its biases. Streetcar Suburbs is
full of valuable lessons about the role
(continued on thefollowing page
)
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Beban Addresses Alumni
The Office of Real Estate Research
sponsored its seventh luncheon for
U of I real estate alumni on Friday,
April 21. Gene Stunard again
arranged for the use of the Chicago
Yacht Club. Gary Beban, President
of Coldwell-Banker Commercial
Group, spoke to approximately fifty
alumni and their guests on "The
Commercial Real Estate Brokerage
Environment." The text of Beban's
speech appears on page 8 as this
issue's interview.
Details on the next luncheon will
be included in the Summer 1989
ORER Letter.
Charles Hill Reappointed
to Advisory Committee
Charles Hill, Executive Vice Presi-
dent of the Federal Home Loan Bank
of Chicago, has agreed to serve a
second three-year term on the Advi-
sory Committee of the Office of
Real Estate Research. John Hogan,
Dean of the College of Commerce
and Business Administration, has
appointed Hill to a term from
August 1989 through August 1992.
Bryan to Speak
ORER Director William Bryan will
address the Midwest District of the
National Association of Real Estate
License Law Officials (NARELLO)
in Springfield on July 17. He will
discuss the interest rate outlook.
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entrepreneurs have played in planning
American residential development The
book can easily be read as a case study of
spontaneous order in the building market
As Warner shows, zoning did not exist in
the late nineteenth century and large de-
velopers (at least in home building) were
virtually absent from the scene. Home
construction and design were highly de-
centraUzed, with thousands of small con-
tractors and individual homeowners con-
trolling the process. Despite this, Warner
noted a surprising standardization in archi-
tectural styles and building methods.
"Somewhat paradoxically," he observed,
"from the extreme individualization of
agency in the building process came great
uniformity in behavior, a kind of regula-
tion without laws."5
Urban historians were slow to build on
Warner's pioneering analysis of the dy-
namics of the real estate market. Fortu-
nately, these sins of omission are now
being corrected. Marc A. Weiss has pro-
duced an excellent study of large-scale
community development by real estate
subdividers in the twentieth century.
Pointing to a pattern of "private innova-
tion preceding public action," Weiss
observes:
The classification of major and minor
streets, the superblock and cul-de-sac, plant-
ing strips and rolling topography, arrange-
ment of the house on the lot, lot size and
shape, set-back lines and lot coverage re-
strictions, planned separation and relation
of multiple uses, design and placement of
parks and recreational amenities, ornamen-
tation, easements, underground utilities, and
numerous other physical features were first
introduced by private developers and later
adopted as rules and principles by public
planning agencies.
^
Ann Durkin Keating, in her study of
Chicago's suburbs during the late nine-
teenth century, found numerous examples
of developers and business associations
installing "improvement packages" (sew-
ers, streetcar line extensions, parks,
streets, water supply) as an inducement to
home buyers. Often, a developer peti-
tioned the state legislature to incorporate
the area of his landholdings into a separ-
ate city government. Several of Chica-
go's suburbs, including Riverside and
Kenilworth, originated as appendages to
real estate investments. In most cases,
incorporation was used as an opportunity
to transfer responsibility for many of
these privately developed services, partic-
ularly streets and sewers, to the new lo-
cal government^
Dedication to "public use" did not al-
ways occur. The streets and sewers of
the town of Pullman (laid out by the
Pulhnan sleeping-car company) remained
under private ownership until the area
was annexed by the city of Chicago in
the 1880s. Developers, however, rarely
followed the private-street model. One
major exception to this norm can be
found in St Louis, Missouri, and neigh-
boring St. Louis County. During the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, nearly one hundred private subdivi-
sions (or private places) were laid out
within the city of St. Louis. A private
place could encompass one or more
streets and was governed by an elected lot
association. Not only did each private
place own and maintain its streets, but in
many cases it also owned the sewers, wa-
ter mains, and utility easement.8
The rules for each private place associ-
ation were laid down in its "indenture,"
or restrictive covenant Most covenants
were framed by the initial subdivider and
contained house set-back requirements,
restrictions against multifamily housing,
and private building codes. Covenants
authorized the collection of annual as-
sessments to pay for the upkeep of the
streets, water mains, parks, and other
common areas. If a lot owner refused to
pay annual assessments, the association
had the power to place a lien on the
property and sue in a court of equity. In
this respect, the private place is similar
to the modem condominium and shop-
ping-mall association.9 All of these ar-
rangements serve fundamentally the same
function as the public oaths of the med-
ieval Peace of God and communal move-
ments: a voluntary covenant is made to
provide collective goods, whether peace,
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parks, or waste disposal. They have the
advantage, however, of resting on speci-
fied contractual obligations and sanctions
rather than on social customs and mores
alone.
The urban designer Oscar Newman has
likened private places to "small indepen-
dent cities." This comparison has merit.
The private places carried on functions
that everywhere else have been considered
essential government services. By other
measures, the analogy to government
does not hold. First, unlike govern-
ments, the private place did not enjoy a
perpetual existence. It often proved flexi-
ble in withstanding and redirecting eco-
nomic change and political pressure -
but there were limits. More than half of
the original private places in St. Louis
have become public streets.lO
Economists Donald J. Boudreaux and
Randall G. Holcombe have provided a
useful schema to understand the difference
between the private place and govern-
ment According to Boudreaux and
Holcombe, the private place association
is a type of "contractual government"
"The establishment of a contractual gov-
ernment," they conclude,"appears to be
the closest thing to a real-world social
contract as can be found because people
must make the explicit choice of moving
into the contractual government's juris-
diction and the government is at no time
imposed on anyone."! 1
Interestingly, using Boudreaux and
Holcombe's approach, a competitive pro-
cess can be discerned in the development
of private places. There is a competitive
discovery process in the provision of
"private government" that allows volun-
tary associations to reduce the costs of ar-
riving at efficient constitutional rules. In
F.A. Hayek's words, competition is a
"discovery procedure." 12 My own re-
search has shown that this procedure was
operative in the evolution of the rules
governing private places: those with se-
verely restrictive unanimity requirements
(in some cases requiring one hundred per-
cent agreement before changes - such as
installation of electrical lighting - could
be made) either found ways of changing
their constitutions or declined. On the
other hand, those with rules that were in-
adequately restrictive and allowed bare ma-
jorities to make changes affecting the en-
tire group faced similar fates. There is a
noticeable shift over time toward consti-
tutional rules that required levels of agree-
ment between unanimity and a bare ma-
jority, offering strong evidence for the
Boudreaux-Holcombe thesis.
The private places' method for provid-
ing urban infrastructiu'e illustrates its re-
sponse to the free-rider problem. 13 indi-
viduals who bought homes agreed, under
the conditions of the restrictive deed, to
pay for these services through the assess-
ments levied by the private-place associa-
tion. Any free rider who refused to pay,
yet used the services, could be easily
brought to terms through legal devices
contained in the restrictive covenant
Moreover, residents had a direct economic
stake in insuring the effective collection
of assessments. When services are pro-
vided by governments, the costs and bene-
fits of these services are socialized on a
grand scale. The free rider on the private
place is a real person known to all con-
cerned. The free rider on government-
provided services is usually a faceless ab-
straction.
In many other respects, however, the
pressure to conform to a "community
standard" may have been less on the pri-
vate places. Because residents of public
streets could not turn to a deed-based con-
tractual association as protection from
free riders, they had little choice but to
rely on "moral suasion." Historian
Alexander Scott McConachie summed up
vital differences between public streets
and private places during the late nine-
teenth century:
The development of customs and taboos
as a means of keeping up the tone of the
neighborhood, such as the famous porch
scrubbing of South St. Louis, seems not to
have been a facet of the private place style.
There was no need for the vigilance and the
subtle pressures toward conformity which
were the price of maintaining quality on
unregulated middle class blocks. 14
Although private streets exist through-
out the country, in no other large city are
(continued on ihefollowing page
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Applying for an ORER
Research Award
One of the major tools the Office of
Real Estate Research employs in gen-
erating original research in real estate
is the Research Award. Awards have
been made to fund research conducted
by individuals and institutions
throughout the United States. The
only requisite condition for an award
is that the research examine a topic of
importance to the real estate commu-
nity. ORER is willing to fund re-
search on a variety of topics, conduct-
ed by researchers from a variety of
disciplines.
Research proposals are evaluated by
the Director, who may solicit advice
from members of the Advisory Com-
mittee or from individuals with ex-
pertise on the topic addressed by the
proposed research. Criteria considered
in the evaluation of a research propo-
sal are:
• Researcher's prior research activity
• Relevance to Illinois real estate
markets
• Focus on economic or financial
aspects of real estate
• Appropriateness of budget
• Schedule of completion of the
research project
• Methodology
A proposal should contain four parts:
• An abstract of no more than
100 words (and a title that is
descriptive of the project)
• A three to five page description
of the proposal
• Vita of all researchers involved
with the project
• Budget
Three copies of the proposal should
be submitted to the Director of the
Office of Real Estate Research.
Individuals with questions on the
ORER Research Award or the propo-
sal process should contact the Office
of Real Estate Research.
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(continued from page 3)
they nearly so common as in St. Louis.
No single reason can explain the wave of
private-place building that took place in
Sl Louis during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. One reason,
often ignored by historians, was the no-
toriously poor infrastructure provided by
the city government of St. Louis during
this period. Spending on streets and sew-
ers was severely restricted by tax, debt,
and spending limitations. Moreover, the
money spent was often drained away by
corruption and mismanagement. As one
local commentator aptly put it at the
time, "we [the city government] may
have been bad, but we were never
bold." 15 If a developer wanted infrastruc-
ture for his properties, often he had no
choice but to provide it himself.
Restrictive covenants were not specific
to either private places or to St. Louis.
By the turn of the century, they were
commonly used by real estate developers
throughout the country. Most restrictive
covenants were binding agreements
placed on deeds by the initial developers
of subdivisions. Common features in-
cluded set-back requirements (governing
the distance between building and street)
and prohibitions against multifamily
housing. Every property on a particular
street would be covered by the restric-
tions (usually instituted before the initial
sale by the developer) but enforcement
would be completely in the hands of indi-
vidual lot owners. Left to their own ini-
tiative, people were often lax in bringing
litigation to stop violations. The courts
generally invalidated restfictions if left
unenforced over long periods of time.
J.C. Nichols, the developer of Kansas
City's Country Club district, described an
ordinary chain of events:
One owner, seeing that another owner has
somewhat violated his restriction, goes a
little further in the violation. The same ad-
joining owner, realizing that the restric-
tions had not been properly regarded by his
neighbors, either in disregard or despera-
tion, seriously violates the restriction and
suddenly the neighborhood awakens to the
fact that the abandonment has become very
general and the restrictions of little force.l"
Nichols's observations about the prob-
lems of enforcement have been echoed by
some historians. "Where enforcement
rested on individual or voluntary action,"
Andrew J. King concluded in his history
of restrictive covenants in Chicago, "the
cost of enforcement and the difficulty of
coercing participation generated a desire
for public solutions. Though some own-
ers successfully organized to enforce re-
strictions, their efforts consumed both
time and money." With much success,
the private-place covenant writers over-
came this drawback by delegating enforce-
ment power to a lot association or a
group of trustees. The average private-
place association existed as a continuing
legal entity, armed with enforcement
power, and thus alert to prevent viola-
tions from getting out of hand. As a
group with ownership rights, the private-
place association had a permanent interest
in protecting the invesunents of its mem-
bers. Public-street associations, on the
other hand, too often had to depend on in-
dividual vigilance and the fickle fortunes
of "neighborhood spirit."17 More re-
search needs to be done before definitive
conclusions can be drawn about the rela-
tive effectiveness of public-street restric-
tive covenants and private-street restric-
tive covenants.
Zoning v. Restrictive Covenants
In the early twentieth century, urban plan-
ners offered zoning as a solution to the
enforcement difficulties of restrictive cov-
enants. The actual legacy of zoning, ac-
cording to Bernard Siegan, has been to
distort and misdirect urban land-use pat-
terns. Siegan argues that high lot size
requirements, which are a staple of zoning
laws, have subsidized the single-family
middle class homeowner at the expense of
the poor. 18
Siegan's research focuses on Houston,
the only large American city never to en-
act a zoning law. Interestingly, referenda
to enact zoning often win the support of
middle-class, suburban homeowners, but
lose heavily in the poorer inner city. Sie-
gan contends that Houston's lack of zon-
ing has given its housing market an unu-
sual flexibility. Even during the oil
boom of the 1970s, for example, the city
had a much higher vacancy rate for apart-
ments than comparable American cities.
Restrictive covenants are a hallmark of
Houston's real estate market. Siegan
challenges prevailing critiques of restric-
tive covenants, persuasively arguing that
they have proven more responsive and ef-
fective than zoning. 19
Historians have subjected the applica-
tions, if not the theory, of zoning to
some pointed barbs. Warner points out
that the first zoning laws were passed in
California to discriminate against Chi-
nese laundries. Other early zoning laws,
in cities such as Louisville and St.
Louis, were directed toward segregating
blacks and whites by blocks. The enact-
ment of New York's landmark zoning law
was spearheaded by owners of retail prop-
erty on Fifth Avenue who wanted to ex-
clude tall buildings leased by Jewish gar-
ment manufacturers.20
Nonetheless, Warner, like virtually all
historians, does not question the validity
of zoning per se. Indeed, he endorses an
expansion of zoning power - albeit in
the service of different ends. Warner's
criticism of the practice of zoning,
though often insightful, raises more ques-
tions than it answers. Although he
points out that professional home sellers
were leading backers of zoning, he tells
little about where commercial property
owners stood on the issue. Moreover, he
never examines why the alternative of re-
strictive covenants was rejected, nor does
he discuss the exception of Houston.
Part of the reason for these blind spots is
that Warner, like other historians, simply
assumes zoning to be a logical extension
of restrictive covenants: a difference in
degree but not in kind.
Spontaneous Order of the City
No urban historian can afford to ignore
the writings of Jane Jacobs. Although
not primarily a work of history, Jacobs's
Death and Life of Great American Cities
(New York: Vintage Books, 1961) is
probably the most important book on ur-
ban issues written in the last three dec-
(continued on page 10)
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Rho Epsilon Completes Spring Activities
The campus chapter of Rho Epsilon
sponsored several professional activities
in a busy Spring 1989 semester.
Jim McKinney, a General Partner with
Regency Associates, visited campus on
February 16. He spoke to the Rho Epsi-
lon members on "The Shopping Center
Development Process."
On March 7, Donald E. Truitt, a Sen-
ior Vice President with Royal LePage,
spoke to the chapter on "Office Leasing
from the Tenant's Perspective."
Equitec's Regional Director of Property
Management, John McDonald, met with
the chapter on March 30. His topic was
"Property Management of Large Income
Properties."
Michael Kendzior, an appraiser with
Arthur Andersen's Chicago office, spoke
to the membership about "Real Estate
Appraisal" on April 1 1
.
The final speaker of the semester was
Joanne Guercio. Guercio, who is now
Vice President, Capital Markets Group
for The Balcor Company, served as the
1979-80 president of the U of I Rho
Epsilon chapter. She returned to campus
on April 18 to discuss "Real Estate
Financial Markets" with the students.
A field pip to Chicago was scheduled
for April 7. Professor Cannaday and
eighteen students visited three major real
estate organizations. At Lincoln Proper-
ty, Fall 1985 Rho Epsilon president
Carolyn (Rossi) Brett and fellow Illinois
alumnus Bill Barry discussed "Real Estate
Development." Real Estate Research
Corporation provided lunch for the visi-
tors, followed by a presentation by Presi-
dent Richard Kately and U of I alumni
Frank Donato and Deborah Brett on "Real
Estate Consulting." At the First Nation-
al Bank of Chicago, Vice Presidents Dea
Schmertz and Tim Meyer spoke to the
students on "Real Estate Lending."
Spring 1989 was also a successful re-
cruiting semester. One new faculty mem-
ber and 21 new student members were
added to the roster, bringing the chapter's
membership to more than 125.
New officers were elected at a chapter
business meeting following the April 18
professional meeting. The Office of Real
Estate Research congratulates the individ-
uals who were chosen to lead the chapter
in the coming Fall 1989 semester:
President: Brigid Mattingly, a senior in
LAS from Chicago (elected to
serve a second term as president)
Vice President; Linda Paolella, a senior
in LAS from Arlington Heights
Secretary: Gerald Pace, a graduate
student in Finance from Jackson,
Mississippi
Treasurer: Katherine Duda, a senior in
LAS from Chicago
Help ORER Update Company Files
The Office of Real Estate Research main-
tains a set of files, for the use of Univer-
sity of Illinois students, containing infor-
mation on organizations engaged in
business activities related to real estate.
These files have proven to be quite useful
in matching students seeking permanent
or summer employment with interested
firms. Unfortunately, while some of
these "company files" are reasonably cur-
rent, others have become outdated, partic-
ularly those for firms that have undergone
changes in recent years.
ORER is calling on U of I real estate
alumni and other ORER Letter readers to
assist us in updating these important
files. If yoiu" firm hires graduating sen-
iors or summer interns on a regular, or
even occasional, basis, please send to the
Office any information on the firm that
would be helpful to students in their job
searches.
Company brochures and news clippings
build a good foundation; a letter from the
firm stating the organization's preferences
regarding programs of study and specific
courses would be a meaningful addition.
Annual updates of all files will help to
minimize wasted hours on the part of
both students and employing firms.
Significant Gift
Donald Rundblom recently donated
$ 1 ,000 to the Office of Real Estate
Research. In making this unrestrict-
ed contribution, Rundblom is
supporting ORER's education and
research programs.
Alumni Offer Support for
ORER
Alumni and other supporters of the
University sometimes ask about the
kinds of support ORER needs in
pursuing its mission of education,
research, and public service. Assis-
tance in any of the following areas
would be greatly appreciated:
1) The Office is looking for corpo-
rate sponsors for the ORER Letter.
2) Two $10,000 fellowships
would help the U of I to attract the
best graduate students.
3) Rho Epsilon can use subsidies
for its general program or for specif-
ic activities. For example, an organ-
ization might sponsor a membership
recruiting activity or a field trip.
4) ORER would very much like to
obtain corporate grants to fund facul-
ty summer research.
5) A long term goal of the U of I
real estate program is to obtain fund-
ing for a named chair professorship.
In addition, we have an ongoing
need for people to contribute their
time and knowledge, and to assist
with the placement of our graduates.
New Working Papers
Four new ORER Working Papers
have been completed. They are #70,
"Impact of Government Payments
on Cash Rent and Farmland Value,"
by John T. Scott, Jr.; #71, "The
(continued on page 11)
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Variability in MLS Listings and Sales
Roger E. Cannaday.
Thefourth addition to the ORER Letter
Series is an abbreviated version ofORER
Paper # 73, "Factors Explaining Variabil-
ity in MLS Listings and Sales. " Any
reader can obtain a copy of the longer ver-
sion of the paper through a written or
telephoned request to the Office ofReal
Estate Research.
Introduction
It would be useful for brokerage firms to
be able to forecast the pattern over time
of listings and sales that generate broker-
age commissions. Such forecasting abili-
ty would enhance the planning capabili-
ties of brokers regarding revenue and
expense projections, anticipated work
loads, and the need to expand or reduce the
number of sales agents and other employ-
ees. Certain aspects of the steps neces-
sary to develop such forecasting ability
are examined in this paper, within the
context of a particular housing market.
The specific purpose of the paper is to
identify the factors influencing variability
in levels of brokerage activity (such as
the number of Multiple Listing Service
listings and sales of single-family units).
Several measures of local economic activ-
ity are considered, along with proxy varia-
bles for trend, cyclical, and seasonal fac-
tors. The methodology used is based on a
statistical analysis of monthly time series
data.
Trends/Cycles/Seasonality in
Housing Markets
Trends, cycles, and seasonality in listings
and sales by brokers are closely related to
such phenomena in housing markets in
general. Long-term trends that influence
the aggregate demand for housing include
changes in the number and composition
of households; changes in levels of fami-
ly income; and changes in housing price
levels, relative both to income levels and
to changes in the prices of other goods.
For a given local single-family housing
market, the level of listing and sales ac-
tivity is influenced not only by the for-
>f"^'""^y*
Figtire 1
Listings
Sales
Number of MLS Listings and Sales, Champaign County, Illinois,
July 1975 -June 1985
mation of new households and in- or out-
migration of households, but also by the
movement of households among housing
units within the local market. In addi-
tion, changes in households' preferences
for single-family (versus multi-family)
housing and changes in their preference
for the use of agents (versus direct sales
between sellers and buyers) will influence
the level of listings and sales of single-
family units facilitated by brokers.
Even if a study can control for long-
term trends and for seasonal variations
within each calendar year, it must still
contend with cycles in housing markets
over intermediate periods of time. These
cycles may be partially explained by the
overall business cycle or by cycles in re-
lated sectors of the economy, such as the
mortgage markets.
One explanation for seasonality in
housing markets relates to factors in-
fluencing supply, including the weather.
However, an alternative explanation of
seasonality in the housing markets is the
seasonal nature of the demand for hous-
ing. The seasonal demand pattern for
housing is in turn attributed to seasonal
patterns of household formations and
household moves that have persisted over
long periods of time. This tradition of
seasonality in housing markets encourag-
es seasonality to continue.
For example, households planning to
sell their homes have come to expect
peak demand, and to hope for decreased
time required for market exposure, during
the late spring and early summer months.
Households planning to buy homes have
come to expect the benefits of a larger se-
lection of properties and decreased search
time during this same period of the year.
Of course, listings should peak earlier
than sales to allow for the time required
for search, negotiations, and closing.
Data on a Local Housing Market
The monthly time series data for this
study was collected from a variety of
sources for the Champaign County,
Illinois market area. The only readily
available source of monthly data on the
number of listings and sales of single-
family units by brokers was the Multiple
Listing Service (MLS) for Champaign
County.
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The entire county was selected as the
study area, rather than the Champaign-
Urbana urban area that constitutes the
county's major population center, because
of the greater availability of useful
monthly data series on a county-wide ba-
sis. Examples include per capita income,
the unemployment rate, the number of
building permits issued for new single-
family housing, and a cost of living index
for housing. In addition, monthly data on
effective commitment rates by savings
and loan associations (for fixed rate, con-
ventional mortgage loans with terms of
25 years or longer and loan-to-price ratios
of 80%) for the state of Illinois was avail-
able for most of the ten year period cov-
ered by the study. It is assumed that the
pattern of mortgage rates was reasonably
consistent across the state during the
study period. Finally, the industrial pro-
duction index for the United States is in-
cluded in the study, because it is available
on a monthly basis and is considered to
be one of the best proxies for the general
business cycle.
The ten year period from July 1975 to
June 1985 was chosen because of the con-
sistency of the data over that period. For
example, the MLS changed its definition
of what constituted a "sale" in July 1985.
The mortgage data series was revised to
include 15-year loans in August 1985,
and the base year for the industrial produc-
tion index was changed in 1985.
A cursory examination of the data (see
Figure 1) reveals strong seasonal patterns
in the number of listings and sales.
Some seasonality is also present in the
number of building permits issued. There
seem to be cyclical patterns in the cost-
of-living index for housing and the unem-
ployment rate, as well as in mortgage in-
terest rates and the industrial production
index. A consistent trend is reflected in
the per capita income data.
The Listing/Sales Gap
One interesting phenomenon is the in-
creasing gap between listings and sales
over most of the study period. Prior to
mid-1978, while the number of listings
always exceeded the number of sales in
any period, Ustings were always less than
double the number of sales for any given
month. After the middle of 1978, howev-
er, the number of listings was almost al-
ways at least double, and was frequently
triple or quadruple, the number of sales.
Some of this increase may be related to
the dampening of sales when effective
mortgage rates first exceeded double-digit
levels in mid- 1978, yet the increased gap
was sustained over the period of steadily
decreasing rates from late 1981 through
the end of the study period.
Alternative explanations include chang-
es in incentives for listings versus sales
and resulting changes in the efforts of
brokers or salespersons to obtain listings.
For example, the typical share of the
commission split between listing and
selling brokers was increased for listing
brokers in the late 1970s. Even within
firms, some brokers began rewarding list-
ings more generously relative to sales.
In addition, trial listings by owners who
had not planned to sell, but (responding
to increased marketing efforts by brokers)
agreed to sell if they could obtain offers
reflecting brokers' suggested listing pric-
es, may have increased during the period
of the study.
Statistical Results
Statistical models are developed for both
the number of MLS listings per month
and the number of MLS sales per month.
The proxy variables for seasonality, cy-
cle, and trend are found to be strongly sig-
nificant in explaining variability in both
listings and sales. Therefore, any predic-
tive model should account for seasonal,
cyclical, and trend factors.
In addition, variables for the effective
mortgage rate and per capita income are
significant in explaining both listings and
sales, while building permit and cost of
living variables are significant only in ex-
plaining sales. The mortgage rate variable
perfomis as expected, but the direction of
impact of the income variable is opposite
that expected, perhaps reflecting its high
correlation with the proxy trend variable.
The permit results may indicate that the
decision to Ust a home for sale is not af-
fected by pending additions to supply,
while the cost of living measure may
have its greatest impact on first-time buy-
ers, who do not affect the supply side of
the market with their own listings.
Finally, the unemployment rate varia-
ble is not significant in explaining either
listings or sales. This result may reflect
the fact that the unemployment rate only
varies over a narrow range at a relatively
low level. Thus, very few households in
the market for owner-occupied housing
are likely to be affected.
Summary and Conclusions
There is a strong seasonal pattern in both
MLS listings and MLS sales, and that
pattern has persisted in the study area
throughout the ten year study period.
The trend over the entire period consid-
ered reflects an average increase of almost
seven listings per month and slighdy
less than two sales per month. Cyclical
variations in both listings and sales ap-
pear to be highly correlated with the gen-
eral business cycle, when the study con-
trols for variations in mortgage rates and
other variables included in the statistical
models.
The variables included in the models
provide for reasonably high explanatory
power. It is hoped that the results of
this study will be useful in the develop-
ment of forecasting models. Such mod-
els might incorporate lagged variables,
since it may be difficult to predict future
levels of many of these variables. Short-
run forecasts may be possible on the ba-
sis of trends indicated by the most recent
months' values of certain variables, com-
bined with the use of proxies for season-
al and trend variables that require only
the month to be specified.
Once a forecasting model for a locale's
total Multiple Listing Service listings
and sales is developed, a particular brok-
erage firm will need only to find a way
to estimate its market share. Other pos-
sible extensions of this study include the
incorporation of non-MLS listings and
sales and the use of dollar volume in
addition to the number of listings and
sales.
Roger E. Cannaday is an Associate Pro-
fessor in the Department ofFinance at
the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, and a Research Associate
with the Office ofReal Estate Research.
ORER Letter I page?
Ig^^^ijiriew
Coldwell-Banker President Gary Beban on Commercial Brokerage
Gary J. Beban is President ofColdwell-
Banker Commercial Group. He joined
Coldwell-Banker in 1970, and held posi-
tions rangingfrom Industrial Property
Specialist to Executive Vice President be-
fore ascending to thefirm's presidency in
1987.
Beban, who now lives in the Chicago
area, is a native of California. While he
earned academic honors as a student at
UCLA, he is perhaps better known as an
outstanding college quarterback. Beban
was named an Ail-American in 1966 and
1967, and in 1967 was selected Heisman
Memorial Trophy winner as the nation's
top collegiatefootball player. The
Heisman award honored a career in which
Beban led UCLA to a 24-5-2 record and a
1965 Rose Bowl victory. Beban later
spent three seasons playing professional
football. In a 1984 book. The Heisman:
A Symbol of Excellence , John T. Brady
notes that someone once said ofBeban,
"He's not that great a passer. He's not
that fast. What he does best is win."
Beban addressed the Spring 1989 lun-
cheon heldfor University ofIllinois real
estate alumni in Chicago on April 21.
The speech was very timely, as a pur-
chase ofColdwell-Banker Commercial
Group had been completed just two days
before Beban's talk. For the benefit of
those who could not attend the luncheon,
ORER Letter reproduces below the text
of the speech as this issue's interview.
Opening Remarks
Roger [Cannaday, who arranged for Beban
to speak to the alumni group], I want to
thank you for the opportunity to join the
list of speakers that have addressed your
real estate alumni. I also extend a belated
expression of congratulations for the rec-
ognition you received last fall for your
decade of Rho Epsilon stewardship and
your work to achieve professionalism in
the real estate industry. Efforts such as
yours have had a major influence in ele-
vating the credibility of the real estate as-
set as a viable invesunent alternative in
an arena that was traditionally reserved for
stocks and bonds. I knew that commer-
cial real estate had made it to Broadway
about six years ago when, on a flight
from New York to Chicago, I overheard
two stewardesses discussing their discus-
sions with stock brokers regarding their
options to invest in One Financial Center
here in Chicago.
Evolution of Coldwell-Banker
Before I proceed with my comments on
the topic, "The Commercial Real Estate
Brokerage Environment," I would like to
briefly describe the scope of my company
in order to provide you with a reference
point that influences my perspective.
Two days ago, Coldwell-Banker
Commercial Group employees, in con-
junction with domestic and international
financial partners, established the largest
independent commercial real estate service
organization in North America by pur-
chasing Coldwell-Banker Commercial
Real Estate Services from Sears.
Coldwell-Banker was founded in 1906
in San Francisco. It became a publicly
traded company with a New York Stock
Exchange listing in 1968, and was pur-
chased by Sears in 1981. Now, eighty-
three years after its founding, the organi-
zation returns to its roots of employee
control and ownership, but within a vast-
ly expanded structure.
Today, with ninety-four domestic offic-
es, we have locations in all major cities
in the United States. In addition, we have
five offices in Canada and one in London.
1988 was one of our strongest years fi-
nancially, as we completed over 26,000
transactions, valued in excess of $26 bil-
lion, and generated $460 million in reve-
nues. Our three operating components
are Commercial Real Estate Services,
which includes property and asset man-
agement services; Capital Management,
which invests pension fund capital in in-
stitutional quality grade commercial prop-
erty; and Capital Markets, which is the
blending of the globalization of capital re-
sources with real estate investments
through a sophisticated acquisition and
disposition marketing posture.
The Changing Environment
To help provide an understanding of the
changing commercial brokerage and real
estate environment, I am going to take a
step back in time. We can demonstrate
change by considering the subject matter
that would have been covered if the
speakers who have recently addressed
your alumni group had instead prepared
their remarks ten years ago:
You would still have heard a repre-
sentative, like Bill Bomhoff, from a
major domestic insurance company
such as Prudential, Metropolitan Life,
or Equitable, explaining the substantial
commitment such organizations had
made to commercial real estate invest-
ment.
However, Michael Herzberg of JMB
Realty would have spoken on tax
structured real property investment, es-
pecially with regard to multi-residential
complexes, instead of "The Future of
Real Estate Syndications."
Sheldon F. Good probably would
have detailed the commercial brokerage
environment, as I will do today, since
the concept of real estate auctions was
still in an embryonic stage.
Donald Rundblom of Morgan
Stanley might have reviewed capital re-
sources for major debt origination in-
stead of "Securitization of Commercial
Mortgage Loans." Actually, it is not
very likely that Don or any other Wall
Street representative would have been
on your list of speakers in 1979.
Chuck Palmer would have altered his
topic to "Real Estate Development
with a Canadian Parmer" instead of a
Japanese partner.
Finally, instead of hearing Yuki
Oshima's views on "Investment in
U.S. Real Estate from a Japanese Per-
spective," you would have invited a
Canadian, British, or Dutch representa-
tive.
My point is that in order to identify
change in our industry, one must focus
on the subject matter rather than the
speaker, because, then or now, the list of
speakers would be largely the same. To
provide a sense of where the industry is
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today, I am going to do a quick compari-
son of today's primary marketplace indi-
cators with those of a decade ago.
Ten Years Ago
The market condition ten years ago was
much stronger with regard to vacancy.
The National Downtown office building
vacancy rate was 3.6%, down from the
previous year's high of 5.6%; downtown
San Francisco stood at 0.4%. In those
"good old days," we used a 4% to 6% va-
cancy factor as a sign of a healthy real
estate market Today, the National
Downtown rate stands at 16.1%. Howev-
er, the market was not uniformly strong
ten years ago; rents were not keeping
pace with the rising costs of construction
and the rising costs of money.
Capital market conditions differed from
those of today. Money was readily avail-
able, but was getting expensive. The
prime rate stood at 14.5%; it was expect-
ed to slightly rise over the year, and in
fact rose to 16.5%. U.S. pension funds
were confirmed as real buyers of prime
U.S. properties; the term "institutionali-
zation of real estate ownership" started to
appear frequendy in print Those de-
scribed as foreign investors at the time
were from the United Kingdom, or were
Canadian, Dutch, German, or Middle
Eastern. Only in Los Angeles did we see
investors from the Pacific Rim.
Newspaper headlines of the time tell
the story. New York: "Commercial
market still tight; more construction
needed." Boston: "Severe space short-
age." Los Angeles: "Foreign investors
key to active market." Mitsui Fudosan
had just purchased the 42-story Crocker
Bank Building for the outrageous amount
of $79 million. In Houston, forty-five
office buildings with 12.5 million square
feet of space were under construction,
with an additional five to seven milUon
square feet on the drawing boards.
Significant trends were under way in
this market environment. Movement
was from the "Rust Belt" in the north and
east to the "Sun Belt" in the south and
west. Movement within regions was
from central city areas to suburban areas.
And our country was in transition from a
manufacturing economy to a service
economy.
In the marketplace just described, the
real estate industry was poised and armed
to outperform a sagging economy that
was about to enter a major slowdown (a
better word would be recession) eighteen
months later.
After the Recession
The economy's recovery from the 1981-
82 recession drove the real estate industry
into an unprecedented growth and activity
phase through the rest of the decade, or at
least until this point. All regions of the
U.S., except the energy related areas, ex-
perienced historic levels of new supply of
product, absorption activity, and expan-
sion of the brokerage and development
segments of the industry. All of this oc-
curred amid several dramatic Tax Refomi
Acts that altered a fundamental principle
of real property in an economic and taxa-
tion sense. In essence, a commercial
brokerage company's mailing list for de-
velopers, user customers, investors, and
competitive firms doubled or even tripled.
In addition to the broadening of our in-
dustry's service capabihties, three devel-
opments during this growth phase can be
highlighted as directly impacting our
working environment
First commercial real estate was con-
firmed and vaUdated as an alternative to
traditional investments. We experienced a
dramatic expansion of our capital base:
from the public sector, to the pension
fund, and finally across international
boundaries. There seem to be no limits
today; American real estate potential has
become globalized. Our industry has
been capital-driven rather than supply/
demand conscious, and the industry still
maintains an over-financed position.
Second, there has been tremendous
growth and proliferation of real estate in-
formation sources. Today, real estate data
is everywhere.
Finally, our industry has interacted as
both teacher and student with its custom-
ers. We have raised the levels of knowl-
edge and skill possessed by our clients,
while those same clients have taught us
that they expect a higher level of service
from us.
An example can be seen in the job tide.
"Corporate Real Estate Director." No
longer is this position held by an em-
ployee who is sent to pasture just before
retirement The underlying value of cor-
porate real estate assets has become a
critical ingredient in the overall corporate
fmancial planning process. Today, the
corporate real estate director, armed with
marketplace knowledge and an ever-
expanding financial background, is play-
ing a larger role in developing primary
corporate fmance strategies.
Respecting our time limitations, I
must at least mention here three other
significant issues that have developed
during the 1980s: hazardous waste, envi-
ronmental sensitivities, and asset man-
agement.
This is where we are today.
The Future
Where are we going? The direction in
which we move will be directly impacted
by how we address the following issues,
in addition to those noted above.
First, can we discipline ourselves? We
must be productive in an industry which
is over-financed and which traditionally
has not been able to resist the temptation
to say, "I have a niche product that can
beat the odds" when the available market
information demonstrates statistically
that we are overbuilt. Our projections of
economic growth and of absorption of
the present inventory of product still
forecast an overbuilt marketplace.
Second, given the quantity of real
estate information becoming increasingly
available to us in the practice of our
trade, the interpretation and evaluation of
readily accessible data will become a crit-
ical factor in the way we do business in
the future.
Finally, we will provide our customers
with a greater degree of service than we
did during die last decade. This will be
true particularly in the initial steps of the
deal development process. The need to
marshal and coordinate available resourc-
es to best serve the client's interest in
order to optimize the financial considera-
tions of his decision, will reshape that
process. Success in the future will de-
pend on what we do before we start the
traditional steps in making a deal.
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ades. Jacobs launched a frontal attack on
the pretentions of urban planners and im-
plicitly called into question the worth of
planning per se. She charged that urban
planners, through zoning, urban renewal,
eminent domain, and other tools of their
trade, had drained the life out of down-
town areas and neighborhoods. Jacobs
scored her most telling points when she
dissected the planners' penchant for lining
the slums with "greenbelts." The concept
of the greenbelt arose out of the deep-
seated anti-urban bias of reformers who
wanted to bring the country to the city.
As Jacobs pointed out, the legacy of the
greenbelt movement can be observed by
any traveler to the inner city. By the
1960s, when Jacobs wrote, greenbelts
were already notorious as lifeless weed-
and crime-ridden expanses deserted by lo-
cal residents, who, much to the consterna-
tion of reformers, still prefeired to pa&on-
ize the more vital and safe crowded
streets.21 (This can be contrasted with
private block parks, such as Gramercy
Park in New York, which is privately
owned and available only to residents of
the surrounding apartment buildings. Vi-
olent criminals and vandals are excluded
from such private parks because they are
fenced and keys are available only to
those who contribute in some way to
their maintenance.)
The Political Economy of Privy
Vaults
The public sewer has become so com-
monplace to American cities that it is
easy to forget that, as late as 1880, more
than 2/3 of urban households still depend-
ed on individual privy vaults to dispose of
human waste. Usually, the privy vault
was a brick-lined hole in the ground,
which was periodically emptied by "exca-
vator" companies that sold the contents to
farmers for use as manure. A little-
known fact is that the British classical
liberal Herbert Spencer coupled his criti-
cism of government sewer-building pro-
grams with calls for expanding the use of
recycling under the privy-vault syslem.22
The conventional view advanced by his-
torians, such as Nelson Manfred Blake,
portrayed the installation of tax-financed
sewer systems during the late nineteenth
century as an unambiguous step forward
in sanitation quality. Such accounts have
usually been accompanied by lurid con-
demnations of the privy vault as a leaky
public-health nuisance. While there is
much truth in these depictions, historians
have neglected to ask whether technologi-
cal improvements — accompanied by
stricter enforcement against liability for
privy-vault pollution - could have reme-
died the defects.23
Ironically, according to a recent study
by historian Joel Tarr, the introduction of
municipal sewers may have increased pol-
lution. Most sewers, Tarr points out,
used a "water carriage" technology relying
on storm water to carry human waste to
the dumping location. Under this sys-
tem, the heavy flow of storm water ren-
dered recycling almost impossible. As a
result, larger quantities of sewage found
their way into lakes and rivers. Tarr's re-
search revealed that the incidence of water-
borne diseases, such as typhoid, actually
increased in many cities after the inttoduc-
tion of municipal sewers. Moreover, the
cheaper water-carriage system priced de-
veloping technologies, such as sewage ir-
rigation, out of the market.24
Conclusion
Through urban history we are able to
trace the development of city life from its
roots in the medieval communes to the
developers, condominiums, and other vol-
untary arrangements of our own day. In
the process we are also able to witness
the growth of western law and western
liberty: from sworn oaths made in public
to voluntary contract, the history of the
western city aptly follows the well-
known path from "status to contract"
traced by Henry Sumner Maine.25 This
evolution, from collective oaths and cov-
enants to very specific and individual pri-
vate contracts, has made possible the
emergence of what Adam Smith called the
"Great Society," a self-ordering system of
economic and social arrangements that
does not rely on a coercive ordering force.
Classical liberal historians often find
the choice of a research topic daunting.
This affliction can be readily treated by
surveying some of the authors dealt with
in this essay. The range of questions
that remains to be answered is great, and
the challenge to classical liberal histori-
ans - whether beginning students or ad-
vanced scholars - is an exciting one.
The urban-history-research trail blazed
over a hundred years ago by the classical
liberal historian Augustin Thierry is well
worth traveling.
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hold estate be assessed and taxed? (Note
that a positive leasehold value is com-
pensable in an eminent domain taking.)
If so, should the assessed value of the
leased fee be reduced by the leasehold's as-
sessed value? What should happen when
the value of the leasehold is negative?
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Pricing of Mortgage Characteristics
and Consumer Choice in the Mort-
gage Market," by David W. Marshall;
#72, "Forecasting Real Estate Value:
The Case of Commercial Land," by
Peter F. Colwell and Joseph G.
Kowalski; and #73, "Factors Explain-
ing Variability in MLS Listings and
Sales," by Roger E. Cannaday.
Copies are available from ORER.
Cannaday Honored for
Excellence
The Commerce Alumni Association
has selected Roger Cannaday to re-
ceive its 1989 Excellence-in-Teaching
Award for Undergraduate Teaching.
The award recognizes Cannaday's or-
ganized and thoughtful manner of in-
struction, his generosity with time
outside of class, and the tremendous
success of Rho Epsilon during Can-
naday's tenure as advisor. The award
was presented on April 27 at the As-
sociation's Annual Spring Luncheon.
U of I Faculty Address
May Conference
ORER Professor Peter Colwell and
ORER Research Associate Jan
Brueckner attended meetings of the
Homer Hoyt Institute's Weimer
School of Advanced Studies in Real
Estate and Land Economics, held
May 4-6 in Singer Island, Florida.
Both served as discussants in a ses-
sion on Office Market Research.
Colwell discussed a paper entitled,
"Estimation of Cost Functions for
Commercial Real Estate: The Effects
of Architectural Quality," by Kerry
Vandell of Southern Methodist Uni-
versity and Nancy Wallace of the
University of California at Berkeley.
Brueckner discussed a paper by
John Glascock, Shirin Jahanian, and
C.F. Sirmans of Louisiana State
University, entitled "An Analysis of
Office Market Rents: Some Empiri-
cal Evidence."
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Price Up, Quantity Down for Quad Cities' Housing
The Quad Cities was one of the areas
within Illinois hardest hit by unemploy-
ment in the 1980s. Employment has im-
proved dramatically over the past few
years, with the unemployment rate in the
Illinois portion of the Davenport-Rock
Island-Moline Metropolitan Statistical
Area (composed of Rock Island and Henry
Counties) falling from 19.0% in January
1985 to 7.3% in March 1989.
However, while the area's real estate
market (as reflected in the value of per-
mits for new construction) has shown a
tendency to move up and down with em-
ployment, it has not shown significant
recent improvement. Single family home
construction, which was very strong at
the end of the 1970s before falling sharp-
ly during the high unemployment envi-
ronment of the early to mid 1980s, is
progressing slowly. Of course, high in-
terest rates have held 1989 construction of
new housing nationwide to low levels.
The increase in total value of new home
construction (see Figure 1 , which in-
cludes 1989 projections) accompanying
the recent low unemployment is at least
partially attributable to inflation. The av-
erage cost (according to the permit data)
to build a new home in the Rock Island-
Henry County area rose from approxi-
mately $55,000 in the 1983-84 period, to
approximately $65,000 in the 1985-86
period, and finally to the $100,000 range
Office of Real Estate Research
University of Illinois a't Urbana-Champaign
304-G David Kinley Hall
1407 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, Illinois 61801
in 1987-88. At the same time, the num-
ber of new units has decreased sharply and
steadily, from more than 500 in 1979 to
less than 100 annually in the 1985 to
1988 interval. Yet an 80% price increase
between 1983 and 1988 would not be a
product solely of inflation. It may be the
case that, given the relatively few new
homes built, the 1983-86 construction
activity was concentrated in homes with
modest features, while more recenly built
homes were more luxurious.
Non-residential construction, as shown
in the graph, was strong at the beginning
of the period, then declined as unemploy-
ment rose, and rebounded, as would be
expected, in 1986-88. The strong non-
residential building activity in 1985, with
unemployment still at a high level, re-
flects the construction in Woodhull of a
Pioneer Seed Com facility (accounting
for $12 million of the year's total).
Multi-family construction activity re-
mains far below its levels of seven to ten
years ago. Such an observation of the
rental market is not surprising, in that
those moving away from an area of in-
dustrial unemployment tend to be young-
er individuals lacking both job seniority
and the financial ability to buy houses.
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How to Revive a Dying City
Mason Gaffney
Following is an edited text of the 1988
Henry George Lecture, presented in Oc-
tober by Dr. Mason Gaffney at St. John's
University in New York City. Gaffney is
a Professor ofEconomics at the Univer-
sity ofCalifornia at Riverside. Henry
George was an economist of the late
nineteenth century, whose views still in-
fluence debates on property taxation.
Introductory
My grandfathers saw New York City as
the center of civilization. It was a hva-
ble, optimistic place: a growing, vibrant,
trend-setting, prospering, cultural city.
A little crooked, sure, and great grandfa-
ther was probably no saint, paving streets
for Tammany Hall. But it had a present
and future, a life and soul, not like the
hopeless despair of today's Bronx.
But we are here to talk of the future.
I hope to see those good times and better
ones come again, preferably without the
graft. And we are here to review the ide-
as of another commuter between New
York and California, Henry George, and
how his ideas might help to revive dead
cities. Henry George was a journalist
who taught himself economics. He had a
flowing pen and a brilliant mind, and his
book. Progress and Poverty, remains the
all-time best-seller in economics (except
for forced-sale items, like textbooks and
the Thoughts ofChairman Mao). People
remember George, however, not for the
volume of his sales, but for his enduring
ideas. The reform program he developed
combines incentive with justice. It com-
prises a plan not just to revitalize cities,
but to reunify society.
Dead and Dying Cities
Some extreme cases of moribund cities
are East St. Louis, Robbins, Harvey, and
Ford Heights, IL; Camden and Newark,
NJ; Benton Harbor, MI; and Gary, IN.
Large parts of many once-vibrant cities
are half dead, seriously blighted, and
trending downwards. New Yorkers know
the South Bronx well enough to avoid
knowing any better. In Milwaukee it is
the near north side, called locally the "in-
ner core," a galloping blight whose area
has tripled in the last 20 years while pop-
ulation has dropped. In Chicago it is
South State Street, near the Madison
Street crossing which for generations was
the most valuable comer in the nation.
Blight is not restricted to stagnant or
declining cities. In booming Los An-
geles, there is Watts. In nearby River-
side, one of the fastest growing cities in
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Alumni Luncheon
Charles M. Hill will speak on
"Restructuring the Thrift Industry"
at the fall luncheon for University of
Illinois alumni working in the real
estate field. Hill is Executive Vice
President of the Federal Home Loan
Bank of Chicago and a member of
the ORER Advisory Committee.
The luncheon will be held on
Friday, November 10. Gene
Stunard has again arranged for the
use of the Chicago Yacht Club's
facilities. The cost of the luncheon,
which is open only to U of I alumni
and their guests, is $25 per person.
Contact Brenda Bishop at the Office
of Real Estate Research for
reservation information.
Henry George Turns 150
The work of economist Henry
George has been a subject of partic-
ular interest in this 150th year fol-
lowing his birth. George is known
for his advocacy of taxing land val-
ue as a substitute for the typically-
encountered tax on combined land
and improvement value.
As a tribute to George, ORER
Letter presents "How to Revive a
Dying City," by economist Mason
Gaffney, as this issue's feature arti-
cle. The article explains Georgist
views which, though formulated in
an earlier era, provide insights into
problems of today's world.
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the nation, the CBD is surrounded by
blight which, among other things, frus-
trates years of subsidies aimed at reviving
the moribund CBD itself.
These extreme cases are not anomalies,
not simply ghettoes and embarrassments;
they are symptoms of systemic malfunc-
tion. They could be portents and symbols
for the rest of the economy. Blight may
be defined as failure to maintain, replace,
and renew capital inherited from the past.
Studies indicate that all of American in-
dustry faces this problem, compared with
vigorous foreign competitors. In learning
to cure blight, we may learn to restore the
greatness and pride of this whole troubled
nation.
Cities That Have Revived
There is also good news: some cities have
risen from the grave. Indeed, all land de-
velopment is resurrection in a sense: all
land has been used before for something.
The history of a city lot usually shows
that there were several antecedent im-
provements, layered like the ruins of an-
cient Troy. The goal should be to make
renewal happen faster and more widely,
while we are still here to benefit.
Germany and Japan recovered from
World War II with breathtaking speed.
Atlanta recovered from Sherman, albeit
in its own courtly time. Chicago burned
in 1871, leaving 90,000 homeless, but re-
covered without breaking stride. San
Francisco and Anchorage recovered from
devastating earthquakes. Washington,
D.C. recovered from the 14th Street riots
and arson. The basics were right; the lo-
cations remained good. Disaster may
even have forced "instant urban renewal,"
by demolishing obsolescent capital and
releasing land for rebuilding.
Other revivals, while less dramatic and
publicized, are more impressive and rele-
vant because they are revivals from nor-
mal decay and obsolescence, pushed
along by good public policy. Southfield,
bordering Detroit, is thriving and flour-
ishing as fast as its parent central city is
dying. Rosslyn, VA, across the Potomac
from D,C., is a forest of high-rises that
rose while Washington was burning and
derelict in the 1960s, Sacramento's once-
depressing center has found new life.
Pittsburgh, of grimy repute, was recently
named the most livable U,S, city. Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Taipeh, once best
known as fetid ports of call, are three of
the "Four Tigers" of southeast Asia.
Local policies in these modem stories
of economic success and social revitali-
zation show the hand of Henry George at
work. In Taipeh, we hear that they are
guided by the philosophy of Dr. Sun
Yat-sen, a Georgist convert. In Pitts-
burgh, we find a "graded tax plan" ap-
plied, framed, and supported by the
Henry George Foundation. Throughout
Pennsylvania, we see smaller cities emu-
lating Pittsburgh's partial application of
George's policies; such cities bear close
watching as they bounce back.
Then there are cities with explosive
growth after slow periods. These in-
clude Sydney and Johannesburg, both
notable for their use of Georgist policies.
Whatever their social faults, these cities
have burgeoned to become the economic
capitals of their continents. There are
other examples in Africa, like Nairobi;
and in the Antipodes, like Brisbane and
Auckland. Many cities of western Cana-
da, including Edmonton and Vancouver,
grew with partial use of Georgist poli-
cies in the early 1900s, Georgist policy
was applied more informally (through
assessment discrimination) by San Fran-
cisco, Seattle, Portland, San Diego,
Houston, and other growing western
U.S. cities during the same period.
It is comforting to know that degener-
ation and failure are not our predestined
fate. We may choose them, but we may
also choose renewal and success. It is a
matter of attitude and know-how.
Why Cities Should be Revived
Some cities should be abandoned.
Towns around played-out mines are ob-
vious examples, A farm town becomes
redundant when new roads let customers
patronize a larger or better town. Sal-
vage what you can and move on.
Some would apply the same logic to
all cities. Dead cities aren't lost, they
say, but rebuilt elsewhere; they were
cash cows that have been milked dry.
Their depreciation allowances are rein-
vested on new frontiers; people and vi-
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tality move with the capital. It is an im-
portant half-truth, but a half-truth is also
half wrong. The basic original site stays
put; land cannot move. Public and pri-
vate social capital cannot move, either.
We cannot afford throwaway cities in
a finite world. New natural sites are not
common. There is only one Hudson Val-
ley with only one mouth, and here New
York City has stood for 350 years. We
cannot abandon the Bronx and duplicate
its environment somewhere; we cannot
rebuild the natural setting, and the sunk
social capital is too costly. Relocating to
suburbs involves commuting cost in
terms of money and congestion. And
then, when we tire of the new suburbs,
where will we go next?
Furthermore, blighted areas have high
potential market values. Picture a topo-
graphic map of a city where the contour
lines represent points not of equal eleva-
tion, but of equal market value per
square foot. The peaks, the Everests and
McKinleys, are in the city retail centers,
where just one square foot rises to
$2,000 (about $90 million per acre).
Land just a few miles away from dizzy-
ing altitudes can hardly be worthless.
Harlem is near Park Avenue; Watts is
near Beverly Hills; South State Street is
very near the Sears Tower. Newark is 15
minutes by train from Manhattan. New-
ark office rents are $25/sf per year. That
is less, of course, than in Manhattan, but
in Riverside, California, we are throwing
up offices to get rent of $ 1 2/sf per year,
while Newark stagnates.
Capital earning $25 is obviously more
productive than that yielding $ 1 2. I do
not mean capital in the floor atop a high-
rise, which likely costs $25/sf (in annual-
ized terms) to build and operate; but cap-
ital in lower floors, which costs less to
build but rents for as much, yielding a
surplus. To get more such capital and
the corresponding surplus, renew more
land in high potential areas, like Newark.
Not to renew is to waste potential sur-
pluses. Each year's loss is gone forever;
services of land perish with time.
Urban revival works best when
healthy pieces remain on which to an-
chor development. In the worst scenario
no such place remains, but even Camden
has Campbell Soup; Newark has a great
airport, a new Hartz Mountain Industrial
Park, and the Pru. Life is persistent and
resilient; seedlings that sprout seek only
sunshine, water, and cultivation.
The Urban Surplus
One reason we remember Henry George
is his pioneering study of how cities work
and the good they do. Previous econo-
mists showed limited understanding of
location value and its causes. Even von
Thunen, father of location theory, ap-
proached cities in an antiseptic way that
left out what today we call urban linkages
and synergy. George was a mensch, see-
ing cities in human, interactive terms.
George saw cities as foci of civiliza-
tion's basic mechanisms. People with
mutual access, associating on equal
terms, expedite cooperation and speciali-
zation through the market. Multivariate
interactions are synergistic. Indeed,
while each parcel is developed in the
stage of decreasing returns, the composite
city is generally in a stage of increasing
retums, thanks to synergy: the whole ex-
ceeds the sum of its parts, and increases
to the whole yield more than the sum of
increases to the parts. Synergistic sur-
plus, said George, lodges in urban land
rents. Thus he explained a phenomenon
which other economists overlooked: the
unparalleled rise in urban rents and land
prices, and in owners' wealth and power.
Building investment exhibits diminish-
ing marginal productivity. For example,
the first $I0K spent yields 30%, or $3K;
but $1K (10%) is paid in interest, leaving
a $2K surplus. To acquire a superior lo-
cation that confers this surplus, the buyer
can spend up to $2K annually, which
means paying up to $20K for the land (at
10%, $20K costs $2K/year). The next
$10K spent may yield more than 10%
too, say 20%, conferring more surplus
and adding more value to the land. The
idea is to invest until the last $10K unit
yields 10%, just enough to pay interest.
To understand ground rents and land
prices is to understand cities; not to un-
derstand is to remain mired forever in
confusion and fallacy. Ground rent con-
tinues forever, generally tending to rise;
therefore, to buy title to land, people pay
AREUEA Nominates Colwell
ORER Professor Peter Colwell has
been nominated to run for a three-
year term on the Board of Directors
of the American Real Estate and
Urban Economics Association
(AREUEA).
The membership will elect four
Board members from among eight
nominees. Other nominees are Jack
Goodman of the Federal Reserve
Board, David Ling of Southern
Methodist University, Frank Nothaft
of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, Ronald Rogers of the
University of South Carolina, David
Seiders of the National Association
of Home Builders, James Shilling of
Louisiana State University, and
Anthony Yezer of George
Washington University.
University of Illinois Economics
Professor Jan Brueckner serves on
the AREUEA Board of Directors.
Former ORER Director James R.
Follain is the organization's curtent
President.
Vrsin Addresses Illinois
Realtors®
ORER Advisory Committee member
Don Ursin addressed the Realtor® of
the Year Banquet on June 7 in
Springfield. He had been named
1989 Illinois Realtor® of the Year.
In his speech, "Reflections of a
Realtor®," Ursin outlined his educa-
tional and professional history, and
noted contributions that others had
made to his career success. He then
suggested steps that others in the real
estate field might follow.
Ursin has been in the real estate
business since 1957. He has been ac-
tive in Realtor® activities at the lo-
cal, state, and national levels, serving
as President of the Illinois Associa-
tion of Realtors® in 1981.
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prices that look high relative to current
cash flows. In Riverside, a low density
city of 208,000, land prices go up to $18/
sf. In San Francisco, with high density
and 800,000 people, prices reach $1,000/
sf; in Manhattan they exceed $2,000. In
Tokyo, probably the top of the line, one
sale is reported at $25,000/sf. Urban
land prices take your breath away.
Land prices vary extremely from city
to city or block to block. The cost to
build a square foot of floor space is fairly
constant from place to place, but demand
varies with location. A small rise in
floor rental translates into a large rise in
ground rent and land price, because the
land owner gets everything above what
is required to operate and amortize the
building. Thus, in Riverside, neighbor-
hood mall space rental of $ 1 2 just pays
for the building, with only a little left
over, resulting in land prices of perhaps
$5-$8/sf. In Manhattan, rentals are triple
those in Riverside; all surplus accrues to
ground rent, resulting in land prices 300
times higher than in Riverside.
At key locations in bigger cities, land
prices are not just high per square foot,
they are higher per capita than in small
cities. They are even higher relative to
building values, in spite of the high-rise
buildings. Remember that each addition-
al floor adds more ground rent, because
floor space rental is more than enough to
cover the added cost.
Land prices across cities and neigh-
borhoods are much more differentiated
than other measures economists com-
monly cite. For example, the median in-
come in upper east side Manhattan is
about 8 times higher than north of Cen-
tral Park, while the price of land per
square foot is probably 40 times higher.
Urban land is also highly concentrated
in ownership; a handful of people and
corporations own most of it. A growing
share of income property is held by
wealthy aliens, who want to diversify
and acquire secure wealth they can man-
age by remote control. Aliens even hold
a good deal of residential property in in-
ternational "jet set" communities.
Sharing the Surplus
Because urban rents are a social surplus.
not a payment for anyone's making or
supplying land, parties other than the
landowner have a claim. A good deal of
American politics deals with how to as-
sert that claim and share in the surplus.
Dividing a big pie seems a pleasant
enough task, but Confucius knew better:
"It is easier to face a common enemy than
to share a surplus." The common ways
of sharing surplus are clumsy, divisive,
and destructive; they bear some responsi-
bility for dead cities. With too much
quarreling over spoils, there are no spoils
to dispute. Consider how spoils are
shared, and how we might do better.
Rent Control
Rent control, which shares surplus with
tenants, is a tempting route that several
cities follow. Renters feel abused and ne-
glected by tough managers and anony-
mous landlords. Supply is inelastic, at
least in the short run, so owners can't cut
and run. Poetic justice is served. But
there are several spots on this policy:
Limited number of beneficiaries. The
original tenants carve out an equity in the
landlord's estate, but benefits spread no
wider. Tenants may sublet to others, be-
coming landlords themselves. Rent con-
trol is at best a zero-sum game among the
few, not a social reform.
Lower incentive to maintain supply. It
becomes unattractive to build new rental
units, which are allowed higher initial
rents but are vulnerable to future caps.
So rent control is worse than a zero-sum
game, it becomes negative-sum. Rent
control confiscates land income and
building income alike; buildings do not
receive needed maintenance if there is no
return. Too, land can be reallocated to
uncontrolled uses, such as condominium-
ization. A new wrinkle in Santa Monica
is to buy a cheap rent-controlled apart-
ment building and convert it to a single-
family residence for the new owner.
Wasted space. Tenants lose incentives
to economize on space that is underpriced
to them. In the extreme, tenants move
away, but retain their apartments to use a
few weeks of the year.
New class society. Old renters become
a privileged class. A lower new supply,
and wasted space, force uncontrolled rent
on new buildings above the market level.
Owner-tenant clashes. An owner's
main goal under rent control is to evict
and repossess. Hastiness and intimida-
tion have become routine, and the war
stories legendary. In Tokyo, outright ex-
tortion and violence are frequent.
Aborted incentive to maintain and im-
prove. Landlords, and tenants retaining
precarious tenures, lose all economic mo-
tivation to maintain or improve property.
Dogged obstructionism. Sitting ten-
ants, who cannot gain by site renewal,
fight it every way they can. Obstruction-
ists have a vested interest in the status
quo, however obsolescent, however de-
cayed, however inappropriate to the site.
Undertaxation . Equity that tenants
carve out of landlords' estates has no
market value, because it is inalienable (at
least legally). Assessed values and tax
yields drop. The privileged class pays
low rent and avoids supporting public
services. Higher tax burdens are dumped
on others, and worsened public services
are suffered by all. By way of analogy, I
am a small farmer with canal company
shares that allow me to buy water below
the market price, but no right to sell my
water. So I and my fellow shareholders
waste water and create a chronic, artifi-
cial southern California water shortage.
The rationale is that housing or water
is too important to leave to the market,
and must be price-controlled. The result
is regulation much worse than anything a
market could accomplish. Around 1973
there were shortages of coffee, raisins,
and even toilet paper. These were too
unimportant to regulate, so their prices
rose, demand fell, supply rose, and the
crises quickly disappeared. Rent control
ensures that we will not overcome the
housing crisis so simply, if at all.
"French Equity" (Equity in Kind)
Under the Code Napoleon, a French tes-
tator must divide real estate equally
among all children. Money cannot sub-
stitute for land; the Code requires equity
in kind. The resulting fine subdivision is
called morcellement, and the Code de-
mands it without regard for efficiency.
Each heir, in fact, must get an equal
share of land of each quality: meadow.
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woodland, etc.
Today we approach French Equity in-
directly, and expensively. We distribute
land haphazardly, but seek to make every
parcel equally good by extending utilities
and roads to all parcels on the same
terms, regardless of cost or location.
Economists call such schemes "post-
age stamp pricing," because postal rates
do not vary with delivery costs. Manhat-
tan has 64,000 residents per square mile;
Montana has 5.4. It costs a lot more to
collect or deliver mail in Montana. The
reason postal rates rise is that the U.S.
urban population is spreading out more
like Montana and less like Manhattan
(which once had over 100,000 per square
mile). Here are five other examples:
The British Columbia Ferry Service.
This socialized system has two urban
lines that make money, but the whole
system hardly breaks even, because less-
er lines serve remote areas. The worst
costs $12 for every dollar of revenue.
British Cohtmbia Hydro. This social-
ized power system charges uniform rates
throughout the Province. Users living in
high-density Vancouver are cheap to
serve. A few live on the Yukon border,
where (I surmise) it costs hundreds of
dollars to earn a dollar of revenue.
Water and sewer service in Milwaukee
County. Wisconsin. City investments
have been captured, controlled, and
milked by suburban land development
interests, helped by state legislators.
State university campuses. The legis-
lative ethic demands a prize, such as a
university campus, in every electoral dis-
trict. Most of the eight UC campuses
have excess land; some have excess floor
space. Sacramento solves rising enroll-
ment not with more intensive use of ex-
isting campuses, but with the costly crea-
tion of new ones, each to enrich
influential land speculators.
Water supply in California. The high
real cost of serving new settlements is
passed on to older settled areas through
an accounting device called "melding,"
stirring all the accounts in the same pot.
Melding passes through several levels: a
state wholesaler serves the metropolitan
district, which serves local districts,
which serve cities. At the end of the
line, in Riverside, it costs society $1800
to serve the marginal acre-foot (a unit of
water) selling for $20. This subsidy is
worth fortunes to developers; the cost is
spread so others won't notice.
Problems with French Equity
There are two problems with these subsi-
dies as an approach to equity: they are
not equitable, and they are wasteful. Eq-
uity achieved by regional cross-subsidy is
not interpersonal, but interregional. It is
like U.S. "foreign aid" programs, which
tax the poor in rich countries to aid the
rich in poor countries. Some who hold
speculative land and enjoy subsidies are
among the world's richest people and cor-
porations. Equity is not served by milk-
ing middle-class neighborhoods to further
enrich wealthy owners. "Public works
for private gain" is bad enough, but worse
when profiteers are already rich.
How about waste? Subsidy creates
waste in the amount of the subsidy, al-
most by definition. The New York Re-
gional Plan Association estimates the so-
cial cost of creating a new lot on the
urban fringe at four times the lot's price
(probably an underestimate). Why devel-
op a lot worth only one quarter of its
cost? Because other people pay the other
three quarters. This process transfers
ground rent from areas of overcharge to
areas of undercharge, but it destroys
much of the ground rent. To spread the
surplus, we lose much of it.
Has French Equity any merit? It
passed for a way to create jobs when
Keynes actually urged waste as a route to
full employment. Those ideas are now
dormant, but we still do not understand
the problem. If we had to fire teachers or
policemen each time a city extended utili-
ties to a campaign donor's raw acres, we
would better sense the true cost of public
works for private profit.
George's Constructive Program
The key to renewing cities is shifting
from (7/7structive ways of sharing rent,
like rent control; and t/^'structive ways,
like looting and subsidies; to constructive
ways. Henry George showed us how eq-
uity and efficiency go hand in hand, how
the magic of justice combines with the
magic of incentive.
First, by George, equity need not be in
kind. The monetary mechanism over-
comes the clumsiness of in-kind equity.
If four families inherit a one-family
house, all four don't crowd in; they sell
and divide the money, or one buys out
the others. There is equity in money as
well as in real estate. Money is often
better; the reinvestment opportunity puts
the house on a magic carpet to follow
you anywhere. Money is wonderful!
Second, by George, use the tax mecha-
nism. Do not divide land into unusable
morsels, or shackle the market with rent
controls, or dissipate rent in subsidies.
Give land to the highest bidder, and tax
ground rents to support government.
Power to Destroy or to Redeem
But we've always heard that tax destroys
incentives. The news in Henry George is
that we can tax all the rent out of land,
and not one square foot will walk away,
nor will God switch off the Creation.
Man creates capital by saving; some Oth-
er Force created land, and sustains and
serves it every day, undeterred by taxes.
Nor will Georgist taxes leave owners
sulking on their land, but the contrary. A
1983 Fortune magazine article calls
them "Higher Taxes that Promote Devel-
opment." The fixed tax is levied on land
value, based on opportunity cost. The
owner uses land harder and improves it
more to meet a fixed tax; or sells, releas-
ing surplus land to those needing more
space. Taxes stifle enterprise only if
they increase with enterprise. Land tax
increases only with opportunity cost,
which is independent of the enterprise of
the owner. The only activity this tax im-
pairs is withholding land from use.
George's land tax promotes equity to-
ward the landless in at least four ways: it
relieves them of taxes, to the extent that
landowners pay more; it supplies them
with more goods and services, as land is
used better; it offers them jobs producing
those goods and services; and it offers
them a better chance to acquire land, as
surpluses are released to the market.
This is supply-side economics with a
kick. It works through tax transforma-
tion rather than tax reduction; total tax
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revenue may rise or fall, as a separate is-
sue. We can raise taxes and stimulate
supply together; there is no hard choice
between them. At the same time, it is de-
mand side economics: untaxing invest-
ment raises the marginal after-tax return,
which, to demand-siders, is the motor
that drives the macro-economy.
George's program not only reconciles
efficiency and equity, it squares taxes
and incentives. What more can we ask
of economic policy than to resolve stand-
offs that have confused us, and dead-
locked constructive action, for genera-
tions? It is an achievement on a par with
resolving Evolution and Creation, except
George's program is something we can
do something about. We can implement
it as quickly as we unclog the cerebral
arteries and follow thought with action.
Many people are comforted to think
justice must be sacrificed for efficiency,
and schools starved or libraries closed to
free up incentives, so nothing, really, can
ever be done. We all feel compassion,
but, to stay whole in this world of beg-
gars and bandits, learn to harden our
hearts. We screen out evidence of injus-
tice and rationalize what we cannot deny.
This mindset, while understandable, is
unaffordable in a period of dangerous na-
tional decline and of growing division
between haves and have-nots. Corking
in feelings is difficult; there is satisfac-
tion in venting compassion via support
of constructive public policies.
Camden has the highest tax rate in
New Jersey, causing a vicious circle as
high rates drive away capital and further
erode the tax base. What if only land
value were taxed? The depressant would
become a stimulant by the simple magic
of converting a variable charge into a
fixed, unavoidable one. So it is with
most depressed cities, which today look
vainly to Washington for salvation.
They need enabling legislation from their
states, on the Pennsylvania model, but
given this power can save themselves.
The Doubling Effect
The counterpart of sharing rent through
taxation is to untax things, like buildings,
that involve human endeavor. This dou-
bles the incentive effect. If laud tax is
the stick, untaxing buildings is the corre-
sponding carrot, and George's program
makes both larger. Every lot with an old
"Defender" building has a potential re-
placement, the "Challenger." Taxing
buildings rigs the fight against the Chal-
lenger. Say the lot-cum-Defender is
worth $100K, and the Challenger would
cost $500K to build. Challenger cash
flow must exceed Defender cash flow by
enough to pay $500K, plus added taxes
based on it.
Georgist tax, by contrast, is impartial
between Defender and Challenger; the
market decides. In 1965, after a detailed
Milwaukee study, I found that switching
to the George program would allow 30%
of the city to be renewed immediately,
simply by untaxing Challengers vis-a-vis
Defenders. (Sadly, Mayor Maier went
the other way, so Milwaukee lost 20% of
its people and much of its wealth.)
The Tripling Effect
New buildings face liquidity crises; al-
most all are built on credit and need time
to yield cash. The timing of tax on a
building maximizes the damage during
the crisis period, for any given tax yield
over time. Of course, every building uses
public services, but new buildings in old-
er cities pay for more than they receive,
while old ones receive more than they
pay for. Think of building tax as a forced
loan to the Treasury, to be recovered
when the building is older. What could
be more counterproductive than forcing a
loan from a builder passing through a
credit crisis? The Georgist tax is low
when the builder's cash needs are press-
ing, and rises slowly over time as the site
ripens to its ne.xt best use.
The Quadrupling Effect
Urban blight is cumulative and self-
reinforcing: blighted buildings cast a pall
on land around them, discourage upkeep,
and stifle renewal. Whatever slows re-
newal of one site slows the neighborhood
in a vicious, downward spiral. Converse-
ly, new buildings stimulate renewal.
There are exceptions; some new build-
ings sterilize blocks with blank walls.
But the exception is not the rule, and
abuse is not the precept. The rule is that
new buildings draw tenants from old and
weaken other Defenders, so that other
owners also renew. When they do,
where better than next to the newest
building? Renewal, like blight, is cumu-
lative, but in a benign, upward spiral.
Competition for sites raises the tax
base if land values are derived from
ground rents. The higher base allows the
city to improve public services without
taxing buildings or scaring away genera-
tors offiscal surpluses. In this scenario,
buildings raise the tax base indirectly, by
raising the value of land around them.
The Quintupling Effect
Riverside built a downtown pedestrian
mall when they were in vogue, and has
been sorry ever since. It did not work;
retailers deserted, and half the stores are
empty; I asked the developer of a suc-
cessful mall why he thought downtown
failed, and got a two word answer: "ab-
sentee ownership." I should have known,
having preached it for years.
Farm advisers say, "The best dressing
for soil is the owner's shadow, applied
daily." In town they ask, "Who's keeping
the store?" Absentees aren't the only
negligent owners, nor are they all bad.
Torpid owners are the problem, and they
come in many forms. A city wants to be
rid of owners who see real estate as a
cash cow for their retirement, and to re-
place them with owners who see it as a
vehicle for enterprise and who apply
their shadows daily. The shadows follow
them to local civic clubs and to enterpris-
ing downtown or neighborhood associa-
tions for making joint improvements.
The surplus to land attracts outside
buyers. Absentees, redundant parties in
production, are often top bidders for pure
ownership, which is the legal right to re-
ceive land rent plus unearned increments
that accrue over time. Georgist taxation
cuts directly into rents and unearned in-
crements, which attract absentee owners;
it spares the rewards of enterprise. It
thereby effects a market transfer of own-
ership from absentees to occupants, with
the community benefits that follow. In a
period of rising concern over alien takeo-
vers of U.S. real estate, these points merit
focused attention.
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The Sextupling Effect
Untaxing buildings attracts outside capi-
tal to an area, but does not result in new
capital formation for the economy. In
Keynesian models, however, reducing tax
on new capital raises the rate of return af-
ter taxes (marginal efficiency of capital)
and creates new capital. In supply-side
models, increasing saving is more impor-
tant. Land taxation helps here, too.
Land taxation, if vigorously applied,
tends to reduce the investment value of
land, through a process called "tax capi-
talization." With land devalued, those
needing wealth acquire substitute assets
by saving more, and investing the savings
in real new capital rather than land.
The Septupling Effect
Georgist taxation tends to reduce the
needfor public spending in nm obvious
ways. One is to increase job opportunity,
which in turn reduces welfare spending.
More productive job opportunities should
reduce pressure for military spending of a
boondoggling, make-jobs nature as well.
The other is to eliminate urban sprawl
and its wasteful cross-subsidies.
Renewal & Housing for the Poor
"Slum clearance" in the 1950s had a neg-
ative caste, with a name catered solely for
middle class consumption. Reuse of
cleared land was often at lower density,
inevitably throwing unhoused people on
the private market. Federal "urban re-
newal" in the 1960s, while better named,
emphasized clearing, not rebuilding. The
inventory of cleared, unrebuilt land under
the program grew each year. Cynics'
cracks of "bombing out" and "Negro re-
moval" were on the mark, though blacks
were not the only evictees. Any talk of
demolition and renewal evokes the spec-
ters of those cruel, wasteful programs.
But George's program begins with fos-
tering renewal and intensive use. Clear-
ance is involved only to serve renewal,
never as a goal in itself. The first land
taken would generally be vacant or with
boarded-up buildings. New buildings
would draw renters and buyers from old
ones, releasing more space. The idea and
impact are to increase rentable, salable
floor space. There would also be more
firms to compete in selling and hiring.
How do we know there would be an
aggregate increase in supply'? Higher
density is one test. Untaxing buildings
fosters higher density because density,
exemplified by high buildings, substitutes
capital for land. Untaxing capital obvi-
ously makes it more economical.
Higher quality is the other test. The
richer the new tenants or buyers, the
more space is released when they move.
This is the hardest point for advocates of
the poor to accept. There will always be
specific cases where the rich bump the
poor, leading to contemptuous names like
"trickle-down" that dismiss effects on the
market. But the aggregate is what should
concern us. If tenants mobilize against
new construction, a minority with a vest-
ed interest harms everyone else, includ-
ing the poor. Building new homes for the
rich, who can afford them, releases usa-
ble space for everyone else.
There are three kinds of slums. Only
the narrowest kind, the slum on high-
value land, causes eviction of the poor to
benefit the rich. Owners in these uncom-
mon areas neglect their buildings, expect-
ing to demolish them for expanding com-
merce or high-rise apartments. The
second kind is on bad land which will
stay bad. The third, and most common,
kind is on good land with old buildings
that have filtered down to people who
generate bad neighborhood effects. Units
go vacant; land value is low. The market
renews these slums not in a stroke, but by
nibbling at the fringes. Yet as it nibbles
incrementally in, it unavoidably creates
more space than it consumes, raising ag-
gregate supply.
The poor also must fear gentrification,
in which new gentry displace the poor in
the same old buildings. This is one result
of not renewing; renewal as such is inno-
cent. It seems carping, too, to criticize
people for restoring old buildings. The
alternative may be seen in ungentrified
neighborhoods, where buildings simply
go out of use, sheltering no one.
But the ultimate end of Georgist policy
is viewed in terms of the nation, pitting
cities against each other to attract people.
Nothing is better for people than to be
competed for. It raises their bargaining
power as tenants, buyers, and workers.
Social Justice
With all that talk of capital and efficien-
cy, remember that we began with a quest
for justice in sharing rent surplus. Jus-
tice and efficiency are not at odds; we
can have both. The trade-off expounded
by many economists is to enervate us so
we won't do anything. Yet we have
shown not just that we can have both,
but more; we cannot have either without
the other. If we do not share rents in the
efficient Georgist manner, social and po-
litical pressures will cause inefficient
sharing and eventual dissipation.
This is what economic policy can do.
The basic impulses, however, the striv-
ing for justice and brotherhood, and the
sense of personal ethics, come from
within, and from family, community,
schools, and religion. So does the sense
of workmanship, the striving for excel-
lence without which no system works.
There are city councilpersons who can
corrupt the best system ever blueprinted.
The Georgist program may even help to
straighten them out. Lincoln Steffens
taught us that the villain in Eden was
neither Eve nor the serpent, but the ap-
ple! The apples of discord that corrupt
city councils are unearned increments to
land value, which they create or deny
with every decision on extending sewers
or changing zoning. Georgist tax dehy-
drates those apples by attaching higher
tax to each unearned increment.
A Summary of Reconciliations
Georgist policy has been shown as a
means to revive dying cities, and in the
process to reconcile equity and efficien-
cy; to reconcile supply-side economics
with taxation; to reconcile capital forma-
tion with taxation of the rich. It can be
seen as a means of harmonizing collecti-
vism and individualism, in the most con-
structive ways possible. I know of no
other program whose proponents can
even make such claims, let alone sub-
stantiate them. In a world that has al-
ready priced younger people out of the
real estate market, we should find
George's program worth our intense
study and support.
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Pricing Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
Yoon Dokko
The fifth addition to the ORER Letter
Series is an abbreviated version ofa
forthcoming^ ORER Paper, "Collateral-
ized Mortgage Obligations: Mortgage
Money Cheaper by the Slice?" Readers
will he able to obtain copies of the longer
version of the paper through written or
telephoned requests to the Office ofReal
Estate Research.
The collateralized mortgage obligation
(CMO) has been a prime example of fi-
nancial innovation in the secondary mort-
gage market. Innovations such as the
CMO have contributed to housing fi-
nance stability and efficiency. The CMO
structure has reduced average costs of
mortgage financing relative to traditional
pass-through securities, and has broad-
ened the range of potential investors in
mortgage securities.
The CMO Structure
A collateralized mortgage obligation is a
debt instrument collateralized by mort-
gage pass-through certificates (in which
loan servicers pass mortgage interest, re-
quired principal, and excess principal
payments to investors) or individual
mortgage loans. The mortgage instru-
ments serving as CMO collateral have
generally been single-family Government
National Mortgage Association (GNMA),
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion (FHLMC), or Federal National Mort-
gage Association (FNMA) pass-through
securities.
A CMO essentially combines the mort-
gage pass-through security with some of
the positive features of a corporate bond.
The major difference between a CMO
and a traditional mortgage pass-through
security is the mechanism by which inter-
est and principal are paid to those who
hold the securities. The traditional pass-
through pays a pro rata share of interest
and principal every month to each of its
holders. Because of this pro rata distribu-
tion mechanism, the major drawback of
traditional mortgage pass-through securi-
ties has been uncertain cash flows asso-
ciated with unpredictable prepayments on
the underlying mortgages.
The CMO Advantage
The CMO departs radically from the
pro rata distribution mechanism of tradi-
tional pass-through securities. Payments
on a CMO are broken into four compo-
nent categories, commonly called
"tranches." The first three tranches all re-
ceive scheduled interest payments. The
first tranche, however, receives all sched-
uled and unscheduled principal payments
from the underlying mortgages, until the
principal owed to the first class of inves-
tors is entirely repaid.
After the principal to the first class of
the CMO is repaid, principal payments
from the underlying mortgages are allo-
cated sequentially to retire the remaining
classes. That is, the second tranche re-
ceives only interest until the principal
owed to the first tranche is paid, and the
third tranche receives only interest until
the principal sums owed to the first and
second tranches have been repaid.
The fourth tranche is an "accrual," or
"z," bond, which receives neither interest
nor principal until principal to all previ-
ous tranches has been retired. The z-
tranche is a zero coupon security, which
permits effective maturities of the other
tranches to be shorter. Money is availa-
ble for the z-tranche because those who
invest in shorter tranches receive a lower
(short-term) rate of interest than that
(long-term) which is paid by the borrow-
ers, given an upward-sloping yield curve.
The advantages of the CMO structure
are clear. The CMO converts a long-term
monthly payment instrument into a series
of semi-annual payment, bond-like secur-
ities with short, intermediate, and long
maturities. The multiple-maturity struc-
ture reduces the degree of uncertainty of
cash flows for any particular maturity
class, and provides the longer maturity
classes with limited call protection (be-
cause shorter tranches absorb the initial
burden of excess principal repayments).
The Theory of CMOs
The theory of CMOs can be adapted
from the commodity bundling literature,
which discusses how firms sell their
goods both in individual units and in
packaged bundles, but typically at differ-
ent prices per unit (individual event tick-
ets vs. season tickets, or a la carte menus
vs. dinner menus).
In a similar fashion, long term mort-
gages can be construed as bundles of
short-term cash flows and long-term cash
flows. The unbundling feature of CMOs
broadens the range of potential investors
in mortgage securities.
An important assumption in the theory
of CMOs is that investors have different
preferred maturities and, therefore,
should be willing to pay different prices
for securities of different expected ma-
turities. Recent experience in the mort-
gage markets supports the validity of
such an assumption.
In fact, the CMO's entry into the mort-
gage markets has been very successful in
attracting "non-traditional" investors,
such as insurance companies and pension
funds, to mortgages. Such investors are
attracted by the broader range of invest-
ment maturities made possible by the
CMO structure. For example, insurance
companies purchase heavily in the 4 - 6
year life tranche. Pension funds have
been active in the longer tranche sector.
With clients having different maturity
preferences, a profit-oriented bond issuer
is able to choose between the bundling
strategy (traditional mortgage-backed
securities) and the unbundling strategy
(CMOs). Given the extent of different
maturity preferences on the part of its cli-
ents, each of these strategies presents the
issuer with advantages and disadvantag-
es, which relate to the term structure of
interest rates.
For analytical convenience, we view
the CMO as the unbundling of a tradi-
tional mortgage-backed security into a
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short tranche cash flow and a long
tranche cash flow. The market yield for
a bundled bond can be expressed as a
weighted average of the yields for the
short-term and long-term tranches.
Hence, the spread between the long-
term and short-term interest rates plays
an important role in the pricing of the
CMO. The analysis in the paper by
Dokko, Edelstein, and Rosen shows that
as the spread between long-term and
short-term interest rates (the so-called
"steepness" of the term structure of inter-
est rates) increases (decreases), the sum
of the prices of the CMO's tranches is
more (less) likely to exceed the price of
the underlying bundled security.
Prepayment Risk
During the early 1980s, while the long-
term interest rate declined, prepayment
rates and prepayment risk increased.
CMOs were developed in response to
this kind of economic environment. As
discussed above, the CMO structure pro-
vides long-tranche investors with limited
call protection.
Required Risk Premium for the CMO
Modem financial asset pricing theory
suggests that the required risk premium
for a security is determined by the degree
of co-movement between the security's
returns and variables that describe the
state of the economy, such as inflation
and GNP. (This so-called "systematic
risk" with respect to the economic envi-
ronment is measured by the relationship
between the security return and macroec-
onomic variables.)
The cash flows for the CMO and the
pass-through security are generated by
the same underlying mortgage pool.
Therefore, systematic risks of the CMO
and the underlying bundled mortgage-
backed security will be the same for all
economic state variables, except for
changes in the term structure of interest
rates and mortgage prepayment rates.
An analysis of actual CMO data has
provided support for the theory. The
study utilizes data on CMOs issued by
Salomon Brothers and Norwest. The
data are monthly observations from No-
vember 1983 through November 1985.
The research examines statistically
whether the steepness of the yield curve
(measured by the spread between interest
rates on long-term and short-term Treasu-
ry securities) and the risk of prepayment
(measured by one month lagged actual
prepayment rates) affect the spread be-
tween the weighted average yield on the
CMO tranches and the yield on the un-
derlying GNMA pass-through securities.
Each 100 basis point increase in the
steepness of the yield curve is found to
provide a 14 basis point increase in the
CMO's weighted yield relative to that
earned on the GNMA pass-through. Sim-
ilarly, an increase in the prepayment rate
leads to a significant increase in the rela-
tive yield spread. These results demon-
strate that a steeper yield curve and a
greater prepayment risk enhance the val-
ue of the CMO security relative to the
comparable GNMA pass-through.
Conclusion
The CMO, a relatively new financial in-
novation, contributes substantial value to
the secondary mortgage market and the
housing finance system. The two major
advantages of CMOs, relative to mort-
gage pass-through securities, are the abil-
ity to take advantage of a positively slop-
ing yield curve and the ability to provide
limited protection against mortgage
prepayment risk.
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Recent Developments in
the CMO Market
Donald G. Rundhlom
In theory, the CMO requires a positive-
ly sloped yield curve. Yet many CMO
issues have come to market in recent
periods of flat or inverted yield curves.
Yields on mortgage-backed securities
(MBSs) rose, and spreads between reg-
ular MBSs and Treasuries widened, as
thrifts liquidated MBSs from their
portfolios. In fact, spreads would be
even wider, if not for the success of de-
rivative products (CMOs) in keeping
spreads stable. Spread stability is due
to arbitrage opportunities: the sum of
the parts is worth more than the whole.
Value is also affected by the CMO's
stated average life. Average life's im-
pact is seen in the PSA (Public Securi-
ties Association) factor, which shows
how quickly prepayments on the un-
derlying mortgages occur. If the col-
lateral is a pool ofGNMA 12% loans,
the CMO may be priced to reflect
325% PSA. If interest rates drop to
8%, prepayments may speed up to, per-
haps, 450% PSA. The CMO matures
more quickly than had been expected.
Performance of a CMO also depends
on the classes in the issue. For exam-
ple, there may be a Planned Amortiza-
tion Class (PAC), whose investors do
not absorb any share of early principal
repayments within a given PSA range.
If there are changes in prepayments,
these fluctuations affect the non-PAC
classes, whose values may change
greatly. PAC classes command a tight-
er spread to Treasuries than non-PAC
classes, due to prepayment protection.
The residual, a CMO's equity, also
absorbs prepayments. The residual
provides the dealer's profit on a CMO;
no profit is realized until the residual is
sold. Again, the keys are the collater-
al, classes, original interest rate and
prepayment assumptions, and current
interest and prepayment rates.
Donald Rimdblom is a Champaign
mortgage banker and an Adjunct
Lecturer at the University ofIllinois.
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Legislation Provides Minority Scholarships
A new Illinois law provides funding for
minority scholarships. The applicable
text of the legislation reads as follows:
Out of each $5 fee deposited in the Real
Estate Research and Education Fund, $1
shall he used tofund a scholarship pro-
gram for persons ofminority racial ori-
gin who wish to pursue a course ofstudy
in the field of real estate. The scholar-
ship program shall be administered by
the Office ofReal Estate Research.
The effective date of the new law is
December 1, 1989. Prior to that date,
administrative and legislative panels will
meet to promulgate rules by which
ORER will be guided in its administra-
tion of the fund. As details become avail-
able, ORER Letter will provide informa-
tion on application procedures and other
specifics of the program.
Bryan to Direct BEBR, ORER
Office of Real Estate Research Director
William R. Bryan has been appointed
Director of the University of Illinois
Bureau of Economic and Business
Research (BEBR). Dean John D. Hogan
of the College of Commerce and
Business Administration announced the
appointment on August 3. Bryan has
been affiliated with BEBR since 1977,
serving as editor of the bi-monthly
Illinois Business Review.
In addition to directing the Bureau,
Bryan will continue to serve as a Profes-
sor in the Department of Finance and as
Director of the Office of Real Estate
Research.
Scholarships Awarded to U ofI Students
A number of current or former students
in the real estate program at the Universi-
ty of Illinois have been awarded scholar-
ships for the 1989-90 academic year.
The Morgan L. Fitch Scholarship was
awarded to Lisa M. Ludwig and Jocelyn
A. Tabujara. Ludwig is a junior in
Finance from Westchester, and Tabujara
is a graduate student in Finance from
Urbana. Both are members of Rho Epsi-
lon. The family of the late Mr. Fitch es-
tablished the scholarship fund to assist
outstanding U of I real estate students.
Linda Paolella, a senior in Finance
from Arlington Heights, has been award-
ed an academic scholarship by the Illi-
nois Real Estate Educational Foundation.
Paolella currently serves as Vice Presi-
dent of the campus Rho Epsilon chapter.
University of Illinois graduate Alissa
Schneider has been awarded a Thomas F.
Seay scholarship for the second consecu-
tive year. Schneider, now a graduate
student at the University of Wisconsin -
Madison, served as President of Rho Ep-
silon during her senior year at the U of 1.
Mr. Seay established the scholarship
fund to assist outstanding Illinois resi-
dents studying real estate in university
programs in the U.S.
The awards discussed in the above par-
agraphs are all administered by the Illi-
nois Real Estate Educational Foundation
of the Illinois Association of Realtors®.
Anna Kwan has been awarded this
year's SIOR Scholarship. The scholar-
ship, funded by the Chicago Chapter of
the Society of Industrial and Office Real-
tors®, is awarded to the student chosen
by University of Illinois real estate facul-
ty as having been the outstanding under-
graduate real estate student in the prior
academic year. Kwan is a senior in
Finance from Chicago and a member of
Rho Epsilon.
Gerald Pace, a graduate student in
Finance from Jackson, Mississippi, has
been awarded a RREEF Fellowship.
RREEF, which manages real estate port-
folios for major institutional investors,
provides fellowships to outstanding mi-
nority students pursuing real estate stud-
ies at the graduate level. Pace currently
serves as Secretary of Rho Epsilon.
Faculty Activities
ORER Director William R. Bryan
wrote an April 1989 Illinois Business
Review (IBR) article that has been
cited in a syndicated news column
and a national magazine. "The Value
of Low Automobile Interest Rates"
discusses tradeoffs between price re-
bates and below-market dealer inter-
est rates. Another Bryan article, "A
View of the Balance of Payments,"
appeared in the August 1989 IBR.
Professor Roger Cannaday has
been invited to serve on the Board of
Advisors of Commercial Real Estate
Training, Inc. in Chicago. The com-
pany was recently formed by Mark
Donahue, who formerly served as
President of Rubloff Corporate Real
Estate Services and Senior Vice Pres-
ident of Coldwell Banker Commer-
cial Real Estate Services. The firm
trains individuals interested in pre-
paring for positions with large com-
mercial real estate brokerage firms.
ORER Professor Peter Colwell has
received a $10,000 Homer Hoyt
Advanced Studies Institute grant to
support a second year of his project,
"Toward a Simulation of Urban Land
Markets." Colwell also participated
in a July seminar on geographical in-
formation systems, sponsored by the
Hoyt Institute's Weimar School. He
participated in an August meeting of
the Research Institute of the National
Council of Real Estate Investment
Fiduciaries. In October, Colwell will
be presenting a paper at the Financial
Management Association meetings in
Boston. The paper is entitled "Sea-
sonal Anomalies in the Housing
Market: A Comparison with the
Stock Market." It was co-authored
by Karl Guntermann of Arizona State
University and Stefan Norrbin of the
University of Alabama. Another
Colwell paper, "Optimal Lot Size
and Configuration," co-authored with
U of I alumnus Tim Scheu (now at
Western Michigan University), ap-
peared in the July 1989 issue of the
Journal of Urban Economics.
(continued on the following page)
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Vacancy Management
Peter F. Colwell
Some property managers see vacant units
as personal failures. The majority of
managers recognize, however, that a
property's vacancy rate resuUs from both
market forces and management activity.
Such a view would rightly lead to the ac-
ceptance of some degree of vacancy in
weak markets or for unusual properties.
Yet it is less well understood that, un-
der given market conditions, a higher va-
cancy rate might actually be preferable to
lower vacancy. The key is understanding
that a property
manager's job
is the maximi-
zation of net
income, not
the maximiza-
tion of occu-
pancy. Maxi-
mum occu-
pancy might
be realized
only at a sub-
stantial penal-
ty in terms of
lower revenue
and higher ex-
penses.
Consider
the revenue side, effective gross income.
Suppose that the relationship between the
occupancy rate and the gross rental rate
can be shown by a backwards S-shaped
curve, as in the figure. The question is:
"What rental rate would maximize aver-
age rent per rentable square foot and,
thereby, maximize gross income?" (Be-
cause rentable space is constant for a giv-
en property, average rent per rentable
square foot is the rental rate multiplied by
the occupancy rate.) The answer is not
an arbitrarily low rate that would assure
100% occupancy. However, what may
seem surprising is that the answer also is
not necessarily the highest rental that
would still produce 100% occupancy.
Note in the figure that $15 is the high-
est rent per square foot at which the
building would be fully occupied, so any
rental below $15 clearly is not desirable.
RENT/S.F./YR
Any rental rate in excess of $32 per
square foot yields zero occupancy, and
therefore zero income. The highest gross
income total is realized at a rent per
square foot of $19.50, at which occupan-
cy is only 87.5%. A vacancy rate of
12.5% is optimal, then, given the market
conditions and abstracting from effects of
managerial decisions concerning expens-
es. Average rent per rentable square foot
at this optimal vacancy rate would be
.875 X $19.50, or $17.06. Lower vacan-
cy, such as
OCCUPANCY RATE 5% (yield-
VERSUS RENT ing average
rent per
rentable
square foot
of$16.63,
given a cor-
responding
rental level
of $17.50)
or even 0%
(yielding av-
erage rent of
$15), are in-
ferior as
managerial
objectives in
the context of the specified market condi-
tions, as shown by the shape and position
of the curve in the figure. Vacancy high-
er than 12.5% is similarly suboptimal;
50% vacancy with a corresponding
$24.50 rental yields an average rent per
rentable square foot of $12.25, while
100% vacancy (zero occupancy) yields
zero average rent.
Is the shape of the curve the key to
bringing about such a result? The answer
is no; the curve need not have the back-
wards S-shape, though the relationship
indicated by such a curve appeals to log-
ic. The key is that the curve is downward
sloping; it is reasonable to assume that,
within a relevant range, per unit rent must
fall if occupancy is to rise. But the flatter
the curve, the more likely it is that the oc-
cupancy rate leading to maximum gross
income would be less than 100%.
15.00
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32.00
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Adjunct Lecturer Don Rundblom
chaired a special June session of the
Environmental Issues Subcommittee
of the Mortgage Bankers Association
of America, held in New York City.
The subcommittee will reconvene at
the Association's annual conference,
to be held in October in Washington.
Adjunct Professor Philip Rushing's
article, "What Are 'Effective' Interest
Rates?" was published in the August
Illinois Business Review. Rushing
also penned "Real Estate Outlook"
for Illinois Economic Outlook: 1990,
published by the U of I Bureau of
Economic and Business Research.
Adjunct Professor Carl Webber
chaired the Illinois State Bar Associ-
ation committee that has drafted a
new suggested uniform real estate
contract, which should be available
to the legal community before the
end of the fall. Webber is also the
President-elect of the U of I College
of Law Board of Visitors. In addi-
tion, Webber serves as chair'of Urba-
na's Chamber of Commerce and as
Secretary of the Greater Urbana-
Champaign Economic Development
Corporation, and he co-chairs the
Save Chanute Committee.
Perlow Earns MAI
Designation
ORER Advisory Committee member
Jerry Perlow has been awarded the
MAI (Member, Appraisal Institute)
designation by the American Institute
of Real Estate Appraisers.
Perlow began his real estate career
in residential brokerage, and remains
a practicing Realtor®, currently serv-
ing as Treasurer of the Illinois Asso-
ciation of Realtors®. However, he
has devoted much of his professional
effort in the past ten years to real
estate appraisal and consulting.
Perlow served on the Illinois Real
Estate Educational Foundation com-
mittee that worked to establish the
Office of Real Estate Research in
1980.
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Peoria: Most Affordable or Most Misunderstood?
The news media have recently dubbed
Peoria the city with the most affordable
housing in America. The September is-
sue of Changing Times magazine, for ex-
ample, concludes that a family could buy
five ordinary houses in Peoria for the
price of one similar home in San Francis-
co. The magazine's source of price infor-
mation is National Association of Real-
tors® median house price data for
existing homes in 84 metropolitan areas.
Peoria's first quarter 1989 level of
$42,000 was the lowest in the U.S.,
$8,000 lower than the next-most afforda-
ble area (Spokane). The second quarter
$47,700 median price is also at the bot-
tom of the list nationally.
It is true that Peoria offers affordable
housing; prices fell in the early 1980s,
and increases have been moderate in a re-
bounded economy. Yet those who know
Peoria's market and are familiar with
prices in other cities caution against com-
parisons of the type offered by Changing
Times. Such individuals might cite a re-
cent Housing Cost Survey by Better
Homes and Gardens® Real Estate, which
finds Peoria to be far from the most af-
fordable in the nation, or in the Midwest
(even St. Louis homes are shown to be
less costly). The survey figures, which
measure the cost of a benchmark resi-
dence, show a new Peoria home to cost
$130,000 and an existing home to cost
$90,600. What, then, is the true state of
the Peoria housing market?
Brokers in the area do not dispute the
$42,000 and $47,700 NAR figures; in-
deed, these figures were computed from
MLS data supplied by the Peoria Board
of Realtors®. However, as ORER Advi-
sory Committee member and Peoria
Realtor® Dave Rittmiller notes, knowl-
edgeable agents do not feel that a house
selling for less than $50,000 in Peoria is
comparable to one selling in San Francis-
co for $250,000.
Market statistics can be deceiving. A
median price is generally more represen-
tative of the "typical" house than is a
mean. The reason is that the median is
the midpoint of an ordered listing of val-
ues from lowest to highest, whereas the
mean is the "average," which may be dis-
torted by a few particularly high or low
transaction prices. (The recent mean
price of houses sold in Peoria was
$56,200.) Yet in some cases the median
is not a particularly representative figure.
For example, if a disproportionate num-
ber of sales involve properties that are
atypically low in price, the median could
be correspondingly low.
Such a result may have occurred with
the Peoria median values. An abundance
of older, lower priced homes offered for
sale has held prices extremely low in this
market segment. Could the competitive
environment in this sector have caused
more sellers to enlist the assistance of
agents, resulting in an atypically high
proportion of low priced sales in the
MLS statistics? At the same time, could
agents have been utilized to a less-than-
typical extent in higher priced segments?
Rittmiller suggests that the Better
Homes and Gardens® figures present a
more realistic picture of the market, at
least for the typical relocation client buy-
ing an existing home. Studies such as the
Better Homes and Gardens® survey tend
to define a "typical" home as one with
specified amenities in a newer neighbor-
hood. Such a definition would account
for at least some of the disagreement in
Peoria's NAR and Better Homes and
Gardens® rankings.
A final question might be how so
many low priced houses could sell if
"typical" home-buying families are pur-
chasing costlier units. Part of the answer
may be that houses in the low price rang-
es have been so plentiful and so afforda-
ble that the types of families who would
typically choose to rent in other cities
have been able to buy in Peoria.
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A New Look at Deposit Insurance Reform
Peter F. Colwell and Joseph W. Trefzger
In August, Congress passed the Financial
Institutions Refonn, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). The
law was designed to deliver a significant
blow in battling the savings and loan cri-
sis. Because many provisions of the law
closely conform to features that President
Bush had requested in such legislation, it
might be argued that in passing FIRREA,
Congress attempted to take a step that is
meaningful and bipartisan.
Unfortunately, Congress chose to defer
action on what is perhaps the most severe
barrier to true reform, the federal deposit
insurance system. The lawmakers per-
mitted Treasury an additional 1 8 months
to study the system of insuring deposits.
The system is ill-conceived, at least if the
true goal of deposit insurance is to pro-
tect the citizenry from loss. The system
has been an unqualified success, howev-
er, if its goal is to encourage renegade
thrift executives to enrich themselves at
the taxpayers' risk and, ultimately, the
taxpayers' expense.
Problem: The Lack of Capital
There is nothing fundamentally wrong
with utilizing borrowed funds; indeed,
"other people's money," lacking a claim
on profits, helps to hold firms' capital
costs in check. The depository institu-
tions industry, however, is unusual in its
ability to operate with extremely high
levels of borrowed funds (though the
junk-bond financed leveraged buyout is
another example). Whereas most types
of firms must obtain substantial entrepre-
neurial money, which would be lost if
these firms were to fail, a depository can
operate with an astonishingly low level of
its owners' wealth at risk, even under the
recently tightened capital requirements.
The Need for Private Insurance
It is essential to bring the private sector
into the deposit insurance process. Only
in competitive transactions in the private
sector do pricing decisions accurately re-
flect costs, including the cost of bearing
risk. The recent savings and loan crisis
provides relevant examples. Expanded
asset powers are easily blamed, yet other
industries whose investment activities are
unlimited have not faced losses in the
hundreds of billions of dollars. The issue
is whose money is at risk. Someone's
money must be at risk in any investment
situation. Unfortunately, those who bear
the risk do not always recognize that they
are, in fact, at risk. We read of life sav-
ings lost to telephone swindlers, and of
depositors of recently-failed thrifts who
thought subordinated debentures they had
been sold were govemment-insured CDs.
Risk is clearly present, even if investors
ORER News
Outlook Day 1990
The Office of Real Estate Research
will sponsor Real Estate Outlook:
1990 on January 9 at the Oak Brook
Hills Hotel and Conference Center.
The program will be held in connec-
tion with the triannual meetings of
the Illinois Association of Realtors®.
The registration fee is $40. A more
complete description of the event
appears in a story on page 14.
Hill Addressed Alumni
Luncheon in Chicago
ORER sponsored its ninth luncheon
for University of Illinois alumni
employed in the real estate field.
Approximately 50 alumni and their
guests attended the luncheon, held on
Friday, November 10 at the Chicago
Yacht Club. Thanks to Gene Stunard
for once again arranging for the use
of the Yacht Club's facilities.
The luncheon speaker was Charles
M. Hill, Chief Operating Officer of
the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chi-
cago. Excerpts from his speech are
reprinted on page 14.
Callfor Papers
The Journal ofReal Estate Finance
and Economics is devoting a special
edition to the role of auctions in the
real estate and mortgage markets.
ORER Professor Peter Colwell will
serve as editor of this special 1991
issue. Papers must be submitted by
December 31, 1990. Professor
Colwell welcomes inquiries from
anyone interested in producing a
paper for the issue.
James B. Kau of the University of
Georgia and C.F. Sinnans of Louisia-
na State University serve as editors
of regular issues of the Journal.
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Commentary
can be convinced that it is not.
Even the government, or perhaps more
correctly, especially the government, can
be drawn into an "unrecognized risk"
trap. Recall that those who supported the
federal government's assistance to Chrys-
ler gave assurances that there would be
no cost to taxpayers; the government was
providing "only a guarantee." Policy
makers accept substantial contingent
risks on behalf of the public without de-
manding compensation for the public.
After all, mere tax dollars are at stake.
In the S&L crisis, as in the Chrysler
case, the problem has been that the gov-
ernment does not know how to price the
service of accepting risk. Thrifts engaged
in risky activities with high potential for
gain yet no potential for loss, since thrift
managers' money was not at risk and the
federal insurance fund did not charge a
premium that reflected the risk of the
guaranteed activity. (Insurance premi-
ums are based on an institution's deposit
volume, not the safety of its assets.) As
Ohio State University's Edward Kane
notes in The S&L Insurance Crisis: How
Did It Happen, "FSLIC was, perhaps un-
wittingly but nonetheless genuinely, pro-
viding capital to these institutions."
Capital, the money provided by the en-
trepreneur, has a cost. That cost is deter-
mined implicitly or explicitly as a func-
tion of risk, as perceived by the provider
and the user of the capital. If the provid-
er and user are both private parties, their
efforts to protect their own interests cause
the risk to be evaluated and priced in the
most effective manner. A private entity
that charges too high or low a price for
accepting risk loses either opportunities
or money. If the provider of capital is the
government, however, the pricing of the
service of bearing risk is likely to be inac-
curate. In the thrift case, reasons range
from the benign (regulators' lack of ex-
pertise or incentives) to the sinister (con-
gressional leaders beholden to vested in-
terests) to the absurd (federal guarantees
on thrifts whose asset powers are deter-
mined at the state level).
The Need for Government Guarantees
There are, nonetheless, reasons why a
purely private deposit insurance system is
not desirable. The first is that some de-
positors, particularly the less affluent
members of society, would face tremen-
dous difficulty in judging the soundness
of a private guarantor. While some pri-
vate insurers may indeed be as solid as
the Rock of Gibraltar, others are not, and
only the soundest could survive a sys-
tem-wide run. Imprudent depository
managers would have incentives to deal
with weaker firms, which could charge
lower premiums and hold lower reserves
(within state regulatory constraints),
thereby passing risk to unwitting deposi-
tors (instead of an unwitting govern-
ment). A depositor might conceivably
avoid a depository insured by a compe-
tent specialist firm with an uninspiring
name, in favor of one with accounts
"protected" by a weak insurer with flash-
ier advertising or a name deceptively
similar to that of a trustworthy carrier.
The second reason why some degree
of continued government involvement is
essential is that no private organization
is immune from failure. Even the larg-
est, most reputable private insurer has
the potential to fail. Indeed, the poten-
tial to fail is the distinguishing feature of
any private enterprise. Is it likely that a
major insurer would fail? Certainly not.
Was it likely, though, that the Penn Cen-
tral Railroad would declare bankruptcy
in 1970, leaving a battered commercial
paper market in its wake? Or that Chrys-
ler would have to turn to government
guarantees to convince the capital mar-
kets to provide needed funds? Or that
staid Continental Bank would require the
largest government assistance package in
history? The answers are, clearly, no.
The federal government is the ulti-
mate sharer of risk. It is not effective at
evaluating risk or efficient in pricing
risk, but it has the legal means to raise
any needed amount of money, to the
benefit of depositors (notably the less
affluent, who can ill afford to risk their
savings) and the detriment of the taxpay-
ers. The private marketplace can do a
better job of identifying and pricing risk;
its success in doing so accrues to the
beneflt or detriment of the private insu-
rance industry and its clients (notably
those who can afford to forgo govem-
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ment guarantees in exchange for risk
bearers' higher returns). Consequently,
both private and government insurance
can be defended on some grounds.
A Dual System of Deposit Insurance
Deposit insurance could be more effec-
tive if both government and private guar
antors were to play a role. The sugges-
tion is not for a partnership between the
government and private industry. (In-
deed, the current system is such a part-
nership, with government bearing risk
and private parties reaping rewards.)
What may be needed is a dual system,
in which some accounts are govem-
ment-insured and others are insured
by private entities, or left uninsured.
Under the present system, each ac-
count at each institution is insured up
to $100,000. However, by spreading
deposits over enough institutions, an in-
dividual can protect an unlimited amount
of money with government guarantees.
In fact, through creative joint account
ownership, a family of four can protect
up to $1.4 million in a single institution.
Such a result conflicts not only with the
concerns of the depression-era Congress
that established FDIC, but also with
common sense. Federal insurance
should protect small depositors who
choose federal coverage over privately
insured, or uninsured, accounts; the
wealthy can protect themselves more ef-
fectively, and at a lower cost to society,
through the use of private insurance.
At the same time, the wealthy should
not be excluded from the system. Gov-
ernment-insured accounts should be
available to all individuals (not entities);
in fact, government insurance should be
available in unlimited amounts. Howev-
er, each individual, as identified by So-
cial Security number, should earn inter-
est on no more than a ceiling amount,
such as $250,000 of federally insured de-
posits, throughout the depository system
(banks, savings and loans, and credit un-
ions). Excess federally insured amounts
should not be permitted to earn interest
for the depositor; the interest that would
otherwise be paid should be directed to
the federal insurance pool.
Denial of interest on excess deposits
would accomplish several important ob-
jectives. First, it would encourage those
of considerable means to utilize private
insurance. Since government cannot
price risk effectively, government in-
volvement in the deposit insurance sys-
tem should be curtailed to every extent
possible. The resulting absence of gov-
ernment guarantees would cause the
money of wealthy depositors and their
private insurers to be at risk, and these
parties would impose upon management
a degree of oversight that has been non-
Someone 's money must he at risk in
any investment situation. Unfortunately,
those who hear the risk do not always
recognize that they are, in fact, at risk.
existent under the assurance of a federal
bailout. Second, the depositor covered
by federal guarantees on a high level of
deposits, as the bearer of an exceptionally
low risk, would be the recipient of an
exceptionally low return; zero interest is
certainly that. Finally, if the interest that
would otherwise be the depositor's were
channeled to the federal insuring agency,
the government would receive funds to
adequately cover the government's depos-
it insurance obligations.
It can be argued, of course, that 0% is a
point on a continuum, not fundamentally
different from other low percentages that
might more accurately reflect the cost of
the risk the government bears in provid-
ing guarantees. However, a bureaucracy
would have to be created to attempt to
assign the risk a nonzero price (a job for
which government is ill-suited) and to al-
ter the interest rate with changes in infla-
tion or other economic conditions. Zero
is convenient in that "nothing" is the op-
posite of "something." While a zero rate
unfortunately imposes differing real costs
under differing economic conditions, the
absence of any nominal return forces the
affluent depositor to consider private in-
surance, or to seek an even higher risk/
return level through uninsured deposits.
A Perfect Fix: The Improbable Dream
Such a system would not cure all ills fac-
ing deposit insurance. For example, re-
tirement plans might require separate
treatment. Some workers have employ-
er-sponsored pensions guaranteed by the
federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpo-
ration. If holders of IRAs and Keogh ac-
counts, which serve many individuals
without company pensions, were not
permitted government insurance beyond
the $250,000 limit, those with PBGC
protected pensions could enjoy more
federal guarantees on their wealth than
those without employer retirement plans.
There would also have to be a
means for designating which deposits
owned by a person with more than
$250,000 would be covered by the
federal insurance. It should not be
difficult, though, for depository insti-
tutions to enact systems to properly
segregate government-insured ac-
counts from privately insured, or unin-
sured, money. Note that institutions
must currently distinguish taxable ac-
counts from IRAs, and ordinary IRAs
from those on which interest is tax-free
but deposits are not deductible. Also in
accordance with current IRA procedures,
the "rollover" of funds among govern-
ment-insured accounts might be limited.
The $250,000 ceiling is, of course,
merely a suggested figure; the level se-
lected by Congress or its designee
should be high enough to protect a nest
egg yet low enough to provide a mean-
ingful incentive for private insurance.
Any ceiling amount would also have to
be subject to adjustment for inflation, or
perhaps to cover growing amounts accu-
mulating in the nation's IRA accounts.
In addition, it is not clear whether pri-
vate insurance should be provided at the
depositor level or the institution level.
Insurers' need to examine asset risk sug-
gests that insurance of an institution's en-
tire portfolio of non-govemment-insured
accounts would be more efficient than
the insurance of individual depositors'
accounts. Yet that decision is one that
could be made most effectively by the
depositors, the depository institutions,
and the private insurance providers,
which would bear the risks and accept
the rewards of their investment cind insu-
rance activities.
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Freddie Mac Financing for Multi-Family Properties
Philip Rushing
The traditional role of the real estate
lending institution was to originate loans
which would be held in the institution's
portfolio. Loanable money was general-
ly restricted to local savings deposits.
However, during the past two decades, a
huge secondary mortgage market has
evolved in the U.S. The secondary mort-
gage market is the financial market in
which existing mortgages are bought and
sold. It has integrated real estate financ-
ing into the broader capital markets, al-
lowing lenders to obtain additional funds
by selling previously issued mortgages to
investors worldwide. Some lenders still
"warehouse" the mortgages they origi-
nate (retain them for their portfolios), but
many now sell at least some of the loans
they originate, either at the time of origi-
nation or at some time after the origina-
tion, in the secondary market.
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, better known as the
FHLMC or "Freddie Mac," is a major
participant in the secondary mortgage
market. The organization purchases
loans from originating lenders and sells
securities backed by the loans' promised
cash flows. Though created by Congress
to provide liquidity to savings and loans,
Freddie Mac is now a for-profit corpora-
tion, with shares traded on the New York
Stock Exchange. (However, because it
has access to government credit sources,
Freddie Mac is still considered a quasi-
agency of the federal government.)
Freddie Mac has become a major secon-
dary market source of funds for original
financing and refinancing, in both the
single-family and multi-family markets.
The purpose of this article is to aid the
reader in understanding the procedures,
the alternatives, and the advantages and
disadvantages of financing multi-family
property through Freddie Mac.
Dealing with Freddie Mac
Why should the borrower be concerned
about whether the loan can be sold to
Freddie Mac? The reason is that compe-
tition with bonds and other bond-like in-
struments in the capital markets keeps in-
terest rates on such loans relatively low.
The borrower who wishes to deal with
Freddie Mac does so indirectly. To ob-
tain a loan that will be purchased by
Freddie Mac, the borrower operates
through a bank or savings and loan that
has been approved as a seller/servicer by
Freddie Mac. An institution that is not an
approved lender can facilitate a Freddie
Mac loan by operating through another
institution that is approved.
The borrower applies for financing
through the approved institution that will
originate the loan. The originator bears
risk even if it sells the loan to Freddie
Mac, because it guarantees representa-
tions and warranties made by the borrow-
er. Freddie Mac, then, has a conditional
put option to sell the loan back to the
originator. For example, if Freddie Mac
learns after the loan has closed that the
borrower's financial statement contains
erroneous figures, Freddie Mac can re-
quire the originating lender to repurchase
the loan. Consequently, originating lend-
ers, which usually service the loans they
sell, are more than mere "middle men."
Once the borrower and property have
passed the originator's inspection, official
application is made to Freddie Mac. This
process requires considerable effort on
the applicant's part, as Freddie Mac and/
or the originating lender are likely to re-
quire a significant amount of documenta-
tion (see the box on the following page).
In addition, if the loan is granted, the bor-
rower must provide operating statements
and certified rent schedules on a continu-
ing basis, and must permit yearly inspec-
tions by the originating lender.
There is a nonrefundable $ 1 ,500 appli-
cation fee; however, the originating insti-
tution should be able to estimate the via-
bility of the application prior to the.stage
at which the borrower would have to pay
the fee. Once the originating lender re-
ceives a commitment from Freddie Mac,
the borrower must accept or reject the
offer within 10 days. If the borrower
chooses to reject, the application fee is
forfeited. If the borrower accepts the
loan, the borrower must pay "points" to
Freddie Mac. Each point is 1% of the
amount borrowed, paid by the borrower
to Freddie Mac at the time the borrower
accepts the commitment. The number of
points paid can vary; two points is the
level assumed in this discussion.
If the commitment is accepted, but the
loan is not closed and delivered, Freddie
Mac retains the full two points. If the
loan is closed and delivered, 1/2 of one
point is kept by Freddie Mac; the origi-
nating lender receives the remainder of
the points. Regardless of who owns the
mortgage, the borrower makes payments
to the loan servicer, which is often the
originating lending institution. The loan
servicer generally receives at least 1/8 of
a point annually for servicing the loan.
(The latter amount is not paid "up front"
by the borrower, but is a portion of the
regular payment stream that is not paid to
Freddie Mac, or to an investor if the loan
has been sold.) For loans in excess of
$10 million, compensation to the servicer
is negotiable.
The income approach is emphasized in
the appraisal, although the market and
cost approaches are also to be consid-
ered. Top quality construction will not
necessarily be awarded a value premium
by Freddie Mac, but poor construction
will be viewed as a detriment.
Alternatives
If the loan is approved, the borrower
must choose an interest rate strategy. For
example, Freddie Mac permits a borrow-
er to "lock in" a rate (rates change daily)
and close the loan immediately. On the
other hand, a borrower willing to gamble
might choose to play the "60 day game."
Freddie Mac provides a guaranteed maxi-
mum rate, which remains in effect for 60
days, to the borrower who does not lock
into the offered rate when the loan is ap-
proved. The maximum rate is 40 to 60
basis points above the rate the borrower
would have paid by locking in. The ben-
efit to the borrower is that if rates fall
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If Freddie Mac learns after the loan has
closed that the borrower's financial
statement contains erroneous figures,
Freddie Mac can require the originating
lender to repurchase the loan.
during the ensuing 60 days, Freddie Mac
will offer a correspondingly lower rate.
(There is also a 15 day program.)
The borrower must choose a loan term
as well. Freddie Mac offers four plans:
5, 7, 10, and 15 years. These are balloon
periods; borrowers can amortize loans
over periods as long as 30 years. Freddie
Mac rewards those who choose shorter
balloon periods with lower interest rates.
The borrower must also consider pre-
payment; Freddie Mac offers plans with
different prepayment options and penal-
ties. Under
the most
popular plan,
the borrower
can choose
between two
forms of pre-
payment
penalty. The first, called the sliding
scale or the 5-4-3-2-1 plan, involves a
penalty of 5% of the outstanding balance
if the loan is prepaid within the first year,
4% of the balance if prepayment is in the
second year, etc. A loan prepaid in year
5 or later carries a 1% penalty (however,
during the last six months of the term
there is no penalty). Under the second
prepayment plan, called yield mainte-
nance, the penalty depends on what hap-
pens to rates between the loan origina-
tion date and the prepayment date.
Finally, the borrower must choose the
level of debt to employ in the purchase.
Freddie Mac loans no more than 85% of
the value of a multi-family property, and
encourages even lower loan-to-value
(LA') ratios by offering lower interest
rates on lower L/V loans. For example,
a recent 60-day prior approval interest
rate for a 7 year balloon loan with an
80% LA' ratio was 10.17%. A similar
loan with only a 50% LA' ratio carried a
9.32% rate. (Rates were also lower for
loans with prepayment penalties based
on yield maintenance, which provides
greater protection to the lender, than on
loans with the sliding scale option.)
Advantages and Disadvantages
Clearly, the greatest advantage of Fred-
die Mac financing is a favorable interest
rate. As noted above, Freddie Mac can
sell its loans. It does so via the pass-
through security, an investment vehicle in
which all principal and interest received
by the loan servicer (except for a 1/8 - 1/4
point servicing fee) is passed through to
the investor that has purchased the loan.
Because pass-throughs compete in the in-
vestment market with bonds and other fi-
nancial instruments, the interest rates on
loans that are salable as pass-throughs are
extremely competitive. Freddie Mac has
recently offered multi-family loan rates
100 to 150 basis points below the rates on
1
comparable
financing of-
fered by sav-
ings and loans.
Borrowers of-
ten find that
other lenders,
' such as insu-
rance companies, offer rates competitive
with Freddie Mac's only on loans of
$2,000,000 or more.
Another advantage to the borrower is
that Freddie Mac loans are assumable, al-
though not necessarily at the borrower's
interest rate, for a fee equalling the great-
er of $750 or 1% of the unpaid balance.
Finally, as noted, the borrower generally
is not personally liable, although this
nonrecourse feature is at the option of the
originating lender or Freddie Mac.
Disadvantages include the application
fee and lengthy documentation process
(although much of the documentation
would also be required by other lenders).
In addition, if, after accepting the loan
and choosing an interest rate, the borrow-
er fails, for any reason, to close the loan
within 5 working days, the points paid to
Freddie Mac are forfeited. Failure to
close tends to be more a problem with
new acquisitions than with refinancings.
Two final requirements are that Freddie
Mac must give written approval before
the borrower can obtain secondary fi-
nancing on the property, and that the
property must be held in the land trust
form of ownership.
Conclusions
The favorable rate available on a Freddie
Mac loan of $500,000 to $2,000,000
probably more than offsets the costs of
dealing with the organization. Borrow-
ers needing more than $2,000,000 might
be offered more attractive terms by ma-
jor insurance companies. In either case,
fees and points necessitate the computa-
tion of effective rates of interest, which
will differ from quoted rates. An article
in the August 1989 Illinois Business
Review explains these computations. |
Documentation Required by FHLMC
and/or the Seller/Servicer
A completed Freddie Mac application and
a $1500 application fee
The borrower's financial statement,
completed on a Freddie Mac form
A credit report on the borrower
The borrower's personal tax returns for
the two prior years (even though the
borrower may not be personally liable)
A statement describing the applicant's
experience in owning and managing
multi-family properties
A proposed management plan
Income and expense statements for the
current year and the two most recent
years (pro forma statements are
required for new construction)
A certified monthly rent schedule, which
includes information on tenants, units,
lease expiration dates, and owner-
provided furnishings or utilities
An appraisal completed on the eight-page
Freddie Mac multi-family form. The
form is to be completed by a qualified
appraiser (typically chosen by the
originating institution)
A survey (or a title insurance policy that
provides survey coverage)
An inspection of the property by a Freddie
Mac representative
A lease history (if the loan is a refinance)
A copy of the settlement statement (if the
property is a new acquisition)
Detailed cost information and an
occupancy certificate (if the property is
new construction)
Philip Rushing is an Adjunct Professor of
Finance at the University ofIllinois and a
Research Associate with the Office of
Real Estate Research. Dr. Rushing is
also an active investor in multi-family
properties who has written many articles
on real estate investing andfinance.
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Local Taxes, Schooling, and Jobs in Illinois
William Sander
Thefollowing is an abbreviated version
ofORER Paper # 75, "Local Taxes.
Schooling, and Jobs in Illinois." A copy
of the longer paper will be provided to
any reader who makes a written or tele-
phoned request to the Office ofReal
Estate Research. The longer paper
contains specific citations on the many
earlier studies of education and employ-
ment to which Dr. Sander refers in this
shortened version of his work.
Two of the most important policy is-
sues facing Illinois (and many other
^
states) are jobs and the quality of
'
education. For the past several dec-
ades, increases in the rate of private
nonfarm employment in Illinois have
been below the U.S. average. During
the same period, the quality of educa-
tion in the state has been a cause for
concern. Both employment and educa-
tion can be affected by another public
policy matter, the level of taxes.
Employment
During the 1950s and 1960s, the rate of
increase in employment in the U.S. ex-
ceeded that of Illinois by 5%. A differ-
ence between the state and national rates
has continued into the 1980s. Since
1980, the rate of private nonfarm em-
ployment growth in the nation has been
1 2% higher than the rate of growth in
Illinois. To some extent, this result is
expected, because job increases have
favored other parts of the country.
The net change in private nonfarm em-
ployment in Illinois was, in fact, nega-
tive over the 1980 to 1986 period. In the
same period, Illinois lost thousands of
farms, and a significant number of farm
jobs. Of course, the period over which
data are measured can cause the employ-
ment picture to appear more optimistic
or less so. The Illinois economy and the
state's employment situation performed
relatively poorly during the 1970s and
the early 1980s, but have improved since
1983. Thus, while during the entire 1980
to 1986 period the rate of job growth was
negative, from 1983 to 1986 the rate was
positive, almost at the national average.
To some extent, employment changes
have been the product of the industry
mix. The Illinois economic base is com-
prised disproportionately of industries,
such as metals and machinery, that have
performed poorly at the national level.
Thus, it would not be unreasonable to at-
tribute a substantial portion of the decline
in industrial employment in Illinois to
external factors. However, all of the
industries in the manufacturing sector in
Local taxes have a negative impact on
employment growth. School quality has
a positive impact on employment. However,
expenditures per pupil do not affect either
employment growth or school quality.
Illinois performed more poorly than na-
tional averages. Even some manufactur-
ing industries that performed relatively
well at the national level performed
relatively poorly in Illinois.
Education
Education is even more worrisome than
the employment situation. Although
schools outside Chicago perform relative-
ly well (with some exceptions), the Chi-
cago public school system has a dismal
record. Students in about half the schools
in Chicago score in the lowest percentile
on the American College Test, or ACT (a
standardized exam used by universities in
evaluating students for admissions pur-
poses). Dropout rates in the Chicago
public schools are exceedingly high. For-
mer U.S. Secretary of Education William
Bennett has called the Chicago public
school system the "worst in the nation."
The Tax Question
One concern raised by the state's employ-
ment problem is that high taxes might ad-
versely affect the business climate and, in
turn, the level of employment. Data indi-
cate that property taxes (which account
for more than 75% of local tax revenues)
per capita in Illinois have historically
been above the national average. How-
ever, since 1960 the property tax burden
in Illinois has declined relative to that of
the U.S. In 1960, property taxes per cap-
ita in Illinois were 29% above the U.S.
average; in 1980, the state was only 13%
above the national average. If cost of
living differences are taken into account,
1980 Illinois property tax per capita was
only 3% above the U.S. average. Taxes
levied at the state level (sales and income
taxes) tend to be below national averag-
es. Thus, while local taxes are high
in Illinois, combined state and local
taxes are not particularly high, rela-
tive to those of other states.
State and local taxes bear on edu-
cation as well as on employment. As
noted above, high taxes may discou-
rage industrial development and re-
sult in less employment. However, tax
revenues support schools. If increased
education spending results in a more
qualified labor force in a local area, be-
cause workers are better trained and fam-
ilies are attracted to the area, the business
climate might improve. Some studies
have indicated, in fact, that increased
spending on education, which requires
higher taxes, has positive effects on state
and local employment growth. Yet other
studies have shown that taxes impede
state and local economic and employ-
ment growth. It therefore seems unclear
whether our policy makers should strive
for higher or lower taxes.
Research Findings
TTiis study examines effects of local tax-
es and schooling on private nonfarm em-
ployment growth in Illinois since 1980.
The study also evaluates factors that de-
termine educational outcomes (ACT
scores, school attendance rates, and drop-
out rates). There are two particularly im-
portant findings. First, property taxes
and other local taxes have a negative im-
pact on employment growth. Second,
school quality, as measured by ACT
scores, has a positive impact on the level
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of employment. However, expenditures
per pupil do not affect either employment
growth or school quality.
It is not surprising that taxes are found
to have a negative impact on state and
local economies; such a finding is consis-
tent with the results of several studies that
have found taxes to hinder economic
activity. TTiese results do not support the
findings of earlier studies that have found
taxes to be unrelated to economic growth
at the county level, or earlier findings that
high property taxes have a positive effect
on a state's industrial growth.
The results of this study also indicate
that the quantifiable characteristics of
schools and teachers, which include
school size, teacher salaries, teachers' lev-
els of schooling and years of experience,
and pupil-teacher ratios, have no impact
on ACT scores. The most important pre-
dictors of ACT scores are found to be
family background characteristics, in-
cluding family income and parents' levels
of schooling. There is also evidence that
children from single-parent families score
lower on the ACT test.
School attendance rates also provide
evidence that spending does not increase
school quality. Experienced teachers are
found to enhance attendance, while stu-
dents from larger cities or larger schools,
or from female-headed households, are
less likely to attend. Students in large cit-
ies or schools are also found more likely
to drop out of school, while those whose
parents are better educated or earn higher
incomes are less likely to be dropouts.
Another interesting result is that educa-
tional attainment, measured as the per-
centage of adults holding college degrees
or the median number of years of school
completed, has no effect on employment
growth. Earlier studies had indicated that
higher levels of educational attainment in
states and urban counties increase em-
ployment growth. In addition, at least
two earlier studies had indicated that
higher levels of education spending in-
crease employment growth. The finding
in the current study that educational at-
tainment and spending have no effect on
employment growth is consistent with an
earlier study that focused on the U.S. as a
whole and certain areas in Massachusetts.
The determination that spending on ed-
ucation has no effect on employment is
not surprising, since most studies have
found no relationship between education
expenditures and education quality. The
ACT score data seem to confirm the hy-
pothesis that the quantifiable characteris-
tics of schools, notably expenditure per
pupil and teacher salaries, are not closely
linked with educational outcomes.
The lack of a relationship between edu-
cational attainment and employment is
more of a puzzle, since the prevailing
wisdom is that U.S. firms increasingly
value workers who possess skills useful
in the modem industrial workplace (re-
ferred to by economists as human capi-
tal). Some of these skills are acquired
through schooling. A possible explana-
tion is that industries increasingly value
human capital in more urbanized areas,
since the growth in human capital inten-
sive industries is concentrated in metro-
politan areas. Most observations in this
study are for non-metropolitan areas.
The finding that family background is
an important determinant of educational
outcomes is consistent with previous re-
search results. Children of parents en-
dowed with stronger educational back-
grounds tend to have greater success in
school. The current study also supports
earlier findings that children from single
parent households are not as successful
in their educational pursuits.
Conclusion
The results of research such as the current
study should be reported with caution.
The finding that teacher salaries and ex-
penditure per pupil did not affect educa-
tional outcomes in Illinois during the pe-
riod studied does not necessarily imply
that there is no relationship between
spending and the quality of education
over time. If there were no relationship
between education spending and educa-
tion quality over the longer term, commu-
nities could clearly improve their busi-
ness climates by reducing taxes and
cutting education expenditures. |
William Sander is a Professor in the
Department ofEconomics at De Paul
University in Chicago.
ORER News
U ofI Faculty, Alumni Partic-
ipate in Iowa Conference
The College of Business Administra-
tion at the University of Northern
Iowa sponsored a November 30 -
December 1 conference. Emerging
Issues in Real Estate Education.
Practice, and Research. Prominent
members of the academic and profes-
sional real estate communities were
asked to participate. The conference
addressed a variety of issues relating
to real estate, ranging from invest-
ment and development to real estate
education.
Two University of Illinois faculty
members were invited to make pres-
entations. Professor Roger Cannaday
discussed the history and activities of
the Office of Real Estate Research in
a session entitled, "Issues in Real
Estate Education and Professional-
ization." ORER Professor Peter
Colwell was a discussant of papers
presented in a session on "Issues in
Real Estate Finance."
Two Ph. D. graduates of the Uni-
versity of Illinois real estate program,
Austin Jaffe of The Pennsylvania
State University and James Webb of
Cleveland State University, were
presenters at the conference. Paul
Uselding, a former chairman of the
University of Illinois Department of
Economics who now serves as Dean
of the University of Northern Iowa
College of Business Administration,
organized the event and was also a
conference participant.
New ORER Papers Available
Two papers have been added to the
ORER Working Paper series. The
first, "Collateralized Mortgage Obli-
gations (CMOs): Mortgage Money
Cheaper By the Slice?" by Yoon
Dokko of the University of Illinois
and Robert H. Edelstein and Kenneth
T. Rosen of the University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley, is Number 74 in the
series. A short version of the paper
was featured as the ORER Paper
Series entry in the Summer 1989
(continued on page 13)
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Austin Jaffe Discusses Eastern Europe^s Housing Crisis
Austin J. Jaffe is Professor ofBusiness
Administration, and serves as Research
Directorfor the Institute for Real Estate
Studies, at The Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity. He earned a Ph.D. in Finance at
the University of Illinois in 1978. Among
his areas of research interest are the con-
ceptual and economic bases ofproperty
rights and the decline in recent years of
private ownership rights in land.
In addition to writing and serving on
editorial hoards for a number ofprestig-
ious U.S. journals, Dr. Jaffe has written
and reviewed articles forforeign journals
and has spoken throughout Europe on
housing policy. On the following pages,
he shares his views on Eastern European
housing and his reactions to an interna-
tional housing conference held last June.
Are housing conditions in Eastern Eu-
rope as bad as Americans tend to be-
lieve? We don't have to wait to evalu-
ate the Eastern bloc's experiments in
socialism. There is an abundance of evi-
dence now, and, in Irving Kristol's words,
we've been "mugged by reality." By
most measures, housing policy in Eastern
Europe is a gross failure.
Tell us about the conference on Eastern
European housing in which you partici-
pated. The conference was called
"Housing Reforms in Eastern Europe."
It was held in late June near Budapest.
The conference was organized by people
actively involved in some international
research associations. The disciplines
represented ranged from sociology to
economics to housing policy analysis.
Some presenters discussed their coun-
tries' housing policies. Others discussed
broader conceptual issues regarding hous-
ing, particularly involving cross cultural
comparisons between the West and East.
I was invited to present a paper entitled
"Concepts of Property, Theories of Hous-
ing, and the Choice of Housing Policy."
Sixteen Western Europeans attended,
mostly from the U. K., Sweden, and Hol-
land. The fourteen Eastern Europeans
represented the U.S.S.R., Hungary, Bul-
garia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czecho-
slovakia. Reports were also made on
housing in Albania and East Germany,
though there were no participants from
those countries. Romania was not repre-
sented. There were also six participants
from the U.S. and two from Canada.
Most participants were young academ-
ic researchers at research institutes or uni-
versities. Few were political appointees,
though some Eastern Europeans were in-
volved in housing policy decisions or oth-
er government activity. One participant
was Hungary's central banker, who talked
about changes underway in the Hungari-
an capital markets.
The Eastern Europeans' presentations
were quite diverse and interesting. In
fact, after the conference had begun, the
organizers revised the schedule to allow
more time to discuss housing in Eastern
Europe and less time for the more mun-
dane housing issues of the West. I was
selected to be on a panel of Western par-
ticipants. We were asked to prepare com-
ments on what we had learned from our
Eastern colleagues on the state of housing
in the East.
How did the Western participants tend to
react to the Eastern presentations?
I was disturbed by the flippant attitudes
some Western participants held. My re-
actions differed from those of some of the
people from England or Holland. We
were not there to talk about a game; a
hundred million people live in Eastern
Europe, and there are another two hun-
dred million households in the U.S.S.R.,
so the region's housing policy is a serious
issue. After hearing one Eastern analyst
after another discuss the bleak housing
pictures in their individual countries, I
was struck by how serious the structural
problems are in the Eastern European
housing systems. In my comments, I
shared five points that 1 had observed re-
garding Eastern European housing.
First, I noted that theory predicts that
when there is divergence between private
and social costs, market failure will be
the likely result. Eastern European hous-
ing systems are hampered by state-
controlled rents, which are always less
than half the rents that would be deter-
mined by private markets. Interest rates
are typically far below inflation, so it
isn't surprising that inefficiency in pro-
duction/consumption exists; in fact, we
would predict it. The evidence is over-
whelming that state socialism has grossly
failed in economic terms, and particular-
ly in housing production.
My second point was that state-run
housing systems cannot succeed when
the national economies are weak. State
socialism has reduced production, and
national income, in virtually every case,
including East Germany. Although East
Germany's production has been high, its
standard of living has continued to fall.
Recent developments in that country pro-
vide additional support for the view that
all is far from "nirvana" in Eastern
Europe's bastion of production.
As national economies have weak-
ened, housing has had to fend for itself.
One key observation by the Hungarian
central banker was that there can be no
housing reform without capital market
reform. Hungary has taken the most rad-
ical approach toward fostering a market
economy. One result should be move-
ment toward housing allocation in terms
of market prices. Earlier responses to in-
stitutional failure, including such com-
munal arrangements as the phenomenon
of self-help, are likely to decline.
What is self-help? Don't we hear about
its use in Albania? Self-help in the
area of housing is an individual response
to institutional conditions that interfere
with housing production. It involves ar-
rangements that transform what has been
allocated into what a family wants. In
most countries with state-controlled
economies, housing outside the cities is
built by individuals acting in this entre-
preneurial fashion. Self-help can involve
bartering with tradespeople to work
weekends, bartering with suppliers for
materials, or even trading skills with
others trying to rehabilitate their houses.
ORER Letter I page 8
Interview
Some controlled economies do not pro-
duce single-family houses (almost every
Eastern European country produces only
multi-family), and the only way people
obtain homes is through self-help. It has
become a standard method of acquisition
in most Eastern European countries for
people who don't live in cities, or for
those who want low density housing.
No one knows much about Albania,
but a report at the conference indicated
that self-help is believed to be quite prev-
alent there. Unlike in other Eastern
states, the rulers of Albania have tried to
foster an agricultural society, so they do
not channel resources to city housing.
We were told there is virtually no
building industry in Albania. Under
such conditions, self-help becomes
the only way to modify urban hous-
ing allocations, the only alternative to
being terribly underhoused. But self-
help can only do so much. One par-
j
ticipant stated that self-help may
solve Albania's problem, but I can't be so
optimistic; the standard of living is so
low that the people live like the peasantry
in Czarist Russia.
Self-help exists in many places, in-
cluding the U.S. But there is debate over
whether self-help is even a good thing. If
markets work properly, the motivation
for self-help should disappear. Self-help
is a symptom of inefficiency in the exist-
ing institutional arrangements. In fact, in
the Eastern bloc, self-help is often a
black market activity (although the mean-
ing of black market varies from country
to country), in the sense that the contrac-
tual arrangements that develop are some-
times quasi-legal and sometimes illegal.
There are numerous reports that bricks
and concrete have to be locked up at state
construction sites, because people climb
fences to steal scarce materials.
In whatforms do we see self-help in the
U.S. ? Self-help occurs in market sec-
tors that don't work very well. For exam-
ple, virtually no private low-income
housing is produced in this country. Peo-
ple who want to expand or improve their
living quarters may not be able to do so,
because of low income or the riskiness of
their neighborhoods. It is also difficult to
hire contractors, get materials, or obtain
loans. As a result, self-help among the
poorest housing sectors in this country is
similar to self-help in Eastern Europe.
Yet the poor are not the only people in-
volved. An apartment owner who lacks
access to credit markets may barter for
improvements or fix things himself.
Self-help is a less desirable solution than
hiring specialists, but in some cases, de-
pending on the institutional arrangements
in place, it may be the owner's only prac-
tical choice. Of course, that is particular-
ly true among lower income families, for
whom I understand self-help is a growing
phenomenon in this country.
There is an abundance of evidence now,
and we 've been "mugged by reality.
"
By most measures, housing policy in
Eastern Europe is a gross failure.
Does state-provided housing offer any
benefits? The evidence is clear that
state-controlled housing does not achieve
better marks than altemative arrange-
ments, particularly in Eastern Europe.
The third of my points, in fact, was that
Eastern Europe has witnessed a rejection
of Marxist theories of rent, interest, and
value. The Marxist/Leninist notion that
rent shouldn't accrue to landlords is still
mandated by law, but it has been rejected
by these countries' economic systems.
On a tour of Budapest, we were shown
different housing arrangements in the
city. Because "rent" is illegal under the
Marxist doctrine, the amount that a per-
son pays for an apartment generally is
something like $ 1 per month. It does not
matter where the apartment is located; the
monthly payment bears no relationship to
site value. Without exception, people I
encountered were proud to have places to
live that only cost $1 a month. But there
is obviously an allocation problem. Prop-
erty should be allocated to uses that are
the most productive. Ignoring the value
of access frustrates this allocation. That
is, those who could make the best use of
access cannot obtain access.
So why don't these countries introduce
market processes in the housing sector?
One reason that the Eastern European
countries have had, and will continue to
have, trouble establishing market econo-
mies is that wage levels have not includ-
ed amounts to be paid for rent. People
are paid relatively little money, but they
don't pay much rent, and the state pro-
vides other material benefits. As a re-
sult, wage income must adjust before
rent can be allowed to rise, or people
will not have enough money to pay it.
In other words, if they were to move to-
ward market solutions for housing, there
would inevitably be higher user charges,
and people would be squeezed financial-
ly. The squeeze has begun in Hun-
gary, and is certainly occurring in
Poland. Poland has experienced rap-
id inflation in prices of many goods,
and people there just don't have ade-
quate incomes. That is the kind of
problem these nations must deal with
as they convert to market allocation.
My fourth point was that Eastern Eu-
rope's experience proves that one cannot
solve complex economic and social
problems through social engineering.
What could be a worse scenario than a
state housing bureau that has poor pro-
duction, cannot conceivably meet the
excess demand for housing, offers few
choices, and does not even produce equi-
table outcomes? We know, from the ex-
perience of the past fifty years, that it's
not efficient for the state to produce
housing. However, many have held the
notion that state housing is more equita-
ble. Part of the socialist ideal is equity
across income classes.
Yet even if the production problem is
solved, as has occurred in East Germany,
where considerable housing has been
built, allocations are not equitable.
There are not long waiting lists for hous-
ing in East Germany, as are found in the
other Socialist countries, but families
have little choice regarding where to
live, and the choices they have are really
unimaginative. The report on East Ger-
many noted that the housing stock is
plentiful, but is really not very attractive.
The most desirable units are retained, at
low established user charges, by those
with the good fortune or political influ-
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tions. So even though East Germans
have "choices," in that there are available
properties, justice remains an issue.
Did the Eastern European presenters feel
that their housing systems are equitable?
Based on their presentations, I do not feel
they supported the notion that Eastern
European housing policy is more equita-
ble than housing policies elsewhere. De-
fenders have argued that state housing
would be fairer, that capitalism is grossly
unfair. Yet there is much inequity in
state housing systems. A system that is
not more efficient and not more equitable
has no justification.
Eastern Europe now understands j
that it can't solve equity problems just i
by maintaining a system in which ne-
cessities are allocated by government.
This has also been discovered in plac-
es like Sweden and Denmark, which
have long histories of government in-
tervention in housing. I was on sabbati-
cal in Sweden and got to know the hous-
ing system; equity is a big problem there,
too. Observers outside Sweden might be
surprised by this; many people in both
Eastern and Western Europe view Swe-
den as a place where socialism has suc-
ceeded. But inequity in Swedish housing
allocation is alive and well.
The final point I made as a member of
the panel was that Eastern European soci-
eties can become richer in the future, but
that success will likely come about only
with a rejection of the fundamental prin-
ciples upon which their housing policies
were built. The view that housing is not
a private good, that it is something the
state should produce, that it should be al-
located rather than purchased, cannot be
permitted to persist. Hungary is ready for
changes. Poland is faced with serious
housing problems, but political changes
there suggest that a change in housing
policy is possible. It will be much more
difficult to convince countries like Bul-
garia. That country is moving slowly,
but its hard-line dictator, Zhivkov, has
given up his power. My impression is
that even Bulgaria, along with a less
repressed Czechoslovakia, is eventually
going to be ready for Western-style
changes, though we don't know much
about what is going on there now.
I suspect that the saddest situation,
aside from isolated Albania, is in Roma-
nia, under Ceausescu. The country is in
desperate straits, and he has taken a firm
stand against any Western-style changes.
The report from the Eastern delegates and
other available information indicate that
housing conditions in Romania are bad
and getting worse. Romania, as I under-
stand it, refused to respond to the invita-
tion to the conference. East Germany at
least declined the invitation; Romania
never even acknowledged being invited.
One sad aspect of Romania's situation
The waiting time for an apartment now
is between twenty and twenty-five years.
We're talking about a generation of adults
living with their parents, then finally
being allocated a single room.
is the waiting time for those needing
housing. The wait for apartment alloca-
tion in most Eastern countries, as well as
in some Western countries such as Swe-
den, is ten to fifteen years. In Romania,
and in Poland as well, the average wait-
ing time now is between twenty and
twenty-five years. So we're talking about
a generation of adults living with their
parents, then finally being allocated a sin-
gle room somewhere. Housing allocation
is increasingly becoming a function of in-
tergenerational decisions. If parents take
the right steps, an allocation of housing
becomes available to the family when the
children eventually need it.
Can those allocations be sold? It var-
ies by country. Sometimes they can be,
but in many cases they can only be sold
back to the state. Even in Sweden, the
value of housing produced and allocated
by the state cannot be capitalized for the
benefit of individuals. For example, the
owner of a state-produced housing unit
cannot sell the unit for a capital gain.
The Swedish housing market is currently
dominated by multi-family housing built,
allocated, and managed by the public sec-
tor. Multi-family housing has not always
been a dominant force, but it is now, in
part because of budget problems of the
1980s, when the government ran huge
deficits despite high tax rates. Since the
public sector is enormous, with over 60%
of the population employed by the gov-
ernment, there now is not even enough
money to build the high-density housing
that Sweden has provided in the past.
Yet surveys indicate that households in
Sweden want single-family units. In the
"home owning" countries, the English-
speaking countries of Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and the U.S., about 70% of
the people would prefer to own or rent
single-family homes. Swedish house-
holds have similar preferences. There
has, in fact, been some private con-
struction of single-family homes, but
for the most part the state supplies
housing for the country's population.
The state built single-family homes in
the 1930s, but housing policies in
more recent years have caused Swe-
den to become the "land of the apart-
ment dwellers." At least Swedish hous-
ing is characterized by high quality
material and workmanship.
While in Sweden I wrote a paper with
a Swedish colleague on differences in
landlord/tenant roles in the United States
and Sweden. In the U. S., housing is
viewed as a private good. So we first
looked at U.S. housing, and at the pros-
pects for an efficient housing market.
Then we considered Sweden, where
housing is viewed as a social entitlement;
each citizen is entitled to a certain
amount of housing. We wondered
whether there would be a relationship
between Sweden's entitlement policy and
distributive justice. We developed some
models for analyzing landlord/tenant in-
stitutions, to measure how well the two
societies have met the goals of economic
efficiency and distributive justice.
Landlord/tenant roles suggest that
housing in the U.S. is much less a private
good than one might expect, while hous-
ing in Sweden is much more difficult to
allocate in a manner that we would call
"fair" than might have been expected.
But there are parallels. Both societies
have moved toward increasing the legal
power of tenants in the contractual land-
lord/tenant arrangement, though Sweden
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has moved farther in that direction than
the U.S. has. For example, there is a
Swedish notion of "security of tenure,"
stating that a tenant cannot be removed at
the end of the lease unless there has been
some gross violation of the agreement.
That is, the landlord in Sweden no longer
has a right to terminate a lease. Tenants
are protected in our country, but not near-
ly to that extent. So notions of housing
rights vary in dramatic and interesting
ways across the two cultures.
There is not a rent control ordinance in
Sweden, but there is a rent-setting mecha-
nism based on cost to the landlord. Stud-
ies have shown that this mechanism be-
haves in a manner very similar to rent
control. It has assured that there will
not be distributive justice. The cost-
determined rent at the city center is
no higher than that in the suburbs, yet
the center of the city offers much
more attractive amenities. We see the
same land use patterns and preferenc-
es in Sweden that we observe in market
systems, but people have to find ways to
circumvent official rules. Side payments
and various types of quasi-legal arrange-
ments achieve a more efficient allocation
of property.
Yet some inequity is inherent in the
system. Choice apartments in the best
neighborhoods of central Stockholm are
retained by people who "live" in them
only on weekends; they don't return pos-
session to the state when they move out,
as required by law. Rent is so far below
what market allocation would set that
some who move keep their government-
allocated units as inexpensive weekend
retreats; that's hardly social justice. We
observe all the aberrations that a Western
economist would expect. The Swedish
housing situation, particularly in Stock-
holm, but also in the other large cities, is
becoming critical. The situation in small-
er cities and the countryside is not as bad.
What conclusions did you drawfrom the
conference? One thought I took from
the conference is that we must be careful
not to generalize too much. The various
Eastern European housing systems are
different, because the countries are differ-
ent. People who talk about Eastern Eu-
rope should be mindful of differences, for
example, between Yugoslavia and East
Germany. Yugoslavia has enormous so-
cial problems along with its political and
economic troubles. East Germany, with a
stronger industrial base, has different
problems, as we recently witnessed in
Berlin. But while there are differences
and we must not generalize too much, we
should recognize that the Eastem bloc
countries do have some similar character-
istics. One thing we tried to do at the
conference was to look at Eastem Europe
as an area where state socialism has dou-
bled the housing problem.
I also left the conference feeling that
Eastern Europe is not like Western
Europe. Western Europe prospers, while
state socialism has bankrupt, or nearly
bankrupt, the Eastern European countries.
people in the West need to be better in-
formed. Because we're so far away, or
because few here are familiar with small
agricultural countries like Bulgaria and
Romania, Americans don't realize how
poor the people there are and how rela-
tively low the living standards are. East-
em Europeans are allocated many things,
but they have little income and few
choices about what to own. Production
has been so bad for so long that there's
nothing in the stores to buy, though it's
not as tme in Hungary and Czechoslova-
kia as in poorer countries. I think the
typical American would be somewhat
shocked to learn what the typical Polish
household buys and eats, and what life is
like in most of the Eastem European
countries. We'll probably begin to leam
more about the East, as a changing Soviet
Union and its former satellites permit
more news to reach the West.
Another thought, one that I know other
participants shared because of sentiments
they expressed to me, is that this was one
of the saddest professional conferences in
which we'd participated. The housing sit-
uation in Eastem Europe is not a very
cheerful topic. The richest country is
Hungary, and even it has enormous prob-
lems that will have to be addressed in the
next decade. As I indicated, we can take
some comfort in the fact that Hungary is
clearly looking toward the West and
away from the East. But when we toured
Budapest we assessed Hungary's econo-
my and its current housing situation;
there's plenty of work to be done.
Some observers have noted that West-
em experts, especially those who have
spent time in the East and understand its
housing, might have considerable oppor-
tunities to advise Eastem Europe on
housing policy. There would be unique
problems; the govemments might not
have money to pay for programs, and the
political situation is always uncertain.
Perhaps people with interests along
these lines can be encouraged by the
recent political climate in Hungary,
in Poland, in East Germany, and even
to some extent in Bulgaria, Czecho-
slovakia, and the Soviet Union.
I traveled last year to Czechoslova-
kia, and to Poland, where I was invit-
ed to speak; and visited Hungary this
year; and have spent time in the Soviet
Union. So I'm cognizant that things
there are just different. When you cross
into Western Europe after traveling in
the East, one emotion you feel is guilt.
After spending a few weeks in Poland
and Czechoslovakia, my wife and I felt
guilty crossing the border into West Ger-
many. The natural setting is the same on
both sides, but an arbitrarily selected po-
litical boundary separates West Germany
from a completely different world, as
demonstrated recently by thousands from
East Berlin.
Some people persist in thinking that
Eastem Europe is a lot like Western Eu-
rope, but that is not tme. Westem Eu-
rope prospers, while state socialism has
bankrupt, or nearly bankmpt. the Eastem
European countries. It has surely bank-
mpt Poland and Romania, and probably
Albania. Too many of the other coun-
tries are on the same path. I just hope
that by sharing our ideas and building a
spirit of cooperation and openness, as we
tried to do in the conference, we can help
to convince the Eastem European gov-
emments to consider market solutions
that would offer real hope to their suffer-
ing people.
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Thought for the Day
Less Is Not More
Peter F. Colwell
Observers of real estate markets have
said, in all seriousness, that the economic
value of Japanese real estate now exceeds
the economic value of real estate in the
U.S. Such statements typically are made
to support notions of a measurably superi-
or Japanese economy.
It is true that individual parcels in Ja-
pan sell at higher prices than similar U.S.
parcels. It is even plausible that a buyer
would have to pay more to buy all the
real estate in Japan than to buy all
U.S. real estate, were all parcels in
both countries to be sold. But the as-
sertion that high real estate prices are
a measure of economic success im-
plies that the welfare Japan derives
from its real estate exceeds the wel-
fare the U.S. derives from its real es-
tate. If Japan truly were better off than
the U.S., by virtue of the higher aggregate
market value of its real estate, then we
would want what they have. We would
offer to trade the U.S. for Japan.
Unlike the statements of the market ob-
servers discussed above, this suggestion
clearly is not intended to be taken serious-
ly. It is offered to illustrate what is intui-
tively obvious: there is something wrong
with the idea that relatively high transac-
tion prices on relatively few parcels of
real estate constitute an economic bless-
ing for Japan. What, specifically, is the
error in this viewpoint?
Let us simplify the argument by focus-
ing on the value of land rather than that
of real estate (which includes improve-
ments). There is not much land in Japan;
the U.S. is approximately 25 times as
large. Quantities of land in the two coun-
tries are represented on the horizontal
axis in the graph. (It would be impractical
to show the U.S. supply curve 25 times as
far from the origin as Japan's, but the de-
gree of difference in the countries' land
areas is shown to be considerable.)
Japan also has less population than the
U.S., but the population difference is
much less pronounced than the land area
difference; U.S. population is only about
twice that of Japan. Suppose that demand
for land in each country relates to popula-
tion size, as suggested in the graph (a
point on the U.S. demand curve corre-
sponding to a given price is twice as far
from the vertical axis as the point corre-
sponding to that price on the Japanese de-
mand curve). The selling price of a unit
of land is established by the intersection
of demand and supply. TTie total market
value of each country's land is the product
of per unit selling price and quantity.
IfJapan truly were better off than the U.S.
by virtue of the higher aggregate market
value of its real estate, then we would
want what they have. We would offer to
trade the U.S. for Japan.
Market value totals for the two coun-
tries are represented in the graph by the
lined rectangular areas. The graph shows
the area of the "tall" rectangle rising
along the vertical axis, representing Ja-
pan, to exceed the area of the "flat" rec-
tangle running along the horizontal axis,
representing the U.S. Therefore, the ag-
gregate market value of land in Japan is
shown to exceed the corresponding U.S.
total. However, the welfare that the peo-
ple of a country derive from their land is
Land Markets: U.S. and Japan
Supply:
not simply the market value total. Wel-
fare also includes the region above each
rectangular area but below the corre-
sponding demand curve, which is called
consumer surplus.
Consumer surplus is the economic ben-
efit accruing to consumers when the mar-
ket price of a product is less than the
highest price some buyers would have
been willing to pay. Those who pay pric-
es lower than they would willingly have
paid can apply the savings to other
uses. Therefore, we measure welfare,
the value of economic activity to con-
sumers, by adding consumer surplus
to market value.
There is much consumer surplus
(triangle ADE) in the U.S. but very
little (triangle ABC) in Japan. The
sum of the rectangular market value and
triangular consumer surplus areas for the
U.S. greatly exceeds the similar total for
Japan, even though the market value total
for Japan exceeds that for the U.S. Pro-
ductive energy of the Japanese is diverted
from other uses into the payment for
land. Such an outcome is certainly not
desirable for Japan's economy. Abundant
land in the U.S. keeps prices relatively af-
fordable. The result is a significant eco-
nomic benefit to our country. |
Supply:
U.S.
Demand:
U.S.
\>i>^///////////////////////////////////777^
Total Land Area
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Campus Activities
Rho Epsilon Completes Active Semester
The campus chapter of Rho Epsilon
completed an eventful 1989 Fall sched-
ule of activities. Under the leadership of
President Brigid Mattingly, Vice Presi-
dent Linda Paolella, Treasurer Katherine
Duda, and Secretary Gerald Pace, the
chapter conducted numerous profession-
al activities and attracted 45 new student
members to the organization.
The first activity of the semester was
an informational meeting, held Septem-
ber 1 1 . Students in the real estate pro-
gram had the opportunity to learn about
courses from members of the real estate
faculty, and to learn about Rho Epsilon.
The first professional activity was held
on September 19. Don Pescara (a former
Rho Epsilon President) and fellow U of I
alumnus Steve Schmitz, with Cushman
& Wakefield in Chicago, spoke on com-
mercial brokerage and financial services.
The second professional meeting was
held on October 10. Charles Shaw,
Chairman of The Charles H. Shaw Com-
pany in Chicago, spoke to the member-
ship on real estate development.
On October 24, Robert Miller, Senior
Vice President of Applied Real Estate
Analysis, Inc. addressed the chapter. His
topic was real estate consulting.
Professor Roger E. Cannaday (who
serves as faculty advisor to the chapter)
and fifteen students visited the offices of
three Chicago firms during a field trip on
November 3. At Price Waterhouse Valu-
ation Services, the students learned about
the firm's appraisal activities. The pres-
entation was coordinated by U of I alum-
nus Dan Bajadek. Another Illinois alum-
nus, Dennis Redpath, coordinated the
visit to Richard Ellis, Inc. The organiza-
tion's activities focus on international
real estate advising. The third firm visit-
ed by the group was Metropolitan Struc-
tures, where John Brown coordinated a
presentation on real estate development.
A graduate of the University's real
estate program spoke to the chapter on
November?. Wendy Timm, a former
Rho Epsilon Treasurer now with First In-
terstate Mortgage in St. Louis, explained
current real estate financing practices.
The final professional activity was
held on November 30. George Petrulis, a
consultant to University Park Investment
Corporation, spoke on real estate devel-
opment. His talk was of particular inter-
est to those in the campus community, as
his organization is developing the "Uni-
versity Executive Centre," a hotel-office
complex to be located just north of the
University's Beckman Institute.
Officers for the 1990 Spring semester
were elected at a November 30 chapter
business meeting and pizza party. The
new officers are Katherine Duda, a senior
from Chicago majoring in LAS Finance
with a real estate concentration, Presi-
dent; Peter Tsao, a first year MBA stu-
dent from Huntington, New York, Vice
President; Michelle Anderson, a senior
from Champaign majoring in CBA Fi-
nance/real estate. Treasurer; and David
Lyons, a senior from Wheaton majoring
in LAS Finance/real estate. Secretary.
ORER congratulates the new officers,
and commends the outgoing officers for
their many successes.
Three Rho Epsilon members were
nominated by the real estate faculty as fi-
nalists for the CCIM Scholarship, award-
ed by the Commercial-Investment Real
Estate Council. The finalists were Nancy
Fendley, a senior from Arlington Heights
majoring in LAS Finance/real estate;
John Jolly, an MBA student from Oak
Lawn; and Lisa Ludwig, a junior from
Westchester majoring in CBA Finance/
real estate. Congratulations to all three,
and particularly to Lisa Ludwig, to whom
the Council awarded the scholarship.
Major firms with real estate divisions
continue to recruit students in the U of 1
real estate program. In late September,
Arthur Andersen and Company inter-
viewed December graduates for positions
with the company's appraisal staff. In
early November, JMB Realty interviewed
students interested in working as pension
fund accountants.
There are 121 student, faculty, and
honorary members of the University of
Illinois chapter of Rho Epsilon. Member-
ship in the organization is open to all un-
dergraduate and graduate students with
career interests in the real estate field.
ORER News
(continuedfrom page 7)
ORER Letter. The second new paper,
Number 75 in the series, is "Local
Taxes, Schooling, and Jobs in Illi-
nois," by William Sander of De Paul
University. A short version of the
Sander paper appears as the ORER
Paper Series article in this issue.
Employer's Guide Available
An informational booklet is available
to organizations interested in recruit-
ing graduates of the University of
Illinois real estate program. It has
been prepared by Rho Epsilon, in
cooperation with ORER.
The Spring 1990 Employer's Guide
to Students Seeking Employment in
Real Estate and Related Fields
contains resumes of students availa-
ble to begin work in January or June
of 1990. Firms that wish to obtain
copies of the booklet should contact
the Office of Real Estate Research.
UofI Ranks High in Urban
and Regional Economics
An article in the Fall 1989 issue of
The Journal ofEconomic Perspec-
tives, written by David Colander of
Middlebury College, presents various
rankings of economists and of univer-
sity economics departments. The sur-
vey that ranks universities by faculty
publications in leading journals in the
urban and regional economics field
places the U of 1 sixth in the nation.
Illinois is also ranked sixth in the
field of international economics.
Don Ursin Retires
ORER Advisory Committee member
and 1989 Illinois Realtor® of the
Year Don Ursin has retired after serv-
ing for eight years as President of
Coldwell Banker Residential Real
Estate Services of Illinois. Ursin's
real estate career has spanned more
than 32 years. His post-retirement
activities will include working on
special projects through Coldwell
Banker's Glen Ellyn offices.
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ORER Activities
ORER Conference to Address Real Estate Outlook
Real Estate Outlook: 1990 is the theme
of the fourth annual Real Estate Outlook
Day conference to be sponsored by the
Office of Real Estate Research. The
event, to be held from 1:00 P.M. to 5:00
P.M. on Tuesday, January 9, will consist
of a series of presentations by experts on
various aspects of the real estate market
and the nation's economy. There is a $40
registration fee.
Unlike the conferences of the two
prior years, the 1990 Outlook will con-
sist of only one day of presentations,
rather than two. The program will be
held at the Oak Brook Hills Hotel and
Conference Center, located at 3500
Midwest Road in Oak Brook, Illinois.
The ORER conference is being held in
connection with the triannual meetings
of the Illinois Association of Realtors®.
The Program
Four speakers will present their views on
the outlook for real estate in the coming
year:
Fred Boelter, CIH, PE, who serves as
Principal Consultant for Boelter Environ-
mental Consultants in Chicago, will talk
on environmental issues that real estate
owners and lenders face.
William R. Bryan, Director of the Uni-
versity of Illinois Bureau of Economic
and Business Research and Director of
the Office of Real Estate Research, will
discuss the state of the economy and its
likely impact on real estate.
Joe F. Hanauer, Chairman of Combined
Investments L.P. and former Chief Exec-
utive Officer of Coldwell Banker Resi-
dential, will discuss trends in residential
real estate for 1990 and beyond.
David F. Seiders, Chief Economist and
Senior Vice President for Economics,
Mortgage Finance, and Housing Policy
for the National Association of Home
Builders, will address two topics. The
first is a housing forecast for the U.S.,
Illinois, and the Chicago metropolitan
area. Seiders' second topic is the impact
that thrift reform will have on the hous-
ing sector.
Following the presentations, ORER will
sponsor a reception for those who attend
Outlook Day.
Registration Information
Anyone wishing to register for the pro-
gram should contact Brenda Bishop at the
Office of Real Estate Research. The
Office's address and telephone number
are included with the editorial informa-
tion on page 2. Those who do wish to
attend are. encouraged to contact the
Office early and pay the registration fee
in advance; seats may be limited.
The Office of Real Estate Research
thanks the Illinois Association of
Realtors® staff for helping to publicize
the event.
Charles Hill Speaks on the Future of the Thrift Industry
Thefollowing are excerptsfrom a speech
given on November 10, 1989, by Charles
M. Hill of the Federal Home Loan Bank
of Chicago. Hill had been invited to
address a Chicago luncheon meeting of
alumni of the University of Illinois work-
ing in the real estate field.
Hill holds an M.S. degree in Urban
Affairsfrom the University of Wisconsin,
and is a graduate of the University of
Michigan Graduate School ofBank Man-
agement. He has been with the FHLB of
Chicago since 1978, and has served as
Executive Vice President and Chief Oper-
ating Officer since 1980. He is also the
Chicago FHLB's Community Investment
Officer. Hill has held several govern-
mental posts, including positions with the
Wisconsin Housing Finance Authority
and the Department ofHousing and Ur-
ban Development. He currently serves
on the ORER Advisory Committee. Mr.
Hill thanks Ms. Leicia Vandercarfor
assiatance in preparing his remarks.
The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB)
System was created during the Great De-
pression to promote home ownership
through the extension of credit to S&Ls.
Interestingly, FHLBs could also loan di-
rectly to individuals, but chose to serve
only as conduits, channeling funds
through thrifts. Though there were ups
and downs, and periods of disintermedia-
tion, this housing finance system operat-
ed smoothly; indeed, it was housing's sal-
vation during the Depression. But over
the last decade, several disruptions took a
toll. Among these were depressed eco-
nomic conditions, particularly in the
Southwest, and overbuilding in some
places. We hear about high vacancy rates
in commercial buildings, in which S&Ls
were not used to investing; when new
powers are granted, there is always a
sucker who will loan on something every-
body else turns down.
There was also lopsided deregulation.
Deregulation on the liability side in 1980
meant market rates had to be paid on
deposits, but fixed rate mortgages still
dominated the asset side until the 1982
deregulatory legislation. In addition,
poor managers focused on quick profits
rather than long-term stability, and there
was some blatant wrongdoing, including
criminal activity. From the mid 1980s to
1989 several plans were put forth; some
of these were embodied in 1987's Com-
petitive Equality Banking Act. Among
other things, we pumped $10.8 billion of
surplus capital from the FHLBs into
FSLIC. Another measure was the South-
west Plan, designed to create synergies
by combining insolvent associations with
a few well-managed institutions. But
what we created instead were a few big
insolvencies. All of these antidotes were
too late and too little.
So Congress had to administer strong
medicine in restructuring and refinancing
the thrift industry, which it did by pass-
ing the Financial Institutions Reform,
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Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
affectionately referred to as FIRREA.
Through this legislation the government
has kept its commitment to thrift deposi-
tors by honoring the $100,000 limit per
account on deposit insurance. While the
cost of the Act's provisions is not known,
estimates range up to $200 billion.
FIRREA allocates $50 billion to re-
solving insolvent thrifts over the next
three years. You, the taxpayer, paid part
of the cost; the Treasury provided the
first $18.8 billion in funding, included in
the budget for fiscal year 1989, which
ended September 30. Ironically, that
spending does not technically violate
Gramm-Rudman, since the year affect-
ed had ended before the money was
allocated to it. Congress wanted to
keep "off budget" the spending for
years that hadn't yet ended, so they
created two new and exotic govern-
ment-sponsored corporations, dummy
corporations I call them: the Resolution
Trust Corporation (RTC) and Resolution
Funding Corporation (REFCO).
REFCO will borrow $30 billion in the
bond market to finance thrift resolutions;
the principal will be backed with zero-
coupon Treasury securities, paid for by
capital contributions from the 12 regional
FHLBs. As of the end of October, the
Chicago FHLB had already contributed
$172 million of our stockholders' surplus
funds to resolving the thrift crisis, and
we're the smallest Bank in the system.
Interest on REFCO bonds is to be paid
with S&L industry money, but FHLBs
could be the interest payors of last resort.
RTC's job is to manage and resolve
insolvent thrift cases; it will become the
world's largest real estate owner, maybe
surpassing the Japanese and Donald
Trump combined, and it must dispose of
billions of dollars in assets. But RTC's
wonderful mandate is contradictory. It is
supposed to quickly liquidate assets like
subdivisions and vacant land and even
golf courses, but without depressing real
estate markets. Yet buyers are waiting
for fire sale prices. So a slow disposition
will slow the recovery, while a rapid sell-
off will depress prices and increase the
cost of the rescue, since sale proceeds go
toward the resolution of other insolvent
thrifts. Either taxpayers or the industry
will have to make up the shortfalls.
The President and Congress have as-
sured us that there will never again be
such a financial crisis. They dissolved
FSLIC and replaced it with the Savings
Association Insurance Fund (SAIF), and
created the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) to
insure commercial banks. SAIF and BIF
are both administered by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, because
there is no longer an FSLIC, but the two
funds, and the premiums collected from
each industry, will remain separate.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board
A huge interlocking directorate controlled
all these regulatory activities. Fifteen
years ago it was viewed as the model for
financial institution regulation. I dare
say no one feels that way now.
(FHLBB) was an interesting creature. It
had jurisdiction over the FHLBs, the
thrifts, and the bottomless pit called
FSLIC; and it served as the board of
directors for Freddie Mac, the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. A
huge interlocking directorate controlled
all these regulatory activities. Fifteen
years ago that was viewed as the model
for financial institution regulation. I dare
say no one feels that way now.
FIRREA abolished the FHLBB and re-
placed it with the Office of Thrift Super-
vision (OTS). OTS is a bureau within the
U.S. Treasury Department, much like the
Office of the Comptroller of the Curren-
cy, which regulates the national banks.
The OTS director supervises thrifts, sub-
ject to general oversight by the Treasury
Secretary. Freddie Mac has been priva-
tized, much like Fannie Mae, with an 18-
person board; five are appointed by the
President and the rest are elected by the
common share holders. The Secretary of
HUD now has general oversight and
regulatory authority over Freddie Mac.
The FHLBs are under a new agency,
the Federal Housing Finance Board
(FHFB). This 5-member board is now
headed by HUD Secretary Jack Kemp,
who is also on the RTC board and over-
sees Freddie Mac, and has many other
responsibilities. In fact, until the other
members are appointed, Kemp will be the
FHFB. FHLBs can now provide banking
services related to housing finance, not
only to thrifts, but to commercial banks
and credit unions as well; the legislation
broadens our base of eligible member-
ship. However, it has narrowed our focus
and made members subject to more strin-
gent regulations; those that we serve
should do specialized home lending.
Two exciting new programs have been
mandated by FIRREA to supply housing
credit. First is the Community Reinvest-
ment Program, in which FHLBs lend to
member institutions at about 10 basis
points over Treasury rates, instead of
the normal 30-40 basis point markup
over cost. Every FHLB must desig-
nate a Community Reinvestment Of-
ficer (I'll be Chicago's, by the way) to
implement these loan programs for
low and moderate income people.
The second is the Affordable Housing
Program. Its purpose is to channel earn-
ings from the FHLBs to member institu-
tions to provide long-term, below market
financing on owner-occupied or rental
units for low or moderate income people.
This program will apply to home buyers
who earn no more than 80% of the medi-
an income and to renters who earn no
more than 50%. Median income in this
area is about $41,700 for a family of four,
so the 50% and 80% figures would be
about $21,000 and $33,000. These are
subsidy funds, not loan funds; money that
is not used is returned to the FHLB sys-
tem, where it is up for grabs. I hope to
grab some and bring it back here.
I think FIRREA will have a stabilizing
effect on housing finance and the thrift
industry. The worst has been weeded
out; it is mostly the healthy part of the
industry that remains. Moreover, stricter
capital requirements will leave the
remaining institutions better able to face
economic downtrends. When the crisis in
the insurance fund is solved, healthy
thrifts will be recognized as necessary,
specialized lenders committed to housing
finance. And now that the regional
FHLBs' housing mission has been ex-
panded, we can help to make affordable
housing a reality, not just a dream.
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illinois Real Estate Markets
Vacancy Rates in Chicago Office Suhmarkets
Peter F. Colwell and Tai-le Yang
The average vacancy rate for office build-
ings in the city of Chicago, weighted by
building size, is approximately 10.8%,
and the average rate in the suburbs is al-
most twice that level. While these figures
are higher than Chicagoland's building
managers and owners would like them to
be, they are lower than the recent Chicago
area office vacancy rates that have been
quoted in some other publications.
Various methods can be used in com-
puting a vacancy rate. For example, our
computations are based on all buildings
included in a survey of selected Chicago
area submarkets. A more popular tech-
nique, though, is to base the vacancy rate
only on the population of buildings that
exhibit vacancies within the studied area.
Yet the rate of vacancy in partially vacant
buildings might not present a clear picture
of the entire market; if there are a number
of fully occupied buildings, a vacancy rate
based only on buildings with vacancies
overstates the true rate. The more conven-
tional computations yield higher vacancy
rates for those city and suburban submar-
kets included in the study than the figures
noted above. Therefore, our findings may
be received as good news.
Of course, the submarkets within the
Chicago area experience differing levels
of vacancy, as demonstrated in the ac-
companying graph. Note the extremes:
the submarket with the worst vacancy sit-
uation (South Suburbs) is experiencing a
rate three times as high as that of the sub-
market with the best situation (the East
Loop area in the city). However, while
the city vacancy picture tends to be better
than that of the suburbs, it is not always
uniformly better. The suburban area wit!
the lowest vacancy (North Suburbs) has
had a slightly lower vacancy rate in some
recent months than the city area with th'
highest vacancy (River North).
Tai-le Yang is an ORER Research
Assistant and a Ph.D. candidate in
University's Department ofFinance.
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In Search of the Housing Downturn
Peter F. Colwell and Joseph W. Trefzger
Housing has some unique characteristics.
Markets are locaUzed, all parcels are
differentiated, and housing's durability
and high cost both permit and necessitate
the existence of complex financing
arrangements. However, the analysis of
housing markets is facilitated by the fact
that housing is a durable good. As such,
the housing market shares some
characteristics with other durable goods
markets.
One general characteristic of durable
goods is that their production seems to
rise and fall in a cyclical pattern, whereas
their consumption seems much more
stable. Sizable inventories accumulate
during the high output phase of a cycle,
and these inventories are depleted after
the cycle has peaked. Unfortunately, ob-
servers of a durable goods market might
take notice of relatively high (or low)
points over a series of repeating cycles,
and wrongly conclude that the market is
in a long-term upward (or downward)
trend. Such an erroneous conclusion
might adversely affect market partici-
pants' behavior and public policy deci-
sions. It is therefore important that we
leam to distinguish short-term fluctua-
tions, referred to in this article as
"cycles," from long-term trends.
The recent history of the Great Lakes
illustrates problems caused by the failure
to recognize cycles. Several years ago,
many observers expected a crisis; Lake
levels had risen to such an extent that
some shoreline property had been
destroyed, and a simple projection of
the "trend" indicated that a substantial
amount of other property around the
Lakes was threatened. However, even a
casual examination of the relevant data
indicates that the water levels in the Great
Lakes follow a cycle (of perhaps 1 1 or 12
years in duration). It is unfortunate that
those who predicted calamity did not in-
stead recognize that they were observing
the peak of a cycle. Indeed, within a few
years the cyclical trough had arrived.
A Downturn in Housing Values?
We question the conclusions of a study
published in the May 1989 issue of
Regional Science and Urban Economics
Winter
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ORER News
Noted Broker Addressed
U of I Alumni
The Office of Real Estate Research
sponsored its ninth luncheon for
University of Illinois alumni working
in the real estate field. Approximate-
ly 75 alumni and their guests attend-
ed the event, held from 1 1 :30 A.M.
until 2:00 P.M. on Friday, April 20
at the Chicago Yacht Club. Thanks
to Gene Stunard, who again arranged
for the use of the Club's facilities.
The speaker was Goldie B. Wolfe,
President of Goldie B. Wolfe & Co.,
which specializes in the office seg-
ment of the Chicago real estate mar-
ket. Ms. Wolfe, who began her real
estate career with Rubloff and was
the first woman to be named a Senior
Vice President of that company,
established her own firm in 1989.
The recipient of numerous awards for
her sales productivity, Ms. Wolfe
spoke on "The Art of Negotiating."
Quigg to Join Illinois Faculty
Laura Quigg will join the University
of Illinois real estate faculty in the
Fall 1990 semester. Quigg, who is
completing her Ph.D. at the Universi-
ty of California at Berkeley, special-
izes in the application of option
theory to land valuation.
Contribution Appreciated
University of Illinois alumnus Robert
Levin of Chicago has made a sub-
stantial contribution to the Office of
Real Estate Research. His support of
our activities is greatly appreciated.
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Commentary
and popularized in a recent Wall Street
Journal editorial and elsewhere in the
media. "The Baby Boom, the Baby Bust,
and the Housing Market," by Harvard
University researchers N. Gregory
Mankiw and David N. Weil, concludes
that real housing values in the U. S. could
decline by close to 3% per annum over
the next two decades. The reported result
of such a sustained decline would be to
render real housing prices 47% lower
than their current levels by the year 2007.
(The figures represent inflation-adjusted
values; with
high infla-
tion, nomi-
nal values
could still
rise under
this scenar-
io.) The ex-
It is unfortunate that those who
predicted calamity did not recognize
that they were observing the peak
of a cycle. Within afew years, the
trough of the cycle had arrived.
planation offered for the coming decline,
whic* .''iiankiw and Weil expect to see
natiofi'Wide, is that there has been an on-
going change in population characteris-
tics. The researchers' results have been
interpreted, for example in the Journal
editorial, as an explanation for recent
housing market declines observed in New
England and other parts of the country.
The reasoning offered is that the "baby
boom" (the large group bom during the
post-World War II period of high birth
rates) has passed its prime home buying
years, hence the strong demand and
accompanying rapid appreciation are
behind us, and we should expect declin-
ing prices after adjusting for inflation.
The prediction offered is that this decline
will continue across the U.S. over the
next two decades. The analysis is
thought-provoking, and the factual infor-
mation on population trends and housing
demand in recent decades is enlightening.
Yet the Harvard researchers offer what is
almost solely a demand-based approach
to explaining market movements that cer-
tainly are not affected by demand alone.
They have noted an association between
demand (as they compute it) and prices.
They imply that they have discovered
causation between demand and price
when, in fact, a number of "cyclical"
economic variables are also closely
associated with these price movements.
TTie Harvard team concedes the gener-
al difficulty of making forecasts, but
does not mention the futility of forecast-
ing price without considering the supply
side. It is quite difficult to reach accu-
rate conclusions by projecting that one
perceived determinant's movement in a
given direction will cause movement in a
complex market to continue unabated for
a prolonged period.
Housing Cycles
Problems in the housing markets of New
England and
other areas
where prices
are said to
have declined
might more
properly be
attributed to
cycles than to demographic factors.
Such cycles might have been triggered
by cyclical declines in regional econo-
mies. This explanation is more appeal-
ing than one based on a supposed long-
run demographic feature. Limited demo-
graphic arguments are seldom convinc-
ing by themselves even in explaining the
demand side of a market, because certain
demographic features, such as adult
population, can be overwhelmed by
others, such as in-migration and house-
hold formation.
Price increases driven by the supply
side of the market reflect labor and
material costs, environmental laws, and
local government policies. In fact, the
price increases of the last decade might
reflect, to some degree, builder attempts
to recoup costs of unmeasured quality
increases, such as improved insulation or
increased electrical capacity. Demand
certainly plays a role; if costs rise but
low demand prevents builders from pass-
ing higher costs to buyers, then builders
may curtail output, and if they fear low
prices over the longer run, many may
exit the industry. Yet price movements
cannot be predicted without recognition
of the activities of suppliers, whose
asking prices are based on their costs.
Even the impact of demographic
factors on demand is not as clear as the
researchers suggest. They assert that
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housing booms of the 1970s were "pre-
dictable far in advance," because of the
maturing baby boom. Yet the housing
booms were largely regional cyclical
phenomena fueled by migration into
growing areas, such as balmy California
and oil-rich Texas. While national adult
population can be accurately predicted
far in advance, migration certainly
cannot be.
Furthermore, even if population were
the sole determinant of demand, we
could not predict in advance the amount
and type of housing that a given popula-
tion would seek in distant future periods.
How many young adults in the year 2010
will marry, or cohabit, or remain in (or
return to) their parents' homes? It
may be tempting to emphasize demo-
graphic explanations, but attributing
to them a high degree of accuracy is
inappropriate. Note that the "baby
bust" was to have resulted in a dearth
of college students by the late 1980s,
whereas applications and enrollments
remained strong.
Therefore, we should not accept a
Wall Street Journal suggestion, that
builders are now in trouble because they
ignored the demographers, without con-
sidering alternative possibilities. One
alternative view is that builders are in
trouble much of the time, because hous-
ing markets demonstrate so much cycli-
cal fluctuation.
Possible Explanations for Cycles
Why do such cycles exist? The answer
may be that there is a real estate market
equivalent of the "hog cycle." The hog
cycle can be explained as follows: when
the price of pigs is high, farmers increase
their pork production. However, several
months must pass before the pigs are
ready to sell, and at the end of that peri-
od a large number of pigs is ready for
market at one time. Therefore, when the
pigs are ready to be sold, the price falls.
The lower price, in tum, causes produc-
tion to be curtailed, and after several
months the supply is again low while the
price is again high.
A similar internal dynamic cycle
might be influencing real estate markets,
causing over-adjustment on the produc-
tion, or supply, side. Builders produce
too much housing during the upward
phase of a cycle, and that excess is
absorbed during the downward phase
following the cyclical peak. Construction
remains low until a time when prices
have clearly risen; at that time, a new
supply cycle begins, as builders become
active, anticipating that prices will re-
main high. (Household formation might
also be explained to some degree by such
cyclical movements on the demand side
of the housing market. A radical decline
in the real price of housing would induce
additional household formation; the
resulting buying activity would, in tum,
serve to moderate the price declines.)
Continuing technological developments
will cause upheavals in the housing
market, leaving the existing housing
stock in the wrong place.
Other explanations might be offered for
the cycles observed in real estate markets.
One theory, which is based on financial
factors, predicts a flight of capital to real
estate development in the face of high
inflation or volatile interest rates.
Why can supply cycles occur; how can
an uptrend in construction continue if de-
mand is not rising as well? One possible
explanation is that an agency problem
exists: builders do not bear the full risk of
the business of building homes, because
they transfer some risk through lenders to
government deposit insurance and ulti-
mately to the taxpayers. Because those
who make the decisions can avoid part of
the risk, they might fail to reduce output
when a true risk-bearer would find it
prudent to do so; the result is cyclicality
in the form of a construction glut in
certain years.
Another possible explanation for cycli-
cal over-adjustments in supply is that
builders find it necessary to protect key
workers, and therefore keep them work-
ing even during weak market periods
when it would otherwise be sensible to
reduce output. According to this argu-
ment, builders accept losses in the short
run in order to retain key workers for the
next highly profitable cyclical upturn.
The Technology Factor
Technology, a factor that influences
supply rather than demand, has been the
impetus for housing booms throughout
recent history, and there is no reason to
feel that it will not be in the future. For
example, why was there an explosion of
home construction after World War II?
Certainly there was the return of the sol-
diers, and their return sparked a high rate
of immediate post-war household forma-
tion. Yet the war had not destroyed our
housing stock, and those young adults
who survived the conflict had all lived
—
I
somewhere before the war.
Admittedly there was underpro-
duction of housing during both the
Great Depression and the War, but
not to a sufficient degree to create
the major postwar building boom.
The fact is that the U.S. had a great
deal of housing, but much of it was
in the wrong place. Because of tech-
nological changes, the early postwar
period found the nation in the midst of
urbanization; rural housing was being
abandoned at the same time urban hous-
ing was being built at an exhausting
pace. A few years later, as with the shift
from rural to urban living, the suburbani-
zation of housing was also largely the
child of technological change.
Technology's impact on housing
location has a long and colorful history.
Early in this century, the street railway,
telephone, and radio became extremely
important factors in the decentralization
of residential areas. Later developments,
such as the automobile, the truck that
delivered goods to distant stores, and the
television that changed the nature of fam-
ily entertainment, permitted movement to
the suburbs. Super highway systems,
urban toll roads, and regional mass tran-
sit systems allowed suburbs to push
farther from central cities. Even the de-
velopment of reliable car heating and air
conditioning has reduced costs, in terms
of difficulty and discomfort, of commut-
ing long distances. The recent develop-
ment of the cellular phone has further
reduced the cost of distant commuting
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(while the Fax machine has reduced costs
of decentralization for firms). As tech-
nologies of transportation and communi-
cation continue to improve, the practical
limit to the distance between home and
work, or between the main office and the
satellite facility, will continue to increase.
However, other technological advances
have led to greater centralization for
some activities. For example, improve-
ments in structural steel and in elevator
design have permitted increased vertical
building activity; as a result there is a
greater density of office properties at the
urban centers. It is possible that future
developments in technology will reverse
the decentralization of residential activity
to some extent.
Therefore, we cannot know whether
the next advancement in technology will
allow us better to take advantage of the
benefits of centralization or those of
decentralization. The only defensible
conclusion is that continuing technologi-
cal developments will cause upheavals in
the housing market, leaving the existing
housing stock in the wrong place. New
developments in previously unattractive
areas will stand in tribute to the technolo-
gy of the time.
Hitting Close to Home?
Champaign-Urbana is substantially
overbuilt at the present, and, given the
inventory of empty homes, we would not
expect 1990 to be a very active year for
construction. Prices have shown some
weakness, and it is likely that those on
the supply side of the market will
respond in the way that best serves their
interests. It would require artful guess-
work to predict whether prices could
weaken as much as they are reported to
have weakened in New England or
Texas; these markets are impacted by
conditions different from those that affect
Central Illinois. Yet all of these regions,
so diverse geographically and economi-
cally, share a common characteristic.
Their market activity cannot be measured
or predicted on the basis of demand
alone.
Figure 1: Cook County Construction Permit Values, 1970-89 ($ Millions)
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Chicago: Avoiding New England Market Woes
Peter F. Colwell
At a time when cyclical movements have
caused price declines in some markets, it
is interesting to study the cyclicality of
Chicago real estate over recent periods.
The accompanying graphs depict single-
family, multi-family, and non-residential
construction activity in the Chicago area
over the past 20 years; they also help to
illustrate the cycles in building activity
observable in real estate markets in gen-
eral. Consider Figure 1 , which shows
fluctuations in Cook County. There is a
very evident cycle in construction; even
during a period of significant market ac-
tivity, such as the 1970s, the graph shows
something other than uninterrupted up-
ward movement. In fact, there were two
strong cycles in the '70s. Because chang-
es in demographic variables were not
pronounced during that period, the
changes in the real estate market must
have been driven by other factors.
Figure 2: DuPage County Construction Permit Values, 1970-89 ($ Millions)
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Figure 3: Lake County Construction Permit Values, 1970-89 ($ MilUons)
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The early 1980s demonstrates a sub-
stantial trough, followed by an overall
rise, in all six Chicago area counties.
Cook County is unusual, relative to the
others, in that, as a major commercial
center, its non-residential construction
activity greatly exceeds activity in the
single-family residential sector. In fact,
in a few periods, single-family activity in
Cook is even dominated by multi-family
activity, a result seldom seen in the collar
counties. Multi-family activity is consid-
erably stronger in Cook County, both in
absolute terms and relative to single-
family, than in the suburban areas.
DuPage County, as shown in Figure 2,
illustrates directional movements similar
to Cook's. However, single-family
construction accounts for the greatest
activity in DuPage, with non-residential
running a close second during much of
the 1980s. Such a result is not surprising,
in that DuPage contains a number of af-
fluent residential communities, but holds
growing commercial centers as well.
DuPage demonstrates a major upward
cycle in the late 1970s, followed by
general upward movement through the
1980s, albeit with substantial fluctuation.
Lake County, as represented in Figure
Figure 4: Kane County Construction Permit Values, 1970-89 ($ Millions)
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ORER News
New ORER Director Named
Dean John Hogan of the College of
Commerce has appointed Peter F.
Colwell to serve as Director of the
Office of Real Estate Research.
Colwell, who played an instrumental
role in establishing ORER, served as
the first Director in 1981, and has
served continuously on the Advisory
Committee. He was named ORER
Professor of Real Estate in 1986, and
in 1987 created the ORER Letter.
Colwell succeeds William Bryan,
who vacated the post in order to
devote his energies to his position as
Director of the Bureau of Economic
and Business Research. Bryan had
held the ORER Directorship since
August of 1988. As Director of the
Bureau, he will continue to serve on
the ORER Advisory Committee.
ORER Advisors Active in lAR
Several members of the ORER Advi-
sory Committee hold key leadership
positions with the Illinois Associa-
tion of Realtors® (lAR).
Gary Clayton continues to serve
as the Association's Executive Vice
President. Lydia Franz chairs the
1990 lAR Executive Committee.
Jerry Perlow is lAR's 1990 President-
Elect; he also chairs the Resolutions
Committee. David Rittmiller and
Don Ursin continue to serve as
members of the board of directors of
the Illinois Real Estate Educational
Foundation.
ORER applauds these individuals
for their leadership in lAR, and for
their dedication to professionalism in
the real estate field.
Bureau of Economic and Business
Research Director William Bryan
and ORER Director Peter Colwell
have also participated in recent lAR
activities. Bryan wrote an article,
"1990: Another Year of Economic
Weakness," that appears in the Feb-
ruary/March 1990 issue of Illinois
Realtor®- Colwell serves on the
board of directors of the Illinois Real
Estate Educational Foundation.
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Figure 5: McHeory County Construction Permit Values, 1970-89 ($ Millions)
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3, exhibits patterns similar to those of
DuPage; a major cyclical upturn is evi-
dent in the late 1970s, followed by what
might be described as a hesitant upward
movement through the 1980s. Lake
County is somewhat unusual in that its
multi-family activity is strong, but not
increasing, during the late 1980s. Note
also that non-residential activity seems to
be more volatile than residential activity.
Kane, McHenry and Will Counties,
shown in Figures 4 through 6, follow the
same general patterns as DuPage and
Lake, with major cyclical upturns in the
late '70s, bottoming out in the early '80s.
The substantial cycles for multi-family in
Kane and McHenry Counties are similar
to those in DuPage, but the overall levels
of production are much lower. Single-
family activity in these counties during
the 1980s is more consistently upward
than the movement in DuPage or in
Lake. Will is the only county where
multi-family activity seems actually to
be lower at the end of the 1980s than it
was at the beginning of the 1970s. The
other counties demonstrate periods of
substantial activity in multi-family con-
struction during the 1980s.
The Chicago Economic Base
Could cyclical supply movements lead to
the kinds of weak markets that have been
reported in some regions of the nation?
Such an outcome is unlikely; the econo-
my of the Chicago area is more resilient
than the economies of areas where "hous-
ing busts" have been observed. The rea-
son for this resilience is the diversity of
the region's economic base. The econom-
ic base consists of those firms that export
goods and services to the world outside
the Chicago metropolitan area, and in so
doing foster economic growth and stabili-
ty. Grocers and day care centers, while
providers of essential services, are not
part of an area's economic base. Luxury
hotels and professional sports, while not
essential to sustaining life, do constitute
part of a community's economic base.
Areas of the country where real estate
values have fallen tend to be areas in
which prices rose quickly during periods
of excessive economic growth and then
fell when high levels of activity could no
longer be sustained. Texas boomed with
the oil business in the mid 1970s, and
New England benefited from high tech
growth of the early 1980s. However,
when industries that had been major
sources of growth foundered in recent
years, the economic bases were not suffi-
ciently diversified to sustain the activity
necessary for stable real estate markets.
Chicago, on the other hand, has a well
diversified economic base. The region is
a major center for corporate headquar-
ters, transportation, financial services,
agriculture, high technology, manufactur-
ing, and entertainment. In addition, its
job growth in recent years has focused on
the service sector. As detailed by Philip
Israilevich and Ramamohan Mahidhara
in the Chicago Fed's March/April 1990
Economic Perspectives, services have ac-
counted for more job growth nationwide
than has manufacturing in recent years
(as manufacturing workers have become
more productive). The region would
appear well positioned to prosper in the
'90s economy, and its real estate market
would not appear to face particular dan-
gers, unless astonishing changes in tech-
nology or in the economy would render
Chicago an undesirable place to be. H
Figure 6: WiU County Construction Permit Values, 1970-89 ($ MUlions) ii
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Update on Homelessness
Peter F. Colwell and Kevin B. Mottlowitz
The following article elaborates on com-
ments provided in "The New Homeless-
ness" in the Winter 1989 ORER Letter.
A more complete discussion is provided
in ORER Paper #77. "Explaining Home-
lessness Rates." A copy of the paper will
be provided to any reader who makes a
written or telephoned request to ORER.
In a 1989 Heritage Foundation Back-
grounder article, "America's Homeless:
Victims of Rent Control," author William
Tucker uses statistical analysis to meas-
ure the impacts of several causal factors
on homelessness in selected U.S. cities.
Tucker finds that 39.7% of the variation
in an area's homelessness rate can be
explained by factors that he had theorized
to be important determinants. We have
reviewed and analyzed Tucker's data to
measure the validity of his results. We
have also attempted to replicate Tucker's
results using different data, in order to
measure the results' applicability to com-
munities beyond those studied by Tucker.
Among the causal factors examined by
Tucker, vacancy rates, mean temperature,
and rent controls are found to be signifi-
cant in explaining the variation in home-
lessness. Factors found by Tucker to be
insignificantly associated with homeless-
ness are population, unemployment, the
population percentage living in poverty,
and public housing relative to population
size. Tucker finds that higher vacancy is
strongly associated with lower homeless-
ness rates, while higher temperatures and
the presence of rent control are strongly
related to higher rates of homelessness.
However, Tucker is concerned that the
effect of vacancy would be overwhelmed
by the effect of rent control if these two
causal factors were considered together,
because the presence of rent control is
closely associated with low vacancy
rates. Our review of Tucker's work indi-
cates that his concern is unfounded; using
the same data, we find rent control to
significantly increase homelessness and
higher vacancy to significantly reduce it
when the factors are considered together.
We have also studied data similar in
nature to that used by Tucker, but for
areas in Pennsylvania rather than the na-
tion as a whole. Our statistical analysis
measures the relationship between the
percentage of homeless households and
some of the same causal factors exam-
ined by Tucker, such as local poverty,
unemployment, and rental vacancy rates.
We also consider total number of house-
holds, a measure similar, but not identi-
cal, to Tucker's population measure.
However, we do not attempt to measure
the impact of rent control or mean tem-
perature, since rent control is not encoun-
tered in Pennsylvania, and mean tempera-
ture does not vary considerably across the
state. Our results show that variations in
the causal factors we have considered ex-
plain 62.2% of the variation in homeless-
ness; factors considered by Tucker ex-
plain 39.7% in his study, as noted above.
It is useful to compare the significance
of the causal factors examined in the two
studies. In neither study is the unemploy-
ment rate significant. (Such a result does
not suggest that unemployment is unrelat-
ed to homelessness, but rather suggests
that such a relationship can be deter-
mined only through additional analysis.)
However, while Tucker finds the vacancy
rate to be statistically significant and the
percentage of population living in pover-
ty to be insignificant as causal factors, we
find the vacancy rate not to be statistical-
ly significant, and find that an increase in
the percentage of households living in
poverty is an important factor in explain-
ing a rise in the homeless household rate.
In addition, we find the total number of
households per county to be significant,
whereas Tucker does not find population
size to be significant. Of course, our
findings do not explain whether populous
places produce more than their share of
homelessness, or simply attract more
homeless families from other areas.
Kevin B. Mottlowitz is an ORER Research
Assistant and an M.S. candidate in the
University's Department ofFinance.
ORER News
U ofI Faculty, Alumni Active
at AREUEA Meetings
A number of University of Illinois
faculty members and graduates par-
ticipated in meetings of the American
Real Estate and Urban Economics
Association (AREUEA), held
December 28 - 30 in Atlanta. Jan
Brueckner, a Professor of Economics
and ORER Research Associate, pre-
sented a paper entitled "Analyzing
Third World Urbanization," and pre-
sided in a session on housing market
behavior. Yoon Dokko, an Assistant
Professor of Finance, presented two
papers, "Efficiency Aspects of the
Commercial Property Market" and
"Optimal Design of Mortgage Instru-
ments." Both papers were co-
authored with Robert Edelstein of the
University of Callifomia at Berkeley.
U of I alumnus Austin Jaffe, now
on the faculty at The Pennsylvania
State University, presided in a ses-
sion on real estate investment. Mark
Sunderman, another Illinois alumnus,
presented "An Analysis of Prepay-
ment Behavior of Mortgage Backed
Securities," a paper co-authored with
Ronald Spahr and James Hyma. All
three are University of Wyoming
faculty. Alumnus James Webb, who
now chairs the Department of Fi-
nance at Cleveland State University,
presented a paper entitled, "Develop-
ment of a Dynamic Investment Strat-
egy Under Alternative Inflation Cy-
cle Scenarios." His co-authors were
Waldo Bom of Eastern Illinois
University and Stephen Phyrr of the
University of Texas.
Outgoing AREUEA President
James Follain also participated in the
meetings. The former ORER Direc-
tor and current Economics Depart-
ment chairman at Syracuse Universi-
ty presented a paper entitled, "The
Tax Subsidy to Housing: An Equity
or Efficiency Concern," co-authored
with David Ling of the University of
Florida. Follain also presided in a
session on location theory.
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Interest Rate Risk and Optimal Design ofMortgage Instruments
Yoon Dokko and Robert H. Edelstein
Thefollowing is an abbreviated version
ofORER Working Paper #76, "Interest
Rate Risk and Optimal Design ofMort-
gage Instruments." A copy of the longer
version of this paper, or ofany paper in
the ORER Working Paper Series, will be
provided to any reader who makes a
written or telephoned request to the
Office ofReal Estate Research.
Recent years of rapid inflation and gen-
erally uncertain economic conditions
have been accompanied by fluctuat-
ing interest rates. These volatile con-
ditions have changed the financial
environment in the real estate market.
The problems of residential mortgage
finance caused by changes in infla-
tion should be viewed in the broader
context of optimal mortgage design.
Even in a zero-inflation world, the
standard fully-amortized mortgage with
constant payments would not be a per-
fect instrument. First, it allocates all of
the impact of interest rate changes to the
lender, who in turn demands a higher
interest rate. Second, it does not allow
any tailoring of the borrower's payment
stream to his expected income stream.
The borrower's satisfaction, then, might
be optimized with some form of alterna-
tive mortgage instrument (AMI).
Changes in inflation raise the social
costs of the rigidities of the standard
mortgage, thereby creating incentives for
developing alternatives. The danger
with AMIs, however, is that they, too,
may be suited for special circumstances,
and may not be based on sufficient gen-
eral considerations. Clearly, a broader
theoretical approach is needed. The ex-
isting literature on lending instruments
neglects two fundamental areas. First,
there has been little analysis of mortgage
instrument choice and pricing. Second,
there are surprisingly few empirical
(based on actual loan data) studies of
mortgage choice behavior. We address
the first of these two omissions, and
discuss an appropriate focus for future
research.
The Basics
Our model for maximizing satisfaction
determines the household's optimal expo-
sure to interest rate risk in the loan con-
tract. We view the contract as one that
potentially consists of both a fixed-rate
component and a variable-rate compo-
nent. At one extreme, there is no variable
rate component, so the household bears
none of the impact of interest rate move-
ments. At the other extreme, there is no
fixed-rate component, so the borrower
absorbs the full impact of interest rate
Building new housing during
economic trough periods may
decrease the average social costs
per unit of housing.
changes. The optimal mix is that which
maximizes household satisfaction with
income, net of mortgage payments. The
solution generated by the model shows
that the household achieves maximum
satisfaction when both fixed-rate and
variable-rate components are utilized.
Therefore, it would not be optimal for a
borrower to seek full protection against
interest rate risk or to fully assume the
risk.
Given our finding regarding the opti-
mal value of household interest rate risk
exposure, we examine whether the opti-
mal level of the fixed-rate component in-
creases or decreases as household income
or the loan size increases. Our analysis
shows that the incentive to protect against
interest rate risk decreases as household
income increases, and is greater for the
household with a large mortgage burden
relative to its income level.
Finally, it has become common for
variable-rate loans to contain caps (limits
on the degree to which interest rates or
monthly payments can increase, over a
given period or the life of the loan). Our
analysis finds that the inclusion of rate or
payment caps in AMIs increases borrow-
er satisfaction.
Fairness and Efficiency
The objective in discussing new mort-
gage choices should be the evaluation of
the social desirability of alternative
mechanisms through which the public
and/or private sector could provide resi-
dential financing. Much of the housing
finance literature implicitly assumes that
it is socially optimal to foster housing
and homeownership. While such a claim
at first seems equivalent to favoring
motherhood and apple pie, it is wise to
explore critically the social impacts of
the assumption. Each set of alterna-
tive home financing arrangements
(mortgage instruments) would allo-
cate resources and distribute rewards
in the economy with a different
degree of efficiency.
The measurement of the housing
— finance system's efficiency and dis-
tributional fairness depends on the func-
tions the analyst feels the housing fi-
nance system should serve. While many
specific housing finance goals have been
suggested by economists, there are three
general, interrelated objectives for the
housing finance system. These general
objectives, which span the specific goals
and which should be used in developing
proper criteria to evaluate the objectives,
are operational efficiency, allocative
efficiency, and fairness considerations.
Operational efficiency is present if the
housing finance system is oi'ganized to
minimize the use of resources (social
costs) for each level of financing and
each distribution of social risk. Alloca-
tive efficiency is present if, for a given
level of resources, social returns are max-
imized for each level of risk. Fairness is
achieved if the housing finance system is
organized so that costs, risks, and
resource utilizations are equitably spread
across society. The degree to which
these objectives are met through financial
institutions and the residential construc-
tion industry measures the social desira-
bility of developing alternative financing
methods.
It has been suggested that AMIs may
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increase total housing construction and/or
reduce fluctuations in home construction
cycles. But it is unclear that increasing or
leveling residential construction is in all
cases better for society. If increased
home construction activity were to absorb
a significant amount of the economy's
available funds, where would we obtain
capital inputs for other activities? Would
capital be redistributed from lower in-
come families to the more affluent buyers
of new homes? Would companies find it
harder to obtain needed capital, leading to
a slowing of the rebuilding of the Ameri-
can industrial machine? These are key
social policy questions that relate to
changes in housing finance.
Without supporting evidence, we also
should not state that society benefits sim-
ply because construction fluctuations are
reduced. If fluctuating construction cy-
cles do not reduce the total stock of hous-
ing in the long run, it is plausible that
building the bulk of new housing during
economic trough periods may decrease
the average social costs per unit of con-
structing the housing stock. The tradi-
tional mode of the construction industry,
then, may provide more benefit to society
than would a system of building housing
at a more constant rate throughout the ec-
onomic cycle. This issue is an empirical
one that, to our knowledge, has never
been satisfactorily addressed. In the
absence of conclusive evidence, the pos-
sibility that cyclical housing construction
is in fact better for society surely should
not be assumed away.
General Equilibrium Impacts
Because construction activity is a signifi-
cant part of the economy in terms of both
Gross National Product and total capital
flows, it should continue to play a role in
general economic stabilization, as it has
historically. Appropriate evaluation
criteria, then, must extend beyond the
effects of AMIs on construction, the
traditional housing finance system, and
borrowers of mortgage funds. In other
words, evaluation criteria must take into
account AMIs' impacts on society.
In a general equilibrium model, in
which the analyst simultaneously consid-
ers the housing market (with its related fi-
nancing mechanisms) and other sectors of
the economy, it is important to emphasize
that new types of mortgages may have
impacts on efficiency and fairness
beyond the residential housing finance
sector. However, in practice, because of
data and modeling limitations, it would
be difficult to develop such an analysis
based on empirical information. Yet the
significance and usefulness of policy
analyses ultimately hinge on our ability
to adequately develop such models.
The appropriate model for public poli-
cy analysis of new mortgage loan designs
must differentiate short run, long run, and
dynamic impacts; and it must separate
demand responses from supply respons-
es. Such features are essential in a useful
model because changes in mortgage
instruments are likely to create different
impacts over different time horizons. In
the short run, effects on the price and
availability of capital for existing housing
may predominate. In the longer run, the
impact on the supply of new housing
might be substantial.
Optimal Design of AMIs
Only limits of imagination constrain the
types of mortgages that can be concocted.
There exist a growing family of alterna-
tive mortgage programs that vary in com-
plexity, creativity, and intended benefici-
ary target groups. Future research might
be directed to integrating at least four
parameters into a theory of optimal mort-
gage design. They are 1 ) the proportion
of the interest rate or payment change
(based on some verifiable index) borne
by the lender and borrower; 2) the mini-
mum index change required to activate
risk sharing (very small changes in the
index typically would not cause the
repayment schedule to change); 3) the
maximum risk exposure caused by index
changes (the limits specified under the
caps); and 4) the amortization-graduation
schedule for loan repayments.
Yoon Dokko is an Assistant Professor of
Finance at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. Robert H.
Edelstein is Co-Chairman of the Center
for Real Estate and Urban Economics at
the University of California at Berkeley.
ORER News
ORER Conference Addresses
Real Estate Outlook
On January 9, ORER sponsored Real
Estate Outlook: 1990, the Office's
fourth annual Real Estate Outlook
Days conference. More than 75 real
estate professionals attended the
event at the Oak Brook Hills Hotel
and Conference Center. Fred Boelter
of Boelter Environmental Consul-
tants in Chicago discussed environ-
mental issues relating to real estate.
Joe Hanauer of Combined Invest-
ments L.P. talked about trends in the
residential real estate business.
David Seiders of the National Asso-
ciation of Home Builders addressed
the housing outlook and the impact
of thrift reform on housing finance.
George Kaufman of Chicago's Loyo-
la University pinch hit for a flu-
impaired William Bryan. Kaufman,
an expert on financial institutions,
provided insights on the thrift crisis.
ORER thanks those who attended,
and expresses special thanks to the
fine speakers, particularly Professor
Kaufman, who with very little notice
rearranged his schedule in order to
participate.
Colwell At Hoyt Meetings
ORER Director Peter Colwell partici-
pated in the annual meeting of the
Homer Hoyt Institute's Weimar
School of Advanced Studies in Real
Estate and Land Economics, held
January 2-7. Colwell, who serves on
the Weimar School's faculty, spon-
sored the University of North Caroli-
na's G. Donald Jud in Jud's presenta-
tion of "The Apartment Market" and
Anthony Yezer of George Washing-
ton University in Yezer's presenta-
tion of "Housing Price Expectations
and Realization."
Colwell also presented a paper on
"Land Values in Chicago" at the
Hoyt Institute's Seminar on the Spa-
tial Aspects of Real Estate Markets,
held March 22-24. Both meetings
were held at the Hoyt Institute's
headquarters in Florida.
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Economist David Fund on the Thrift Crisis^ Government Interference
David Fand is a Visiting Scholar at the
Centerfor the Study ofPublic Choice at
George Mason University. Prior to join-
ing the Center, he servedfor more than
two decades as a Professor ofEconomics
at Wayne State University in Detroit.
The prominent market-oriented thinker
holds a Ph.D. in Economicsfrom the
University of Chicago. Fand is interest-
ed in many fields ofEconomics,from
international trade to economic history
to monetary andfiscal policy. He is a
strong advocate ofmarket solutions to a
wide variety ofproblemsfacing society.
Fand has served as an advisor to many
government institutions and agencies,
including the Federal Reserve Board, the
U.S. Treasury, the Department ofCom-
merce, and the Joint Economic Commit-
tee. Fand has also published more than
100 monographs and articles that have
appeared in academic and professional
publications.
In thefollowing interview, Fand shares
his views on the causes of and possible
cures for, the thrift crisis; and comments
on the problems caused by recent
Congressional involvement in financial
and regulatory matters.
What restraints has the S&L crisis put on
monetary policy? The problem used to
be that when interest rates rose housing
was affected immediately, because so
much of the money for housing finance
came through the intermediaries, which
were operating under Regulation Q.
Fifteen years ago, before the secondary
mortgage market made money available
from more diverse sources, and while
Regulation Q was still in effect, many
people were concerned that monetary
policy put a disproportionate burden on
housing starts. They alleged that most of
the impact of tight money fell on hous-
ing, while other sectors escaped with less
damage. The issues today are different.
What are these issues ? The thrift cri-
sis that we are dealing with now has actu-
ally been with us for 25 years. In a 1965
report to the government, I warned that
institutions cannot readily convert liabili-
ties payable on demand — overnight mon-
ey — into 30-year loans. Yet Congress,
which created the thrifts as we know
them today, has continued to support this
entire industry based on very short-term
liabilities and very long-term assets.
That's one issue. A second issue is
whether weak and sickly thrifts should
pay the same deposit insurance premiums
as strong and healthy thrifts. Should we
not question when someone running mar-
athons and someone who has had three
heart attacks pay the same life insurance
premiums? Deposit insurance premiums
are based on deposit volume, not on risk;
that structure creates a problem of moral
hazard. Another issue is interference by
members of Congress. Their constant
meddling and maneuvering promotes
their own interests over the public good.
We all know about former Speaker
Wright and the Keating Five, but the
problem is worse than that; those
people are just the ones who have been
on the network news. Politics has always
played an important role in the thrift
industry, and its regulatory agencies have
been very politicized.
But is the industiy more politicized than
other sectors of the economy? To un-
derstand the nature of the thrifts' political
problem, consider other industries.
While the auto industry has a major
impact on the economy, there are only a
handful of companies to promote the
industry's interests. However, when we
talk about construction and housing and
the related selling and financing activi-
ties, the clout of the thrifts is just the
starting point. Add in 50,000 builders;
they are a very powerful lobby. Then add
the construction unions, with the backing
of the AFL-CIO. Then add the Real-
tors®, with their lobbying muscle, and
you begin to see the potent force that the
thrifts have exerted for a long time.
Think about another type of financial
institution, the money market mutual
fund. Money market funds came into
being in the 1970s as a result of disinter-
mediation, which occurred when regula-
tors continued to manipulate deposit in-
terest rates to protect thrifts. The thrifts
and their regulators thought they could
hold down interest rates without losing
depositors' money to other investments.
Instead, their actions created a major
new financial industry, with deposits that
probably exceed all demand deposits in
the U.S. New industries should come
into being because the market recognizes
a need, not because of ill-conceived
attempts to protect other industries. The
irony is that the S&L, with liabilities
payable on demand and assets with 30-
year maturities, is itself a creature that a
market would not have generated.
The only way to avoid the kinds of
problems we have experienced is to keep
politics out. That is true not only with
respect to housing; anything Congress
touches becomes a problem that the rest
of us pay for. Congress bungled the
thrifts and Social Security, and now it
may be damaging the health care system.
We are facing a problem of price con-
trols in medicine today. The government
is trying to keep down Medicare expen-
ditures while letting the elderly believe
that they're entitled to as much health
care as they want. That costs a lot of
money, so the answer from Congress is
to control prices. The result is inevitably
that the quality of medical service will
deteriorate.
Housing is but one of many areas in
which Congress has created problems by
politicizing the issues, by telling voters
they can have something for nothing. If
we tell people that they are entitled to as
much housing or medicine or child care
as they want, if we tell them that things
are free when in fact they are expensive,
then we create the kinds of serious
problems that we are observing today.
Without Congressional interference,
firms and their customers would have to
recognize risks. Institutions making
long-term loans would presumably bor-
row long-term; if they issued bonds pay-
able in thirty years, they could lend the
proceeds under 30-year mortgages.
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Their balance sheets would be clean;
they would be immunized against interest
rate risk. On the other hand, if they
wanted to attract short-term deposits,
they would lend under variable-rate mort-
gages. Now, some people believe that
institutions that borrow short can lend
long, if they hedge with futures and
options. I agree in principle that it can be
done, but institutions doing this would
have to be run by very accomplished
money market experts, and I'm not sure
that such experts are available to the
thrift institutions on a mass scale.
Thus, if Morgan Stanley or another
sophisticated investment bank wants to
make mortgage loans financed with ,
—
short-term liabilities, we shouldn't
stop them. If they want to take those
kinds of risks they should be allowed
to do so. The trouble is that our
mortgage lending industry has been
organized so that managers can reap
the gains if their risks pay off, while '—
the taxpayer gets stuck if the managers
strike out. If we want a viable system,
we must restrict mortgage lenders either
to raising their money through the bond
market or, if they raise short-term mon-
ey, to making variable-rate loans.
You indicate that thrift problems have
been with usfor 25 years. Was the post-
war period betterfor the industry?
The '50s were spectacular for thrifts. The
learned opinion of the day was that there
was no future for commercial banks; the
future "belonged to the thrifts." That
idea was known as the Gurley-Shaw
Financial Intermediation Thesis. Many
articles published in the banking litera-
ture between 1960 and 1965 were written
in the spirit of Gurley-Shaw. The thesis
was that commercial banks would be-
come an increasingly smaller component
of the financial system, because other
intermediaries had a big advantage over
commercial banks. The theory was
based on observations that during the
1950s the thrift institutions had grown
very rapidly. But the theory's proponents
had simply extrapolated trends of the
'50s; there was no meaningful analysis.
The thesis was partly ideological, too,
in that many people considered monetary
policy to be old-fashioned. The name of
the game at the time was fiscal policy, so
the Gurley-Shaw Thesis was used to
buttress the position that monetary policy
was inappropriate as a stabilization weap-
on. The argument was that monetary pol-
icy operated on commercial banks, which
were becoming a smaller part of the
financial system, so the Federal Reserve
Board was attempting to control a grow-
ing economy by operating on a shrinking
part of the system. Therefore, monetary
policy was inappropriate; therefore, we
should have been emphasizing fiscal poli-
cy. Gurley-Shaw seemed to support the
Keynesian view that monetary policy
The irony is that the S&L, with
liabilities payable on demand and
assets with 30-year maturities, is
a creature that a market would not
have generated.
should not be used as a stabilization tool;
that helped to fuel its acceptance. In ret-
rospect, the Gurley-Shaw case was very
weak; its success was probably based on
the fact that it supported the prevailing
fiscal policy ideology.
So the thrifts were already in trouble
when Gurley-Shaw was gaining a wide
following? By 1966, it was clear that
the thrifts were in trouble. The most ob-
vious signal was that year's disintermedi-
ation crisis. But let's look at the source of
the trouble. Citibank invented the certifi-
cate of deposit (CD) in 1 960 or 1 96 1 . It
was a remarkable invention, a very pow-
erful instrument that revitalized and revo-
lutionized the commercial banks, ena-
bling them to get money from wherever
extra funds were available. By means of
the CD market, a bank located where
loan demand is strong can easily get
money from other areas of the country.
Commercial banks became very efficient
when they started using CDs. It is inter-
esting that the inventors of the CD were
the banks, not the thrifts. Instead of
developing innovative ways to compete,
the savings banks and S&Ls developed
the innovative idea that every time they
wanted something they could go directly
to the government, or go indirectly
through Congressmen. The commercial
banks knew that they were not going to
get anything from Congress, so they
used the market.
It is ironic that when most academic
writers felt we were entering the age of
the thrifts, the banking industry invented
an instrument revolutionary in its effi-
ciency and marketability. The CD is a
brilliant idea. A corporation with money
available for 7 1/2 days can buy a 7 1/2
day CD. Commercial banks were inno-
vating, while S&Ls were so secure in
their reliance on Congress that creativity
never occurred to them. Almost all the
—
I financial innovations of recent years
have come from the commercial
banks or the investment banks, not
the S&Ls. The situation is almost on
a par with the biblical theme of liv-
ing and dying by the sword; thrifts
were created by the government,
—
' they got government benefits, and
they are going to die because they are so
dependent on the government that they
are unable to develop an original solu-
tion to the serious problems they face.
Can you elaborate on the impact the
money marketfunds have had, both in
the early 1970s and as time has passed?
The money market fund made it obvious
that Regulation Q could be outmaneu-
vered in the marketplace. The theory be-
hind Reg Q, by which Congress limited
interest rates paid on savings accounts,
never made any sense. The stated intent
was to protect the "little guy" from pay-
ing high mortgage interest rates by giv-
ing lenders a cheap source of funds. But
the people with savings accounts were
typically "little guys," too; wealthier
people had access to more attractive
alternatives, and Reg Q never applied to
deposits of more than $100,000.
So we were hurting the little guy with
a savings account by paying 5% on sav-
ings, at a time when inflation was 14%,
in order to benefit the so-called little guy
borrowing to buy a house. The trouble
is that the person being deprived of a
competitive return on savings had fewer
resources than the person being helped
on a mortgage; I believe that home buy-
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ers are wealthier than small savers. The
depository institutions had a big lobby to
preserve Regulation Q so they could con-
tinue to enjoy rate ceilings on small de-
posit accounts, and Congress justified the
whole thing as a way to help the "little
guy." But we really were not helping the
little guy, certainly not the small saver.
Would the thrift problems have been less
severe under more normal economic con-
ditions? If there had not been such
high inflation ten years ago, the outcome
would certainly have been different. De-
fects in a system appear when the system
is exposed to stress. In the thrift crisis,
the stress has been inflation. Even
assuming a Reg Q ceiling, in the
absence of inflation, nominal interest
rates probably wouldn't exceed 4%,
so a 5% ceiling would not be restric-
tive. But such a ceiling becomes
ludicrous when inflation is 14%.
If we had not experienced double-
digit inflation, the effects of any prob-
lems that occurred would have been
spread over a much longer period. There
were structural problems with the thrifts;
many of the older S&Ls were just cou-
pon-clipping organizations. They accept-
ed deposit money, paid low regulated
rates, and charged slightly higher rates on
loans or bought government bonds; basi-
cally they did very little financial inter-
mediation. An institution that operates in
that manner is not a financial institution,
in any significant sense.
What is the distributional ejfect of help-
ing the thrifts, and why do liberals sup-
port these programs? The distribution-
al effect is that we penalize small deposi-
tors. It is a serious penalty; if we pay 5%
on deposits when inflation is 14%, we de-
prive the saver of $9 per year on a $100
account. Then we have the gall to tax $5
as income, when in fact the depositor has
lost $9. Liberals don't worry about that;
their line has been that the system is good
for housing, so the little guy is helped.
My guess is that liberals support anything
that is "good for housing" because they
go along with the trade union lobby,
which has always been pro-housing
because of the construction unions.
After talking about reforms since the ear-
ly J 970s the government finally passed
laws in 1980, '82, '87 and '89. What
should these laws have looked like?
They should have been designed to create
institutions perfectly matched in terms of
duration: long-term borrowers lend long-
term and short-term borrowers become
variable-rate lenders. We could have
accomplished these ends just by taking
away the government guarantees. Man-
agers who cannot run to the government
are not going to make 30-year mortgages
with overnight money; in my world, if
you make the wrong kinds of loans, you
should suffer the losses. But S&Ls have
not been afraid of that, because they
Ifgovernment guarantees were taken
away, some thrifts would continue
this very risky type of intermediation
activity. Many of them wouldfail;
that would be their privilege.
could go to the Federal Home Loan
Banks, or, better yet, send their Senators.
I would like to see a system of private
financial intermediaries that raise their
own capital and receive no government
guarantees. There would be no reason
for regulators to restrict the activities of
such firms. But we need to strictly con-
trol the asset and liability powers of gov-
ernment-guaranteed depository institu-
tions, limit them to holding relatively
matched portfolios. Intermediaries that
want government guarantees should
expect restrictions on what they do.
Institutions should have operations
that are relatively easy to manage in a
risk sense. There are two easy ways to
manage: one is to issue bonds and lend
long-term; the other is to accept short-
term liabilities and make variable-rate
loans. Then there is a third type of man-
agement, found in what we might call
sophisticated mortgage operations. These
institutions should be run by managers
who know the money market and the
Eurodollar and Euroyen markets, and
who know how to hedge. The large
investment banks do that now, and they
do it without government guarantees.
Unfortunately, many S&Ls have tried to
play the same game, but with taxpayers
taking the risks. Most S&Ls haven't
been sophisticated enough to be in that
kind of activity, but a few were. If gov-
ernment guarantees were taken away,
some of these thrifts would continue this
very risky type of intermediation activity,
and a few would do it well. But many
would fail; that would be their privilege.
Should laws force insured thrifts to spe-
cialize in mortgage lending? Should the
government play a role in deposit insu-
rance? I don't think we should force
people to do anything. If we leave them
alone, some institutions will specialize.
—n Problems arise when we give special
benefits to mortgage lenders, but they
decide that the accompanying regula-
tions are too restrictive; they want to
make commercial loans and still
receive the benefits given to home
lenders. If we don't give special
treatment, if the rules reflect market
discipline, then outcomes are fair and
efficient. If government makes the rules,
an institution with a friend in Congress
may be able to obtain special privileges.
A lot of the regulations we have today
grew out of the Great Depression. Since
that time there have been complex rules;
the Federal Reserve has acted as a lender
of last resort; and, of course, we also
have deposit insurance. It would be ideal
if the defiosit insurance system could be
managed without the government. But if
the government has to be involved, I
would like to see risk-adjusted premium
pricing based on actuarial methods.
Yet a simpler and even more important
reform, one that would work wonders in
terms of keeping the system honest, is
mark-to-market accounting. We need
honest balance sheets. A financial insti-
tution can value an asset at cost even
though its market value has fallen by
50%. When we allow institutions to
misrepresent their financial positions, we
need an army of regulators to catch the
misrepresentations. If institutions had to
publish balance sheets based on market
values periodically, we would not have to
regulate so much; the market would
provide the needed discipline.
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Should the capital requirements he
increased? People who talk about rais-
ing capital requirements want to continue
government guarantees on the institu-
tions' liabilities, so the capital question is
one of protecting the government from
losses. There should be as few govern-
ment guarantees as possible. We could
retain insured accounts for the small sav-
er, who needs a savings outlet that does
not expose him to risk, but institutions of-
fering these accounts should be restricted
to investing in low-risk securities.
Think of these banks, with taxpayer
guarantees, as government-protected
checkeries. Small depositors open trans-
action accounts, the institutions invest
in Treasuries (or possibly AAA-rated
bonds or commercial paper), the
depositors earn small returns, and the
government guarantees deposits.
That limits the small depositor's
options, but a small saver should not
be investing in risky assets like real —
estate, and should not expect the high
returns that only risky assets can provide.
We have to separate the guaranteed de-
posit mechanism from mortgage lending.
The secondary market has already
brought that about to some extent; a lot of
mortgages are being packaged and sold
by the thrifts. I think the pension funds
are providing most of the mortgage mon-
ey now, and that is a healthy and sensible
move. Pension funds have long-term
commitments, so it makes sense for them
to be long-term lenders.
What are your thoughts on recent Fed
policy? In 1924, John Maynard
Keynes published a book called a A Tract
on Monetary Reform. A chapter in that
book discusses whether monetary policy
should be used to stabilize the economy
or to stabilize exchange rates. That is the
issue the Fed is struggling with right
now. Brady and the Bush Administration
want to manipulate monetary policy to af-
fect exchange rates, while the Greenspan
Fed holds the opposite view. Yet Keynes
exposed the fallacy of the Administra-
tion's approach in 1924, so we've learned
very little in 66 years.
About six months ago, Greenspan went
to Moscow to speak on financial interme-
diaries. At the end of his talk, he spoke
briefly about why it is not desirable to
use monetary policy to stabilize exchange
rates. Of course, that had nothing to do
with his topic; the Russians had no idea
what he was talking about. The state-
ments were directed at Brady. It's really
rather funny; Greenspan meets with
Brady once a week, but he has to go to
Moscow to say what he really thinks
about what Brady is supporting.
I tend to favor Greenspan's argument
over the Bush/Brady view; I think mone-
tary policy should focus on the economy
rather than exchange rates. With respect
to Fed policy in general, I would prefer
The worse the law, the more help
a Congressman can give you in
obtaining absolution from that law,
and the more help he can then
expectfrom you.
less emphasis on fine tuning. The Fed
has tried too hard to fine tune the econo-
my, and in the process has been follow-
ing perhaps too tight a monetary policy.
What is the next crisis going to he. and
when will we see it? I think the next
crisis will come as soon as interest rates
rise, and I think it could be a big crisis.
We had an almost ideal environment
through most of the 1980s, because after
1981 interest rates fell dramatically. Yet
in spite of low interest rates we had the
thrift problems. Imagine what would
have happened to the assets of the thrifts
if we'd had a more typical experience,
with two or three cycles of spiking rates.
We're lucky that only a third of the thrifts
have failed, and we should not be
surprised if there are more problems.
We also have to remember that banks
are not necessarily strong just because we
have not heard about a multitude of bank
failures in recent months. For example,
look at what happened recently to the
Bank of New England. Its stock fell from
$24 to $3 per share; that's quite a drop.
It apparently related to the expected an-
nouncement of a $1.5 billion fourth quar-
ter loss, caused in part by bad real estate
loans. The downfall of this bank is a ma-
jor story. Of course, it's only one bank.
But there seem to be serious problems in
New England, and these problems could
happen in other places, too.
Note that the difficulties did not arise
from a collapse in New England's econo-
my. When real estate was bad in Dallas,
everyone understood the serious prob-
lems in the oil patch. But why should
real estate be so bad in Boston; the area
is not depressed. It could be that there
was a high-tech boom that exploded.
I realize that reduced defense spending
does not help New England, but the
economy has not collapsed. You might
remember that Dukakis talked of a "Mas-
—
I sachusetts Miracle." The irony is that
this "miracle" was based on defense
spending, which Dukakis wanted to
sharply cut. Even with the more
modest cuts that have been enacted,
the "miracle" came to an end. But
the economy did not collapse.
Do we have reason to he optimistic
about the future? Ours is a brilliant
country; that gives cause for optimism.
We just have to keep the government out
of the way. If you want to cause sense-
less problems, get Congress involved.
Dealing with the govemment is very dif-
ficult for the individual or the business
enterprise, because it is often "profitable"
for Congress to pass a bad law. If they
pass a terrible law, every seriously
affected party goes to a Congressman for
help. Of course, the legislator expects a
financial contribution in return.
If you know Catholic church history,
you may recall that Martin Luther was
disturbed by the selling of indulgences.
A person could commit all manner of
sins, and then pay a church official to
sell him an indulgence, after which the
sins were "forgiven." That's similar to
what we have in Congress today. The
worse the law, the more help a Congress-
man can give you in obtaining absolution
from that law, and the more help he can
then expect from you. Our lawmakers
are selling themselves. Keating under-
stood that. Maybe his downfall is anoth-
er reason for optimism. He paid his
million dollars and a half, and was mad
that he did not get his money's worth. |
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Thought for the Day
Vacancy Management II: An Agency Problem
Peter F. Colwell
This is the second in a series ofORER
Letter articles on the economic analysis
ofproperty management. The first arti-
cle in the series, "Vacancy Management,"
appeared in the Summer 1989 issue.
The purpose of the previous article was to
debunk the notion that maximum income
is the natural outgrowth of a zero vacancy
level. That article focused on effective
gross income (EGI), demonstrating that
maximizing the EGI of an income-
producing property may require the i
—
owner and manager to tolerate some I
level of vacancy. The current article
focuses on net operating income
(NOI), which is the portion of EGI
that remains available to the property
owner after management and other
!
operating expenses have been paid.
An owner's goal, of course, should be
to maximize NOI. Like EGI, NOI is
maximized at a vacancy rate in excess of
0%. In fact, maximizing NOI would gen-
erally require greater vacancy than maxi-
mizing EGI. These concepts are illustrat-
ed in the graph. Note that the horizontal
axis measures occupancy, so points far-
ther from full-occupancy point F repre-
sent higher vacancy levels. Vn, the level
of vacancy that maximizes NOI (it falls
below vertical line AB, which shows the
maximum difference between EGI and
operating expenses) is to the left of Ve,
the vacancy that maximizes EGI (it falls
below the highest point on the EGI
curve). Therefore, a higher level of va-
cancy is required for NOI than for EGI.
But would the manager seek the level
of vacancy that would maximize NOI? If
so, is the manager's duty to the owner the
force that would assure NOI maximiza-
tion? Under an improperly designed
compensation system, there would be an
inherent conflict between the manager's
goals and those of the owner. Therefore,
a desire on the part of an owner does not
necessarily lead to consistent action by a
non-owning manager. The economics
and finance literature have long noted this
conflict, which is known as the agency
problem. To control this problem, we
must design a compensation system that
aligns the manager's motivation with the
owner's goal of maximizing NOI. In de-
signing such a system, we must first con-
sider whether a manager, who is typically
paid a percentage of EGI, would prefer
that the EGI be maximized. Second, we
must question whether paying the manag-
er a percentage of NOI would eliminate
the conflict between the manager's and
owner's goals.
A seemingly helpful change in the
typical compensation scheme would
guarantee a conflict between the
owner's goals and the manager's.
It is logical to assume that the manager
would wish to maximize his own com-
pensation. We might initially conclude
that the hired manager, if compensated as
a percentage of EGI, would pursue any
activity that would increase gross
receipts, doing so even if the activity
were a largely unproductive one involv-
ing high expenses, a slight increase in
EGI, and a resulting decrease in NOI.
Such a conclusion requires, however,
that the manager bears no cost associated
with operating expenses. Consider an al-
ternative view, in which we assume that
the manager's own costs, in terms of such
factors as time, supervision, and worry,
are the same percentage of total costs that
the manager's compensation is of EGI.
If this is the case, there is no conflict
between the goal of the owner and that of
the manager. Both would want to maxi-
mize NOI, even if the manager's compen-
sation were based on EGI. There would
be no conflict between principal (owner)
and agent (manager). Thus, with
conventional compensation schemes
the possibility exists that there would
be no agency problem.
What would happen if we were to
instead pay the manager a percentage
of NOI? If the manager would bear
any opportunity costs (and it is pre-
posterous to imagine that a manager
could avoid costs), then his compensation
would be maximized at some point (level
of vacancy and expenses) other than that
which would maximize NOI. That is, a
seemingly helpful change in the compen-
sation scheme would guarantee a conflict.
The compensation arrangement that
might appear on the surface to prevent an
agency problem would create an agency
problem where one need not otherwise
exist. *
Optimal Occupancy/Vacancy Rates: EGI and NOI
Occupancy Rate
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Campus Activities
Rho Epsilon Completes Another Active Semester
The Spring 1990 semester brought the
members of the U of I chapter of Rho
Epsilon many opportunities to explore
real estate careers. The semester was
also successful for recruitment, as the
number of active student members in the
chapter reached 1 20.
The semester began with a January 30
organizational meeting. Officers spoke
on chapter activities, and new members
were introduced to Rho Epsilon.
The first professional activity was held
February 27. Larry Lund, the Vice Presi-
dent for Retail Development with U.S.
Equities, Inc. in Chicago, spoke to the
membership. His topic was "Real
Estate Development."
On March 2, Bob Israel, a Project En-
gineer for SDI Consultants in Chicago,
visited the campus. After his presenta-
tion on "Land Development: An Engi-
neer's Perspective," the chapter spon-
sored a social hour.
Neil Freeman, President of The
Freeman Group, also based in Chicago,
spoke to the chapter on March 13. His
topic was "Mortgage Banking."
On March 27, Professor Roger
Cannaday, the chapter advisor, and 8 stu-
dents attended the Society of Industrial
and Office Realtors® Luncheon in Des
Plaines. The luncheon allows students to
meet leading professionals in the Chica-
go area real estate community and to
learn about summer job opportunities.
Three past recipients of the SIOR annual
scholarship, which is awarded to the out-
standing U of I undergraduate real estate
student, also attended. They are Ed
McMahon of Metropolitan Life, Fabio
Baum of Dai-lchi Kangyo Bank, and Jim
Hanson of Arthur Andersen.
During the April 6-7 weekend. Profes-
sor Cannaday and 14 chapter members
participated in a field trip to Chicago.
On Friday, U of I alumni Ed McMahon
and Gerry Kostelny made presentations
to the students. McMahon, a former Rho
Epsilon Vice President, is currently a
Senior Investments Analyst in Metropol-
itan Life Insurance Company's real estate
investment division. Kostelny is the
Managing Partner of Lincoln Property's
Chicago office. On Saturday, chapter
members attended a seminar on "The
Real Estate Development Process," spon-
sored by Lambda Alpha's Ely chapter.
Mark Donohue, President of Commer-
cial Real Estate Training in Chicago, was
the professional speaker on April 10. He
spoke to the chapter on "How To Get Into
Commercial Real Estate."
Four representatives of Hawthorn
Realty in Chicago addressed the chapter
on April 17. Former Chicago Bears star
Gary Fencik and UI alumni Bill Norwell,
Roy Splansky, and Alissa Schneider
discussed "Real Estate Investment and
Asset Management."
Two representatives of the Chicago
branch of Dai-lchi Kangyo, the world's
largest bank, were scheduled to speak at
the semester's final professional activity
on April 24. Brian Fargo, Manager of
Real Estate Finance, and Illinois alumnus
Fabio Baum, a loan officer, were to dis-
cuss "Japanese Real Estate Investment."
The meeting was to be followed by a piz-
za party and Fall 1990 officer elections.
Employing organizations continued
their active recruitment of U of I real es-
tate students. Among firms interviewing
on campus were The Deerpath Group,
Heller Financial, JMB Properties Urban,
La Salle Partners, Richard Ellis, Inc.,
Sears Mortgage Corporation, Trammel
Crow Company, Travelers Relocation
Company, the U.S. General Services
Administration, and Van Vlissigen and
Company. Rho Epsilon cooperated with
the Commerce Placement Office by again
publishing the Employers' Guide to
Students Seeking Employment in Real
Estate and Related Fields.
ORER commends Rho Epsilon, and
particularly the Spring 1990 officers,
whose work brought so much success to
the chapter. Those who served as
officers are Katherine Duda, a senior in
LAS Finance from Chicago, President;
Peter Tsao, an MBA student from Hunt-
ington, NY, Vice President; Michelle
Anderson, a senior in Commerce Finance
from Champaign, Treasurer; and David
Lyons, a senior in LAS Finance from
Wheaton, Secretary. I
ORER News
Cannaday, Colwell Attend
ARES Meeting
Professor Roger E. Cannaday and
ORER Director Peter F. Colwell
attended the Sixth Annual Meeting
of the American Real Estate Society
(ARES) held March 28-31 at Lake
Tahoe. The two presented a paper
entitled "Using Market Evidence to
Estimate the Value of the Option to
Develop Land" in a session on
valuation topics. Colwell presented
a second paper, "Determining Land
Values Using Geographic Informa-
tion Systems," in a session on
Geographic Information Systems.
U of I alumni who participated in
the conference were Han Bin Kang of
Illinois State University, Arnold
Redman of Western Kentucky
University, Mark Sunderman of the
University of Wyoming, and James
Webb of Cleveland State University.
Former UofI Professor
Studies Homeless
In another paper presented at the
ARES meeting. Professor James R.
Cooper of Georgia State University, a
former real estate faculty member at
the U of I, suggests a partial solution
to America's homelessness problem.
Cooper calls for a new housing ar-
rangement for single people who are
employable but whose incomes fall
below the poverty level. He proposes
a means whereby homeless single
persons could legally contract to be-
come "housemates" of homeowners
with whom they could not otherwise
legally reside.
The proper structuring of the legal
arrangement is essential to assuring
that parties' rights are specified, that
the owner will not face local regula-
tion as a rooming house operator, and
that the share of household expenses
paid to the owner is not treated as in-
come by the IRS. However, Cooper
notes that working to change societal
views of living arrangements is as
important as giving proper attention
to legal details.
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Keeping Up With A Changing Freddie Mac
Philip J. Rushing
The Fall 1989 ORER Letter presented
Rushing's discussion of Freddie Mac
multi-familyfinancing. At approximately
the time that the article was published.
Freddie Mac instituted a major change in
underwriting criteria. The following
article explains the current standards.
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, better known as Freddie
Mac, purchases loans from lending insti-
tutions (referred to below as "seller/
servicers") and sells securities backed by
these loans in the capital markets. The
organization has been an active partici-
pant in both the single-family and multi-
family mortgage markets in recent years.
Now Freddie Mac is re-evaluating its
multi-family program. One major change
has already been enacted: the agency
recently reduced the maximum permitted
loan-to-value (LA^) ratio for non-
recourse multi-family loans from 80% to
60%. One reason for this change has
been an alleged decline in property
values on the East and West coasts.
Another reason is the agency's unfavora-
ble loss experience; while multi-family
lending constitutes a relatively small per-
centage of Freddie Mac's business, it ac-
counts for a relatively large percentage of
losses. Clearly, the new, more conserva-
tive standard will reduce significantly the
number of multi-family loans that Fred-
die Mac purchases, and the losses it
sustains through multi-family lending.
Freddie Mac is considering two addi-
tional changes as well. One would allow
originators to sell loans with LA' ratios
between 60.01% and 70% to Freddie Mac
with recourse. If the borrower defaulted,
Freddie Mac would have the right to col-
lect from the seller/servicer; that is, the
seller/servicer would essentially guaran-
tee the borrower's payments. It is not cer-
tain that such a plan would be greeted en-
thusiastically; if loan prices did not adjust
to reflect added risks, the seller/servicers
would gain no advantage in selling loans
while retaining default risk. A seemingly
reasonable solution would be for the sell-
er/servicer to retain recourse against the
borrower. However, there is a legal limit
to the amount of recourse credit that a
lender can extend to one borrower. Non-
recourse loans are not limited in this
manner (underwriting tends to be stricter
on such loans), so a nonrecourse arrange-
ment would allow the lender to do addi-
tional business with the borrower.
The second change being considered
would allow for multi-family loans in the
60.01% - 70% L/V range to be sold to
Freddie Mac as participation repurchases.
Under the participation repurchase pro-
gram, the seller/servicer would sell the
majority of a loan, perhaps as much as
90%, to Freddie Mac. The seller/servicer
would retain ownership of the remaining
portion for some period, perhaps as short
as 18 months, after which Freddie Mac
would buy that remainder. The program
would provide for risk-sharing during the
first 1 8 months of the loan, when a rela-
tively large proportion of problems tend
to occur. The program would expose
seller/servicers to some default risk.
However, it would allow them to make
fixed interest rate loans, which they
would probably not be willing to make if
they were to face interest rate risk for
longer time periods. The short time
period and the small percentage retained
should result in the participation repur-
chase program's being met with more
favor than the recourse program.
The recourse and participation pro-
grams are still in the planning stages, and
may or may not be implemented. If im-
plemented, both plans would, of course,
be subject to further modification. I
Philip J. Rushing is an Adjunct Professor
of Finance at the University of Illinois
and a Research Associate with the Office
ofReal Estate Research. Dr. Rushing is
also an active investor in multi-family
properties who has written many articles
on real estate investing andfinance
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Privatization of Assessment, Zoning, and
Eminent Domain
Peter F. Colwell
The following article presents a view of
property rights that departs radically
from conventional practice. The author
is not suggesting that the Constitution be
amended and that jurisdictions in the
United States abandon current practices
in favor of those described in the pages
tofollow: such a change would be
unlikely to garner support among policy
makers, who gain personal advantages
from current government monopolies.
The author's purpose is to encourage the
reader to view the rights and responsibil-
ities that accompany property ownership
from a different perspective, in the hope
that better understanding might allowfor
evolutionary change toward a more
efficient and equitable system.
There are characteristics that distinguish
real estate from many other economic
goods. For example, real estate has a
long life, cannot be moved, and cannot
be hidden. These characteristics render
real estate more subject to government
control than are most types of personal
property. Examples of the controls that
government places on real estate are
taxation, zoning, and eminent domain.
Society accepts government's right to
control real estate in these ways. Howev-
er, since government alone can apply the
controls, there can be various ineffic-
iencies. For example, government assess-
es property value, and must charge prop-
erty owners (through higher tax pay-
ments) for performing the assessment
"service." (Of course, the property owner
who disagrees with the administered as-
sessment must contest the assessment at
his own expense.) It allocates properties
to certain use, or "zoning," classifica-
tions, typically in a suboptimal manner
(see ORER Letter, Fall 1988), and charg-
es property owners (through higher tax
payments) for performing this "service."
It takes property from owners for the
benefit of other citizens, at a price that
may not be agreeable to the seller, and,
once again, charges (through higher tax-
es) for providing the eminent domain
"service."
Special Auction Issue
Submissions are still being accepted
for a special issue of the Journal of
Real Estate Finance and Economics.
ORER Director Peter F. Colwell is
serving as editor of a 1991 issue of
the journal, which is to be devoted
solely to the role of auctions in the
real estate and mortgage markets.
Those interested in submitting pa-
pers for consideration are encouraged
to contact Colwell through the Office
of Real Estate Research. All entries
should be submitted no later than
December 31, 1990.
McDonald Joins Faculty
Ward F. McDonald has joined the
faculty of the University of Illinois as
an Adjunct Professor of Finance and
an ORER Research Associate. The
1964 graduate of the U of I real
estate program and 1969 graduate of
the U of I College of Law will teach
the Legal Environment of Real Estate
course in the coming Fall semester.
McDonald, a practicing attorney in
Champaign, has extensive experience
in the area of real estate law. Prior to
establishing a private practice, he
was an executive in the corporate
real estate and title insurance fields.
Carl R. Webber had taught the
Legal Environment course since
1987. Webber resigned the post in
order to devote more time to profes-
sional and family matters, including
a new baby. Congratulations to the
Webber family.
Colwell Adclresses Board
ORER Director Peter F. Colwell
addressed the Peoria Board of Real-
(continued on page 9)
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Commentary
Society could benefit in many ways
from reform in the areas of zoning, prop-
erty taxation and eminent domain. The
greatest potential benefits would be the
imposition of discipline on the scale of
government activity, the provision of a
relatively efficient substitute for some
governmental regulation, and the facilita-
tion of the redevelopment of our urban
cores. An alternative method for adminis-
tering tax assessment, zoning, and emi-
nent domain would provide fairer and
more efficient outcomes for the directly
affected property owners, and for society
as well.
The alternative proposed in this article
is based on the concept of value assess-
ment by the owner of the property. While
the origin of this proposed system is
apparently the self-assessment portions
of the New Zealand Land and Income
Tax of 1891 (dropped in 1896), self-
assessment proposals have come from
such diverse sources as Sun Yat-sen, the
father of the successful 1911 Chinese rev-
olution, and Arnold Harberger, a Univer-
sity of Chicago economist.
Under a self-assessment system, the
real estate owner determines the value on
which his property tax is based. This self-
assessed value becomes the price at
which the property can be purchased by a
governmental unit or a private party in
an involuntary taking. This system facili-
tates the redevelopment of urban land by
eliminating the holdout problem in land
assembly. The self-assessed value also
serves as a basis for protection against
undesirable nearby uses, protection cur-
rently provided, or at least purportedly
so, by zoning laws.
Property Tax Assessment
Think of the resources devoted to assess-
ing real estate for taxation purposes: costs
to elect township assessors; salaries for
assessors, supervisors of assessment, of-
fice staff, and boards of review; outlays
for equalization procedures at the county
and state levels. This costly system does
not even provide us with efficient or equi-
table outcomes; since property is not re-
assessed continuously, in a rising (fall-
ing) market those with outdated assess-
ments pay unfairly low (high) taxes.
Examples of like-valued properties be-
ing assessed unequally and differently-
valued properties being assessed equally
are legion. Then, when the dust seems to
have settled, we find that the hard-won
assessed value serves one purpose only:
it is the base for ad valorem taxes.
What if, instead, each real estate own-
er were to assess his own property for
tax purposes? The benefits would be
many, in terms of cost saving and fair-
ness, if the system were properly de-
signed. The owner would, of course,
have to be provided with incentives not
to underassess his property. The method
for providing proper incentives is a poli-
cy whereby any party, be it governmen-
tal or private, can purchase the property
from the owner for a given percentage of
the assessed value, 1 10%, for example.
In other words, the law would provide
every citizen with a call option to buy
the real estate of any other citizen, at an
exercise price equal to some percentage
above the self-assessed value; the extra
sum would compensate the seller for
search and transaction costs incurred in
obtaining a new property.
The owner of real estate, then, would
assess his property not at the market
value, but at his own reservation price.
the price at which he would be willing to
sell. Reservation prices would, for some
owners, be equal to market values; some
households would be willing to sell their
homes and move to new ones if they
could receive the market price and
recoup all of their search and moving
costs (which can be substantial if we
consider time spent becoming familiar
with new neighborhoods).
Of course, reservation prices for many
owners would be above market values.
Owners who were exceptionally fond of
their parcels would willingly overassess
to establish high taking prices, and
would accordingly pay higher taxes than
market value assessments would require.
How would such a system increase
efficiency and equity? The efficiency
argument is that the property would be
retained by, or purchased by, the party
that valued it most highly. The fairness
argument is that the owner could specify
the price at which he would sell in any
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involuntary transaction, a benefit sadly
lacking under the current system.
Eminent Domain: Reduced Efficiency
Losses
The existing system of government tak-
ings might appear on the surface to be a
benevolent one; taking can be only for a
"public use," and "just compensation" is
to be paid. However, the system is less
than optimal. For example, anecdotal ev-
idence suggests that owners rarely view
prices at which they are forced to sell to
the government as "just." More impor-
tantly, the system is subject to manipu-
lation by politically powerful parties; ex-
amples exist nationwide of governmental
units having condemned property not for
schools or roads, but on behalf of firms
wishing to expand. While such a taking
is not necessarily bad, it is inefficient if
value in the new use is below value real-
ized in the old use; an example would be
the famous Poletown case in Detroit.
If an owner could specify the price at
which he would sell in any forced trans-
action (and would support the validity of
that specified value by paying taxes
accordingly), that owner would receive a
truly fair price in an involuntary conver-
sion. In addition, if a private party could
force the owner to sell at the price the
owner has specified as acceptable, there
would be no special benefit for political-
ly well-connected private parties. In fact,
there would be a lower level of govern-
mental forced takings than the present
system brings about, because the govern-
ment would have to pay prices that were
fair in the eyes of the sellers. The low
price paid encourages the government,
under the current system, to take more
land than is socially optimal.
Private Takings: Efficiency Gains
Suppose that a private developer is as-
sembling land for a commercial develop-
ment. Assume further that each parcel in
the targeted locality has a similar market
value, but that different owners have dif-
fering reservation prices. If the developer
approaches an owner, and that owner be-
lieves that his parcel is the only one the
developer wants, then that owner is will-
ing to sell at his own reservation price.
If, however, the owner knows that the
developer needs two parcels, then that
first owner approached expects to be paid
as much as the seller of the second parcel.
The first owner approached, then, expects
to be paid the higher of 1 ) his own reser-
vation price or 2) the lowest reservation
price of a possible second seller. If three
parcels are needed, the first and second
sellers approached will accept no less
than the lowest reservation price of a
possible third seller; and so forth.
Because the developer who can not
keep the assembly a secret must pay too
high a price for needed land (indeed, by
paying above a given seller's reservation
use of contiguous parcels is an assembly
operation. It is not necessarily equivalent
to a taking; one might quibble about the
extent of the bundle of rights the owner
loses. Examples can range from almost
all rights in the bundle (in the context of
a coastal commission's proscription of
all building activity or a zoning district's
proscription of lot sizes less than 25
acres) to more trivial controls (such as
minor differences in minimum lot sizes,
with relatively small dollar impacts).
Consider an example involving less
than the full ownership bundle. Imagine
a private market for land use controls, in
which land use rights are restricted only
Under the current system, not just government
takings, but also private acquisitions, result in
suboptimal allocation of land. Private buyers take
too little, while government takes too much.
price the buyer pays more than the land is
worth to the seller), the developer assem-
bles less than the socially optimal amount
of land. (As more parcels are assembled,
the developer must pay a higher price for
each, because one seller's high reserva-
tion price is demanded by all sellers.)
Therefore, under the current system,
not just government takings, but also pri-
vate acquisitions, result in suboptimal al-
location of land. Private buyers take too
little, while government takes too much.
How can optimal allocation be attained?
If the develper could keep the assembly a
secret, he could practice price discrimina-
tion, paying a different price (the individ-
ual reservation price) to each seller. (The
term discrimination is not to be construed
negatively in this context; it is not akin to
discrimination based on race, sex, or
age.) In a similar fashion, if the developer
could take properties at sellers" self-
assessed values (their reservation prices),
optimal allocation would be achieved.
Zoning and Related Private Controls
A similar analysis can be applied to the
issue of zoning. We might think of zon-
ing, in fact, as a type of land assembly;
the exertion of uniform control over the
in private transactions through ease-
ments, subdivision covenants, and fee
simple determinable (or on a condition
subsequent) ownership. The "taking" im-
pact of these controls might be viewed as
the reduction in the price of a property
resulting from the imposition of an ease-
ment or other private limitation.
An example of a private control that is
similar to zoning might be an easement-
in-gross held by a utility company. Be-
cause those granted such easements tend
to be monopolist producers of essential
goods, their partial takings typically need
not be negotiated. Their ability to take
without paying a truly fair level of com-
pensation (for owners' lost ability to
build on portions of their land, for exam-
ple) results in control of more land than
is socially optimal. (Less powerful pri-
vate parties, by contrast, likely engage in
too little land use control activity.)
Governmental partial takings, in the
fonn of an uncompensated, or zero price,
taking known as zoning, result in an
even worse misallocation. Zoning se-
verely overallocates land to the control;
that is, it places far too much restriction
on rights. The effect is to underallocate
land to some "lower" use, such as com-
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mercial. (However, economist William
Fischel presents a counterargument to
the view that zoning represents a zero-
priced taking. In The Economics ofZon-
ing Laws (1985), Fischel argues that the
government, even in regulating rather
than taking, incurs opportunity costs, in
that it could sell indulgences permitting
the buyers to avoid regulation. Perhaps
exactions would be an example of gov-
ernment indulgences for sale.)
How do we reach the efficient level of
land use control? We must eliminate
government's franchise for takings
through zoning and eminent domain. As
noted earlier, we would do so by creating
a call option for anyone in society to pur-
chase any other person's property at a
price related to the owner-assessed value.
If the assessment did not accurately
reflect the loss in value resulting from
controls (or a lack thereof), a private buy-
er could call the property at the reserva-
tion price and resell at a profit.
It is clear, then, that owner assessment
could allow for more efficient privatized
systems of tax administration, eminent
domainn, and zoning.
An Alternate Zoning System
Symmetrically, it would be possible to
create a system of put options whereby
property owners could put, or sell, their
land to new users of proximate property.
T. Nicolaus Tideman of Virginia Poly-
technic Institute and others have suggest-
ed such a system. A nuisance producer
entering a neighborhood would expect to
be forced to buy property whose value is
A Graphical Analysis
It is instructive to represent graphical-
ly the importance of the scale of land as-
sembly. The graph on the facing page,
which borrows heavily from a 1976
Journal of Political Economy article by
Patricia Munch, helps to illustrate the
gains in efficiency that could be realized
if the present system were replaced.
A horizontal market value (MV) line
represents the price that would be paid
for a parcel located randomly in a neigh-
borhood. Under the present system of
eminent domain, all property taken by
government is allegedly compensated
with the "market value."
The supply (S) line reflects the likely
reservation prices of groups of owners of
contiguous parcels that could be pur-
chased in related transactions. At any
given time, a given owner might find it
inconvenient to move, or might hesitate
to give up a property characteristic not
valued by the market. Therefore, he pric-
es his property above the market value.
Thus the supply curve for contiguous
properties rises above the market value.
The marginal expenditure on land
(MEL) line is above the supply curve.
The reason relates to the necessity of pri-
vate land assemblers to pay sellers equal
compensation for parcels with equivalent
features.
Suppose that, under the current sys-
tem, a developer is assembling land for
commercial development, and that each
parcel in the targeted locality has an indi-
vidual market value of $50,000. Suppose
further that the developer needs two par-
cels to build the proposed development.
The developer would hope to buy the first
parcel in the assemblage for its $50,000
market value. However, it is unlikely that
a developer will find two suitable contig-
uous parcel that can be acquired for their
market values. Yet both sellers will want
to be treated equally if they are aware of
the assembly. The need for the second
parcel will cause the developer to offer
more for each than he would have to offer
for a single parcel. That is, we are assum-
ing that typically the buyer-assembler
cannot price discriminate.
For example, assume that the owner of
the first parcel knows that, among neigh-
boring owners, none will sell for less than
$65,000. This first owner tells the devel-
oper, "You're paying my neighbor
$65,000, so that is the price I expect to
receive for my similar parcel." Had he
needed only one parcel, the developer
would have paid the $50,000 market val-
ue, but because he needs at least two par-
cels, his marginal cost for the second is
$80,000: $65,000 direct outlay and an
additional $15,000 payment for the first
parcel. This situation could be represent-
ed by the following points on a graph: at
a quantity of two parcels the MEL would
be $80,000, the S would be $65,000, and
the MV would be $50,000.
The downward-sloping line labeled
marginal benefit (MB) relates to purchas-
ers' additional benefits from an increase
in the quantity of land assembled. As the
buyer's holdings increase, the benefit pro-
vided by each successive acquisition
falls. Economic theory indicates that an
individual's profit (but not society's
welfare) is maximized when marginal
benefit equals marginal cost. Assuming
that this developer cannot keep his inten-
tions secret, the marginal expenditure
curve, rather than the supply or market
value line, indicates his marginal costs.
Assembly continues up to the develop-
er's point of profit maximization, where
marginal benefits equal his marginal
expenditures (point A). The quantity of
land assembled is Qx-
However, at Qx the assembly opera-
tion, while optimizing the private assem-
bler's position, is too small in the social
sense that there is underallocation of
land to the new activity. Society's bene-
fits would be maximized if quantity Qd
of land were assembled. The social loss
caused by underallocation can be meas-
ured, in dollar terms, as the most darkly
shaded triangle in the figure. The area
under the MB curve, between A and D,
is the gross gain to the assembler from
acquiring (Qd-Qa) additional land. The
area under the supply curve would be
the corresponding loss to the owners.
Therefore, a net societal gain equal to
the area of that small shaded triangle
would be realized if the developer in-
creased his acquisition from Qa to Qq.
Suppose instead that the government,
which has the same marginal benefit
curve as does the private taker, acquires
parcels through eminent domain. Its
marginal cost is represented by the
"market value" line, because the power
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adversely affected by the nuisance. In a
manner inverse to that used in takings,
the nuisance producer would buy the
owner's property for a given percentage
of assessed value, 90%, for example
(with the 10% reduction representing an
amount to cover the involuntary buyer's
transaction costs).
The existence of this put option ren-
ders the call option (the right of others to
buy the owner's property) more palata-
ble; owners gain valuable protection
through the put option at the same time
that risk of an involuntary sale is created
through the call option. Most important-
ly, the put option eliminates the need for
zoning, so the cost of zoning administra-
tion is eliminated. Nuisance producers
(such as industrial generators of air, wa-
ter, noise, or visual pollution) would find
it optimal to internalize the adverse con-
ditions that would otherwise be forced as
externalities upon neighboring property
owners. A nuisance producer would, in
other words, be reluctant to generate out-
puts that would harm surrounding proper-
ties if he could be forced to buy these
properties at the owners' reservation
prices; losses on resale would accrue to
the nuisance producer rather than to the
innocent owner. The quantity of exter-
nalities produced would be optimized.
Of course, the owner would reduce the
values of others' call options on his prop-
erty, and at the same time increase the
value of his own put option, by increas-
ing his assessed value. Discipline would
be imposed on the system, therefore, by
an ad valorem tax, based on owner-
of eminent domain requires "just" com-
pensation, which for any size taking
equals "market value," even though such
a price might force an owner to realize a
loss (to the extent that the market value
is less than the owner's reservation price,
represented in the figure along line S).
The government, in an attempt to opti-
mize its position (rather than society's),
condemns quantity Qe of property if it
intends to pay the market value-based
"just compensation;" at Qg the govern-
ment's marginal cost equals its marginal
benefit. However, that quantity of land is
too great an allocation, in a social sense,
to the new activity; Qd is the optimal
quantity for society. The cost of this
misallocation is shown by the medium-
shaded triangle in the figure. The gross
loss of property value to sellers resulting
from (Qe-Qd) excess taking is the area
under the supply curve, between D and
E. The corresponding gross benefit to the
government is the area under MB over
the same range. Thus, that medium-
shaded triangle represents the difference,
the net social loss from overallocation.
Price discrimination allows the private
buyer to treat the S curve, rather than the
MEL curve, as his marginal cost. Under
price discrimination, private assemblers
achieve the socially desired level Qd of
assembly; it is optimal because the mar-
ginal seller's reservation price equals the
buyer's marginal benefits. Of course, the
optimal level of assembly, Qp, would
also be attained under a self-assessment
system, because previously established
reservation prices prevent sellers from
changing their asking prices in reaction
to other sellers' positions. Assemblers
would pay prices represented approxi-
mately by the S line, not the MEL line.
Partial "takings" may also be repre-
sented in the graph. Suppose that the S
curve represents the reservation prices of
contiguous property owners for granting
"easements." MEL represents the margi-
nal expenditure on the private assembly
of contiguous easements, assuming that
the assembly is not kept secret.
Qa represents the level of private par-
tial "takings" in the absence of the call
option—there is no easy solution for im-
plementing the call option solution for
private partial "takings." Qe represents
the level of quasi-public partial takings,
such as the easements-in-gross held by
utility companies. Because those with
easements-in-gross typically need not se-
riously negotiate for them, their marginal
benefits equal marginal costs at Qe.
Qz represents the level of government
partial, regulatory "takings" such as zon-
ing. The level of this activity is found
where the MB line intersects the horizon-
tal axis, because the government's mar-
ginal costs for the exercise of police
powers, such as zoning, are approximate-
ly zero. The optimal quantity of land
controlled by zoning is Qq. Therefore,
zoning over-regulates land use. How do
we reach the efficient level of land use
control? The system of put options pro-
posed in the accompanying article ac-
complishes just that result.
j|w^ miiifiiiwr '(i'l ii'i'iii iii'i i \^i\\ii iijiniiii|||||jjujjuj^^
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assessed values, on all real estate.
Site value taxation (the taxing of land
rather than a "package" consisting of
land and buildings) would not be an ef-
fective tool in this context. Taxing only
(or more intensively) land would tempt
the owner to declare a modest land value
along with a huge untaxed (or at least
lesser taxed) improvements value. There
is, then, an inherent conflict between
self-assessment and site value taxation.
An exception to this rule might be en-
countered if only the government could
engage in takings, and it could choose to
compensate only land in a given taking.
Such a situation might exist if the gov-
ties at the assessed values. According to
Howe, not one owner accepted that offer.
(Such an outcome is certainly not unex-
pected. Even after the increase, the land
was assessed only at its market value,
which would, because of such factors as
search costs, typically be below an own-
er's reservation price.)
Self-assessment systems are not, in
fact, simply curiosities from days long
past. The Taiwanese today employ a self-
assessment system, along with a system
of govemmentally-assessed "floor" val-
ues. However, it must be conceded that
even in Taiwan, takings can occur only
under the government's eminent domain
Private taking activity might become particularly
robust in central cities, where land assembly for
large-scale development makes economic sense.
ernment acquired an option to take land
without compensating for the value of
improvements.
Insurmountable Opportunities?
The reaction of the reader encountering
these ideas for the first time may be that
such a system would be too difficult to
design and administer. Responses to
some of the concerns that readers might
have would be as follows:
Could a taxation system of this nature
work in the U.S. ? Yes; self-assessment
systems, or programs with similar fea-
tures, have actually been utilized. For ex-
ample, early in this century Frederic C.
Howe and a group of like-minded indi-
viduals were appointed to the Cleveland
Tax Commission. As Howe relates in his
1925 book. The Confessions ofa Reform-
er, the Commission was disturbed by the
long-standing underassessment of the
city's most valuable parcels. To remedy
this problem, the Commission, which in-
cluded some significant property owners,
reassessed downtown real estate based
on recent sale prices, and offered to
those who felt overassessed the option of
letting the Commission sell their proper-
power. (Most self-assessment proponents,
in fact, promote its use under a govern-
mental takings system.)
What if households cannot afford the
higher taxes that accompany updated
self-assessments (to protect against prop-
erty loss) in an environment of rising
nominal property values? The
answer is that tax rates should be lower.
That is, if nominal home values increase
faster than the general rate of inflation
(which is the rate by which we would
expect government expenditures to rise),
the taxing authority can collect its re-
quired total by applying a lower tax rate
to the higher tax base. There is no reason
to expect a greater tax affordability prob-
lem under a privatized regime than under
the traditional taxation system. Of course,
some individuals can be hard hit by any
property tax system. Yet there is no rea-
son why special assistance, as is provided
under the present system, could not be
continued under self-assessment.
What ifhome owners lack the time,
energy, or expertise needed to maintain
knowledge ofproperty values in a chang-
ing environment? The household al-
ways has the option of overassessing its
own property in order to prevent others
from wanting to purchase it. However,
there is an easier and less costly way for
the household to protect its interests. If
assessment administration were placed in
the hands of the owners of the taxed
properties, private appraisal firms would
find it profitable to offer, at reasonable
prices, information on rates of price
increase in particular neighborhoods.
What would he the nature of the taking
activity under a privatized system?
Government would do less taking under
a privatized regime, because it would
have to pay reservation prices rather than
"market" prices. Private parties, of
course, would do more taking, since the
present system does not provide for pri-
vate takings outside of negotiated market
transactions. Private taking activity
might become particularly robust in cen-
tral cities, where land assembly for large-
scale development makes economic
sense. Provision for beneficial develop-
ment would be a major reason for the
implementation of a privatized system.
Therefore, while a heightened interest
in takings might seem on the surface to
be bad news, it could actually be good
news, both for the community and for
the owners of the property taken. The
owners would receive their desired reser-
vation prices, and the community would
benefit from the resulting economic
activity; property would be held by those
who valued it most.
Could such a system he politically palat-
able? Yes; at the same time a property
owner would lose rights through the call
option that other parties held on his prop-
erty, he would gain rights through the
put option (the right to force a nuisance
producer to buy his property, certainly
not available today, though the political-
ly well-connected typically need not fear
the invasion of noxious u.ses into their
neighborhoods). Even the degree of loss
in rights through the call option is mod-
erated, in that each property owner is
both, in effect, the writer and buyer of a
call option.
For example, it would not be sensible
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to permit an owner moving into an area
already containing a nuisance use to put
his property to the nuisance owner. How-
ever, the new resident would have the
right to call the nuisance property, in
order to impose on that property a use
that, to him, seems more appropriate.
Taiwan has a system of self-assessment,
based on the economic views ofDr. Sun
Yat-sen. However, that system does not
work particularly well. Dosen't the Tai-
wanese e.xperience show that such a sys-
tem is not an improvement over typical
ta.x systems? The Taiwanese system,
as discussed above, has some unusual
features. The assessment procedure is
not pure self-assessment, but rather joint
govemment/self assessment. The govern-
ment reassesses each parcel annually,
and while the owner cannot request a
lower assessment to reduce taxes, he can
request a higher assessment in order to
set a higher reservation price in an un-
wanted taking. While such a system
could nonetheless function in a manner
similar to that recommended in this arti-
cle, there is a problem in that the call
option is retained by the government.
The government, that is, has a monop-
olist position with respect to takings; pri-
vate parties cannot take property at the
assessed (reservation) value. If only the
government has the power to take, then
takings can never adversely affect those
with political clout; the cadre of politi-
cally powerful owners can underassess
their own real estate without fear of loss
through a taking. In a properly designed
privatized system, however, any underas-
sessed property would be ripe for taking.
The Taiwanese property taxation sys-
tem also suffers from the same problems
inherent in the New Zealand system of
the late nineteenth century. Taiwan
taxes site value more than improvements
value, and, as stated earlier, site value
taxation should not be combined with
self-assessment. Yet the government's
assignment, in the Taiwanese case, of
minimum values to both land and im-
provements reduces, though it does not
eliminate, owners" opportunities to ex-
ploit the system. The mutual inconsisten-
cy of a self-assessment system and site
value taxation, then, has also played a
role in preventing the Taiwanese system
from fully succeeding.
What ifa wealthy individual decides, out
of spite, to displace some poor house-
hold, with whom the wealthier person
has had a dispute, by buying the poor
household's home? The system could
actually benefit less wealthy households.
These households would declare high res-
ervation prices, and could profit as
wealthier parties bought their interests at
prices above market (replacement) costs.
As the less wealthy potential "victims"
came to understand the workings of the
system, they would discover the means to
redistribute wealth from the spiteful rich
to themselves. Truly poor families argua-
bly would not find it difficult to pay the
higher taxes accompanying higher reser-
vation (self-assessed) values, because
they would locate (markets might even
develop to facilitate their locating) inves-
tors willing to help them pay higher taxes
in order to extract penalties from the
mean-spirited among the rich.
Is it not possible that an owner who tries
to protect himself with a high self-
assessment might nonetheless lose prop-
erty with high sentimental value through
a forced purchase? Such reasoning
ignores two facts of life in the real estate
markets. First, it is unlikely that a buyer
would actively seek opportunities to pay
inflated prices for real estate.
Second, and of more fundamental im-
portance, people tend to forget the nature
of rights in real estate; an "owner" does
not have unlimited right of use or unlim-
ited protection from taking under the cur-
rent system. Property use is controlled by
zoning ordinances, building codes, and
nuisance laws; and "owners" can lose
their ownership through eminent domain
or failure to pay taxes and other liens.
Therefore, while sentimental attachment
to property that has been in one's family
for generations is understandable, the
owner of such property must stand ready,
under the present system, to lose that
property at the whim of policy makers.
Adding the possibility of private takings
changes only the degree, not the nature,
of the risk of a taking, while allowing the
owner to set the price at which any
forced transaction would occur.
The complete system discussed above
might be workable in areas where pri-
vate property rights are not yet well de-
veloped. Could self-assessment systems-
become the norm in developing Third
World countries? In democratizing East-
ern European countries? On Mars?
Theirs for the Taking?
There is a view that paying zero com-
pensation in takings is efficient. The ar-
gument is that compensation results in
too much capital investment on land.
An efficient investment plan would take
into account the fact that any capital
improvements are usually demolished
when land is taken. (For example, when
the state takes land for a new road,
buildings on the land typically must be
destroyed for the construction to pro-
ceed.) If the state pays full market value
as compensation to the owner, there is
no private loss. Of course, a societal
loss results from the purchase of capital
improvements for which the govern-
ment has no use. Therefore, according
to proponents of this argument, com-
pensation causes private investors to
bear too little risk.
One presumption behind this view
is that govemment will take the right
amount of property from private own-
ers. Such a presumption contrasts with
the preceding article, which supports a
view that the government, left to its
own devices, consistently takes more
privately-owned land than it should.
For a more complete explanation of
the zero-compensation argument, and
of some related views on the economics
of government takings, one should read
"Takings, Insurance, and Michelman:
Conmments on Economic Interpreta-
tions of 'Just Compensation'," by
William Fischel and Perry Shapiro in
the June 1988 issue of the Journal of
Legal Studies.
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Mortgage Lending: The Risks of Foreclosure Laws
Terrence M. Clauretie
Thefollowing is an abbreviated version
ofORER Working Paper #79. '•Foreclo-
sure Laws and FHA Loan Losses: Illinois
and Neighboring States." A single copy
of the longer version of this paper, or of
any paper in the Working Paper Series,
will be provided to any reader who
makes a written or telephoned request to
the Office ofReal Estate Research.
Several factors can affect the losses that
lenders suffer when borrowers default on
loans. Early studies of defaulted loans fo-
cused on characteristics of the borrower,
the property, and the loan. Various ex-
planations cited the borrower's income,
the borrower's marital status and family
size, the property's size or location, the
loan contract rate relative to prevailing
market rates, and the loan-to-value ratio
as predictors of loan default. One study
found evidence of the validity of the "eq-
uity theory of default," which states that
a borrower with positive equity will not
default on the related mortgage loan.
However, prior studies have not ad-
dressed the impact of laws defining bor-
rower and lender rights in foreclosure.
The process is governed by state, rather
than federal, laws, and the laws vary
considerably among the 51 jurisdictions.
While there are many minor variations,
there are three main provisions in the
various state laws that affect the likeli-
hood of default, the cost of foreclosure,
and the loss realized by a lender on a
defaulted loan. These are the method of
foreclosure, the existence of a statutory
right of redemption (and, if so, the length
of the redemption period), and the
enforceability of deficiency judgments.
Method of Foreclosure
First, some states require that foreclosure
be completed in a court of law, a method
known as the judicial procedure. Under
judicial foreclosure, the court examines
the evidence of default, supervises the
sale of the property, and oversees the dis-
bursement of funds; the process is costly
and time-consuming. Although the judi-
cial procedure is allowed in all states,
many states in addition permit the fore-
closure process to be completed by a trus-
tee under a non-judicial, or power-of-
sale, provision. The latter procedure can
expedite the lender's actions in obtaining
title to a foreclosed property.
Statutory Right of Redemption
Second, some states allow a dispossessed
owner to redeem property by paying the
amount owed the lender within a stated
period after the foreclosure. This statuto-
ry right augments the borrower's equita-
ble, or common law, right of redemption,
which exists in all states. (The equitable
right allows the defaulting borrower to
regain property by paying all sums owed
to the lender before the lender has fore-
closed in a judicial or power-of-sale pro-
ceeding.) In other words, if there is a stat-
utory right, the borrower has a call option
on the property, so the buyer's interest is
not perfected at the foreclosure sale.
The period specified under the statuto-
ry right of redemption varies significantly
among the states that provide for its use;
statutory redemption periods vary from a
few weeks to one and one half years; one
year appears to be the norm. (Some states
used to specify two years.)
Deficiency Judgments
Finally, several states, California being
the largest, prohibit deficiency judg-
ments. Such a judgment allows the lender
or the lender's insurer to attempt to seize
unpledged assets of the defaulting bor-
rower, in order to obtain money in an
amount equal to the difference between
the balance owed on the loan and the liq-
uidation value of the real estate (or other
property) that serves as collateral. The
deficiency judgment is not frequently
used even in the states where it is permit-
ted; the borrower's ability to declare per-
sonal bankruptcy can prevent the lender
from attaching other assets. Still, the
threat of its use can reduce the lender's
losses by prompting a defaulting borrow-
er to voluntarily settle the deficiency.
Costs to the Lender
Losses on defaulted loans can be substan-
tial in states where the laws cause the
foreclosure process to be unusually cost-
ly and lengthy. The expenses that a lend-
ing institution must incur in connection
with REO ("real estate owned," meaning
real estate to which a lending party has
had to take possession and title) include
hazard insurance premiums, property tax
payments (since the taxing authority's
lien has precedence over the lender's),
and outlays for maintenance. These ex-
penses are higher in states with more
protracted foreclosure processes.
The existence of a statutory right of
redemption can depress bids at the liqui-
dation sale of the property. Bidders in
such instances recognize that the proba-
bility of the former owner's redeeming
the property is higher the longer the re-
demption period. A bidder's incentives
are reduced when he knows that he must
wait for a year or more to secure the full
bundle of ownership rights.
When the law provides excessive pro-
tection to the defaulting borrower, the
costs to the lender can be staggering; in
states with onerous foreclosure laws,
• lender losses of 60 to 70 percent of loan
balances are common. The average loss
nationwide on FHA loans is approxi-
mately 40 percent. Restrictive foreclo-
sure provisions, of course, lead lenders to
protect themselves with higher interest
rates and more restrictive loan covenants.
Therefore, a matter of concern should be
whether borrowers are harmed by the
state's chosen foreclosure statutes.
Illinois Foreclosure Laws
Illinois law requires the judicial proce-
dure in all foreclosure proceedings. In
addition, there is a statutory redemption
period which, though shorter now than it
used to be (it was shortened from one
year to six months effective July 1
,
1987), forces the foreclosing lender to
absorb substantial carrying costs. Lend-
ers do, at least, have the right to seek
deficiency judgments under Illinois law.
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The Illinois Experience
The effects of the laws governing the
foreclosure process can be illustrated
with data from the FHA (Federal Hous-
ing Administration) loan programs. The
FHA recently computed its losses on a
very large sample (165.000) of loans on
which borrowers defaulted between 1972
and 1988. The agency defines a loss as
the difference between the outstanding
balance on the loan at the date of default
and the value on that date of the home on
which the loan was made. Because the
state where each loan was originated is
identified in the data set, it is possible to
compare the loan loss experience for
Illinois with those of other states.
During the period studied, there were
3,958 defaulted loans in Illinois. The cor-
responding numbers for four neighboring
states were: Indiana, 2,673; Iowa, 702:
Michigan, 2,154: and Wisconsin, 2,060.
The FHA's average loss on Illinois fore-
closures was $25,316. Its average loss in
Iowa, with foreclosure laws almost iden-
tical to those of Illinois, was $22,469.
The average loss in Michigan, which
allows power-of-sale foreclosure, was a
much lower $15,847. In Indiana, a state
that requires the judicial foreclosure pro-
cess but provides for a shorter six-month
redemption period, the FHA realized an
average loss slightly lower than that in
Michigan, $15,805. (Recall that the Illi-
nois redemption period was twelve
months during most of the years stud-
ied.) Wisconsin presents unusual results,
in that the FHA's average foreclosure
loss was a relatively high $23,646,
though the state's legal provisions are
essentially the same as Indiana's.
Of course, factors other than the fore-
closure provisions discussed above can
affect the severity of lenders' losses. An
example would be growth in housing
prices; borrowers are more likely to de-
fault in an environment of falling home
values. Still, the results of the study
would seem to indicate that state foreclo-
sure laws have a major impact on lend-
ers' loss experiences.
Policy Implications
The figures noted above, of course, are
based on the experiences of only a few
states. However, those results are repre-
sentative of the findings obtained in a
larger and more comprehensive study.
(See "The Effect of State Foreclosure
Laws on Loan Losses: Some Evidence
from the Mortgage Insurance Industry,"
Terrence M. Clauretie, Journal ofMoney,
Credit, and Banking, May 1990.) The
more broadly-based study demonstrates
that loan losses, on both conventional and
government (FHA and VA) loans, are
greatly affected by foreclosure laws in
the states where the loans are extended.
The FHA's underwriting standards are
uniform across the country, and the agen-
cy charges a nationally uniform insurance
premium (3.8% of the original loan
amount). Therefore, aside from variations
in regional economic conditions, one
would expect loss experiences to be simi-
lar in the various states, unless institu-
tional factors at the state level were to
cause differences. It is clear that such
differences exist.
The result is that borrowers in states
with laws that facilitate the foreclosure
process (and thereby reduce the default
losses suffered by lenders) subsidize bor-
rowers in states that have enacted laws to
make the foreclosure process costly and
lengthy. Illinois would appear to be
among the states in which borrowers
receive that subsidy; in other words, Illi-
nois provides more than its proportionate
share of default losses on FHA loans. If
the FHA were to change its policy of uni-
form insurance premiums, and were to
instead price insurance to reflect the risk
of default, Illinois borrowers would likely
face higher premiums.
Of course, such a move by FHA would
force legislators in Illinois (or a similarly
positioned state) to reconsider the state's
restrictive foreclosure laws. In fact, the
recent reduction from twelve to six
months in the statutory redemption peri-
od might serve to reduce the likelihood
that FHA would undertake such a move.
At the least, the move would reduce the
Illinois risk classification if risk-based
premiums were to be enacted. |
Terrence M. Clauretie is a Professor of
Finance at the University ofNevada at
Las Vegas.
ORER News
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tors® on April 26, 1990. He spoke on
recent trends in the area's real estate
market. A related article appears in
this issue's Illinois Real Estate
Markets column.
Through its Star Series, the Bureau
of Economic and Business Research
at the University of Illinois provides
speakers to professional and commu-
nity groups across the state. Parties
interested in arranging for speakers
should contact the BEBR; its tele-
phone number is (217) 333-2330.
ORER Papers Available
Four new papers have been added to
the ORER Working Paper Series. The
first is Paper #78, "Does Credit
Rationing Affect Residential Invest-
ment? Deja Vu All Over Again," by
Yoon Dokko, Robert H. Edelstein,
and E. Scott Urdang. Next is #79,
"Foreclosure Laws and FHA Loan
Losses: Illinois and Neighboring
States," by Terrence M. Clauretie.
(A short version of this paper appears
to the left as this issue's entry in the
ORER Letter Series.) Paper #80 is
"Managerial Compensation and the
Characteristics of Firms: The Case of
REITs," by Joseph E. Finnerty and
Hun Y. Park. The most recent entry
in the Series is Paper #8 1 , "Voting
With Capitalization," by Jan K.
Brueckner and Man-Soo Joo.
A single copy of any paper in the
series is available at no cost to the
requestor from the Office of Real
Estate Research.
The Office ofReal Estate Research makes
every effort to assure the accuracy of all
statements in ORER LETTER articles prepared
by ORER staff members. However, the reader
should note thai legal and regulatory matters,
which are occasionally addressed in ORER
LETTER articles, are subject to change and to
varying interpretations. ORER LETTER
articles do not purport to provide legal or
investment advice, and the Office of Real
Estate Research shall not he held responsible
for damages resulting from omissions or
inaccuracies in the ORER LETTER or other
ORER publications.
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Kenneth Lusht Discusses Real Estate Auctions^ Australian Style
Kenneth Lusht. a Professor ofBusiness
Administration at The Pennsylvania Stale
University, spent the 1988-89 academic
year on sabbatical studying Australian
real estate markets. The National Associ-
ation ofRealtors® providedfunding for
this study and will publish a summary of
Lusht' s monograph, "Auctions Versus
Private Sales ofHouses: A Description
and Empirical Analysis of the Melbourne,
Australia Market." in forthcoming issues
ofREAL ESTATE OUTLOOK.
Lusht is a noted authority' on real
estate appraisal and market analysis. He
is a past president of the American Real
Estate & Urban Economics Association,
and his articles have appeared in numer-
ous academic and professional journals.
Lusht is the author ofa forthcoming
book. REAL ESTATE VALUATION: THEO-
RY. EVIDENCE. AND PRACTICE. His
e.xpertise e.xtends beyond real estate:
Lusht also co-authored the horse racing
monograph HANDICAPPING THOR-
OUGHBREDS: A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH.
In the following interview. ORER Re-
search Assistant and University of Illi-
nois M.B.A. candidate Michelle Mahue
discusses with Professor Lusht his find-
ings on the growth ofAustralia's highly
developed auction markets, the state of
auctions as a transaction mechanism in
Australia vis-a-vis the U.S.. and the bene-
fits and risks associated with marketing
property through the auction process.
How widespread is the use of real estate
auctions in Australia? The auction is a
very popular means of selling real estate
in that country. All types of properties,
particularly expensive homes, are regu-
larly sold in Australian auctions. Real
estate auctions have been widely used in
Australia since the country's earliest
days; the technique was possibly brought
by settlers from the United Kingdom.
Why has the real estate auction been so
much more popular in Australia than in
the U.S.'.' There are several possible
reasons. The first that comes to mind is
that American real estate auctions often
have been used to establish sale prices in
cases involving unusual legal questions
or tax considerations. As a consequence,
many people in our country have come to
associate auctions with problem proper-
ties or otherwise unattractive real estate.
Auctions also are popular in Australia
because of the 1983 Land Sale Act. The
use of auctions grew considerably after
the passage of this law, which has except-
ed auction sales from a three day "cool-
ing period" and made sellers responsible
for proving good title to buyers.
In addition, Australian sellers perceive
that properties sell more quickly at auc-
tion than in private listings, because the
auction process is expected to lead to a
final sale on a specified date. (The private
listing is what we typically think of as a
"listing" in our country.)
Finally, there are institutional explana-
tions. For example, Australian real estate
agents, who have a great deal of influence
on their clients and the transaction pro-
cess, find auctions to be more profitable
than private listings (for reasons relating
to sellers" payment of advertising costs).
The Australian media also find auctions
more profitable: an auction generates four
times the revenue for a newspaper as
does a private listing. Newspapers, in
turn, popularize auctions by running fea-
ture stories on auctioned properties and
publicizing scheduled auction sales.
Why doesn't the U.S. market make great-
er use ofauctions? Americans expect
great art works to sell at auction, but not
high priced real estate. As long as the ma-
jority of U.S. real estate auctions are pro-
moted as bargain hunting opportunities,
they will be associated with low-end
properties. Australian buyers generally do
not expect bargains in property auctions.
In fact, in Australia, the properties sold
through private listings on "multi-list"
are those that could not be sold through
auctions or private, non-shared listings.
Their multiple listing arrangement is a
dumping ground, which some people feel
our MLS was at one time.
The U.S. real estate industry is over-
whelmingly focused on private listings;
only a few firms specialize in auctions.
While the use of auctions in the U.S. is
much greater than it was ten years ago,
the proportion of properties sold at auc-
tion is still very small. The heavy use of
auctions in higher priced market seg-
ments, which we see in such countries as
Australia and Scotland, is unlikely to be
matched in the U.S. as long as the typical
American view of auctions persists.
Has the auction overtaken the private
listing as a means of selling Australian
real estate? More properties still sell
in private listings, but the auction has
grown tremendously in importance.
Since World War II the popularity of
auctions has grown steadily. The most
significant growth occurred from 1983 to
1988, with passage of the Land Sale Act.
The percentage of houses listed for sale
through auctions grew to rival that of
houses offered through private listings,
rising from 25% in 1983 to about 50% in
1988. Since I left Australia, late in 1989,
its residential market activity has fallen.
And since that time, more home sales
have involved private listings than auc-
tions, although in some suburbs auctions
have maintained their popularity.
Part of the growth in auctions certain-
^y can be attributed simply to the overall
increase in market activity. Recent years
have also brought periods of fluctuation
in the rate of increase in prices; the ac-
companying uncertainty promotes auc-
tions. It is important to note, however,
that during the 1983-1988 period, when
auction listings were so numerous, only
25% - 50% of the houses with auction
listings actually sold at the scheduled
auctions. The balance were sold before
or after the auctions, or not at all.
You mentioned that sellers pay the costs
of advertising Australian auctions. What
are the economic implications ofsuch a
system? Seller-paid advertising is a
primary reason why agents find auctions
to be so profitable. The average advertis-
ing budget for a private listing, in the
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U.S. or Australia, equals about a quarter
of a percent of e.xpected gross revenues.
In the Australian auction market, where
marketing time is limited and promotion
is much heavier, the advertising budget is
closer to 1%. Agents feel that the seller
who covers these high costs is sending a
signal to the market, demonstrating a
commitment to selling the property. In
terms of generating market interest, seller
commitment is an important factor.
The primary reason why agents find
seller-paid advertising so profitable, how-
ever, is that a percentage of these high
costs can be channeled into agents' pock-
ets. Sellers pay retail advertising rates to
the agents, but the agents may place so
many ads that they can get quantity dis-
counts. By retaining up to 40% of sellers"
advertising costs, agents can increase
their base commissions by up to 15%.
We might speculate as to whether the
seller passes the advertising cost along to
the successful bidder. On one hand, al-
though there is a risk for the seller, since
an auction sale is not guaranteed, a seller
might be willing to absorb the costs, giv-
en the benefits of a targeted sale date. On
the other hand, we might expect the sell-
er to raise his reservation price to cover
the advertising expense, thereby shifting
much or all of the cost to the buyer.
There is some evidence that sellers are
able to pass their costs along; we'll come
back to this point.
Why do auctions work more ejfectively in
Australia during periods of rising prices,
and with respect to more expensive or
more specialized properties? There is
no historical stigma attached; auctions in
Australia are not associated with undesir-
able properties. The auction therefore can
be an extremely effective means of mar-
keting quality property, particularly when
the seller does not know what the highest
offer might be. In uncertain markets, in
which prices change rapidly and buyers
tend to be more impatient than sellers,
auctions offer sellers a mechanism by
which to concentrate demand. That is,
auctions bring together, at one time and
place, all potential buyers. Sellers use
auctions, then, when they think that auc-
tions will increase their net revenues.
I am amazed at how closely Australian
auction markets reflect price theory. Price
theory tells us that as an item becomes
more differentiated, the market finds it
more difficult to value that item with cer-
tainty. The increase in auction activity
that we have discussed has been pro-
nounced in affluent Melbourne suburbs
located within five or six miles of the
CBD. These inner submarkets offer many
highly sought-after Edwardian and Victo-
rian period homes, which are more heter-
ogeneous than newer homes.
Similarly, the outer submarkets that
have experienced noticeable increases in
auction activity tend to be those with
ders are influenced by bids placed by
others), expected revenues are highest
when the bids are offered openly. In call-
ing a bid. a potential buyer reveals infor-
mation, which others use to confirm or
adjust their own bids. Therefore, the fear
of the "winner's curse," or overbidding,
is lessened. The open cry stimulates the
bidding process, increasing expected
revenues in cases in which the buyers'
principal fear is overbidding.
In other cases, however, bidders are
less concerned with overbidding than
with losing desired properties to other
bidders. Such instances often involve
commercial or investment properties.
In calling a hid, a potential buyer reveals information,
which other bidders use to confirm or adjust their own
bids. Therefore, the fear of the "winner's curse," or
overbidding, is lessened.
heterogeneous, high priced homes. Com-
mercial properties tend to be unique, one-
of-a-kind structures; this heterogeneity
helps to explain why most commercial
properties also are sold through auctions.
Prices are fairly certain, however, for
more homogeneous, run of the mill
homes or multiple unit "cookie cutter"
properties, so sellers find it less advanta-
geous to incur the expenses of auctioning
them; the payoff is less.
How are bids solicited in Australian auc-
tions? Homes are auctioned individual-
ly, and in Melbourne the auctions are
held on the front lawns of the properties.
(In Sydney, by contrast, the bids are ac-
cepted at a designated place away from
the site, such as in a hotel meeting room.)
Most such auctions are of the "English"
variety, in which bids are called openly
and the sale is to the highest bidder, pro-
vided that the seller's reservation (mini-
mum acceptable) price is met. While this
"English" system is used for virtually all
home auctions, some commercial proper-
ty is auctioned with sealed bids.
This pattern would be predicted by tra-
ditional auction theory, which suggests
that in the presence of affiliated bids (bid-
Sealed bid auctions tend to maximize
revenues if bidders are particularly
averse to the risk of seeing properties
fall into the hands of other buyers.
Does the role of the Australian sales
agent differfrom that of the agent in the
U.S.? The agent's role is not much
different, but the compensation structure
is markedly different. The standard
Australian commission is 2% plus $660,
which, for most transactions, is much
lower than the corresponding U.S. com-
mission would be. (All my quoted fig-
ures are in Australian dollar terms.) This
relatively low legislated commission lev-
el applies to private listings and auctions
alike. Such a legally mandated fixed
price feature represents a market imper-
fection. However, its impact may not be
severe; agents I talked with did not feel
that costs differ materially between the
two types of transactions.
One reason why there are so many
fewer agents and agencies in Australia
than in the U.S. is that Australian com-
missions are so low. In a different mar-
ket setting, low commissions could serve
as an incentive for agents to push for
high property turnover while failing to
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maximize sale prices. However, the auc-
tion mechanism helps to ensure the high-
est possible price, and thereby keeps this
potential agency problem from occurring.
The Australian agent selling a property
at auction faces a much shorter marketing
time than does the agent with a private
listing in the U.S. An Australian auction
is held within 45 days after the property
is listed, so the agent has a relatively
short period over which to perform vari-
ous marketing duties. Therefore, while
the auction offers the benefits of a quick,
relatively certain sale, the agent is pushed
to generate an intensive marketing effort.
Furthermore, if for some reason the prop-
be concealed from the market for long.
An unsuccessful auction can, in fact,
have positive results, in the sense that a
passed in property demonstrates a seller's
commitment to the stated minimum sale
price. Of course, a property's having
been passed in may indicate that the sell-
er has unrealistic expectations. While
passed in properties can be rescheduled
for auction sales, in practice such proper-
ties are generally marketed privately. One
reason is that a listing expires about a
month following an unsuccessful auction,
so there is considerable pressure on the
agent to complete a sale of the property
in question as quickly as possible.
In an area where prices averaged $245,000, houses sold
at auction generated, on average, $16,200 more revenue
than those listed privately. The price differential
represents close to 7% of the average property value.
erty fails to sell at auction (for example,
no bidders or inadequate bid prices), the
agent retains the right to sell the property
for only 30 additional days. Then the
listing converts to an open listing, under
which any licensed agent can locate a
qualified buyer and earn the commission.
While the stress associated with auc-
tions is higher than that of private list-
ings, agents view auctions as more profit-
able for two main reasons. First, they can
retain part of the advertising costs. Sec-
ond, they believe that auction sales pro-
duce maximum prices for their clients,
leading to higher dollar commissions.
What are the possible outcomes ifan
auctioned propert}- fails to sell? In the
type of auction in which wine is sold, the
auctioneer does not reveal that an unsold
item has been "passed in," meaning that
it has not sold. At an Australian real
estate auction, however, when bid prices
fail to meet the seller's reservation price,
the auctioneer concedes that the property
has been passed in. While in some in-
stances there may be resistance to reveal-
ing an unsuccessful sale, it is my opinion
that such resistance is unnecessary, since
an unsuccessful real estate auction cannot
Are agents correct in believing that auc-
tions produce higher prices than private
listings? To measure pricing effects of
auctions, I analyzed sales of single family
detached dwellings in Melbourne's most
active inner suburbs. The sales all were
completed between January 1988 and
March 1989. Of the 74% of the houses
that were offered through auction listings,
12% sold prior to auction, 71% sold at
auction, and 17% sold after auction.
Houses offered and sold at auction
would be expected to bring higher reve-
nues, controlling for quality differences,
than those sold through private listings.
Conventional wisdom would suggest fur-
ther that prices of properties sold before
auction should be at least as high as, if
not much higher than, prices agents
would expect to achieve in auctions. A
property that fails to sell at auction, how-
ever, would be expected to sell at no
more than the highest auction bid. In oth-
er words, due to time constraints and the
increased bargaining power of the bid-
ders, a passed in property would be ex-
pected to sell for less than a property sold
at its original auction. The agent in such a
transaction would be perhaps more likely
to encourage the seller to accept a low
bid, rather than to run the risk of losing
the listing.
My findings regarding prices were
consistent with the results we would ex-
pect. In an area where prices averaged
$245,000, houses sold at auction generat-
ed, on average, $16,200 more revenue
than those listed privately. Furthermore,
houses listed for sale through auctions,
but sold prior to the auctions, generally
sold for higher prices than similar houses
that sold at their scheduled auctions.
Houses that passed in and then sold later
sold for less than expected auction prices.
The price differential between auctions
and private listings represents close to
7% of the average property value, so it is
clear that the seller at auction is more-
than-covering a 1% advertising cost. Of
course, it is hard to say whether the seller
intends specifically to pass along that
cost, or simply to maximize revenue. It is
also difficult to say to what extent auc-
tion prices reflect true market values. In
theory, a property sold at auction cannot
be resold at a profit; the maximum price
should have been realized. But I am not
certain that such a result always occurs.
If auction offerings produce sig-
nificantly higher revenues, one could
question why private listings are still
used in affluent, active market segments.
It is possible, as some would contend,
that the auction process produces more
variation in selling price, or that it pro-
'duces higher risk of a "no-sale," but the
results of my study do not show this.
Other explanations have been offered by
previous studies, which found that sellers
do not always believe that auctions pro-
duce higher net revenues, and that sellers
may resist bearing advertising costs. Fur-
thermore, some people dislike the stress
and impersonality of the auction process.
What effects do false bids and minimum
sale prices have on bidding? This is
the most controversial aspect of the Aus-
tralian auction system. In Australia, bids
from sellers, or "dummy bids," are not
only legal; they are commonly used. The
seller may use "plants" in the audience,
or the auctioneer may call out fictitious
bids. Agents told me that seller bids are
used primarily as a means of stimulating
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the auction mechanism, ensuring that the
minimum sale price will be met in those
instances in which there are few bidders.
However, a seller may continue to bid
even after the reservation price has been
met, in the hope of generating still higher
bids. Yet the agents reported that seller
bids usually are not needed, due to the
high buyer interest in the types of proper-
ties offered at auction.
Some observers claim that the use of
seller bids conceals the true number of
bidders for a property, inducing potential-
ly distorted bids. The argument is that a
false bid can increase a bidder's per-
ceived risk of losing the property to an-
other bidder; it creates the appearance of
competition when there is none. As bid-
ders become more "impatient," the bid-
ding process is stimulated. However,
since this is a difficult issue to study
systematically, I cannot offer empirical
evidence of the argument's validity.
Australian auctions typically include
reservation prices; the purpose is primari-
ly to protect sellers. U.S. auctions some-
times are "absolute auctions," without
reservation prices. But guaranteeing a
sale, even if the highest bid is below the
minimum acceptable to the seller, can
have unfortunate results. Given the
chances of, say, poor weather or low
turnout, common sense suggests that the
seller should have the right to reject an
unsatisfactory winning bid. Furthermore,
the use of minimum prices and seller bids
helps to prevent collusion among bidders.
What are unconditional contracts, and
what are the implications of their use?
A conditional contract is one in which
the buyer can avoid the sale if some con-
tingency arises, such as the buyer's ina-
bility to get financing. In Australian auc-
tions, negotiations and contingencies of
any kind are rare; the contracts are un-
conditional. An unconditional contract is
appealing for a seller, because it provides
the buyer with fewer excuses for legally
backing out of a deal. Of course, there is
no "free lunch," contingencies that can
cause difficulty for buyers might lead to
less bidding and lower offered prices.
In an Australian auction, 10% of the
price is typically paid at the sale, with the
balance due at settlement. Since the sell-
ing price cannot be determined prior to
the auction, it is difficult for a buyer to
arrange financing in advance. (Seller
financing is virtually unheard of in the
Australian markets.) There are two result-
ing financial implications. First, even
after a successful bid, a buyer might find
that he cannot get financing, or as much
financing as he needs. A wealthier party,
of course, is in a better position to absorb
this risk. Second, because any financing
must be obtained after the fact, higher in-
come buyers may find it easier to obtain
loans; a lender can base a loan on a
wealthy borrower's credit worthiness
noted by sellers included advertising
costs, along with stress and the period of
uncertainty before the sale takes place.
The absence of the chance to negotiate
seems to be relatively unimportant to
sellers in the affluent submarkets studied,
where contingencies are unusual even
with private listings. Interestingly, while
just over half of the sellers stated that
they would buy at an auction, three quar-
ters said they would sell again at auction.
Their responses seem to reveal a percep-
tion that auctions favor sellers.
The main advantage of auctions re-
ported by buyers was the possibility of
buying at bargain prices, though they
While just over half of the sellers stated that they
would buy at an auction, three quarters said they
would sell again at auction. Their responses seem
to reveal a perception that auctions favor sellers.
rather than on the property's value.
These financial implications of uncon-
ditional contracts are accompanied by
social implications. Because a potential
buyer must be able to bid unconditional-
ly, there is concern that auctions system-
atically discriminate against low income
bidders. Wealthier parties may be the
only ones who can afford to take the risks
associated with unconditional contracts.
Even the Victoria Ministry of Housing, in
order to curtail the use of auction sales,
has refused to grant low interest loans for
the purchase of auctioned houses. This
action, of course, has the paradoxical
effect of further discriminating against
lower income buyers.
Which market participants are the
strongest supporters ofauction transac-
tions? In a study conducted by Profes-
sor Chris Maher of Monash University
in Melbourne, sellers, buyers, and agents
were asked to cite the advantages and
disadvantages of auctions.
Sellers responded that they had auc-
tioned their homes primarily on their
agents' advice. The auction's ability to
yield the best selling price on a specific
sale date also was noted. Disadvantages
conceded that the probability of actually
getting bargains is low. Possible overbid-
ding, particularly because of the use of
dummy bids by sellers, was seen by most
buyers as the primary disadvantage of
purchasing real estate through auctions.
Agents seem to be the staunchest sup-
porters of auctions. They cited an uncon-
ditional sale at a price that is, at least in
theory, the true market value as the main
advantage. Nearly 40% of the agents
polled cited no disadvantages to auc-
tions; almost all buyers and sellers noted
at least some disadvantages. The Austra-
lian real estate industry's clear bias in fa-
vor of auctions indicates that the auction
process will continue to play a major role
in that country's real estate markets.
Whatfuture do you see for auctions in
the U.S.? I don't think there is any
doubt that their use will increase. The
extent of that increase, however, will
depend on the degree to which our mar-
kets can adjust to a number of factors.
Among these are sales of quality proper-
ties at auction, the role of seller bids, the
disposition of advertising costs, and
the nature of unconditional contracts
with their related financing problems. ^
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Vacancy Management III: The Pitfalls of Ratios
Peter F. Colwell
This is the third in a series of articles on
the economic analysis of topics relating
to property management.
Property managers encounter problems
by relying too heavily on ratios or other
"rules of thumb." One such popular meas-
ure is the operating expense ratio (OER).
A manager might strive to minimize that
ratio, believing that doing so leads to
maximum net operating income (NOI).
However, it is inefficient to minimize the
OER; a lower OER is not necessarily bet-
ter than a higher one. In minimizing OER,
the manager produces an occupancy rate
that is too low (or, equivalently, a vacan-
cy rate that is too high).
As noted earlier in this series, NOI,
which is the measure that the manager
should strive to maximize, may be high-
est at an occupancy rate somewhere be-
low the 100% maximum. If one were able
to find a way to minimize the operating
expense ratio, that knowledge would not
lead to maximizing NOI and optimizing
the occupancy rate.
The accompanying figure utilizes a
centrally-located vertical axis and a two-
way horizontal axis that permits the si-
multaneous measurement of two other
variables. The right side of this figure is
essentially the same as the figure that ap-
pears in the prior article in this series (see
"Vacancy Management II: An Agency
Problem," ORER Letter, Winter 1990).
This right side shows that both effective
gross income (EGI) and operating ex-
pense (OE) relate to the occupancy rate.
However, operating expense continues to
increase with occupancy throughout the
range of possible values, while EGI
begins to fall beyond a particular occu-
pancy rate.
Movement farther to the left in the left
side of the figure indicates higher levels
of EGI. The straight lines on the left side
of the figure therefore have positive
slopes. The left side of the figure is
derived from the right side. The left side,
however, shows operating expenses as
they relate to EGI. rather than to occupan-
cy. For this reason, the left-side OE curve
is not simply the mirror image of the
right-side OE curve.
A point on the left-side OE curve is
derived by forming a rectangle. The
rectangle begins on the 45° line above a
specified EGI. Its length is the distance
between that 45° line and the EGI curve in
the right portion, and its height is the gap
between the EGI and OE curves (the NOI)
in the right portion. The connecting point
on the left-side OE curve is the remaining
vertex of the rectangle. The derivation of
that point for a particular EGI level is
labeled a in the figure.
The operating expense ratio measures
the steepness of a line extending from the
origin (where the vertical and horizontal
axes intersect) to a point on the left-side
OE curve. The lowest OER is defined by t
in the figure; it is the point at which a line
is tangent to (just barely touches) the OE
curve. A line through t must be the mini-
mum OER, because it is not possible to
construct a line with less steepness that
touches the OE curve.
It is important to note that line F is
parallel to the 45° line: its slope equals
one. Point m. at which line F is tangent to
the OE curve, thus is located where the
Analysis of tlii
curve's slope is one. Point m. then, is the
point of maximum NOI; a rectangle
drawn with respect to point m corre-
sponds to maximum distance between
EGI and OE in the right side of the figure.
Yet m is to the left of t, so it corresponds
to a higher occupancy rate. Minimizing
the OER (at point t). therefore, results in
too low an occupancy rate. Both EGI and
OE are too low at that point. More impor-
tantly, NOI is too low.
The OER that maximizes NOI is found
by extending a line (not shown in the
figure) from the origin through point m.
Such a line would cut the OE curve at two
points, one just to the left of t (at m) and
one just to the right of t. The NOI-max-
imizing OER, then, relates to two occu-
pancy rates, one that maximizes NOI and
one that is lower. (The right-hand border
of a constructed rectangle appears above
the corresponding occupancy rate.) Also
note that the NOI-maximizing OER
exceeds the minimum OER.
The OER is not the only ratio common-
ly misused by managers. Problems exist
with respect to cost/benefit ratios (pri-
marily by managers of publicly owned
property) and profitability ratios (primari-
ly by corporate managers). H
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Peoria: Anatomy ofa Recovery
Peoria is not the only Illinois real estate
market area in which ORER LETTER
takes an interest. However, the city has
gained more than its share of attention in
the quarterly Illinois Real Estate Mar-
kets feature. The city presents an inter-
esting case, in that its median home
prices consistently rank lowest among
measured areas nationwide, whereas
people familiar with the local markets do
not consider Peoria housing to he partic-
ularly cheap. ORER Director Peter F.
Colwell analyzed data provided by the
Peoria Board ofRealtors® in preparing
for a recent presentation to the Board.
Some of his conclusions follow.
The Peoria area real estate market seems
to have recovered much of the vitality
that it lost in the first half of the 1980s.
The level of activity has not approached
that of the "glory days" of the late 1970s.
Still, the area certainly does not appear to
be the housing wasteland that would be
suggested by the nation's lowest median
home price. (Actually, the most recent
figures show Saginaw, MI below Peoria.)
The graphs below help to tell the story
of the area's recent market experience.
Construction activity has been increasing,
particularly in the single-family and non-
residential sectors. The mix is different,
however; major downtown redevelop-
ment of the early 1980s has given way to
suburban projects, and multi-family
construction, once substantial, has been
particularly slow in recent periods.
The excess inventory of homes has
been depleted considerably in the most
recent few years; note that in 1986 there
were approximately nine times as many
listings as sales, whereas the most recent
listings-to-sales multiple is less than two.
As the relative abundance in supply has
fallen, sellers have been able to com-
mand higher prices; the mean selling
price of a home increased by almost
$10,000 (a 20% increase in nominal
dollar terms) between 1986 and 1990.
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Privatization of the Financing of Public Projects
A recent Wall Street Journal editorial
page article brought to mind the subject
matter of tv.'o papers that ORER Director
Peter F. Colwell presented in the 1970s.
In "What Am I Bidfor Fifth Avenue?"
{WALL STREET JOURNAL. June 19, 1990}
author Carl Bakal suggests that public
property he renamedfor those who earn
the right by contributing the most money.
Because a major publication has so re-
cently addressed the subject, and because
the main articles in this issue deal with
privatization and auctions, ORER LETTER
devotes our closing page to views stated
in the Colwell papers. These views, while
largely in agreement with Bakal's, more
fully address the administrative proce-
dures and economic implications ofa pri-
vatized program offunding public works.
Parks and public buildings, which may
improve the quality of life in the neighbor-
hoods in which they are located, are typi-
cally financed with taxes. However, there
is no reason why these and other facilities
for public use could not be financed, in
effect, through donations. Private parties
might provide these funds to demonstrate
their philanthropy (or, inadvertently, their
vanity). Donors, in turn, would be granted
the right to name public works projects
(after themselves, family members,
friends, or mentors). The public would
take advantage of the donors' motives as a
means of increasing the production of
public amenities.
Auctions could be held to allocate the
rights to name public projects or facili-
ties. The optimal format might be that of
the "Dutch" auction, in which the open-
ing offer is set at a high level, and subse-
quent offers are progressively lower. For
example, the right to name a new park
might carry an initial offer of $1 million;
an interested bidder who chose to wait for
a lower price could lose the naming rights
to another party willing to pay the $1 mil-
lion. A project could proceed if the high-
est bid were above a specified minimum
level. That minimum would not have to
be an amount sufficient to completely
fund the project in question; costs could
in some instances be shared by the
taxpayer and the philanthropist/egoist.
Institutionalizing the "giving" process
would, of course, enhance the welfare of
the public, but it would also benefit the
donor by lowering the cost of charity, or,
viewed another way, the cost of immor-
tality. Costs would be reduced in three
ways. First, because policy makers would
identify projects in need of financing
(bidders would bid only on the right to
name projects that had already passed
public scrutiny), the price to the donor of
locating suitable projects would be low.
Second, because any facility to be named
would have been selected by officials
with the power to grant approval, the
"red tape" that might otherwise accompa-
ny donated projects would be eliminated.
Finally, because the project would pre-
sumably have been publicly debated be-
fore being targeted for funding, the donor
would not face the prospect of unenthu-
siastic recipients. (Anecdotes suggest that
wealthy patrons have presented cities
with fountains or outdoor art works that
the public seemed not to want.)
By putting a price on the naming of
public facilities, we could increase, at no
additional cost to the taxpayer, the level
of public services and add to neighbor-
hood quality. The problem would be get-
ting public officials to end their expen-
sive habit of naming assets that produce
public services after beloved members of
their own ranks, who were already paid
for their services. (It is surprising that
private subdividers have not begun nam-
ing streets after those willing to pay for
the right, instead of choosing names of
their relatives, or of various species of
trees.) Universities have understood this
principle for a long time. Shouldn't the
word be spread to local governments? H
"The Economics ofNeighborhood Beautifica-
tion" was presented to the Eastern Communi-
ty College Association on April 4. 1975. "The
Production and Destruction ofNeighborhood
Qualiry" was presented at meetings of the
Atlantic Economic Society on Oct. 13, 1977. I
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The Creation of Property Rights in Peru
Hernando de Soto
After establishing himselfas a successful
businessman in Switzerland, Mr. de Soto
returned to his native Peru in 1979.
when democratic reforms were promised
by the socialist regime. Studying the di-
verse living standards among Peruvian
communities, hefound that the lack of
secure property rights created a serious
constraint on the economic well-being of
his country' s citizens. Asfounder and
president of the Institutefor Liberty and
Democracy (ILD) in Lima, Mr de Soto
challenged his country's cumbersome
and discriminatory means of legal real
estate development. The ILD' s system of
property registry enables the Peruvian
populace to acquire well-defined proper-
ty rights and to exercise them to secure
transactions. Mr de Soto is also the au-
thor of the bestseller THE OTHER PATH
(Harper and Row, 1989). which more
completely details the economic impor-
tance ofproperty rights to impoverished
areas. He has been the subject ofmany
articles in the popular press, including a
January 1989 READERS DIGEST article
and some recent articles in the WALL
STREET JOURNAL.
A major difference between developing
and industrialized countries lies in the ef-
fectiveness of government and the legal
system in creating property rights and
safeguarding their exercise. Governments
of developing nations tend to ban or
restrict these rights, or to leave them ill-
defined, thereby failing to offer property
owners protection from government or
third-party interference.
Citizens must be able to gain govern-
ment recognition of their property rights
at a low cost, and such rights must be
protected through well functioning and
accessible legal institutions. When gov-
ernments fail to meet these objectives,
businesses suffer and inefficiency rises.
In January of 1990, a radically new
system of property registration was inau-
gurated in Peru. This registry is a pillar in
a three part ILD program to provide prop-
erty rights to all Peruvian citizens. By
providing legally binding proof of owner-
ship, the registry enables citizens to
improve their land with high-quality
permanent buildings, even to offer their
property as collateral for loans. The pop-
ular mortgage and credit insurance are
Summer 1990 ^
UUHU Mews
Alumni Luncheon
The tenth semiannual luncheon for
University of Illinois alumni working
in the real estate field will be held at
the Chicago Yacht Club on Friday,
November 2. Peter R. Morris, Chair-
man of the Executive Committee of
VMS Realty Partners, will share his
"Reflections on the Current State of
the Real Estate Industry." ORER
again thanks Gene Stunard for
arranging for use of the Yacht Club.
Alumni will receive more specific
information in an upcoming mailing.
Anyone wishing to make a reserva-
tion should contact Brenda Bishop at
the Office of Real Estate Research.
Affordability Workshop
ORER Director Peter F. Colwell
conducted a recent workshop con-
cerning the availability of affordable
housing. The workshop, held at the
University of Illinois on August 10,
brought together representatives of
the academic, professional, and
regulatory sectors of the Illinois real
estate community. A summary of the
topics discussed and the conclusions
reached at this meeting will appear in
the Fall issue of the ORER Letter.
Life Imitates ORER Letter
Real estate developer and U of I
Adjunct Lecturer Don Rundblom
has provided a timely example of the
exactions discussed in the article on
page 16. Rundblom has planned
construction of a 62,000 square foot
warehouse in an area of Orlando,
Florida where infrastructure is
already in place. He reports that he
must nevertheless pay "impact fees"
of $57,000 in order to break ground.
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Commentary
the remaining elements of a program that
facilitates the creation of property rights
by building a bridge between the nation's
financial institutions and the poor.
Informality
A daunting array of restrictions confronts
the great majority of economically active
Peruvians, known as "'informals" because
they operate outside the formal economic
system. Only in rare instances does infor-
mality imply a general lack of compli-
ance with laws; in most cases only certain
specific legal provisions are violated (an
example would be a food vendor operat-
ing without a permit). Therefore, though
informal activities benefit the formal
economy and are, in fact, necessary to the
country in providing goods and services,
they are not entitled to the full protection
of the law. Informality is, in effect, a gray
area paralleling the legal world, where
people take refuge when the cost of legal-
ity outweighs the corresponding benefits.
The roots of informality, then, lie in
overwhelming, cumbersome regulations
imposed by government on business
activity. These regulations, which present
obstacles for anyone attempting to do
business, are particularly burdensome for
the nation's poor. This problem is due
primarily to Peru's inadequate legislative
system, under which ill-advised laws, of-
ten totally divorced from reality, are en-
acted behind closed doors by lawmakers
ignoring the real interests of the people.
The same restrictions that confront
urban "informals" are faced by rural coca
growers. With more than 200,000 small
farms depending on the income from
coca cultivation, Peru supplies much of
the raw material for the world cocaine
markets. When their coca plants are de-
stroyed without sufficient compensation,
these farmers respond simply by starting
anew elsewhere, expanding into ever
more remote areas, looking to terrorist
organizations for protection. While there
are many alternative crops that are at
least as profitable as coca, cultivation of
these crops requires investment, credit,
larger-scale production, and formal con-
tracts with buyers. Without well-defined
property rights, Peruvian farmers cannot
meet any of these conditions.
Efforts to measure informal activities
have revealed the amazing entrepreneuri-
al energy of the poorest segments of
Peruvian society. In aggregate terms, the
informal sector generated nearly 40% of
the gross domestic product (GDP) in
1984, and supplied 60% of the total
man-hours worked during this period
nationwide. According to our estimates,
by the year 2000, informal activities will
account for over 6 1% of GDP, despite
the fact that lack of access to formal
institutions keeps the informal sector's
average productivity equal to only one
third that of the formal sector.
Informal Housing
One of the largest sectors of informal
activity is the housing sector, which
offers a unique illustration of the chasm
between government regulations and the
Peruvian reality. Slightly over 50% of all
existing housing in the Lima metropoli-
tan area, sheltering 53.6% of the city's
population, was built informally (in vio-
lation of government regulations). Fur-
thermore, less than 4% of all informal
property in Lima has been titled to date.
One way to assess the importance of
the investment in informal housing is to
compare it with the state's efforts. Dur-
ing a period roughly between 1960 and
1984, the state's investment in housing
for lower-income settlers amounted to a
mere 2. 1 % of the informal investment in
similar housing. As of 1984, total public
investment in shelter, including con-
struction of middle class housing, was
only 10.4% of informal investment.
Compliance with all governmental
regulations regarding formal housing is
discouraged by the time and difficulty
involved. For example, an individual
wishing to obtain a land grant must com-
ply with 207 administrative formalities,
associated with 48 different government
agencies, in a process requiring a mini-
mum of 43 months to complete. Another
40 months is required for the applicant
to obtain the necessary land develop-
ment and building permits. Therefore, a
total wait of nearly seven years faces the
typical family attempting, through the
formal sector, to establish a place to live.
In some cases, the waiting time can
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reach ten years. (Recently, the number of
administrative formalities has been cut to
116, involving 27 government agencies.
The length of the land grant process,
however, has been cut only from 43 to
37 months).
These excessive delays demonstrate
why the invasion and occupation of gov-
ernment and privately-owned land have
come to represent the most effective
alternative in providing shelter for the
poor. The fact that, according to govern-
ment statistics, there were 282 illegal
occupations and only 3 official grants of
government-owned land in Lima in
1985, and that seven out of each ten
buildings constructed are informal dwell-
ings, clearly illustrates the inoperability
of Peru's housing regulations.
Making matters worse, rights to even
duly recorded properties are not entirely
secure, since corresponding data often
are not processed correcdy. Moreover,
due to an ineffective bureacratic system,
owners who have legalized their dwell-
ings, or who plan to complete necessary
legalization formalities, find it extremely
difficult to reap the benefits of govern-
ment protection. Consequently, after 100
years of existence, the traditional real
estate register provides documentation
for less than half of all formal housing
in the Lima metropolitan area.
In an attempt to evade government
regulations, the informal economy
reverses the development process. The
informals' first step is to take possession
of the land through informal occupancy
or "squatting." The next step is to build a
dwelling, installing infrastructure and
developing the land through the approval
and registration of a survey and final site
development plan. The last step is the ac-
quisition of property ownership through
the legalization of title in accordance
with municipal regulations. Obtaining
legal title, then, is the last, rather than the
first, step in the creation of new housing.
Communal Associations
The invasion and occupation of land is
only one means of informally acquiring
property. A second means is through ille-
gal land sales arranged via agricultural
cooperatives. These associations were
created by the Agrarian Reform of 1969,
under which the government expropriated
land and distributed it to peasants to farm
under collective ownership.
As the danger of expropriation reduced
property values, land owners colluded
with settlers to transfer possession of land
at prices higher than those offered by the
government in forced takings, but lower
than market values in voluntary transac-
tions. The cooperatives, which enjoyed
communal property rights, were the nom-
inal purchasers, but they redistributed
purchased land. By 1989, 75% of the
cooperatives had freely and democratical-
ly chosen to divide the land among their
regulations, encourage a large percentage
of new business activity to be carried out
in violation of the law.
In other words, a government that
does not recognize the transfer of proper-
ty rights to another party produces two
effects that jeopardize the well-being of
its citizenry and the nation's overall eco-
nomic development. First, owners fear
that, at any moment, the government or
another party may strip them of their
property rights without their legal ability
to challenge the confiscation. Under
these circumstances, an owner is hesitant
to invest in improving property or ex-
panding the business in which the prop-
When their plants are destroyed without sufficient
compensation, coca farmers respond simply by starting
anew elsewhere, expanding into ever more remote areas,
looking to terrorist organizations for protection.
members. (Even small farmers who had
been given land in the agrarian reform
sometimes found it profitable to sell their
land to cooperatives, despite government
regulations against such sales.)
In other words, while farmers main-
tained limited property rights as members
of cooperatives, they requested that they
also be granted rights to individual prop-
erties and registered titles. However,
while the farmers had opted for private
ownership, the state only recognized the
collective ownership of the cooperatives.
Consequently, the popular housing that
developed through these groups, with
their special legal status, were considered
informal in the same manner as illegal or
squatter settlements. The creation of the
new land register, explained in more
detail below, allows for the legalization
of these housing cooperatives and similar
housing associations.
Economic Impact
The difficulties associated with this lack
of secure property rights discourage in-
vestment in economically sound activi-
ties, eroding much of the value of the
property. These problems, and the impos-
sibility of complying with government
erty is used. Thus, the inability to exer-
cise rights undermines the value of prop-
erty, unnecessarily aggravating poverty.
The country also incurs opportunity
costs, in terms of the loss of beneficial
effects of the business that might have
been carried on by the property owner.
These economic costs are highly signifi-
cant in light of an ILD study which
found that, among comparable socioeco-
nomic groups, over a period of ten years,
the average value of houses with proper
tide was nine times higher than the value
of houses without title.
The second negative effect caused by
a lack of well defined property rights is
the creation of a permanently stagnant
market for property. Without secure title,
nobody wants to buy property, because
its transfer is not recognized as legally
valid. The result it that those who can
make the best use of a particular proper-
ty are dissuaded from buying it. Thus,
the potential seller loses as a result of his
inability to profit from the sale of his
property. The buyer also loses by having
to look for another, less suitable proper-
ty. In terms of lower levels of aggregate
business activity and slower national
growth, Peru ultimately loses as well.
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The absence of legal title to land and
housing means the occupant has abso-
lutely no security and no legal status.
Furthermore, without legal protection or
recognition, a dwelling may not be sold,
rented, or mortgaged, so its inherent val-
ue as potential capital to generate new re-
sources is lost. If, on the other hand, an
individual can obtain legal title, thereby
ensuring legal status and security, he can
increase the market value significantly.
As a result, the owner is able to get a
better price in the event of a sale, and the
sale can be financed by a lending institu-
tion on better terms for the owner.
Therefore, even if a given property is
tance. rather than to impose a system of
collective ownership.
Property and Possession Registry
The new registry, which imposes less
than one percent of the cost required by
the previous system, is based on three
main guidelines: simplification, deregula-
tion, and decentralization. Simplification
refers to the elimination of impractical
formalities and of overlapping require-
ments, in an effort to lower unnecessarily
high charges to the public. For example,
proof of property tax payment is no long-
er required for registry, notarized build-
ing certificates may be replaced by stan-
... a government that does not recognize the transfer of
property rights jeopardizes the well-being of its citizenry
and the nation 's overall economic development.
not duly entered in the new land register,
the mere existence of such a registration
mechanism enhances the property's
value. The register offers a buyer the
chance to rapidly obtain possessor rights
to the land and title to the corresponding
dwelling built on such land.
A More Workable System
Securing property rights for those cur-
rently outside the law requires a new
legal institutional framework that not
only formalizes informal status but, at
the same time, informalizes the formal
sector. To serve this purpose, the ILD
developed the popular mortgages
system, comprised of the land register,
the popular mortgage itself, and the
credit insurance program.
As a cornerstone to its system, the
institute recognized the set of extralegal
norms present in the informal settle-
ments. These norms, which to some
extent regulated social relations, served
to offset the absence of legal protection.
However, the main function of the pre-
vailing extralegal system and the infor-
mal housing organizations was to safe-
guard and enhance the private property
acquired through invasion or inhabi-
dard printed forms, and records may be
stored on a computerized system.
Unlike the traditional registration sys-
tem, in which everything the applicant
says must be proven by documentation,
the new land register assumes that the
applicant is telling the truth (presumption
of good faith). Furthermore, the occupant
of land is assumed to be the owner of
any building constructed on that site.
Based on the customs and extralegal
standards studied by the ILD, the types of
evidence required to verify land tenure
are both realistic and easily obtainable
by users of the new land register. Docu-
mentation requirements have been sim-
plified to allow the personal verification
of lawyers, architects or engineers to
replace more formal procedures. The
applicant must supply proof that he actu-
ally possesses the land and/or buildings.
Acceptable proof includes written state-
ments from neighbors or local residents'
associations verifying tenure, receipts
from payments for utility services, or
local residency and loan agreements with
building and loan associations.
Deregulation is the transfer of certain
decision making powers, currently in the
hands of the real estate registry, to the in-
dividuals using the registry. The new
land register replaces government bu-
reaucrats with private inspectors, separ-
ates title registry from site development,
and recognizes settlers' associations and
user participation in the management of
the land registry.
Similarly, decentralization describes
the delegation of decision making powers
to local registration offices, placing them
in closer contact with existing problems.
Because the previous registry was cen-
tralized in Lima, millions of Peruvians
living outside the capital were denied ac-
cess to the system. The creation of auton-
omous regional registers allows the entire
registration process to carried out within
the area where the property is located.
The land register allows informal set-
tlers to rapidly and definitively register
their dwellings, in order to obtain legal
recognition of their rights. By registering
their property, citizens can exercise the
rights inherent in property ownership:
selling, leasing, or using as security for
credit transactions. The single act of reg-
istration confers legal status not only on
the land, but also on the building, which
can represent as much as 80% of the total
property value. Based on the growth rate
of housing in the Lima metropolitan area,
the ILD estimates that almost all property
holdings in informal settlements will
have been registered within five years.
Popular Mortgage System
Even with the establishment of the new
property registration system, under which
an occupant can legally document his
possessory rights to land and any struc-
tures on the site, a mere occupant still
could not mortgage land in his posses-
sion. While the right of an occupant is a
mere "possessory" right, a landowner en-
joys all inherent property rights, includ-
ing those of use, enjoyment, disposal,
and recovery. With this inequity in mind,
and in an effort to provide economic ben-
efit from large cumulative capital invest-
ments in informal housing, the ILD
proposed a new type of mortgage for
realty in informal settlements.
Unlike the conventional mortgage,
which requires that the grantor hold legal
title to the property in order to establish a
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mortgage right, this "popular mortgage"
system is based on tenure rights, duly re-
corded in the land register. The popular
mortgage enables previously disenfran-
chised people to use the value of occu-
pied land, and dwellings on such land, as
security in obtaining formal credit. The
money obtained may be used to fund
small business start-ups or expansions.
Tenure rights extend to those with oc-
cupancy status the inherent rights of use,
enjoyment, disposal, and recovery, creat-
ing a title that is free from formal regis-
tration requirements. The system thereby
makes it possible to mortgage real estate
without holding formal title. Further-
more, the presumption of ownership may
not be contested by previous owners,
whether private citizens or government.
The processes of establishing and ad-
ministering mortgages have been simpli-
fied dramatically. Foreclosure was in the
past accompanied by a long, tedious col-
lection process. This slow-moving (three
to four years) judicial procedure discou-
raged the granting of loans, because, by
delaying their payments, delinquent bor-
rowers could increase (at lenders' ex-
pense) the benefits of inflation and nega-
tive real interest rates. Loan maturities
have since been shortened, and public
auctions of mortgaged property have
been simplified to prevent borrowers
from obstructing the process.
The most important innovation with
respect to foreclosures is designed to
make the popular mortgage attractive to
creditors. The creation of a new extra-
judicial foreclosure system allows the
parties to mutually designate a third
party, such as a bank or a magistrate, to
sell the mortgaged property in the event
the borrower should default. As a result
of these reforms, a foreclosure can be
carried out within two weeks (in contrast
to the 3-4 years required under a regular
Peruvian mortgage).
Credit Insurance
In granting loans, financial institutions
analyze not only traditional security
devices, but also subjective qualifying
criteria, such as verifiable formal sources
of income. Yet more than 60% of Peru's
citizens do not earn their incomes from
formal sources, so for legal purposes their
incomes are nonexistent. Informal busi-
ness owners are consequently prevented
from qualifying as "good credit risks"
despite the wealth generated by their
income-producing activities.
To bridge the gap created by these sub-
jective requirements for access to formal
credit, the ILD has recommended a mech-
anism known as credit insurance. A local
insurance company provides a guarantee
on behalf of the borrower in return for a
premium equal to 4% of the full amount
of the loan. The lender is insured for the
immediate recovery of a loan in the event
of default, and therefore does not require
an excessively high interest rate to
compensate for risk. Under the present
financial system, informal borrowers are
accustomed to paying interest rates as
high as three to six times the market rate.
Implications
Creating property rights will not only
provide the key to the economic enfran-
chisement of the poor, but will also help
combat the power exercised by terrorists
and drug traffickers. Furthermore, grant-
ing formal title to those who have been
deprived of such rights fosters political
stability, by easing the social tensions
between those without property titles and
wealthy property owners. HI
The problems recognized in, and solutions
proposedfor. Peru by Mr. de Soto are not
unlike some that have been noted by other
observers in other regions. In the Fall
1989 ORERLETIER. economist Austin
Jaffe discussed informal "self-help" in
Eastern Europe, where a lack ofprivate
property rights has created a housing cri-
sis. In a recent WALL STREET JOURNAL
article. Canadian economist Tom Velk
described the communal ownership prac-
ticed on U.S. and Canadian Indian reser-
vations. The system prohibits individuals
from selling "their" land or enjoying oth-
er private property rights, thereby con-
tributing to poverty and unrest. Another
recent WALL STREET JOURNAL piece told
of black South Africans who have been
moved by de Soto's writings to support
"informality" as a means offostering
prosperity in their troubled nation.
ORER News
AREUEA Focus On Auctions
The 1990 meetings of the American
Real Estate and Urban Economics
Association will devote a session to
the topic of auctions. The session will
be chaired by Kenneth Lusht of The
Pennsylvania State University. An
interview with Lusht, on the use of
auctions in the Australian real estate
markets, appeared in the Spring 1990
ORER Letter.
ORER Director Peter F. Colwell
will present his paper, "The Value of
Agricultural Land." Others present-
ing in the session will be Kerry
Vandell and Timothy Riddiough of
the University of Wisconsin; George
Gau and Dan Quan of the University
of Texas, with Theodore Sternberg of
Vanderbilt: and Bruce Vanderporten
of Loyola University in Chicago.
Joining Lusht as discussants will be
Michael Giliberto of Salomon Broth-
ers and Norm Miller of the Universi-
ty of Cincinnati.
Rho Epsilon Officers
The University of Illinois chapter of
Rho Epsilon, the professional real
estate fraternity, has elected its Fall
1990 officers. The election was held
following the final chapter meeting of
the 1990 Spring semester.
Michael Teska, a joint MBA/
Master of Architecture candidate
from Evanston, is serving as chapter
president.
Vice president is Chris Tiemey, a
senior from Bartlett majoring in LAS
Finance/concentration in real estate.
Scott Richrath, a senior in CBA
Finance/real estate from Elmhurst, is
chapter treasurer.
The chapter secretary is Jeffrey
Mitchell, a junior in LAS Economics
from Alton.
The Office of Real Estate Research
congratulates these individuals. Pro-
fessor Roger Cannaday serves as the
chapter's faculty advisor.
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The Economic Impact of Property Rights: Russian Land Reform
Paul Klehnikov
Thefollowing piece augments the open-
ing article; it discusses the economic
benefits that accompanied recognition of
private property rights in Russia in the
early 1900s. Itfirst appeared as "The
Man Who Saved Russia
.
.
. With Capi-
talism." in the July 24. 1990 WALL
STREET JOURNAL. Copyright 1990. Dow
Jones & Company. Inc. It is reprinted
with permission: all rights reserved.
Mikhail Gorbachev ostensibly wants to
dismantle his centrally-planned econo-
my. But after five years, the Soviet Un-
ion is still mired in slothfulness and inef-
ficiency. Why? Because Mr. Gorbachev
has not kept up the pace of his domestic
reforms.
When Mr. Gorbachev took office in
the spring of 1985, he is said to have
commissioned a study of the Stolypin re-
forms. Piotr Stolypin was prime minister
of Russia in the early 20th century. Un-
like Mr. Gorbachev, Stolypin managed
to stave off national disintegration while
reviving a moribund economy.
In the summer of 1905, the humiliat-
ing loss of the war with Japan precipitat-
ed a wave of strikes, mutinies, and po-
groms. Czar Nicholas II granted a con-
stitution that established a democratical-
ly elected parliament in October, but that
step failed to restore order. The follow-
ing year, the new parliament called for
the resignation of the czarist government
and the expropriation of private property.
Enter Stolypin. An experienced civil
servant, he took over the government
with energy and decisiveness. He quick-
ly suppressed the revolution, and rewrote
the electoral laws to favor property own-
ers. Stolypin believed that only broadly-
based property ownership could provide
the foundation for democracy and pros-
perity.
At the time, agriculture accounted for
half the nation's GNP and an impover-
ished peasantry constituted 84% of the
population. The peasants lived in approx-
imately 100,000 villages across Russia,
most without electricity and some inac-
cessible even by road. Their customs had
changed little since the Middle Ages.
Land was owned communally by the
whole village and periodically redistribut-
ed in an egalitarian fashion by village
elders. Capable individuals had no incen-
tive to improve their farming practices,
since the rewards would effectively revert
back to the commune. The result was soil
exhaustion and technological backward-
ness. The peasant commune was a primi-
tive socialist society.
Stolypin blamed the peasant commune
for many of the ills affecting Russia.
Since individual peasants rarely owned
any land of their own, they had no reason
to respect anybody else's property.
Whenever the squalor of village life
became unbearable, they attacked the
property of landowners, shopkeepers, or
whoever else happened to have more than
they did. These revolts had to be sup-
pressed by force, propelling Russia into a
cycle of revolt and repression.
Stolypin's solution was privatization.
He wagered that the peasants would leap
at the chance to own their farms indepen-
dently of the village commune. He enact-
ed a land reform that gave peasants the
right to claim land they worked as private
property. They could even trade their
scattered strips for American-style
homesteads.
Peasants' distrust of the government
ran deep and their attachment to the vil-
lage commune was reinforced by centu-
ries of tradition. But it wasn't long before
the benefits of Stolypin's reform became
clear. The individual farmer could finally
try out the innovative techniques he had
dreamed of; finally he could plant alfalfa
without having the village cattle come
and eat it all: finally, he could skip the
endless bargaining sessions at the village
assembly and concentrate on his own
business.
Within a few years, the creaking pro-
vincial bureaucracy could not survey the
lands and draw up the deeds fast enough.
By 1914, over 40% of peasant house-
holds held their land as private property
and many more waited for their petitions
to be processed. To the dismay of social-
ist intellectuals, the peasants firmly re-
jected the notion of communal land ten-
ure. The big gentry estates meanwhile
were squeezed out of the market by more
resilient peasant competitors; by 1916,
the gentry farmed only 11% of Russia's
farmland.
As a result, the efficiency of Russia's
farming sector improved dramatically.
Russian agricultural production in the pe-
riod 1911-1913 was an average of 47%
higher than in the period 1901-1905. Do-
mestic food consumption rose, but agri-
cultural exports rose even faster, by 6 1 %
between the two periods. Russia solidi-
fied its position as the world's largest ex-
porter of agricultural products. Higher
peasant incomes meant higher consump-
tion of domestic manufactures and great-
er accumulation of capital (peasant sav-
ings increased ninefold in nine years).
Increased export earnings and the solidi-
ty of the gold-backed ruble encouraged
foreign businessmen who rushed to
invest in Russia's booming economy.
Sadly. Stolypin did not live to see his
reforms succeed. In 1911, while attend-
ing a performance at the Kiev Opera
House, he was fatally wounded by a left-
ist gunman. With its restructuring only
partially complete, Russia was thrown
into the First Worid War. Strikes and
mutinies precipitated a new revolution in
February 1917. Stolypin's newly em-
powered peasants refrained from joining
it. But they couldn't hold back the coun-
try's slide into anarchy and terror.
The lesson of Stolypin's reform is that
given economic freedom, even backward
peasants can become entrepreneurial and
politically conservative. Simply put,
privatization pays. But economic reform
should be undertaken boldly: Vacillation
only leads to economic deterioration and
political polarization. If he is serious
about economic reform. Mr. Gorbachev
needs a prime minister like Stolypin. H
Mr. Klehnikov. a reporterfor FORBES
magazine, is writing a Ph.D. dissertation
on the Stolypin reforms.
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Privatization of Assessment , Zoning, and Eminent
Domain Revisited: Accuracy of Owner Valuations
Peter F. Cohvell and Michelle A. Mahue
An article in the previous ORER Letter
(Spring 1990) proposed privatization of
the assessment, zoning, and eminent do-
main functions. The key to this privatiza-
tion plan is the use of assessments pro-
vided by the property owners. Much of
the criticism of that article has centered
on the notion that owners are incompe-
tent at valuing their property.
There is some evidence that, in fact.
is inversely related to owner estimates.
Follain and Malpezzi. in the Review of
Public Data Use. 1981. take a different
tack, comparing owner estimates to house
characteristics, neighborhood characteris-
tics, and tenure length. Their thesis is that
if differences in tenure length are asso-
ciated with differences in owners" valua-
tions, holding characteristics constant,
owner estimates are of doubtful quality.
Except for the overestimate by a constant amount, "...the
results indicate that the appraiser and the homeowner
determine their estimates of housing value with the same
degree of accuracy."
owners are relatively good at valuing
their property. The evidence to the con-
trary seems to compare the estimates of
owners with those of appraisers, appar-
ently with little thought given to possi-
ble errors in appraisers" estimates.
For example, Kish and Lansing in the
Journal of the American Statistical As-
sociation, 1954, find that owners slight-
ly overestimate their property values (by
only 4%) as compared to estimates by
appraisers. The authors find that this er-
ror is negligible across different classes
of community size, house price, tenure
length, and socioeconomic status. They
also find, however, that only 37% of
owners" estimates are within plus or mi-
nus 10% of appraisers' estimates.
In a 1972 study published in the same
journal. Kain and Quigley find that, on
average, owners underestimate by 2%
relative to appraisers. They find that the
relative valuations of owners and ap-
praisers are not influenced by the own-
ers" race, income, age, marital or em-
ployment status, or region of origin. Yet
they find that tenure length increases
owner estimates relative to appraiser
estimates, as does the level of appraised
value. The level of education, however.
as long term residents fail to keep up with
changing prices (a result opposite that of
Kain and Quigley). Given average tenure
length, Follain and Malpezzi compute an
average overestimate ranging from 2% in
Salt Lake City to -7% in San Antonio.
On average, owners underestimate their
property values by 2%. with those in only
two cities overestimating values.
The most direct test of the proposition
that owners are incompetent appraisers is
also the most complete refutation of that
proposition. Robbins and West, in the
Journal of the American Statistical Asso-
ciation, 1977, compare the estimates of
professional appraisers and owners with
statistical estimates of selling prices. (It is
interesting to note that their data includes
only low and moderate income families.)
The only systematic error the authors find
with respect to owners" estimates is an
overvaluation by a constant amount.
However, they find no significant differ-
ence in the dispersion of appraisers" and
owners" estimates. Their conclusion is
that, except for the overestimate by a con-
stant amount, "... the results indicate
that the appraiser and the homeowner de-
termine their estimates of housing value
with the same degree of accuracy." ^
ORER News
U of I Students Honored
Several U of 1 students have been
awarded 1990-91 academic year
scholarships by real estate organiza-
tions. Rho Epsilon secretary Jeffrey
Mitchell is one of 19 undergraduates
nationwide to have received a $2,000
American Institute of Real Estate
Appraisers Scholarship. Mitchell also
joins Cynthia Dee, a law student from
Lombard, in receiving a $1,000 Aca-
demic Scholarship from the Real Es-
tate Education Foundation (REEF) of
the Illinois Association of Realtors®.
The Morgan L. Fitch Scholarship
Fund, also administered by REEF,
has awarded $2,000 to MBA candi-
date Jeffrey Bramson from Chicago
and $1,250 to Lisa Ludwig, a senior
in CBA Finance/real estate from
Westchester. Ludwig was also a
1989-90 recipient of this award.
Ludwig also has been awarded a
$500 SIOR Scholarship by the Chica-
go chapter of the Society of Industrial
and Office Realtors®. Rho Epsilon
Vice President Chris Tiemey has
been awarded $1,000 by the SIOR.
The SIOR Scholarship is awarded to
the individual(s) selected by a com-
mittee of the real estate faculty as the
previous academic year"s outstanding
undergraduate real estate student(s).
Two $5,000 RREEF Fellowships
have also been awarded. The recip-
ients are Daphne Kennedy, a first-
year M.S. Finance candidate from
Chicago, and Karen Woods, a
second-year MBA student from
Chicago Heights.
ORER commends these individuals
for their academic excellence.
The Office ofReal Estate Research malces
every effort to assure the accuracy of all
statements in ORER LETTER articles prepared
by ORER staff'members. However, the reader
should note that legal and regulatory matters,
which are occasionally addressed in ORER
LETTER articles, are subject to change and to
varying interpretations. ORER LETTER
articles do not purport to provide legal or
investment advice, and the Office ofReal
Estate Research shall not be held responsible
for damages resulting from omissions or
inaccuracies in the ORER LETTER or other
ORER publications.
ORER Letter I page 7
r RER Paper Series
Voting Behavior When Public Spending Affects Property Value
Jan K. Brueckner and Man-Soo Joo
The following is an abbreviated version
ofORER Working Paper #81 "Voting
With Capitalization." A single copy of
the longer version of this paper, or ofany
paper in the Working Paper Series, will
be provided to any reader who makes a
written or telephoned request to the
Office ofReal Estate Research.
Economic theory can help to explain vot-
ing behavior in elections in which public
expenditures are determined. Consider
the case of a referendum on raising a
school district's property tax rate. Voters
understand that extra revenue generated
would be used to raise teacher salaries,
reduce class sizes, and upgrade facilities
and instructional materials. In deciding
whether to vote in favor of the referen-
dum, each local household must evaluate
whether the benefit that it would receive
from such spending justifies the higher
property tax payment that would result.
But how should the benefit be measured?
Researchers studying voting behavior
in the past theorized that a household
casts an affirmative vote in such a refe-
rendum if the expected direct benefit
(the dollar value of the improvement in
its children's education) exceeds the tax
increase, and a negative vote otherwise.
For example, several years ago some
economists attempted to explain demand
for education spending by relating voting
behavior to household characteristics
(size, age, income, and education). They
considered responses to survey questions
on the degree to which voters felt local
school expenditure levels were appropri-
ate (results appear in a 1982 Econometri-
ca article by Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and
Shapiro), along with information on
pre-referendum tax burdens.
Although such survey responses might
initially appear to provide a good picture
of the degree to which different types of
households value education spending,
the approach contains some anomalies.
For example, the findings show that vot-
ers over 65 years of age have a higher
demand for school spending than do
younger voters with similar incomes and
educational backgrounds. Since elderly
voters do not have school-age children,
and therefore would receive little direct
benefit from added education spending, a
finding that the elderly support high edu-
cation expenditure cannot be explained
by a theory based on direct benefits
alone. What could explain this result?
The Impact of Wealth
The answer to the puzzle may lie in a
critical omission in the standard theory of
voting. The theory fails to recognize that
when the voter's wealth (rather than sim-
ply the receipt of government services) is
affected by the level of public expendi-
tures, the usual view of voting behavior
must be modified. How are voter wealth
and public spending connected? At the
local level, the connection is obvious: the
resale value of the voter's house is deter-
mined, in part, by the quality of local
public services, particularly education.
In deciding how to vote in a school
spending referendum, the voter therefore
considers three effects. The first and sec-
ond, as standard theory would suggest,
are the direct benefit that the household
receives from the spending and the detri-
ment that it suffers from increased prop-
erty tax. A third consideration, however,
should be the expected change in house
value caused by improved schools. The
household's own receipt of education ser-
vices, then, is not the only benefit that it
considers; the analysis should also in-
clude a house value, or wealth, effect.
The answer to the over-65 puzzle thereby
becomes clear: while the typical elderly
household has no need for the services of
public schools, concern about impacts on
property value might lead older owners to
cast affirmative votes in school spending
referenda (and to indicate high demand
for spending in survey responses).
Benefits and Costs
The purpose of our research is to develop
a theoretical model that captures the
influence of house value considerations
on voting behavior. The first step is to de-
termine conceptually the extent to which
home values depend on the level of edu-
cation spending. We make this determi-
nation by considering the preferences of
the family most likely to buy the house in
the future. The future buyer's marginal
benefit from school spending (that is, the
direct benefit provided by an extra dollar
of spending) depends on the nature of the
buyer's household; if it has young chil-
dren, then its marginal benefit from add-
ed education spending is high. (For
simplicity, we assume that buyers in all
future transactions would share the char-
acteristics of a "most likely" buyer; we
therefore need not consider the buyer's
evaluation of the preferences of house-
holds to whom he might later sell.)
As school spending rises, however, the
future buyer must also pay additional
property taxes, which represent the mar-
ginal cost. As long as marginal benefit
exceeds the marginal cost, extra school
spending enhances the attractiveness of ,
the house to the future buyer, raising its |
value. However, once education outlays
become so high that the marginal benefit
of extra spending falls below marginal
cost, then the higher tax that finances the
extra spending lowers the attractiveness
of the house to the future buyer, reducing
its value. As a result, there is some inter-
mediate "value-maximizing" level of
school spending that is most attractive to
the most likely buyer and, thereby, yields
the highest possible value in the market if
the house is sold.
If the future buyer would receive sub-
stantial direct benefits from school spend-
ing (as would be the case if the most like-
ly buyer were a household with many
children), then the house would be most
attractive (its value maximized) if the
community's school spending level were
high. If direct benefits to the future buyer
were low (the most likely buyer would be
a household with children approaching
college age), then the house would be
most attractive (and its value highest) if
school spending were relatively low.
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Preferences of the Most Likely Buyer
Imagine that the voter plans to sell the
house in the near future (for example, the
voter might be an elderly person retiring
to Florida), and that the voter knows the
relevant characteristics of the most likely
buyer. As a result, the voter knows the
level of education spending that maxi-
mizes the value of the house. Further-
more, imagine that the voter can borrow
against the future resale value of the
house (through a second mortgage or a
home equity line of credit). Initially, we
might also assume that the voter can bor-
row against future income (amounts that
can be borrowed under this type of ar-
community residents. As a result, politi-
cal power is exerted by people who do
not yet reside in the community.
Optimal Spending Redefined
The modified rule for determining the
voter's ideal spending level is a simple
one that reflects the above considerations.
Education spending is best from the vot-
er's point of view when a weighted aver-
age of the marginal benefits to the seller
and the buyer is equal to marginal cost.
For example, spending might be ideal
when 2/3 times the current owner's mar-
ginal benefit plus 1/3 times the most like-
ly buyer's marginal benefit equals margi-
The buyer's preferences thus influence the voting
behavior of current community residents. As a result,
political power is exerted by people who do not yet
reside in the community.
rangement, of course, are limited for most
households). Incorporating all of these
assumptions, we then ask how the voter's
ideal spending level is determined.
If we were to ignore house value ef-
fects, the answer would be that the voter's
most preferred spending level is the level
at which the marginal direct benefit from
an extra dollar of spending is just equal to
the marginal cost in the form of higher
property taxes. How does the answer
change when house value effects are tak-
en into account? The first factor to con-
sider is that an increase in the value of the
house represents an extra benefit over and
above the direct benefit (improved educa-
tion), while a decrease in house value rep-
resents an extra cost. These benefits and
costs must be taken into account in deter-
mining the voter's ideal spending level.
We must also remember that spend-
ing's impact on a home's value depends
on the marginal benefit of spending/row
the future buyer' s point of view, not from
the seller's. Therefore, in taking into ac-
count house value impacts of the school
spending level, the voter ultimately takes
into account the preferences of the most
likely buyer. The buyer's preferences thus
influence the voting behavior of current
nal cost. The weights applied in this aver-
aging process reflect, in part, the expected
date of sale of the house. If the voter plans
to sell the house shortly after the referen-
dum is held, then the buyer's preference
receives a large weight relative to that of
the voter. The construction of this weight-
ed average would explain, for example,
the apparently anomalous behavior of the
elderly voter. If such a voter were plan-
ning to sell within a short time horizon,
the buyer's preferences would play a big
role in determining the ideal spending lev-
el; the elderly seller would favor increased
school spending if the most likely buyer
would be a household with children.
Some economists contend that a ration-
al voter should be concerned only with the
house value effect, and should ignore di-
rect benefits. These observers contend that
if the direct benefit to the voter's house-
hold is not adequate, the house is sold and
the voter moves to another community.
Such an assumption is clearly unrealistic,
given that job and family ties restrict most
people's mobility. Our analysis shows
how the incentive for property value max-
imization is altered under conditions of
restricted mobility. Using the formula dis-
cussed above, we can show that unless the
voter plans to move immediately (in
which case buyer preferences receive
100% of the weight), the owner will not
vote simply to maximize house value.
The voter's preferred spending level
falls short of the value-maximizing level
if the voter's marginal direct benefit
from school spending is less than the
buyer's. This would be true, for example,
in the case of an elderly voter, whose de-
mand for education services is low rela-
tive to that of a buyer with children. The
relationship is reversed if the voter's de-
mand for school services is higher than
that of the buyer; the voter's ideal spend-
ing level then lies above the value-
maximizing level.
A Useful Framework
There are a number of additional ques-
tions that can be addressed using our
framework. One concerns the effect of a
borrowing constraint. Suppose that the
borrower can realistically borrow against
the value of the house but cannot borrow
against future income. How does the
presence of this constraint affect the
ideal school spending level? The answer
is that a voter who is constrained by the
borrowing rule (after consuming all his
housing equity, he would like to borrow
more but cannot) will prefer a spending
level closer to the value-maximizing
level than will a borrower who is not
constrained. In effect, a voter who wants
high current consumption will try to ex-
tract more money from his house than
will a more patient individual. He does
so by voting for school spending closer
to the value-maximizing level (in order
to increase the home's collateral value),
thereby eliminating the need to borrow
against future income.
The results of this research should im-
prove our understanding of voting behav-
ior in local spending referenda. Howev-
er, more work needs to be done, espe-
cially at the empirical level, to explain
the role of property value considerations
in local politics. |
Jan K. Brueckner is a Professor and
Man-soo Joo is a Ph.D. candidate in the
Department ofEconomics at the Univer-
sity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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Real Estate Brokerage: From Sales to Service Through Strict Liability
Thomas Potter, Theron R. Nelson, and Susan L. Nelson
The following article involves an inter-
esting topic on which the authors have
taken a controversial stand. They feel
that brokers may soon find themselves
facing product, and not simply profes-
sional, liability exposure. Yet although
courts in the U.S. have certainly ex-
panded the scope of liability law in re-
cent years, the authors are not aware of
an instance to date in which a court has
determined that a broker who never
held ownership is part of a property's
"chain" of sale.
ORER Letter provides this informa-
tive piece in place of an interview in
this quarter's issue. As more informa-
tion becomes available on the topic, it
will be reported in future issues.
This article is an excerpted version of
"Product Liability Issues in Real Estate
Brokerage." Copies of the complete
version are availablefrom the authors.
The world of real estate brokerage has
become an increasingly treacherous and
complex tangle of conflicting relation-
ships. The old rule of caveat emptor has
finally expired after a lingering illness,
leaving real estate professionals exposed
and vulnerable to lawsuits initiated by
buyers who did not get all they had hoped
for in real estate transactions. The ex-
panding field of professional malpractice
has, in many states, gathered real estate
brokers into its train, increasing the stan-
dard of care which courts apply to the
actions of real estate professionals.
The most menacing development of
all, however, is the rapid evolution of the
Easton rule, which emerged from a Cali-
fornia court case. This rule, now included
in the California Civil Code, imposes an
affirmative duty on a real estate broker to
disclose to each prospective purchaser all
facts which could materially affect the
value of a property. Unfortunately, while
courts have imposed new duties of full
disclosure owed by the broker to the buy-
er, the courts have not relieved the broker
of traditional fiduciary duty to the princi-
pal (the seller). As the application of the
Easton rule expands, brokers will regular-
ly be presented with a "catch 22." In
Easton Rule jurisdictions, a broker who is
aware (or should be aware) of a material
fact which reduces the value of the prop-
erty being shown will have to decide
which set of duties to violate. Either the
broker violates fiduciary duties owed to
the seller by disclosing the material fact
adverse to the principal's interest, or the
broker violates the duty of disclosure
owed to the buyer by remaining silent.
While the growth in broker liability
problems caused by expanded disclosure
and professional liability standards has
caused some concern within the industry,
these problems pale in comparison to the
problems that are appearing on the hori-
zon. // is only a matter of time until prop-
erty owners are allowed to recover dam-
agesfrom brokers under product liability
theories. The rising tide of product liabil-
ity law has begun to creep perilously
close to real estate transactions. New Jer-
sey and California have already held that
the rules governing manufacturers of de-
fective goods and builders of defective
structures should be the same. These de-
cisions are consistent with the modem de-
velopment of product liability law, and
there is every reason to believe that other
states will adopt this posture in the future.
It is also clear that as soon as home build-
ers are swept into the strict liability rules
of the product liability doctrine, real es-
tate brokers will be held to the same stan-
dard, since they act as agents of sellers in
the distribution chain for housing.
Product Liability Theories
The current theory of product liability
maintains that a product manufactured
with due care, which nonetheless causes
injury when used for its intended pur-
pose, must contain an unreasonably dan-
gerous defect. By casting the burden of
injury upon the manufacturer, the courts
have hoped to provide a financial incen-
tive to all manufacturers to release to the
public only products posing little or no
risk of injury. The expected result would
be a reduction in the injuries experienced
by American society. (The unintended
side effect would be a reduction in the
number of products released.)
The safety standards imposed by the
courts' decisions regarding product
liability have played a decisive role in
forming the expectations that citizens of
our country have about the products they
own and use. In view of this develop-
ment, it would be foolish to believe that
the rising tide of burden-casting in prod-
uct liability cases can be resisted.
Unlike negligence actions, in which
defendants pay only for damages which
are "their fault," in strict liability actions
defendants pay for all damages suffered
in connection with the use or ownership
of a product, regardless of fault. There-
fore, those who make and sell products
are strictly liable for any injuries sus-
tained by plaintiffs who use the products.
In a strict liability action, the plaintiff is
entitled to recover damages when proof
is presented that the plaintiff was injured
while using the product. In a very real
sense, strict liability requires the makers
and sellers of products to perform the
functions of insurance companies.
Originally, the term "product" was
applied only to personal property items
(power tools, home appliances) placed
into the stream of commerce by a party
intending to earn a profit through their
sale. This relatively narrow legal defini-
tion clearly excludes the kinds of proper-
ties that real estate professionals typical-
ly sell, and for this reason strict liability
rules have not been applied to real estate
transactions thus far. However, the legal
definition of the term "product" has been
undergoing steady expansion for the last
thirty years, and the definition is now
creeping ever closer to the inclusion of
homes and commercial space.
In 1980, the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled that a storage tank which allegedly
developed cracks was a product within
the scope of strict liability. The product
was placed into the stream of commerce
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by its manufacturer, which apparently
turned a profit on the transaction. The
court ruled that even though the tank had
been affixed to the realty upon which it
was located prior to cracking, the incor-
poration into the real estate did not
change the application of the strict liabili-
ty doctrine to the sale of the tank.
The trend is to hold building develop-
ers strictly liable for defects in the "prod-
ucts" they introduce into the stream of
commerce. Several state courts have held
that, in modem society, there are no
meaningful distinctions between the
mass production of houses and the mass
production of automobiles. Because sell-
ers and buyers have unequal knowledge
and, therefore, unequal bargaining posi-
tions, a buyer is no less vulnerable in a
home buying transaction than in a car
buying transaction. Therefore, according
to the trend in court rulings, manufactur-
ers of both types of "products" should be
subject to strict liability.
The rising tide of strict liability is now
lapping at the ankles of building develop-
ers. In the near future, as the water reach-
es the waists or necks of developers, it
will also sweep real estate brokers into
the strict liability sea. All sellers who en-
gage in the business of selling products
are exposed to the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity. The rationale for this aspect of the
product liability doctrine is a simple one,
consistent with the pure insurance moti-
vation that created the field in the first
place. When a plaintiff is injured through
the use or ownership of a product, the
law seeks to provide recompense for the
injury with minimum inconvenience to
the plaintiff. For this reason, plaintiffs
are allowed to sue any seller in the chain
of distribution, which begins with the
manufacturer of the product and culmi-
nates in the seller from whom the plain-
tiff actually purchases the product.
The plaintiff may choose the nearest
defendant with a pocket deep enough to
pay for the damages. The law then leaves
it to all of the sellers in the distribution
chain to determine among themselves
who will ultimately bear the burden of
the plaintiff's injury. Each seller in the
chain may sue any seller higher up the
chain to recover the damages it may have
been required to pay. Since real estate
brokers, acting as agents of builders and
developers, are in the chain of distribu-
tion for real property, they may be held
strictly liable for all damages suffered by
owners or users of properties they sell.
Strict Liability and Defective Products
In modem practice, the law presumes any
product that injures a plaintiff to contain
an unreasonably dangerous defect. Thus,
the question in a strict liability case is
when a defect, in either manufacture or
design, is unreasonably dangerous. The
answer is that a defect is unreasonably
dangerous whenever it injures a consu-
product. There are, however, serious
legal limitations on the effectiveness of
such warnings to protect manufacturers
from liability if injury occurs.
Liability and Real Estate Professionals
What kinds of defects can exist in prop-
erties (soon to be viewed as products)
sold by real estate professionals? First,
manufacturing defects may include
faulty wiring, missing hand rails on stair-
cases, inadequate ventilation for gas ap-
pliances, or any violations of applicable
building codes. Add to these the substi-
tution of inferior materials (intentionally
or otherwise), use of materials later dis-
Real estate professionals must begin preparations for the
day when courts include real property developments
within the scope of product liability law.
mer who is using the product in a reason-
able manner. It is here that the issue of
foreseeability can be raised by a defen-
dant in a product liability action. For ex-
ample, if a homeowner is injured while
using his power mower to trim a hedge,
a manufacturer of the mower would cer-
tainly argue that hedge trimming is not a
foreseeable use for a lawn mower. Since
that is true, there is no obligation to de-
sign a lawn mower that can be used safe-
ly as a hedge trimmer, and the lack of de-
sign features that make hedge trimming
with a lawn mower safe will not consti-
tute an unreasonably dangerous design
defect. Within the possible interpretations
of foreseeability, however, sellers face an
extremely broad and very gray area.
Waming labels are a more economical
means of avoiding the application of
strict liability. If a waming is given, the
seller may reasonably assume that it will
be followed. Furthermore, a product safe
for its intended use and bearing a waming
against unintended uses is neither defec-
tive nor dangerous. Such reasoning leads
to the conclusion that the best defense to
a strict liability action is a strong offense,
in the form of waming labels, permanent-
ly and conspicuously attached to the
covered to be hazardous or noxious (urea
formaldehyde insulation, for example),
or the installation of furnaces, water
heaters, or other appliances that later
prove to be defective. When the current
trend reaches its logical conclusion,
building developers will be strictly liable
for any injuries that occur during the use
or ownership of the "products" they de-
velop. The developer will be held liable
even when the proximate cause of the in-
jury is a product from another manufac-
turer, which has been incorporated into
the building. As members of the distribu-
tion chain engaged in selling these prod-
ucts, real estate brokers will carry the
same burden borne by the developers.
The really interesting problems will
arise from design defects. For example, a
manufacturer of a pool could be held
strictly liable for injuries incurred due to
a defective diving board. If the manufac-
turer of the pool is strictly liable, then
the developer who built the house on the
lot where the pool (now incorporated
into the developer's product) is located,
and the real estate broker who sold the
house as an agent for the developer, are
also strictly liable as members of the
chain of distribution.
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The reader who is troubled by the
seeming absence of fairness has forgotten
that fairness is not the issue in product
liabiUty law; insurance is the issue. Prod-
uct liability law was developed to protect
victims of dangerous products from hav-
ing to bear the burdens of their injuries.
Strict liability was developed to cast the
burden upon manufacturers of defective
products. It may be true that an initially
reasonable proposition (that makers of
defective products should bear costs of
injuries) should not have led to a conclu-
sion that any product causing injury must
be presumed dangerous. But "dangerous
until proven otherwise" has become a
market value of the property destroyed).
The damages for personal injury, which
include actual medical expenses incurred
by the plaintiff and damages for pain and
suffering (determined by the jury), are
more difficult to determine. Assume that
the jury awards another $1.8 million to
help the plaintiff endure such suffering.
The really big ticket item, however, is
lost income. The plaintiff, of course, is
entitled to recover monetary damages
equal to her income during the period
when she is unable to work. Since our
plaintiff is no longer able to perform sur-
gery, she is entitled to receive the present
value of her future income until retire-
As members of the distribution chain engaged in selling
these products, real estate brokers will carry the same
burden borne by the developers.
guiding principle in shaping American
values and expectations. Those who
ignore the impacts of such a broadly held
set of values do so at their own peril.
Determining the Damages
The measure of damages used in comput-
ing the payment owed by a defendant to
a successful plaintiff in a product liability
action includes not only medical costs
and reimbursement for property damage,
but compensation for pain and suffering
and for lost wages as well. To simplify
the analysis, suppose that a surgeon pur-
chases a home at a cost of $ 1 .5 million,
and fills it with personal effects and
household goods valued at $300,000. A
short time later, the house catches fire
and burns to the ground. The surgeon
suffers bums on her hands that render her
incapable of practicing her profession.
An investigation concludes that the wir-
ing in the house was improperly ground-
ed, causing the kitchen appliance circuit
to overheat, thereby setting off the blaze.
The plaintiff in the lawsuit that will in-
evitably follow is entitled to damages for
both property loss and personal injury.
The amount of the property loss is fairly
easy to calculate: $1.8 million (the fair
ment. Assuming that this individual is fif-
ty years old, and that she had expected to
earn $650,000 per year for each of the 15
years until her retirement, the present val-
ue of that income is just under $5 million.
Our hypothetical broker is now horrified
to discover that his firm is strictly liable
for a damage award to the surgeon ap-
proaching $9 million.
Perceptive readers should now be ask-
ing why the doctor would sue the broker
instead of the developer who built the
house and created the manufacturing de-
fect. Furthermore, since all or most of the
damages would be covered by insurance,
it may seem puzzling why the doctor
would want to sue anybody at all.
The answer to the first question is sim-
ple. The doctor might, indeed, attempt to
sue the developer. Assume, though, that
the developer who built the house also
had developments in Houston, and is no
longer in business after losing its corpo-
rate shirt during the oil bust of the early
1980s. Recall that under product liability
law the plaintiff may choose anyone in
the distribution chain as a defendant, so
a real estate broker with substantial net
worth becomes a handy target.
The answer to the second question is
almost as simple. An injured party with
adequate insurance might be reluctant to
sue. However, insurance policies cover-
ing such perils generally contain standard
form subrogation clauses, allowing the
insurance company to bring action
against any party that the insured could
have sued. Since insurers have paid
billions of dollars on product liability
claims over the last twenty years, they
can be expected to jump at the chance to
become product liability plaintiffs under
subrogation rights.
A Modest Proposal
The preceding analysis suggests that real
estate professionals must begin prepara-
tions for the day when courts include real
property developments within the scope
of product liability law. Protective meas-
ures that brokers might undertake now to
guard against the draconian possibilities
discussed above would include:
1. Never sell a house to a physician,
or other high income individual.
2. Never take a listing on a house
with a swimming pool.
3. Never allow your net worth to
reach a level that might attract
the interest of an insurance com-
pany shopping for defendants.
4. Carry lots of insurance.
If these measures seem unpalatable,
there is one other direction that the real
estate industry can take to ward off the
dangers of product liability litigation.
Our recommendation involves a small,
but radical, change in the way real estate
professionals think about their industry.
Currently, the culture of the industry
and the Realtors® Code of Ethics are
built upon a common understanding that
real estate brokers act as agents of the
sellers in most transactions. As an agent
of the seller, a broker is engaged in the
business of selling houses. This common
understanding causes some difficulty for
brokers. Dual agency conflicts are well
known to the industry, and the Code of
Ethics warns all real estate professionals
against allowing dual agency obligations
to occur. All real estate professionals are
aware that the buyer does not have a rep-
resentative at a closing, unless the buyer
retains the services of an attorney.
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The Easton rule, now codified in Cali-
fornia, represents the largest encroach-
ment to date on the traditional under-
standing of the broker's role. Unfortun-
ately, even with the disclosure rules now
in effect in most states, some real estate
buyers are unaware that brokers they con-
tact and work with do not represent them.
Easton rule courts have shown sympathy
to this buyer ignorance by imposing on
the broker an affirmative duty of disclo-
sure to the buyer. While the duty of dis-
closure owed to buyers may often con-
flict with the fiduciary duties the broker
owes to the principal, it is reasonable to
expect that the industry will learn how to
cope with the attendant problems.
However, the product liability threat is
much more dangerous. By insisting that
brokers always act as agents of the seller,
the real estate industry insists that brokers
sell houses. When houses are included
within the legal definition of "products."
the real estate industry will find itself in-
sisting that brokers sell products, thereby
rendering brokers strictly liable for any
injuries sustained by the use or ownership
of the "products" sold. If houses are not
products, then brokers may escape per-
sonal liability in disclosure cases by be-
ing extraordinarily careful in doing their
jobs. But if houses are products, then
brokers cannot escape liability for injury
caused during home ownership or use,
because liability will be strictly imposed
without regard to knowledge, care, or
diligence on the part of a defendant.
The only way to escape product liabili-
ty is to avoid selling the product. That
avoidance is exactly what we recom-
mend. We believe that the time has come
for the real estate industry to proclaim it-
self a service industry. Brokers who sell
their services to participants in the real
estate market are immune to the product
liability doctrine, while brokers who sell
the houses listed by their principals will
be subject to the doctrine on and after the
day that houses are included within the
legal definition of "product."
The service business exception to the
product liability doctrine was created pri-
marily to benefit the medical profession.
For example, blood banks are relieved of
product liability, because they do not sell
the blood; they sell the service of match-
ing blood donors to blood recipients. In
the same way, a physician who prescribes
medication for a patient is not strictly li-
able for injury caused by taking the medi-
cation. Both the physician and the blood
bank can be held liable for negligent be-
havior, but this liability can be avoided
through the exercise of due care.
By positioning itself as a service indus-
try, the real estate profession can take ad-
vantage of the service industry exception
to the product liability doctrine. This ex-
emption would allow the professional to
escape liability for injuries that occurred
in spite of that professional's effort.
other market makers provide clear, con-
temporary examples of ways to view the
real estate industry. Just as changes in
the way we do business are inexorably
leading the courts to characterize real
property as a product, those changes may
also enhance the market making aspects
of real estate brokerage. The prospect of
product liability being introduced into
the real estate industry makes it impera-
tive for practitioners to examine these
models, and to change the way they
think about their profession.
Our guess is that sometime between
1993 and the year 2000, the sale of resi-
dential properties will be captured by the
By positioning itself as a service industry, the real estate
profession can take advantage of the service industry
exception to the product liability doctrine.
knowledge and diligence. By retaining
the current understanding, whereby bro-
kers sell houses as the agents of owners,
real estate professionals will be over-
whelmed by the inescapable duty to pay
under the doctrine of product liability.
We believe that retaining the current
agency framework is not in the best inter-
ests of the real estate profession. Fortu-
nately, the industry's seeming insistence
that brokers sell property is not mandated
by law in most states. We surveyed li-
censing laws in half the states, and found
that the jurisdictions which, by statute,
impose fiduciary agency duty on licensed
practitioners are a distinct minority.
It appears that the agency relationship,
taken for granted in the real estate indus-
try, is mostly a historical artifact. The
agency relationship had some factual va-
lidity during the middle part of the 19th
century, when a large proportion of real
estate work was done by the commission
agents of the railroads, employed to sell
the thousands of square miles of land ac-
quired from the government as an incen-
tive to lay track. But in the 20th century,
other models of business activity seem
more appropriate.
Stock brokers, commodity dealers, and
product liability doctrine. Commercial
property may be included within the doc-
trine during that same time period. If our
guess is correct, then brokers have a very
short time to restructure their industry
and to turn it into a service business that
lies outside the chain of distribution of
the real estate product.
If the real estate brokerage industry
gains the needed revisions to state stat-
utes to make the industry a true service
business, would that classification ex-
empt real estate brokers from strict liabil-
ity rules if real property is detemiined to
be a product? We cannot answer with
certainty, but there is reason to hope that
the answer would be yes.
If the industry retains its current struc-
ture, will real estate brokers be held
strictly liable, at some point in the future,
for any injuries suffered during the nor-
mal course of owning or using property
they sell? The answer to this question is,
clearly and unequivocally, yes. H
Thomas Potter is a Professor ofFinance,
Theron Nelson is Chairman of the De-
partment ofFinance, and Susan Nelson
is a Professor ofMarketing, at the
University ofNorth Dakota.
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Aurora Market Remains Affordable
Peter F. Colwell
ORER Director Peter Colwell spoke to
the Aurora Board ofRealtors® on Sep-
tember 5. He presented an analysis of
data on the area's recent market activity.
A siimmaij of hisfindings is presented
below.
Through its Star Series, the Bureau of
Economic and Business Research at the
University of Illinois provides speakers
to professional and community groups
across the state. Parties interested in
arranging for speakers should contact
the BEBR: its telephone number is (217)
333-2330.
The recent history of the Aurora area
market presents an interesting case. The
city is close enough to Chicago to be
influenced by that market's activity, yet
is far enough away, and has a strong
enough identity of its own, that separate
trends can appear (see ORER Letter,
Winter 1990).
The first figure below plots the average
number of days a single-family property
has remained on the market through
MLS. As one might expect, houses sold
quickly in the late 1970s, then remained
unsold longer amid high interest rates in
the early 1980s. Should we be troubled
that recent experience shows average
days on the market approaching the highs
of a few years ago; have the "bad old
days" returned? Probably not. Measure-
ment error can easily find its way into
this statistic in certain market environ-
ments. For example, the highs shown for
the early-to-mid 1980s are likely under-
stated, since during that period a frustrat-
ed seller may have changed brokers after
a listing's expiration, or even withdrawn
a property from the market for a period
of time. The measured time in such a
Figure 1: Days on Market
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period may have reflected only a portion
of the time the property was actually
available for sale. While the market has
softened recently, it is not close to the
depths reached in the early to mid 1980s.
The second figure plots both number
of houses sold and total real estate list-
ings (annual rates for all property types,
the only relevant data available, with
estimates for 1990). It is interesting that
the gap has closed in recent years,
though it seems to have widened slightly
in the late 1989 - early 1990 period. But
again, there is not necessarily cause for
concern. The gap is certainly not as wide
as it was at its peak, and there could be
errors from estimating the 1 990 listing
total or from aggregating all property
types. Note in the third figure that the
sale of lots, which accounts for some of
the listing activity, has remained strong.
Perhaps the most interesting story is
told in the fourth figure, which tracks the
average price of an Aurora area home, in
both nominal and inflation-adjusted dol-
lars. We should not be surprised to see
today's nominal cost considerably higher
than that of the late 1970s. What may be
surprising is that the inflation-adjusted
cost is somewhat lower today than it was
in the vigorous market of a dozen years
ago. In fact, Aurora's affordability is
even greater than the figure might indi-
cate, because the quality of the average
home has risen in recent years. A figure
showing the average "real" cost of a
"constant quality" home in Aurora would
certainly demonstrate a downward slope.
Aurora appears to offer a very affordable
housing market. B
ORER News
ORER Paper Available
Paper #82, "The Use of Futures To
Hedge the Price Risk of Construction
Materials," by Mohammad Amr A.G.
Hassanein, is the most recent addition
to the ORER Working Paper Series.
Dr. Hassanein is on the faculty of the
U of I College of Engineering. The
paper is available in two versions, the
longer of which is a technical work of
sufficient length that ORER must
charge $6 for each request (to cover
copying and mailing costs). A short-
er, summary version is also available.
A single copy of the summary
version, or of any other paper in the
series, is available at no cost to the
requestor from the Office of Real
Estate Research.
New Licensing Examination Procedures
Recent administrative changes in the
Illinois licensing examinations for real
estate salespersons and brokers may be
of interest to ORER Letter readers.
The changes follow the state's appoint-
ment of a new examination administra-
tor; Assessment Systems, Inc. replaces
Educational Testing Service. The first
tests under the new system will be ad-
ministered on October 16. There no long-
er are application forms; all registration
activity is conducted by phone. The
applicant should call 1-800-274-0999
(between 8:00 A.M. and 8;00 P.M.
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday)
at least three business days before the
desired examination date.
The exam is to be completed on a de-
vice called Ex Pro, a hand-held computer
that administers all aspects of the multi-
ple-choice exam. It presents questions.
allows review of previous questions, and
keeps track of time (four hours are per-
mitted) and score. The examinee learns
immediately upon completion if a passing
score has been achieved.
Examinees may use calculators, but not
those with alpha keyboards. Solar calcula-
tors, which require brightly lit rooms, are
not recommended.
A Candidate' s Booklet will be provid-
ed to each individual who registers for
one of the exams. The booklet is to con-
tain information on exam dates and test-
ing center locations. The Booklet must be
obtained from Assessment Systems. Inc.
:
ORER will not have access to the Booklet
and will not be able to provide copies to
U of I students or alumni. The examina-
tion fee of $42 must be paid on the day of
the exam. Cash and personal checks are
not acceptable forms of payment.
Course and experience requirements
remain the same. U of I Finance 264 and
464 continue as qualifying courses for the
salesperson's exam, while the other
Finance courses in real estate (365 - 369)
and Agricultural Economics 312 can help
to fulfill broker exam requirements. The
applicant who has completed any qualify-
ing course work at the University of Illi-
nois should contact the Office of Real Es-
tate Research for a Uniform Real Estate
Transcript. Please include your full name.
Social Security Number, the semester the
course was completed, the name of the
instructor, and the final grade.
Readers should also note that the Gen-
eral Assembly has delivered to Governor
Thompson a bill to require each license
holder to complete twelve hours of
continuing real estate education every
twenty-four months. H
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Exactions as Double Taxation
Peter F. Colwell and Joseph W. Trefzger
Municipalities routinely take from owners
some of their rights to use land, and,
instead of paying compensation for the
property taken, require the owners to pay
ransom to recover their lost rights. These
payments are euphemistically referred to
as exactions; they entail charges in the
form of money, land, or public facilities
improvements required by local govern-
ments in return for development rights.
Money charges of this nature, sometimes
called impact fees, may be as high as tens
of thousands of dollars per lot.
The popular view is that in the absence
of exactions, developers of new projects
would not be paying their fair share for
the new public facilities (for example,
waste water treatment and road or utility
extensions) required specifically to serve
their new developments. Many feel that
without exactions, owners of previously
developed properties would be subsidiz-
ing the owners of new developments.
This view may be incorrect, however,
as it fails to recognize the double taxes
that can actually be applied to undevel-
oped properties that are prime candidates
for development. Imagine a community in
which the jurisdictions of taxing authori-
ties (such as a fire protection or mass tran-
sit districts) extend beyond the urbanized
area into the agricultural fringe. The
market value of an agricultural parcel in
the area close to urban developments
reflects two components: the value in use
of the tract as farm land, and the value of
the owner's option to develop the agricul-
tural land for urban activities.
If the undeveloped land is assessed for
tax purposes based on its value in use,
then the owner certainly is not paying for
an urban level of public services. If, how-
ever, the undeveloped land is assessed
based on its higher market value, the
owner of the undeveloped land pays sub-
stantial sums for a trivial level of public
services. Yet the higher property tax rep-
resents only the first time that the owner
of undeveloped land must pay for these
urban services.
The owner then pays for urban services
a second time, when forced to acquire the
right to develop the property by paying
exactions. For example, in order to gain
the jurisdiction's approval to subdivide
a parcel into residential lots, the owner/
developer might have to donate to the
jurisdiction a tract that can be used as
a public park or as the site for a new
school. Essentially, the municipality has
captured the rights to use and develop
land, and will return these rights only if
the owner pays an exaction. It should not
surprise the reader that under "exaction,"
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Diction-
my lists the synonym "EXTORTION."
Of course, if owners of land on the
urban fringe do not pay taxes on the
option value prior to undertaking devel-
opment, and if after development they
receive services of greater value than
their immediate tax payments could buy,
then they indeed receive subsidies from
owners of established properties. Howev-
er, to the extent that owners of not-yet-
developed tracts on the urban fringe do
pay taxes in excess of the values of the
public services received, it is they who
are subsidizing the owners of previously
developed land. In such instances, if
owners of undeveloped land must then
pay for rights to develop, they are clearly
being required to pay twice.
It would be interesting to learn the
relative magnitudes of the subsidies that
exist. Perhaps, contrary to the popular
view, the owners of undeveloped land
pay more than their fair share; such an
outcome would result if the subsidies
these owners paid prior to developing
exceeded the subsidies they received
after development occurred. Of course,
the net subsidy depends on the rules for
assessing agricultural land and the juris-
dictional boundaries. H
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Fish Story: The Great Acid Rain Flimflam
Edward C. Krtig
The following is a slightly edited version
ofan article by the same title appearing
in the Heritage Foundation' s Spring
1990 POLICY REVIEW (Volume 52. pp.
44-48). It is presented with permission.
For more than a dozen years, the conven-
tional wisdom among scientists, environ-
mentalists, and politicians has blamed
acid rain for the depletion of game fish-
eries in the Adirondacks and Nova Sco-
tia and for substantial damage to forests
from Vermont to North Carolina. The
government of Canada certainly takes
this view, and regards acid rain clouds
from the Midwest as one of its principal
sources of tension with the United States.
President Carter endorsed a report by his
Council on Environmental Quality call-
ing acid rain one of the two most serious
environmental problems of the century.
It is largely to reduce the acid in rain that
President Bush"s Clean Air legislation
calls for a 50 percent reduction in sulfur
dioxide emissions (10 million tons) by
the year 2000, at an estimated cost of
$4 billion to $7 billion per year.
The concerns that acid rain legislation
is intended to address are legitimate and
understandable. A number of rivers in
Nova Scotia have lost most of their sal-
mon over the past 40 years as they have
become more acidic. Red spruce are dy-
ing on top of Camel's Hump in Vermont
and Mount Mitchell in North Carolina.
And there is no doubt that some Adiron-
dack fisheries are in a bad way. From the
turn of the century until the 1950s, for in-
stance. Lake Colden was one of the best
trout fly fishing lakes in the eastern U.S.
Teddy Roosevelt fished there often; he
was vacationing at Lake Colden when
President McKinley was shot. Today,
Lake Colden is highly acidic (pH 5.0)
and nearly fishless. It is held up as the
classic case of acid rain's destructiveness.
Recent research, however, suggests
that acid rain has little or nothing to do
with these problems. Surveys of lakes in
New England and New York show much
less acidity than anticipated, while other
studies show that acid rain has very little
effect on suiface water acidity. Perhaps
most intriguing, fossil records in lake
sediments reveal that many lakes that are
acidic today have been highly acidic for
centuries, except for several decades in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries
when they were unnaturally alkaline.
Memories of trout and salmon in now
fishless lakes and streams apparently date
from a period of ecological aberration. A
number of lakes in the Adirondacks and
Nova Scotia that are naturally acidic be-
came more alkaline for several decades
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Fall 1990
ORER News
Brueckner Edits JVE
University of Illinois Economics Pro-
fessor and ORER Research Associate
Jan Brueckner has been named Edi-
tor of the Journal of Urban Econom-
ics. The prestigious Journal is one of
the leading publications in urban
economics. Brueckner has served for
many years as a member of the publi-
cation's editorial advisory board.
Go East, Young Man
On October 18, ORER Director Peter
Colwell presented the results of his
study. "The Value of Agricultural
Land," to a seminar of faculty mem-
bers at the University of Connecticut.
On October 30 he presented the same
paper at a seminar sponsored by the
Center for Real Estate Development
at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. The MIT presentation
was part of a series of seminars on
real estate and urban economics
conducted by the Center. Colwell
had earlier presented his findings to
a faculty audience at the U of 1.
Alumni Luncheon
The tenth luncheon for University of
Illinois alumni working in the real
estate field was held on November 2
at the Chicago Yacht Club. More
than 90 attendees heard Peter Morris
of VMS Realty Partners share his
"Reflections on the Current State of
the Real Estate Industry." Thanks
again to Gene Stunard for arranging
for use of the Yacht Club's facilities.
The luncheon series has been very
successful in bringing alumni togeth-
er and providing a foaim for timely
and, at times, controversial speakers
who volunteer to address those in at-
tendance. Costs of food and facilities
can be substantial, and any shortfalls
(continued on page 7)
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Commentary I
when massive cutting of trees and burn-
ing of stumps by lumberers reduced the
acidity of the forest floor, and soil runoff
made it possible for species such as trout
and salmon to survive. After lumbering
and burning came to an end. forests grew
back, and the soil runoff, and hence the
waters, returned to their natural acidity.
These changes in land use often dwarf in
importance the impact of acid rain.
There is similarly no evidence of wide-
spread forest decline related to acid rain.
Indeed, Forest Service statistics indicate
Northeastern forests to be the most robust
in the country. The principal concern is
that acid rain may have damaged red
spruce in high-altitude spruce/fir forests.
But these forests make up only a fraction
of 1 percent of Eastern forests, and even
here, the influence of acid rain is uncer-
tain. The EPA's National Acid Precipita-
tion Assessment Project (NAPAP) has
determined that other stress factors (kill-
ing winters and severe droughts over the
past 40 years, such as occurred at Cam-
el's Hump and other mountains) have
been more important. Also, many species
of trees and bushes-among them red and
black spruce, oak, balsam fir, eastern
hemlock, rhododendron, and blueberry-
depend on acidic soil for survival.
Control Soot, Emit Acid
There is no question that the rain and
snow over the Appalachians, New Eng-
land, and Nova Scotia are more acidic
than normal. Rain over the Ohio Valley
and Adirondacks has a pH of 4.2, while
that over Nova Scotia has a pH of 4.6 to
4.8-compared with a pH of 5.0 for nor-
mal rainfall over forested areas. (Chem-
ists use the measure pH to describe the
concentration of hydrogen ion released
into water by an acid. It is a negative log
scale, so the smaller the number the
greater the acidity; thus pH 4.0 water is
10 times more acidic than pH 5.0 water.
Lemon juice has a pH of 2.0 and our
stomach juices are pH 1.0. Apples have a
pH of 3.0, meaning they are 16 times as
acidic as Adirondack rain.)
Nor is there any question about the
source of acid rain. It results from the
combustion of fossil fuels, especially in
the Midwest, and ironically it has been
aggravated by environmental policies de-
signed to reduce air pollution problems,
especially soot, in areas such as Pitts-
burgh and Cleveland. Acid rain is creat-
ed by burning fossil biomass. Carbon,
nitrogen, and sulfur (present in all bio-
logical material) are converted to gases
upon oxidation (burning). These gases
combine with atmospheric water to form
carbonic, nitric, and sulfuric acids.
When tall smokestacks were built to
spread emissions from the vicinity of
Midwestern factories, winds carried the
acidic clouds to the northeast. Emissions
also became more acidic as advances
such as particle precipitators and cleaner
burning fuels reduced soot. (Soot con-
tains alkaline substances that neutralize
acid. ) Efforts to alleviate local soot prob-
lems thus led to regional acid rain.
Sulfur Trouble
Widespread acid rain probably began by
the 1940s in the Northeast. It peaked
around 1973, when national sulfur diox-
ide emissions measured 3 1 million tons.
But the emissions had fallen to 23 mil-
lion tons by 1985, partly as a result of
pollution controls and conservation, and
replacement of older, more heavily
polluting factories and power plants by
state-of-the-art facilities as mandated
under the Clean Air Act of 1970.
The major concern over acid rain has
to do with sulfuric rather than nitric acid,
because forest growth in eastern North
America is limited by the availability of
nitrogen. Essentially all nitric acid in
acid rain is absorbed as a nutrient by
trees; little reaches lakes and streams.
However, deposition of sulfuric acid ex-
ceeds the nutritional requirements of the
forests and much, but not all, of the sul-
fate finds its way into lakes and streams.
Even the normal rainfall in forested
areas, with pH 5.0, is too acidic for most
species of sport fish to survive. Fish and
many other species can survive the rain-
water only because acids are naturally
buffered by lime-like substances in rocks
and mineral soils of lake and river drain-
age systems. Acid in watershed runoff is
consumed by reaction with the alkalinity
of lime-like substances found in many
types of rocks and mineral soils that
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underlie watersheds and the bottoms of
lakes and streams. Acidity of lakes in the
l\dirondacks and Nova Scotia results not
from acid rain but from the absence of
this natural buffering.
For Peat's Sake
Most lakes in the Northeast are not high-
ly acidic, even though acid precipitation
falls on the entire area. In 1980. before it
had studied the situation, the EPA assert-
ed that the acidity of Northeastern lakes
had increased 100-fold (a decrease of
two pH units) as a result of acid rain.
But a 1984 lake survey by NAPAP found
only 240 of New England's and New
York's 7.000 lakes to be "acid-dead"
(pH of 5.0 or lower). The survey found
that in the whole eastern United States
there are only 630 acid lakes, represent-
ing 35,000 of the approximately 200 mil-
lion acres of water in the East, or less
than one fiftieth of 1 percent of the
water. Over half the acid lake capacity,
20,000 acres, is in Florida, which does
not receive high rates of acid rain.
Further studies by NAPAP in 1988
and 1989 suggest that since 1850 there
has been no increase in acidity in lakes
with a pH above 5.5: these lakes have
granite and gravel bottoms with suffi-
cient lime to neutralize the acid in rain.
For Adirondack lakes with a pH under
5.5, NAPAP concluded that there has
been some acidification, but on average
by less than half a pH unit. Attention on
acid rain now focuses primarily on the
Adirondacks rather than on the entire
Northeast, because studies show 10 per-
cent of Adirondack lakes (or 24 percent,
depending on what is included as a lake)
to have pH of 5.0 or lower.
There are much more important rea-
sons than acid rain, however, to explain
their acidity. The Adirondack lakes in
question are in poorly buffered and,
therefore, naturally acidic watersheds.
Their rocks are poor in lime-like
substances: their watersheds are mantled
by highly acidic, very thick peaty forest
floors, and leaching of water through the
soil produces a low-nutrient environment
where acid-producing trees and plants,
such as sphagnum mosses, are common.
In fact, a recently completed multimil-
lion dollar biological and chemical sur-
vey of over 1 ,400 Adirondack lakes and
ponds observed a striking correlation
between biology and acidity: sphagnum
mosses are associated with acid lakes.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory deter-
mined that acid Adirondack lakes tend to
be concentrated in watersheds having co-
niferous forests and the most acidic soils.
Bark Eaters
Perhaps NAPAP's most important Adi-
rondack studies have involved paleolim-
no/o^?v-examinations of fossil organisms
and chemicals buried in lake sediment.
The pH balances of earlier periods can be
eliminated from Lake Champlain by the
1830s, and lake trout have disappeared
from the lake since 1880.
Since the 1800s, the Adirondacks have
been well known for their massive stock-
ing failures. Tens of millions of fish have
been put into waters where they prompt-
ly died. Great Lakes whitefish were
introduced as food for trout. But these
whitefish grew too large for trout to eat.
Competition from whitefish. along with
fishermen's preference to catch trout,
reduced or eliminated trout populations.
Introduction of bass and yellow perch
outcompeted and eliminated trout fisher-
ies from many ponds and streams.
After lumbering and burning came to an end, forests grew
back, and the soil runoff, and hence the waters, returned to
their natural acidity. These changes in land use often
dwarf in importance the impact of acid rain.
determined with considerable precision
by examining algae fossils in conjunction
with radioisotope dating, because differ-
ent species of algae are present with dif-
ferent pH levels. These studies reveal
that high-altitude Adirondack lakes,
including Lake Colden and Woods Lake,
have been fishless for most of their histo-
ry. However, the lakes temporarily lost
some natural acidity during the mid-to-
late 19th and early 20th centuries, and
during this period were filled with fish.
Woods Lake, for instance, was acid-dead
in 1850, long before there was acid rain.
Beginning in the 1860s, the lake became
gradually more alkaline, peaking at a 5.7
pH in 1910. It has since reacidified, and
now has a pH of 4.8.
These findings are consistent with
what we know from history. Indians nev-
er lived in the Adirondacks. The Iroquois
word "Adirondack" means "bark eater;"
the food supply, including fish, was nev-
er plentiful. Most Adirondack waters
have always been cold and unproductive;
the few excellent fisheries were generally
confined to the few large lowland lakes
and rivers. Initial European settlement
and activity damaged what fisheries there
were. For example, Atlantic salmon were
Devastated Land, Fish in the Lakes
However, there were successful stock-
ings of brown and brook trout in the
mid-to-late 1 9th century, when the Adi-
rondacks became a major center for lum-
bering and paper pulp-and also for the
destructive slash-and-bum methods that
until recently were typical of logging.
Cutting was invariably followed by fires.
Fuel was plentiful; left-over cuttings,
and the luxuriant mosses and thick peaty
forest floor, exposed to sun and air,
became dry and highly flammable. In
1903, in a two-month conflagration
rivaling Yellowstone's 1988 fires,
Adirondack fires literally burned in their
own updraft, like chimney fires sweep-
ing up mountainsides. Witnesses com-
pared the burning mountains to "smol-
dering volcanoes." The sun became
orange; stars were blocked out at night.
The cumulative devastation was horri-
ble. According to an official history
published by the Adirondack Museum,
"Logging and fires changed the Adiron-
dacks more drastically and rapidly than
any factors since these mountains first
rose above the sea." The landscape was
denuded, and severe erosion washed
away the thin and rocky mineral soils.
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Runoff from the land became much more
alkaline. Forests gone, spongy and
water-absorbent mosses and the acidic
peaty forest floor were burned off and re-
placed by alkaline ash. The ironic result,
though, was that sport fish could survive
in lakes previously uninhabitable.
Unprecedented disturbance in the Adi-
rondacks was then followed by unprece-
dented protection. Plans for the "Forever
Wild" Adirondack Park and Forest Pre-
serve were established in 1892. and the
state of New York gradually acquired
park land, much of it purchased literally
at fire-sale prices from lumber and paper
companies that were abandoning their
nearly half its lakes have a pH lower than
4.7. Salmon have been disappearing as
lakes and streams have become more
acidic, and fingers are pointing to acid
rain as the culprit. The concern is perfect-
ly understandable, but the rain over Nova
Scotia is only one third as acidic as that
over the Adirondacks.
As in the Adirondacks. Nova Scotia
has a history of slash-and-bum lumbering
followed by reforestation, and a long his-
tory of fishery problems. A 1986 study of
Nova Scotian fisheries by Environment
Canada (the Canadian version of our
EPA) noted the severe burning of forests
in the province at the turn of the century.
Environmentalists who are concerned with
preserving natural acidic aquatic ecosystems
will he at odds with those who want to lime
lakes and streams in order to go fishing.
devastated forests. Since about 1915,
laws against cutting and burning have
been seriously enforced. Forest fires are
now put out quickly. As a result, the fo-
rests, acid peaty soils, and acid-requiring
and acid-producing trees and mosses are
coming back. And lakes that historically
have been highly acidic are nearing their
natural pH balances.
To add to the pressure on fisheries
from natural acidification, the beauty
of the mountains and improved public
transportation resulted in a massive
increase in the number of fishermen.
Registration in Adirondack public
campgrounds rose from 37,000 in 1927
to 950,000 in 1970. In addition, these
campers were very uncomfortable with
insects, particularly blackflies. DDT was
mixed into cement bricks and deposited
into the waters to slowly release DDT
over the years to kill flies. Elimination of
flies contributed to the disappearance of
the trout that relied on them for food.
The Key to Lox
The experience in Nova Scotia is similar
to that of the Adirondacks. Nova Scotia
has more acid lakes and streams than
any other area of North America; indeed
with 90 percent of southwestern Nova
Scotia (where salmon depletion is most
pronounced) then being mapped as tree-
less barrens.
The soils-little more than peaty forest
floor and moss-were literally burned
down to the underlying granite bedrock,
leaving behind alkaline ash. By 1954,
however, about half of the land was for-
ested, and in 1970, 70 percent was fores-
ted. Effects on lakes were the same as
in the Adirondacks: forest runoff, which
had become more alkaline, returned to its
natural acidic state. The process is con-
fimied in sediment studies, which again,
as in the Adirondacks case, reveal that
lakes are acidifying after a period when
they were unnaturally alkaline.
Kejimkujik Lake, 10 square miles of
water in the acid lake and river district of
southwestern Nova Scotia, had a pH of
4.0 in 1 850. In the decades thereafter,
lake pH rose to about 5.0 with cutting
and burning of the watershed. With
forest recovery, the lake has reacidified
slightly to pH 4.8. While the sediment
record shows that Kejimkujik Lake has
become somewhat more acidic over the
past 30 years, it is still not as acidic as it
was before cutting and burning.
Rivers of Hunger
Experience in Norway is also compara-
ble. Acid rain clouds from Britain and
Germany have been blamed for the
recent depletion of trout in lakes in south-
em Norway. But this is not the first time
these lakes had lost their fish. Viking
legend is filled with stories of fishing M
lakes and streams that went barren as a
result of "sinful" behavior. The medieval
Norwegians even had a word for lakes
without fish, "fiskelostjem." Sediment
analyses of Lake Langtjem, the most
studied acid lake in the country, show
that it was more acidic 800 years ago
(pH 4.3) than it is today (pH 4.7). Studies
of two other Norwegian lakes show a
sharp increase in acidity (from pH 5.5 to
pH 4.5) between 1350 and 1500, when
forests grew back because the plague of
1349 killed two thirds of Norway's popu-
lation. Of the 12 Norwegian lakes with
published sediment records, 1 1 were
acidic prior to the industrial era.
Between 1850 and 1900, long before
tall smokestacks and particle precipita-
tors, there was a sharp increase in the
acidity of many Norwegian lakes and
streams, and a corresponding decline in
fisheries. Geologist Ivan Rosenqvist
developed the theory of changing land
use to explain the phenomenon. After
1850 an exodus of population to the New
World, combined with modem agricultu-
ral and forestry practices, put an end to
traditional slash-and-bum methods that
had been used to burn off acid soils and
acid-producing vegetation. Marginal
rocky and mountainous lands were aban-
doned and afterward were covered by
lichens, moss, heath, and forest. Acidic
peaty soils and acid-producing vegetation
increasingly covered the landscape.
According to Rosenqvist, it was these
watershed changes that most affected
the pH balance of surface waters.
The notion that acid rain is responsible
for acidity in lakes and streams is also
contradicted by the existence of highly
acidic surface waters in regions without
acid precipitation. Fraser Island, Cooloo-
la National Park, and Tasmania in Aus-
tralia, and the Westland area of New Zea-
land have no acid rain, yet are filled with
highly acidic lakes and streams. Indeed,
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the magnitude of acidic surface waters in
areas without acid rain dwarfs that of
areas supposedly "devastated" by acid
rain. In the Amazon basin, a river system
the size of the Mississippi, the Rio Ne-
gro, is naturally acidic and fishless. The
naturalist and explorer Alexander von
Humboldt wrote of these "rivers of hun-
ger" nearly 200 years ago. definitely pre-
dating industrial activity in this region.
Clear as Acid
The return to natural acidity in the lakes
and streams of Nova Scotia and the Adi-
rondacks is obviously a disappointment
to sport fishermen. It is not clear, though,
why acidification should otherwise be
considered an environmental problem.
Acidity frequently contributes to beauty.
particularly the crystal clarity of acidic
waters with little living in them. And
swimmers do not face nuisances such as
slimy green algae or leeches. Lake Cold-
en and the other fishless High Peak lakes
are the Adirondack Park's most visited.
Similarly, the clear acidic lakes of the
Cape Cod National Seashore (an area
with almost as many acid lakes as the
Adirondacks) are so popular that the
National Park Service has deliberately
underdeveloped swimming and hiking
access to them to prevent overuse.
If. however, the loss of fish is consid-
ered a problem, then multibillion dollar
controls on sulfur dioxide emissions are
not the solution. Since lake acidification
results much more from the absence of
natural buffering than from acid rain,
reductions in the sources of acid rain
will not restore fisheries. According to
NAPAP projections, a 30 percent reduc-
tion in rain acidity over 20 years would
deacidify only 26 Northeastern lakes.
A much less expensive and more ef-
fective solution is to do what farmers and
gardeners do with acid soil: add lime.
Lime dropped by helicopter buffers acids
in watersheds the same way that cutting
and burning, or limestone in rocks and
gravel, does. A NAPAP study estimates
that all Adirondack lakes and ponds
more acidic than pH 5.7 can be limed for
$ 1 70.000 per year. Extrapolating to the
entire Northeast, all acid lakes in New
England and New York could be limed
for under $500,000 per year.
Over the past several years, scientists
have added lime to Woods Lake. But.
as in most acidic headwater lakes, lime
placed directly into the lake gets flushed
out too quickly to be very useful. There-
fore, in the fall of 1989. scientists limed
the acidic soils surrounding Woods Lake
so that the lime will slowly dissolve over
time to wash alkalinity into the lake. It's
a simple answer that is much less expen-
sive than emission controls and has the
advantage of working.
Similarly, the overall health of high-
altitude red spruce forests can be im-
proved by low-cost, low-rate application
of a balanced neutral nutrient salt mix. as
is being done in Europe. Liming is not
appropriate in these forests because it can
reduce acidity, thereby adversely affect-
ing varieties of trees requiring acidity.
Improved nutrient status enables forests
to better resist all types of stress, from
climate and disease to air pollution.
Of course, environmentalists who are
concerned with preserving natural acidic
aquatic ecosystems will be at odds with
those who want to lime lakes and streams
in order to go fishing. This conflict has
come to a head in Cape Cod, where the
National Park Service cites its mandate to
"protect the natural ecosystems of its
parks" in resisting pressure to "improve"
acid lakes by liming. Liming would kill
the sphagnum mosses that grow deep in
the bottoms of these lakes. The question
is whether we want sphagnum mosses or
fish; we usually can't have both.
The response among most American
and Canadian voters is almost certainly
to be fish. If so, the central question for
acid rain policy is this: Do we want to
spend billions of dollars a year on emis-
sions controls that won't put back fish in
lakes and streams that used to have them?
Or do we want to spend hundreds of
thousands of dollars a year on a simple
policy that will? m
Edward C. Knig is a writer and consul-
tant in Winona. Minnesota. He is current-
ly completini> a hook on the acid rain
issue. At the time the original article was
written. Dr. Krug was a soil scientist with
the Illinois State Water Survex.
Acid Rain Update: Watershed
Liming Presents A New Alternative
There are new solutions to high acidi-
ty in streams and lakes. In the past,
fish in many upstate New York lakes
were lost after the water became too
acidic. While some still argue wheth-
er this rise in acidity is due to chang-
es in surrounding land use (reforesta-
tion) or to the impact of acid rain,
most scientists are committed to
counteracting its destructive effects.
The traditional method of reducing
acidity is to treat the water itself by
applying a limestone slurry. This
method, however, has met with limit-
ed success. Spring rain and melting
snow drain into restocked lakes, and
acidity returns to its previous high
levels, killing fish and their eggs.
Cornell biologist Carl Schofield
approaches acidity from a different
angle. By dropping limestone pellets
throughout the watershed, Schofield
attacks high acidity at a level one step
closer to the problem's source.
Schofield drew his ideas from pre-
vious experiments in Great Britain
and Scandinavia. Watershed liming
provides an extended period during
which the alkaline pellets gradually
dissolve, allowing for greater longev-
ity of treatment. His New York
experiment, which includes Woods
Lake, marks the introduction of this
method of treatment to the U.S. If the
results are consistent with those of
previous experiments, the benefits of
watershed liming may last five or
more years. Since the effects of direct
liming last about a year, watershed
liming may well be more economical.
Critics argue that liming creates its
own set of ecological problems. In-
creased levels of toxins and sediment
have been demonstrated, as well as
more frequent abnormalities in fish.
In an argument not designed to
appeal to fishermen, critics claim that
liming destroys forms of life that
thrive in more acidic environments.
Artificial means of reducing acidity,
however, could be replaced by a
more active lumber industry. Perhaps
this alteration of surrounding land
use, although not necessarily politi-
cally palatable, presents the most
direct solution to high acidity.
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The Clean Air Act and Its Impact on Illinois
Peter F. Colwell and Michelle A. Mahue
After nearly a year and a half of debate
in both houses of Congress. President
Bush signed the Clean Air Act on No-
vember 1 1, creating the nation's primary
air pollution legislation. Although the
Clean Air Act has been signed into law,
the actual guidelines for Illinois utilities
and other industries have yet to be estab-
lished. The EPA, in conjunction with
Illinois energy and environmental regu-
latory bodies, will negotiate the specific
requirements and allowances.
Beginning January 1, 1995, users of
high sulfur coal will face added emission
restrictions. Even tougher requirements
will take effect January 1, 2001, when the
second phase of restrictions on sulfur
dioxide is implemented. The restrictions
force utilities to switch to lower sulfur
coal or to install scrubbers. One conces-
sion Bush made to help assure the bills"
passage was agreeing to provide training
and income assistance to workers dis-
placed by restrictions on high sulfur coal.
Restrictions affecting Illinois most severely concern
sulfur dioxide emissions. Southern Illinois is the home
to many high sulfur coal mines. Furthermore, many of
the state's industries burn high sulfur coal.
Main Provisions
In an effort to reduce vehicle pollution,
the Act creates phased restrictions that
require auto makers to install more effi-
cient emission control systems. In cities
with high smog levels, such as Chicago,
restrictions will be placed on fuels that
may be sold; only cleaner fuels, such as
ethanol, may be available in such areas.
Officials predict that Cook. DuPage,
Lake, and portions of Will, McHenry,
and Kane Counties will be affected. Reg-
ulations to control emission credit trad-
ing between counties have not yet been
established. The restrictions will in-
crease fuel and, consequently, commut-
ing costs. Relative property values will
shift in favor of more accessible parcels.
Another series of restrictions will be
placed on industries located in cities that
fail to meet the Act's ozone attainment
standards. Firms emitting any of the 1 89
toxic substances identified in the Act
must reduce emissions or face shut-
downs. Further use of chlorotluorocar-
bons and other ozone-hanning chemicals
will be phased out. Because Chicago
falls within the scope of these regula-
tions as well, its industrial property
values may be adversely affected.
Impact on Illinois
The restrictions that will affect Illinois
the most severely are those concerning
sulfur dioxide emissions. Southern Illi-
nois is the home to many high sulfur coal
mines. Furthemiore. many of the state's
utilities and industries bum high sulfur
coal. Although legislators bargained for
extra pollution allowances, the restric-
tions imposed by the Act will still be
difficult and costly for Illinois to attain.
An Example: Illinois Power
Decatur-based Illinois Power, which pro-
vides electricity to many downstate are-
as, is the largest user of Illinois coal. The
company has begun activities to comply
with the federal guidelines while not de-
viating from its stated policy of utilizing
coal from Illinois mines.
At its largest coal-burning plant, near
Baldwin, IP will install scrubbers on two
of the three generators to allow contin-
ued use of high sulfur coal; the third gen-
erator will switch to lower sulfur coal.
Because scrubbers require additional
structures to house chemical cleaning
equipment, they are only cost effective
for large plants. At Hennepin, IP has a
test project for smaller scale facilities;
emissions are reduced through rebuming
in natural gas. While this method in-
volves a higher cost per unit than with
scrubbers, it is cost effective for smaller
plants. Measures that allow continued
use of high sulfur Illinois coal will help
to minimize the Act's overall impact on
the southern part of the state.
Compliance with the first phase of the
Clean Air Act will cost IP between $250
and $550 million. Since the initial phase
requires the most drastic adjustments, the
second phase requirements should cost
much less. Furthermore, if state and fed-
eral regulators grant favorable financing
allowances, IP predicts rate increases
resulting from the legislation to be no
more than 10%. IP is currently negotiat-
ing with state and federal regulators for
investment credits, pollution bonds, and
federal grants to help fund equipment
purchases and construction of scrubbers.
Favorable financing allowances are.
of course, subsidies to utilities funded by
taxpayers. Although their status has not
been finalized, nearly all of these subsi-
dies have been removed from the new
legislation. If subsidies are unavailable,
consumers must provide the cost diffe-
rential in the form of higher rates.
Pollution credits, granted on a utility
by utility basis, are also subject to possi-
ble regulation. Regulation will prove to
be difficult, since it is common practice
for utilities to buy and sell electricity. In-
teresting questions regarding such trada-
ble credits are who will buy and what
price will prevail. To promote efficient
use of resources, society must recognize
utilities' relative costs of compliance.
Obviously, some utilities may comply
more cheaply than others. Utilities facing
higher compliance costs may consider
purchasing credits. Clearly, such utilities
would only purchase credits if doing so
were cheaper than full compliance. I
ORER thanks Mr. Michael Monahan of
Illinois Power and Mr. Michael Bushman
ofRep. Terry Bruce' s office for providing
helpful information.
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Rho Epsilon Completes Busy Fall Schedule
The members of the campus chapter of
Rho Epsilon enjoyed a Fall 1990 semes-
ter filled with many professional activi-
ties, both on campus and in Chicago.
The semester was also another successful
recruiting period for the organization.
Forty-one new student members and two
new faculty members (Professors Ward
McDonald and Laura Quigg) joined the
chapter, which now has an active mem-
bership roster of 1 14 individuals.
The semester's first activity was an or-
ganizational meeting held September 18.
Officers discussed Rho Epsilon and the
chapter's planned activities. Real estate
faculty members spoke about the U of I
program and career opportunities.
The professional schedule commenced
with the October 16 meeting, at which
Craig Bayless spoke on "Real Estate
Development." Bayless is a Managing
Director at Tishman Speyer Properties in
Chicago.
David Barr of Barr Real Estate in
Champaign addressed the chapter on Oc-
tober 25. The University of Illinois grad-
uate spoke on "Commercial and Residen-
tial Real Estate Markets in Champaign-
Urbana."
Fourteen student members and Profes-
sor Roger Cannaday, who serves as fa-
culty advisor to the chapter, participated
in a field trip to Chicago on the weekend
of October 26 - 27. On Friday the group
toured, and viewed presentations by,
three Chicago area real estate organiza-
tions. The visit to Bennett & Kahnweiler
was coordinated by Tim Fleming. U of 1
alumnus Dan Walsh coordinated the visit
to Draper & Kramer. Roy Splansky.
another Illinois graduate, organized the
group's visit with Hawthorn Realty.
Saturday's event was Lambda Alpha's
annual fall seminar; this year's edition
was entitled "Real Estate in the 1990s."
Professor Cannaday and eight students at-
tended the series of presentations, which
covered topics including emerging trends
in real estate and issues relating to real
estate investment and financing.
Rick Tannenbaum of the Chicago
office of Deloitte & Touche's Roulac
Group visited the campus on October 30.
His topic was "Pension Fund Investment"
in real estate.
Two speakers made a joint presenta-
tion to a joint meeting on November 13.
Chicagoans Jerry Johnson of Fujikawa
Johnson Architects and Bill Purdy of
Metropolitan Structures addressed a com-
bined meeting of Rho Epsilon and Archi-
tects in Management. Their topic was,
"The Architect/Developer Relationship."
The final professional activity of the
semester was the November 27 meeting.
Bert Scherb, the president of Scherb &
Company in Chicago, spoke on "Com-
mercial Real Estate: Brokerage, Develop-
ment, and Management." The meeting
was followed by a pizza party and Spring
1991 officer elections.
Those who served as officers in the
Fall 1990 .semester are: Michael Teska,
President; Chris Tiemey, Vice President;
Jeff Mitchell, Secretary; and Scott
Richrath, Treasurer. Those who have
been elected to serve as chapter officers
in the coming Spring 1991 semester are:
Chris Tiemey, President: Jeff Mitchell,
Vice President; Liz Bunte, Secretary; and
Jim Kerrigan, Treasurer.
The Office of Real Estate Research
commends the officers and membership
for another successful semester. :M
ORER News
(continuedfrom the first page)
must be absorbed by the Office of
Real Estate Research. ORER there-
fore appreciates the support of the
alumni who attend the luncheons.
New Working Paper
A new ORER Working Paper is
available. "The Effect of Career
Stages on the Job Attitudes and Job
Performance of Real Estate Sales-
people," by James B. DeConinck and
Don John.son, is the 83rd entry in the
working paper series. An abbreviated
version will appear in the next ORER
Letter. A single copy of any paper in
the series is available without charge
to those who submit written or tele-
phoned requests to the Office of Real
Estate Research.
Homelessness Revisited
The Winter 1989 ORER Letter
reviews a Heritage Foundation paper
in which William Tucker studies the
relationship between rent control and
homelessness. The review agrees
with Tucker's notion that rent control
affects homelessness, but calls for a
more careful analysis.
A Winter 1990 article in the Jour-
nal ofPolicy Analysis and Manage-
ment addresses the same issue. In
"Does Rent Control Cause Homeless-
ness? Taking the Claim Seriously,"
Professor John Quigley of the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley ex-
amines Tucker's results and includes
additional variables in the analysis.
Quigley finds that when the effects of
income and rent are considered, rent
control has essentially no impact on
homelessness.
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Environmental Contamination and the Rise of Lender Liability
Michelle A. Mahue
In recent years, financial institutions have
in some instances been hdd liable for
environmental contamination caused by
their borrowers. The outcry that has
followed involves the security interest
exemption included in the 1986 Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or,
more commonly, "Superfund"), which
was designed to protect passive lenders.
Several court decisions have held
extremely narrow interpretations of the
exemption, enabling the government to
pursue lenders as "deep pockets."
The basic issue in detemiining liability
is whether a lender's degree of involve-
ment with a borrower renders the lender
an owner or operator, and not simply a
supplier of financing. In the 1985 case of
U.S. V. Mirahile, a federal district court in
Pennsylvania found that a lender which
had foreclosed and gained title to
a contaminated property could be held
liable if that institution had sufficiently
participated in management and control
of the facility prior to foreclosure.
Under a more narrow interpretation, a
subsequent Maryland case found that a
lender could be held liable not because it
had participated in management of the
facility, but because it had assumed title.
The court held that by foreclosing on the
site, the lender had allowed its security
interest to ripen into an investment. Al-
though the lender was not responsible for
generating pollution, the court held the
lender, as owner of the property, strictly
liable for costs of the cleanup.
In the May 1990 U.S. v. Fleet Factors,
the I Ith district U.S. Court of Appeals
held that a lender could be liable if it had
the mere capacity to inlluence a firm's
decisions concerning hazardous waste
disposal. This ruling puts at risk a signifi-
cant number of nomial lending activities,
notably those involving workouts.
In the August 1990 Berii.soe Metal
Corporation case, a federal circuit court
rendered a decision that conflicts with
that of Fleet Factors. Although this more
recent holding requires the lender to have
taken certain actions in order to be liable,
the Bergsoe court, like other courts in
previous decisions, failed to identify what
those actions might be.
Consequently, the courts have clouded
the issue of whether lenders should fore-
close on contaminated sites. Since clean-
up costs may exceed property value, a
bank might refuse to foreclose in order to
avoid potential liability. Moreover, pro-
tective warranties and indemnities, which
have become common loan features, are
only as strong as the mortgagors' credit-
worthiness. In the event of foreclosure,
courts will look to the actual borrower-
lender relationship regardless of the pres-
ence of these clauses.
Economic Analysis
From an economic perspective, the lender
liability issue focuses on whether the add-
ed imposition of liability on lenders is a
more efficient allocation of productive
resources than would be the limitation of
liability only to polluting firms. Propo-
nents of lender liability cite an argument
that is somewhat compelling: the lender's
independent risk analysis provides society
with an added protection. Such reasoning,
however, ignores agency costs incurred in
the bonower-lender relationship. Placing
responsibility for environmental compli-
ance on lenders eliminates incentives for
borrowers to carefully manage their own
operations.
Liability should fall on those parties
that can most easily remedy the offensive
activities. Subjecting a lender to liability
for actions taken by a borrower imposes
on the economy the additional cost of the
lender's monitoring action. A more effi-
cient allocation of productive resources
would be achieved if companies took full
responsibility for their own compliance.
Because it increases the cost of foreclo-
sure, lender liability reduces the supply of
financing below the efficient level. This
reduction, in turn, causes productive out-
put to decline below the efficient level.
Bankruptcies and unpaid debts increase,
imposing the costs of liability onto third
parties. Furthermore, banks may be
induced to shift potential liability costs
to customers, through increased service
charges or higher interest rates.
The market's long run responses may
be counterproductive to CERCLA's orig-
inal intent. Instead of merely discourag-
ing institutions from lending to proven
hazardous waste generators, the recent
interpretations will dissuade lenders from
providing funding to borrowers posing
any potential environmental risks. Virtu-
ally all properties could present some
risks of contamination. Yet even waste
disposal facilities might in some cases be
worthy of receiving funding; if there are
fewer such facilities, the reduced compe-
tition among those remaining could cause
the price of waste disposal and recycling
to increase.
The Windfall Issue
It may be argued that preserving the
security interest exemption would allow
lenders to gain unjust enrichment from
making loans to polluting facilities. The
reasoning is that the lender, protected
from liability, could acquire the property
at the foreclosure sale for a bargain price,
since other potential buyers would not be
exempt from CERCLA liability. Follow-
ing the cleanup (the costs of which would
be borne by the government), the lender
could sell the property, capturing the
increase in the property's value.
However, it is not certain that this sce-
nario would occur. The protected lender
might be the only viable nongovernmen-
tal bidder at the foreclosure sale, but the
most the lender could bid, without assum-
ing liability as an investor, would be the
outstanding loan balance (plus foreclos-
ing costs). The EPA. with a lien of its
own, could also bid: it could offer a price
marginally higher than the lender's bid.
Of course, because EPA's lien would be
subordinate to the lender's, the sale
proceeds would pay the outstanding loan
balance. But EPA could then conduct the
cleanup and sell the property; it would re-
tain the difference between the property's
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value after the cleanup and the balance
on the loan. The Agency would limit its
losses if it could be convinced to act in
such an entrepreneurial manner.
Recent Developments
In response to what many view as gross
unfairness in the Fleet Factors decision,
there has been tremendous support for
the restoration of the security interest ex-
emption. Bills currently under considera-
tion in Congress would protect the lender
from liability unless the lender had
cau.sed the contamination. Surprisingly,
in August of 1990, EPA announced that
it would not oppose these bills: however,
it would prefer to restore the exemption
lacking precision, the regulations state
that the exemption does not apply to
lenders that participate actively in man-
agement. Problems with these vague limi-
tations arise because contemporary loan
transactions frequently entitle lenders to
various equity interests. These arrange-
ments provide lenders with ownership in
borrower facilities, or with shares of
appreciated value or of profits earned on
properties: they allow lenders to exercise
certain controls over borrowers. Equity
kickers may therefore render banks liable
as owners if the arrangements allow
banks to exert control over company
operations or to gain additional profits
from the success of polluting facilities.
Because it increases the cost offoreclosure, lender
liability reduces the supply offinancing below the
efficient level. This reduction, in turn, causes
productive output to decline below the efficient level.
through regulation. The regulations have
been drafted and are undergoing execu-
tive review at this time.
Drafts of the regulations reveal EPA's
view that the exemption is designed to
protect security interests, not invest-
ments. The distinction between a securi-
ty interest and an investment, however,
remains vague. EPA concedes that
lenders must conduct some oversight to
protect their security interests; periodic
monitoring is acceptable as long as the
borrower retains primary control of the
facility. Workout financing, which typi-
cally includes alteration of the terms of
the loan, counseling, or other reasonable
actions which may help to avoid foreclo-
sure, is also acceptable under the pro-
posed regulations. It is interesting that
these regulations protect entities such as
the FDIC and RTC, which assume own-
ership of property through involuntary
acquisitions or legal proceedings.
Reversing the government's stand in
Fleet Factors, the regulations maintain
that the lender's mere ability to exercise
control of the polluting facility is not
sufficient to trigger liability if the lender
does not take affirmative actions. Still
Furthermore, to prevent lenders from
gaining windfall profits, the regulations
permit lenders neither to bid above out-
standing loan balances nor to refuse rea-
sonable bids from other parties. Finally,
if a lender holds a property for longer
than six months, it bears the burden of
proving that its efforts are merely to
protect the security interest.
The EPA realizes that the security in-
terest exemption has been so ineffective
that normal lending activity has been con-
strained. It hopes that the regulations will
protect passive lending without unfairly
benefiting the lenders or permitting them
to offer unduly favorable terms to pollut-
ing borrowers. Although the new regula-
tions may help courts interpret when
lenders should bear liability, the ambigui-
ty regarding equity participations and rea-
sonable foreclosure terms will prove to
be problematic in application.
Lenders have been charged with the
responsibility and cost of policing their
borrowers. Efforts to relieve these bur-
dens are under way, but the ability of
lending institutions to operate efficiently
under the specter of CERCLA liability
remains highly uncertain.
ORER News
Cammack Lecture Series
An innovative educational tool has
allowed students at the University of
Illinois to learn practical aspects of
the financial marketplace without
leaving the classroom. Each Friday,
students enrolled in the introductory
insurance class. Finance 260, are
addressed by leaders from the insu-
rance industry through the Emerson
Cammack Lecture Series. Because
the topics covered include property
insurance and risk management, the
series is of interest to students in real
estate and other areas of Finance as
well as those studying insurance.
Among the topics that have been
addressed are the problems facing
property/casualty and life insurers,
actuarial issues, consumer concerns,
marketing developments, and career
opportunities. Many notable insu-
rance company executives have
participated in the series, including
Edward Rust, Chairman of the Board
of State Farm; Raymond Kiefer, Pres-
ident of Allstate; Howard Humphrey,
Chairman of the Board of Franklin
Life; and James Skelton, President of
the Illinois Insurance Exchange.
The lectures honor T. Emerson
Cammack, who retired from the
U of I this past August. Cammack, a
noted authority on insurance, taught
the University's introductory insu-
rance course for 41 years. He also
co-authored an acclaimed insurance
textbook and served for 22 years as
the Associate Dean of Undergraduate
Affairs for the College of Commerce.
Professor Stephen D'Arcy coordi-
nates the lecture series.
The Office ofReal Estate Research makes
every effort to assure the accuracy of all
statements in ORER LETTER articles prepared
h\ ORER staff members. However, the reader
should note that legal and regulatory matters,
which are occasionally addressed in ORER
LETTER articles, are subject to change and to
vaiying interpretations. ORER LETTER
articles do not purport to provide legal or
investment advice, and the Office ofReal
Estate Research shall not be held responsible
for damages resulting from omissions or
inaccuracies in the ORER LETTER or other
ORER publications.
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Speculative Markets in Real Estate
On November 16. sixteen individuals met
during the lunch hour at Urhaiia's Yen
Ching North restaurant to discuss specu-
lative markets in real estate. Those in
attendance were Finance professors
Roger Cannaday. Yoon Dokko. Virginia
France, Him Park. George Pennacchi.
Laura Quigg. Jay Ritter. and David
Whitford: Economics professor Charles
Kahn: Adjunct Finance professors Ward
McDonald, Philip Rushing, and David
Sinovt': and Finance graduate students
Michael Davis. Joe Trefzger. and Tai-le
Yang. ORER Director Peter Colwell
served as host and discussion leader.
The conversation was spirited and the
Mongolian Beefwas excellent. Because
the discussion touched on so many inter-
esting areas. ORER LEITER presents a
transcript of the meeting in place of an
interview in this issue. Speakers are
identified by their initials.
PC: A topic that, to my knowledge, has
not been addressed in the Hterature is that
of speculative markets in real estate. We
all probably have experiences we could
share to enrich this area of discussion.
The ultimate aim should be to get people
who follow and participate in real estate
markets thinking about these issues.
HP: By speculative markets, do you
mean option markets?
PC: Options can certainly play a role.
But maybe there are futures markets and
other speculative outlets as well. I got
started thinking about these markets
while talking to Phil (Rushing) about the
nature of the forward market for student
apartments, and the extent to which the
forward market and the spot market are
used. Students have traditionally reserved
apartments in advance, but there is some
evidence that in the past year or so a lot
of students have moved into fraternity
houses for the first few weeks of class
and then gotten into the spot market be-
cau.se they saw good opportunities there.
JR: They discovered how difficult life in
a fraternity house can be?
PC: Actually, for some that may have
been the case. But for others, it was an
ex ante policy; they had anticipated in the
spring, when many fall leases are signed,
that they could find housing bargains
after fall classes were under way.
People with uncertain vacation plans
face a different kind of problem; they'd
like to reserve a cottage, but may not
know until the last minute if they can
actually be there, and fear being forced to
pay for facilities they can"t use. There is
no secondary market for future commit-
ments, so they must use the spot market;
they settle for a hotel or other accommo-
dation immediately available. Or suppose
that in our local rental market a student
commits in April to a lease for the next
school year. Then during the summer he
discovers that he'd like to back out of
that commitment. Is it possible to sell the
lessee's rights in some kind of secondary
market for subleases?
CK: Yes: that's what students are doing
when they advertise for roommates;
someone has committed to a lease and
reduces the cost by selling rights to oth-
ers in a secondary market. What limits
the activity is that students may not be
overly concerned about the difficulty of
getting out of leases they've signed.
PC: So maybe we're really talking about
an options market. A student signs a fall
lease in March, then flunks out and
moves back to Hometown. Is the landlord
going to chase the student down and try
to collect rent? The student gives up the
damage deposit, but that can be viewed
as the price of an option.
PR: My partner and I have observed
these phenomena recently in buildings
that we own. A lot of people who have at-
tempted to trade on the spot market have
been frustrated by the disappointing units
or locations they found. If a group of four
wants to live together, it may make sense
to go into the forward market; if they
wait until August, they may only find one
bedroom apartments. There's definitely a
potential for risk reduction by seeking
early commitments. So while, as Peter
noted, some students think they can find
good deals in the spot market, we're also
seeing earlier commitments in the for-
ward market. Some students are trying
now. in November, to sign leases for
next August. It's interesting that the
markets are serving the needs of people
with such differing preferences.
JR: There could also be selection bias,
in that renters with enough sense to plan
ahead might be better quality tenants.
CK: Do the students who commit in the
forward market locally tend to get dis-
counts relative to market rent levels?
PR: Not to my knowledge; we simply
ask the price that we think the market
should command, given past experience.
PC: So you offer a single fixed price
with sequential adjustments. How often
do you have to make adjustments?
PR: Adjustments aren't typically made.
It is possible to pay more than your
neighbor for a similar unit; it's as though
there was a sale and you missed it.
CK: It seems that apartments are so
unstandardized that even if someone
thought about complaining, he or she
would simply figure that differences in
amenities caused the rent differences.
PR: Not always; identical units in the
same building can rent for different pric-
es. I suppose that landlords practice a
form of price discrimination: they try
to get a higher price when the tenant is
•higher on the demand curve.
CK: Are there people who come in at
the peak of the season and are desperate,
and will pay a higher price?
PR: Yes, but we don't see extremely
high prices in today's market; the supply
is just too great.
PC: But you could imagine significant
opportunities to price discriminate in
another environment. I think that the so-
called "excess supply" that we're seeing
now is just a peculiarity caused by recent
building activity.
DW: About two years ago local land-
lords went from twelve month leases to
nine month contracts, but held the aggre-
gate price more or less the same.
PR: That's right; when the rent levels
went up many owners took their twelve
month rent totals, divided them by nine
and a half, and offered nine and a half
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month leases at the higher monthly rents.
We're now seeing a lot of these leases.
VF: Does that activity reflect the fact
that it's so hard to enforce payment of
rents over the summer?
PR: The problem is that most students
aren't here for the summer. In the twelve
month lease environment, which pre-
vailed when units were scarce, renters
had to advertise and offer concessions to
find subtenants. Now, with the advent of
vacancies, a landlord might offer a nine
and a half month lease as a competitive
tool. A lot of students are happy to pay a
premium monthly rent just to avoid the
headache of subleasing or the pain of
paying money for an empty unit.
JR: Landlords seem to be taking advan-
tage of the strong seasonal demand. They
cover their capital costs with the high
fall-spring rents, so the competitive equi-
librium price for summer becomes the
marginal operating cost.
YD: A student who negotiated a twelve-
month lease at a price just slightly higher
than the 9 1/2 month total could be said
to be paying a premium for an option to
remain for the summer. Many types of
implicit options can be found in this type
of market.
PC: There is also a forni of securitiza-
tion clearly occurring. It relates to the
roommate situation that Charlie spoke of;
someone buys something, breaks it up,
and sells the pieces as a different type of
asset. In fact, we see this securitization
activity not only in the student rental
market. Don Rundblom told me about
investment bankers in New York who
rent houses in the Hamptons for the sum-
mer. They sign leases and then go back
to their investment banks and ask,
"Would anyone like to rent the upstairs
the first two weeks in June?" They break
their leasehold interests up and sell off
pieces, and make possible a more com-
plete market by doing so.
DW: The markets themselves can also
be broken up, into tiers. We had to find
a temporary rental unit before our new
house was completed. Fortunately, there
are some properties that serve the short-
term rental market. Properties seem to
move in and out of that market as supply
and demand conditions dictate.
PR: We see more of that in income prop-
erty markets nationwide. For example,
the owner of a building in a major college
town can rent a vacant apartment just for
a football weekend. Typically the owner
furnishes the unit and provides linens and
cooking utensils: it becomes a resort con-
do instead of an empty apartment unit.
PC: Could people reserve, say, every
football weekend for the next ten years?
PR: They could if the owner expected to
have surplus units that far into the future.
MD: In a major college town, the de-
mand would certainly be there. I know
people who make hotel reservations for
U of 1 homecoming far in advance; they
want the same room each year.
the renters in the area are unman'ied
military personnel who sublet their
apartments for the week and move into
bachelor officer quarters. They stock
their refrigerators with cheap, untaxed
military liquor and charge $2000 for a
week's stay: that certainly exceeds the
nomial weekly rent. Just like the football
fans, the golf fans reserve accommoda-
tions years in advance.
PR: Breckenridge, Colorado has a snow
festival one weekend each year. When I
was in college, people would pay $ 10
just to sleep on our floor. If we'd talked
to people who were willing to buy
ahead, we could have subleased the
whole unit and made a lot of money.
In the housing market, zve sometimes need
unabashed -price gouging after a crisis. That is
how we generate much more intensive use of
the remaining housing stock.
PR: Last June I tried, unsuccessfully, to
get a room at the Edgewater in Madison
for an October weekend that turned out to
be homecoming. Large groups have the
entire hotel booked for every single
homecoming on a standing basis.
TY: Do small groups ever control tradi-
tional housing units that way, excluding
others on a systematic basis?
PC: Austin Jaffe saw it happen in Swe-
den, where public intervention has caused
serious problems in the housing market.
People retain apartments in Stockholm to
use only on weekends, simply because
the controlled rents are so low. The gov-
ernment gives owners' rights to tenants,
who then keep properties for their margi-
nal uses and exclude others who may
have greater needs.
JR: But government controls aren't at
work in college towns with peak demand
during homecoming. Why, then, do we
see facilities booked up years in advance
rather than premium pricing in high
demand periods?
PC: It depends on who is speculating.
DW: One market where we do see pre-
mium pricing is Augusta, Georgia during
Masters Golf Tournament week. Many of
RC: The same kinds of things happened
in Knoxville, during the World's Fair,
and will no doubt happen in Atlanta
during the Olympics, and in other areas
where the markets are hit by temporary,
perhaps one-time, demand shocks.
PC: Those high prices reflect market
equilibrium conditions during the unusu-
al kinds of market periods that have been
described. But often we find that people
who charge equilibrium prices are ac-
cused of price gouging, and it apparently
is undesirable to be known as a gouger.
JR: To avoid accusations of gouging, a
hotel might advertise a $200 room rate,
but charge that during homecoming and
offer big discounts the rest of the year.
PC: That strategy might work in the
lodging market. But in the longer-term
housing market, we sometimes need una-
bashed price gouging after a crisis, like
an earthquake. The way the market econ-
omizes is by charging higher prices.
That is how we generate much more in-
tensive use of the remaining stock, how
we encourage doubling and tripling up.
DS: As an investor, I'd like to know
what factors would give rise to a secon-
dary market in apartment leasing, in
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Champaign or Augusta. My goal would
be to understand how the rights to buy
the options you've discussed would best
be obtained, and how I could play a role
as a broker or negotiator.
PR: We've had some subleasing activity
locally. I once tried to get assurance that
a building I was purchasing would be ful-
ly leased by the closing date. The seller
guaranteed that all units would be rented;
he said. "I'll personally sign a lease for
every empty unit." Because he reserved
the right to sublet. I'd view that part of
the agreement as a secondary market
transaction. He did sign a few leases, and
the sale worked out nicely for both of us.
a form of temporary ownership, with the
right to residual returns and the risk of
vacancy loss.
CK: I don't know that we should try to
develop a model for the "one-shot" case
like the Olympics. It would be more diffi-
cult, but more fruitful, to analyze a mar-
ket where speculative undertakings could
work on a repeating basis, like the annual
golf tournament. If there were recurring
opportunities, entrepreneurs could experi-
ment, and if speculative activity did not
work they could leave the market.
JR: Another aspect of the one-shot deal
is the lack of opportunity for reputational
effects to overcome moral hazard and ad-
Time sharing would seem to be an example of
securitization. It would certainly be the case if a
network permitted the owner to trade for a
different time period or a different location.
PC: Developers routinely do essentially
the same thing with "master leases" on
office buildings. Of course, we see this
activity primarily in the commercial
property market, but there is no reason
why the residential market could not
adapt to the same kinds of arrangements.
DS: Imagine that you could go to a
hotel, reserve a block of rooms, guaran-
tee payment to the hotel, and then rent
the rooms at whatever price the market
would bear. You would have an option,
with a premium equal to the guaranteed
payment, and it would be in the money if
you could rent the rooms for more than
the guaranteed rate. There is no reason
you couldn't do that, as long as you were
not violating local, state, or federal laws.
On a football weekend, the speculator
would hope to rent the rooms for a price
in excess of the guaranteed rate, but
could lose a lot as well.
RC: In selling the option, the innkeeper
would be hedging the risk that the home
team might have a bad season.
PC: But if you guarantee full payment,
I'm not sure it's an option arrangement.
YD: It is, to the extent that the investor's
downside risk is limited to the amount of
the guaranteed payment. But it's also like
verse selection problems. Owners of leas-
ing rights want to sublet to people who
they know will treat the properties with
care, and tenants want to be assured of
proper maintenance and services. I sus-
pect that adverse selection is a problem in
the student spot market: units available
on September 1 may constitute a non-
random sample. Somebody moved out
after being in a unit for only a week, or
people are looking for a new roommate
after a dissatisfied roommate moved out.
PC: But if subleasing is regularized,
landlords will learn the market and won't
need someone like David. It's primarily
in the one-shot case that an outside inves-
tor might have the system figured out
better than a landlord would, and could
profit while providing the landlord with
hedging opportunities.
GP: Time sharing would seem to be an-
other example of securitization. It would
certainly be the case if a network pennit-
ted the owner to trade for a different time
period or a unit in a different location.
RC: The market for such exchanges
is pretty well developed: you can even
trade internationally.
VF: Can you convert your time to cash?
LQ: Not directly, but you might be able
to rent it out. Management would charge
the owner a fee for arranging the rental.
HP: How can there be a secondary time
share market given that the properties in-
volved are so differentiated with respect
to amenities and location?
LQ: Units are classified by grade. There
might be four grades: back comer units,
premium units, and a couple of grades in
between. You would trade your grade B
time share condo for another grade B at
a different time or location.
PC: If the people running the trading
system find that the relative prices are
wrong, they can change them.
LQ: Administering relative prices is
very important, because there are peak
times and off-season times. If you trade a
week of peak season time, you should get
in return more than a week of off-season
time, or a higher quality unit.
MD: It's interesting to note the prices
that time shares command. The last one I
looked at was in Orlando, Florida. Two
bedrooms and a hot tub cost $13,000 for
one week each year. That works out to
$676,000. But the tax assessor only had it
assessed at $145,000. Is that premium,
the difference between $676,000 and
$145,000, an issue we should consider?
PC: There are several issues here. They
probably can't sell 52 of those weekly
shares, so it must be that the vacancy rate
is fairly high. In fact, I'll bet the natural
rate of vacancy is close to 50%. Also, the
high turnover and heavy use really beat
the places up, so the useful lives may not
be as long as for other types of proper-
ties. So while $13,000 for 52 weeks to-
tals $676,000, if we consider that some
shares might sell for less and some weeks
won't sell at all, we can see that the net
value could very well be $145,000.
DS: It's also true historically that time
shares tend to sell in the secondary mar-
ket at prices below the development
costs. The first buyer buys on emotion;
the sales pitch seems too good to pass up.
LQ: The salesman only makes a com-
mission if you buy right then and there,
and he will keep you there until you buy.
It's a really hard sell.
PC: C.F. Simians has studied the recrea-
tional condo market, and found that a lot
of people make downpayments and never
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go back for closings. They treat their
downpayments Hke option premiums.
MD: There are often backout provisions,
and the periods can be pretty long; people
can get back money they put down.
RC: Most states regulate this heavily.
The laws have evolved as the issues have
become more complex: there is third gen-
eration legislation in some jurisdictions.
PC: Illinois condominium law provides
a backout period that is really a type of
option without a premium: Bruce
Vanderporten at Loyola has written about
this issue. Even if a time share or other
condominium is sold at auction, the seller
doesn't know if the unit is actually going
to change hands, despite the finality of
typical auction sales. The reason is that
the condo law allows the people who
"buy" condos, even at auction, to back
out a few days later.
LQ: My father paid a time share deposit
with a credit card. He got both Hawaii's
seven-day backout period and the right to
refuse to pay on the card if he found
physical damage or evidence of fraud.
PR: Now that's a zero priced option.
RC: Except that you commit time and
face some opportunity cost, or might pay
a higher price in that type of transaction.
DW: Another example of implicit op-
tions on real estate involves long term
living arrangements for retired people.
They sell their houses and give the total
proceeds to a retirement community run
by a church or a charitable organization.
Then as long as either spouse is alive
they're guaranteed a roof over their
heads. If their health fails they move into
nursing care facilities on the premises.
PC: Since you don't know when you're
going to die, and don't know how bad
your health could become, there are many
contingencies involved.
CK: Can you imagine applying this idea
to student housing? Stay in an apartment
as long as you haven't graduated?
DW: A large church organization could
diversify across many such retirement
communities and employ actuarial as-
sumptions. I'd feel safer with a portfolio
of these than with one isolated complex.
PC: Sellers should look at their positions
in portfolio terms, but buyers of units will
never have that luxury unless it becomes
possible to short sell your own mortality.
MD: You do that with life insurance.
The sooner you die, the sooner your
family gets the proceeds of the policy.
DS: Let's get back to the notion that
more value can be squeezed out of real
estate than we have conventionally real-
ized. If we can increase the market by
compartmentalizing real estate into indi-
vidual components, the sum of the parts
might exceed the value of the whole.
PR: We can break up ownership in addi-
tion to breaking up physical property. For
example, it is possible to buy a house and
sell the right to any appreciation in value.
VF: That situation would seem to pre-
ple who sell graves; from a present value
standpoint, selling plots in advance can
generate high returns to the cemetery.
RC: The idea is also that your children
won't face difficult choices: they just put
you where you said you wanted to be.
TY: So real estate can be broken up in
an unlimited number of ways to achieve
an unlimited number of ends.
PC: I think it's even possible to profit
when values fall, by going short in hous-
ing. My idea is to buy part of a discount-
ed pool of loans that have federal guaran-
tees, but that originated in a place where
you anticipate more defaults than the rest
of the market expects. Every defaulted
An example of implicit options on real estate involves
long term living arrangements for retired people. As long
as either spouse is alive they're guaranteed a roof over
their heads.
sent a moral hazard: the owner ignores
proper maintenance to reduce the resale
price of the home.
PC: That's a good point: moral hazard
definitely exists in shared appreciation
loans. As you suggest, maintenance is
clearly a problem area. But also consider
that if accounting rules require capital im-
provement expenditures to be deducted
from the price on which measured appre-
ciation is based, then people buy lap
pools and other amenities that are fun
to use but that actually reduce value.
PR: A few years ago a guy in Manhattan
bought a vacant lot, had it replatted, and
deeded it out one square foot at a time.
The sum of the parts definitely exceeded
the value of the whole: people wanted to
own a piece of Manhattan.
PC: But who had control, who could use
the parcel? We don't break up just the
physical property or ownership interests;
voting control could be the most valuable
of the broken up pieces.
LQ: I think that's the idea behind buying
a cemetery plot before you die. You con-
trol the use of that land.
PC: The concept of buying a grave
before you die seems goofy to me.
DS: The idea is to make money for peo-
loan will be paid off at book value. You
buy at discount and receive payment at
book; the more defaults, the better.
DS: San Francisco would be an interest-
ing market for a study of that possibility.
Property values there have decreased by
15 to 20 per cent in the last six months;
the market might have difficulty in fore-
casting the level of defaults.
PC: A problem we would face in the
current market is that discounted loans,
with interest rates below the current lev-
el, originated many years ago; they are
seasoned issues on which defaults will
be few. But going short in interest-onlys
should be another way to profit from
lower values. If there are a lot of defaults
the guarantor pays principal, the interest
payments stop, and the lOs die. Is there a
market for this, can you short lOs?
LQ: There is no reason why investors
could not do it. The market wouldn't be
too liquid, but there are potential buyers.
PC: POs, or principal-onlys, also
present possibilities for profiting from
falling property values. The PO is the
reverse of the lO: it provides principal
payments, but no interest. A PO sells
initially for the discounted value of the
expected future payments. It has a very
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long duration: if interest rates rise, the
investor is hurt by waiting so long to get
money back to reinvest, so the price of
the instrument falls. But if defaults were
to exceed what the market had anticipat-
ed in setting the price, then the investor
would be repaid sooner, and could re-
invest at the high market rate. Again, you
buy at discount but collect face value,
and the key is to locate the region where
defaults will exceed the level that the
market expects. I'm assuming that we
can get regionally specialized POs.
LQ: You might be able to, especially in
a place like California, where there has
been so much secondary market activity.
house has to fall in value a little more
before it becomes attractive to default.
HP: You're talking about anticipating
price movements. How do you monitor
volatility in the real estate market, as
compared to the broader equity markets?
PC: That is a $64,000 question. There
are various schools of thought, and the
differences seem to relate to where the
analysts get the data. If we consider micro
real estate data and try to develop price
indexes that make sense, we find that real
estate market volatility looks a lot like
stock market volatility. However, people
who focus on appraisal data, including
those who follow the Frank Russell Co.
A government corporation buys federal employees' old
houses at guaranteed prices. The lower government pay
relative to what might he earned in a private sector job
coidd be viewed as an option premium.
TV: But POs are always discounted.
LQ: No: if the current market rate is
below the rate earned on the PO. then
the PO would sell at a premium relative
to the market.
YD: You are assuming that falling home
values will lead to many defaults.
PC: Absolutely: if prices fall enough the
put option is in the money, and the bor-
rower puts the property to the lender.
VF: Aren't there serious legal conse-
quences of defaulting on a loan?
PC: There are, but it can be of small
comfort for a lender to win a judgment
against a bon'ower with no job in a weak
economy. The point is that the reduction
in value triggers a default, and the holder
of the guaranteed PO gets the full face
amount of the loan.
DS: Your plan might work in a deed of
trust state, like California. If the value of
your property falls below the remaining
loan balance, you just walk away without
facing any further legal obligation.
PC: No obligation at the state level, but
federal authorities could view the gain in
net worth, the excess of the loan balance
over the home value, as taxable income.
However, all that the taxability really
does is to lower the strike price: the
index, tend to think that real estate mar-
kets are relatively stable. I view that as a
dubious proposition.
CK: Even if we could anticipate market
volatility, individual participants would
still face significant risks with respect to
their own positions. For example, say I
use an option-like transaction to reserve a
particular unit. When the day to exercise
the option arrives, will I want that unit or
a different property? Should I obtain, and
pay for, a number of options?
JR: You're creating a distinction
between hedging moral hazard problems
and other problems of the general real
estate market, and hedging the risk of
obtaining a particular unit, on which you
might value some of the amenities more
than somebody else does.
CK: Exactly. A viable forward or futures
market must provide opportunities for
individual market participants to improve
their positions.
WM: How badly do owners of property
really want to improve their positions?
Assume that a corporation is willing to
hedge your $160,000 residence. You pay
this mythical coiporation a premium, and
it agrees to purchase your house at some
future date at a particular strike price.
Would anyone accept that offer?
PR: We could apply that same idea to
the rental market, by converting student
apartments into condominiums. We
could market units to parents of U of I
students, and could offer a guaranteed
buy-back in four years. We'd extract a
premium for hedging the buyers' posi-
tions. Several local apartment owners
have talked about doing this: I don't
know if anyone has actually tried it yet.
PC: These types of guarantees exist:
they are used in some Chicago suburbs
that have a disturbing way of addressing
the integration issue. They use deep
municipal pockets to guarantee the price
of your house if you move into an
integrated neighborhood.
CK: Chicago is considering doing the
same thing in some neighborhoods.
MD: The government offers the same
type of guarantee as an employee benefit.
FBI agents who are transferred from
Washington to Springfield have no wor-
ries about relocating, because a govern-
ment corporation buys their old houses at
guaranteed prices. The lower government
pay relative to what might be earned in a
private sector job could be viewed as an
option premium.
PC: A lot of firms offer a similar bene-
fit. By the way, I like your argument that
the lower wage is an option premium.
DS: Consider a market like Japan's.
The total value of Tokyo real estate is
greater than the value of all real estate in
the U.S. People in Japan worry about
these values vis-a-vis values in other
countries. The market's volatility ought
to give rise to hedging opportunities: if I
owned a few square feet worth millions
of dollars in downtown Tokyo, I'd be
willing to pay for a price guarantee.
PC: The problem is that nobody's big
enough to assume the risks.
LQ: Don't the Japanese have a very reg-
ulated market?
PC: It's tremendously regulated; in fact,
that's probably why urban property there
is so valuable. They have moved their
supply curve way over to the left.
LQ: Berkeley is another highly regu-
lated market: the city has extreme rent
control, and also vacancy control, so
rents stay the same even when new
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tenants move in. You see signs that say,
"Apartment Wanted, Will Pay $500 for
Lease." As time passes that price goes
up: people get desperate for units.
PC: That's called "key money." In some
rent-controlled markets landlords charge
key money before they will sign leases.
In this case the money seems to be going
to the people moving out of units.
CK: But why does the key money figure
go up over time? If there is an option
element, the price should fall as the
expiration date approaches.
LQ: People hope to get units without
paying key money, but eventually realize
that paying $500 or more is necessary.
PC: So these people are irrational?
CK: In a rent-controlled market, it could
very well be that irrationality prevails.
WM: I'd like to share a few legal
observations. We have to keep in mind
that while we might analyze real estate in
market terms, we're always ultimately
talking about individual parcels. We
must also remember that the law is slow
to follow creative thinking. How do you
propose to protect people's interests
under some of the types of transactions
you propose? If I hold an instrument that
is tantamount to an option, how am I pro-
tected if the current owner pollutes the
property or encumbers it with liens? I
could end up with something I would not
want, perhaps having negative value if
there were an environmental problem.
PC: But there have long been contingent
claims in real estate, like the life estate
and the fee simple determinable, and the
accompanying reversion or remainder
interests. And can't we record options?
Can't we enforce specific performance?
WM: You can record an option, and you
might be able to force someone to sell,
but neither action will protect you from
some types of liens, such as mechanic's
liens. We also have to recognize that
activities that enhance the value of one
parcel could diminish the value of the
piece next to it. For example, what if a
condo owner decided to rent his unit
repeatedly for two-week intervals? That
would diminish the values of neighboring
units. Developers understand this prob-
lem: some now sell units with covenants
that prohibit rentals for periods less than
a year. While not a cure-all, such a policy
at least keeps a complex from being taken
over by transients. Rather than breaking
real estate up to achieve higher individual
values, they are consolidating in order to
protect values for all owners in an area.
CK: If there were no prohibition against
it. could an owner break up property in
any way desired, such as treating a tradi-
tional condo unit as a time share?
WM: If there are no specific restrictions,
you can always lease your property as
you wish. And you could probably sell
time shares, but state laws can be tricky:
a court could view a poorly designed time
share arrangement as a series of leases.
tenant, who had offered to buy it, for 99
years with renewal options. Control was
mentioned as a valuable item among
broken up pieces: this parcel is under the
tenant's control for hundreds of years.
JT: If transactions involving guaranteed
repurchase became popular, the tax
authorities could contend that what the
grantee receives is an interest other than
ownership. They could then try to use
that finding to deny the favorable tax
treatment given to the buyer of a home.
PC: So you're arguing that the "buyer"
doesn't own the property?
JT: Maybe what any buyer with a guar-
antee gets is, in substance, some type of
VJe have to recognize that activities that enhance the
value of one parcel could diminish the value of the
piece next to it.
MD: Some condos must be occupied by
the owners: leasing is not allowed at all.
But what would keep an owner who can't
lease from selling with a one-year repur-
chase option? The downpayment could be
viewed as an option premium.
WM: In most developments a one-year
arrangement of that nature would proba-
bly work. However, if you try to get
around a short-term rental prohibition by
selling for two weeks and repurchasing,
I believe the argument of substance over
form would prevail. A court would treat
the agreement as a lease.
GP: Short-term sales would also be held
in check by the high costs of selling.
Transfer taxes and title searches would
seem to be costs you could not avoid even
with two-week buyback arrangements.
MD: If the "seller" finances the purchase
for the "buyer," a title search might not be
necessary; only a small amount of the
buyer's money is ever at risk. There might
still be a transfer tax: it would depend on
whether the financing were in the form of
a mortgage or a contract for deed.
PR: An opposite problem can occur as
well. A condo owner was able to freely
lease his unit, but there were a lot of re-
strictions on selling. So he leased it to his
lease. He occupies the property, but has
not assumed risks of ownership. It is a
type of transaction that perhaps has not
yet been defined for tax purposes. But if
the practice were to become widespread,
would the IRS have to react?
PR: At least some types of guaranteed
sales are widespread: relocation benefits
have included guarantees for a long time.
PC: So why doesn't the IRS take a hard
look at those programs?
PR: Maybe they tried and gave up.
PC: So what constitutes a transfer?
PR: In the case of the 99 year condo
lease, the "tenant" boiTowed money and
paid as up-front rent an amount equal to
the value of the unit. Tax questions arose
with regard to deductibility of the "less-
ee's" mortgage loan interest and recogni-
tion of income on the "lessor's" part.
IRS ruled that the transaction was essen-
tially a sale, and the occupant got all the
tax advantages of home ownership, even
though technically he had a lease.
PC: But as soon as we think we've
found ways to get around regulatory
hurdles, new banners are put into place.
That's what has happened historically
when market participants have been
innovative and creative. iiM
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Thought for the Day
Escrow Scam?
Peter F. Colwell
Anyone who obtains the use of money in
an arm's length transaction must pay for
the money used. We refer to payment for
the use of money as interest. There can
be no "free lunch:" interest is paid even if
there is not an explicit interest rate. "Non-
interest bearing" accounts do bear interest.
It would seem that this issue was settled
a decade ago when the IRS ruled that bor-
rowers issuing "zero interest," five-year
notes were nonetheless entitled to treat
some portion of their payments as interest.
Deposit accounts are no different; every
deposit bears interest, regardless of wheth-
er the depositor receives interest directly.
Mortgage lenders that require escrow,
or impound, deposits (for payment of bor-
rowers' homeowner insurance premiums
and property taxes) must compete with
lenders that do not. Escrow accounts typi-
cally pay no stated interest. Explicit inter-
est rates charged on loans, therefore,
should reflect differences in costs faced
by borrowers who must make escrow
deposits and those who need not; lenders
requiring escrow should charge lower ex-
plicit rates. Even mortgage bankers should
be able to offer lower rates if they can
extract concessions from the institutions
in which the escrow accounts are placed.
It is unfortunate that, in investigating
financing packages, buyers of real estate
(and those who advise them) too often
seek information only on interest rates
and "points." They should also consider
costs of the escrow arrangements to
which they would become subject under
the ternis of various packages. If they
ignore escrow costs, borrower/depositors
cannot make informed choices regarding
tradeoffs. The borrower who does not
consider these costs does not see the
impact of placing money in an escrow
account. As a result, lenders and loan ser-
vicers can take advantage of borrowers.
For example, some servicers require
the escrow account or accounts to contain
an amount sufficient to cover disburse-
ment for tax or insurance a full month or
more prior to the date when the payment
must actually be made. Recent Wall
Street Journal and Consumer Reports ar-
ticles tell of borrowers required by servic-
ers to hold cushions of more than $1,000.
It should be obvious that requiring such
cushions increases imputed interest cost.
Consider in addition combined versus
separate tax and insurance escrow
accounts. In some states, the accounts are
treated jointly; there must merely be suf-
ficient funds between the two accounts to
cover payment needs. In many states,
however, the accounts may be treated
separately. Separate treatment places a
floor on each account, thereby raising the
imputed interest cost to the borrower,
and, in turn, the imputed interest return to
the lender or outside servicer.
The amount that a borrower is required
to hold in escrow accounts, and therefore
the interest rate differential, obviously
depends on numerous factors. Among
these are the property value, the property
tax rate, the insurance rate, the loan to
value ratio, the building to value ratio,
and the imputed interest rate. Regardless,
the differential is not trivial; it might
easily reach seven to ten basis points, and
peculiar situations could generate even
greater differences.
It would seem that "truth in lending"
provisions should require lenders to dis-
close the costs that escrow arrangements
impose on borrowers. But apparently
such disclosure is not required. (Disclo-
sure clearly is not made to borrowers, but
the escrow account area is one is which
the laws seem routinely to be ignored.)
An alternative protection for consu-
mers would be to require that interest be
explicitly paid on escrow accounts. If this
action were undertaken, borrowers would
more clearly see the cost of escrow
accounts, and their rejection of mispriced
loans would narrow the interest rate dif-
ferential between loans with and without
. escrow accounts. Borrowers would select
financing packages that were truly best
for them with regard to cost and risk. |
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Privatization of Public Housing in the U.S.
Peter F. Colwell and Michelle A. Mahue
In September of 1990, the 464 unit
Kenilwovth-Pavkside housing project in
Washington. D.C. was sold to its resident
management corporation for the modest
sum of one dollar. While ownership of
the units will he transferred gradually
as renovations are completed, the entire
project eventually will he owned as a
cooperative under the direction of this
private management body. The sale of
Kenilworth-Parkside to the tenant group
represents the culmination of nearly ten
years' ejfort by the resident management
corporation to assume ownership.
During the 1980s. Kenilworth-
Parkside emerged as a modelfor tenant
management. As more managerial re-
sponsibilities were placed in tfie hands of
residents, their quality of life improved
dramatically. Moreover, it is estimated
that the sale of this project alone will
save the government $6 million in the
first ten years, with savings growing to
$26 million overforty years. These re-
sults indicate that tenant ownership can
be a favorable alternative for taxpayers
and residents alike. Although it may not
be tiw case in every situation, most ten-
ant managed and tenant owned projects
have enjoyed some degree of success.
The concept of privatization, the transfer
of government activity to private control,
has slowly gained popularity in the U.S.
in recent years. Two frequently cited
examples of privatization measures are
contracting out public services and
selling government assets. Much recent
debate in the U.S. has focused on the
potential benefits of selling to the
private sector such government-owned
real estate assets as undeveloped Western
land and urban public housing projects.
Public housing is a topic of concern
among lawmakers, because its sale has
public policy implications for both the
government and the buyers (occupants
of the units prior to the sale). Evidence to
date indicates that buyers of public hous-
ing can reap abundant benefits; projects
sold to their tenants have displayed not
only improved maintenance and manage-
ment, but significantly less crime, drug
usage, and teenage pregnancy as well.
Resident ownership increases dwellers'
stakes in the properties where they reside,
thereby providing them with incentives
to improve their living environment. A
natural response, therefore, is to question
why privatization of public housing has
not become more popular.
WHIWIWP
Generous Contributors
U of I alumnus Robert Levin of Chi-
cago has made a significant financial
contribution to ORER. Mr. and Mrs.
Howard Builta have done so as well.
Both Mr. Levin and the Builtas have
been regular contributors for several
years. The generous support of alum-
ni and others helps the Office to meet
its mission of promoting education,
research, and public service.
Alumni Luncheon Scheduled
ORER is scheduling a Spring 1991
luncheon for University of Illinois
alumni working in the real estate
field. The date of the event will be
April 26; the featured speaker is yet
to be announced. Alumni luncheons
are open only to alumni of the Uni-
versity and their guests. The Office
of Real Estate Research will send
registration notices to individuals on
the mailing list who have identified
themselves as U of I alumni.
Cannaday National President
Professor Roger Cannaday has been
elected national President and Na-
tional Executive Council member for
Rho Epsilon. He is the faculty advis-
or to the U of I chapter. An article on
the chapter's recent activities will ap-
pear in the Spring 1991 ORER Letter.
ILD Proposals Adopted
President Alberto Fujimori of Peru
has enacted several initiatives based
on Institute for Liberty and Democra-
cy policies discussed in "The Crea-
tion of Property Rights in Peru"
(ORER Letter, Summer 1990 issue).
Among these policies, described for
ORER Letter readers by ILD presi-
dent Hernando de Soto, are the busi-
ness registry and property registry,
and related anti-drug programs.
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Commentary
Successes Overseas
Although many other countiies have
adopted .some privatization measures,
none has been more vigorous in its
pursuits than has the United Kingdom
(see accompanying article on page 6).
Britain's programs have served as models
for privatization around the world, while
the U.S. has lagged behind many less-
developed, and even previously commu-
nist, countries in privatization activity.
As even the British experience has
shown, however, bureaucratic sluggish-
ness is likely to greet any serious efforts
to promote or implement tenant owner-
ship. Little was done to foster this form
of privatization in the U.S. until 1987,
when the Housing and Community
Development Act, engineered by then-
Congressman Jack Kemp, outlined "right
to buy" procedures for tenants. While the
Reagan administration had given a nod to
tenant management, it was not until this
legislation was passed that tenants' rights
were broadened to include ownership.
The legislation eliminated many of the
legal barriers to resident control and
provided funds for tenant groups.
Some observers feel that privatization
has not become more widespread in the
U.S. because of political opposition.
Thatcher was able to counter opposition
to British privatization by unifying and
mobilizing those parties that would stand
to benefit from the programs. U.S. propo-
nents, on the other hand, have failed to
organize a coalition among the parties af-
fected by potential changes. By ignoring
these parties' existing interests, propo-
nents may have frightened and alienated
bureaucrats and program participants
alike. Although Kemp has emerged as a
champion of privatization, the multitude
of requirements that tenant groups must
satisfy is evidence that bureaucratic foot-
dragging continues.
Steps to Resident Ownership
The literature describing the Department
of Housing and Urban Development's
privatization procedures is filled with
rhetoric addressing the need for tenant or-
ganization and mobilization. The proper
post-sale environment, HUD apparently
feels, depends primarily on the tenants'
1
being forced not only to join together,
but also to work together. Indeed, HUD
procedures and requirements place on
tenants significant burdens to prove that
they are capable of managing the dwell-
ings they own.
Under HUD requirements, a tenants"
leadership group must complete a 12 to
18 month training program covering
such areas as organization, management,
development, and ownership before it is
"prepared" to negotiate a possible pur-
chase. Only after completing the pre-
scribed training can the group contract
with the local Public Housing Authority
(PHA) to determine the responsibilities
and fees to be borne by each of the two
parties. Given that an Illinois real estate
salesperson is required to complete only
45 hours of training before assisting oth-
ers with real estate transactions, HUD's
1 ,000 hour classroom requirement for
public housing tenants who will repre-
sent their own interests appears onerous.
After at least three years of successful
management experience, the tenants'
group, called a resident management
corporation (RMC), is permitted to pur-
chase the property. While the property
may, in theory, be run as either a cooper-
ative or a condominium, HUD's housing
policies are structured such that coopera-
tive ownership is the preferred choice.
HUD's bias toward the cooperative form
is demonstrated by its policy that rent
subsidy certificates may be applied
toward mortgage loan payments only
for projects managed as cooperatives.
Of course, public housing tenants do
face maximum income restrictions, so
it may be easier for a tenant group to
secure a loan on an entire complex orga-
nized as a cooperative than for individu-
als to finance their units. Yet the finan-
cial and managerial problems associated
with cooperative ownership are well
known. Cooperatives, so frequently un-
successful in private markets (there was
no co-op boom during the condo boom),
are even more unlikely to succeed in
a semi-regulated market in which the
interests of HUD, the local PHA, and low
income tenants must all be served.
HUD also requires the completion of
a number of administrative procedures
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before any transfer of ownership is possi-
ble. For example, the PHA must prepare
a plan meeting a requirement that a new
dwelling unit be built to replace each
unit privatized. In addition, the tenant
group must submit an economic and
financial feasibility study to support its
ownership plans. Furthermore, to meet
minimum housing quality standards,
significant investments in renovation
and rehabilitation are required, virtually
necessitating that the RMC secure a
mortgage from a commercial lender.
Specifically, HUD requires a minimum
investment of $ 1 .000 per unit in order
for tenants to convert rent subsidy certifi-
cates to mortgage subsidies.
There is, however, no economic ratio-
nale for this minimum. Policy makers
evidently feel that a tenant will not rec-
ognize his stake in a project's success if
he is not forced to assume some financial
responsibility for improvements. In man-
dating a required investment, officials
appear to have underestimated the incen-
tives that tenant control provides. A
mortgage loan should be made only if
the value added by rehabilitation meets
or exceeds the cost of the loan. Certainly
public housing tenants can understand
that funds are lost otherwise.
Once an RMC has jumped through
hud's procedural hoops and finally is
permitted to purchase the property, the
group faces even more ill-conceived
restrictions. For example, the RMC is
encouraged to employ tenants as mainte-
nance workers and in various other staff
positions. While this practice may initial-
ly reduce local unemployment, it sets the
stage for favoritism and waste. Similarly,
public housing tenants are not permitted
to hire professional management. While
arguments may be made that such servic-
es are beyond the budgets of low income
housing projects, basic economic theory
supports the claim that the party with the
comparative advantage should be chosen
as the supplier. No other private condo-
minium or cooperative owners must ful-
fill requirements even remotely compara-
ble to those placed on public housing
dwellers. In light of this inequality, HUD
regulations appear to be excessive obsta-
cles to privatization.
Why Privatization Can Work
A tenant's economic stake in a unit he
can purchase is a function of the value of
the property. A low income tenant, whose
equity is likely to be limited, realizes a
high return on dollars invested if his
property appreciates in value. Converse-
ly, since he has little equity to lose,
downside risk is small. HUD's literature
regarding tenant control emphasizes po-
tential social improvements rather than
the more obvious economic incentives,
yet social betterment follows from eco-
nomic incentives. Given the ability to
realize gains, the tenant will monitor the
environment to protect his investment.
Some who argue that privatization is
not economically viable assume that oth-
er government institutions cannot accom-
modate tenant ownership. For example, if
rent subsidies may not be applied to the
purchase cost of a dwelling, then a tenant
at the margin truly will find it more cost-
ly to buy and maintain his dwelling than
to continue renting. It has also been
argued that comparing successful housing
privatization programs in Britain with
tenant control in the U.S. is inappropri-
ate, given differences in the markets
served in the two countries. When
Thatcher took office, nearly a third of all
British families occupied public housing,
while just over one percent of American
families lived in government units.
One may surmise from these figures
that many of those living in Britain's
public housing earn incomes close to the
national median. In contrast, a U.S. pub-
lic housing dweller is typically from the
poorest segment of society, earning only
a small fraction of the nation's median
income. American public housing resi-
dents, so the argument goes, would there-
fore tend to face much more difficulty in
purchasing housing than do their British
counterparts. There are, of course, cases
in which it does not pay tenants to pur-
chase their dwellings. If, however, the
tenant may realize the appreciation in the
property's value, as well as any equity
build-up accruing from loan amortization,
then there is as much economic justifica-
tion for poor American renters to pur-
chase as there is for wealthier British
public housing dwellers to do so.
ORER News
New ORER Paper
Another paper has been added to the
ORER Working Paper Series. "Valu-
ing Long-Term Leases: The Option
to Redevelop" by Dennis R. Capozza
and Gordon A. Sick is the 84th entry
in the series. A single copy of any
paper in the series is available free of
charge from ORER.
Scholarships Awarded
University of Illinois seniors Lisa
Ludwig (from Westchester) and
Chris Tiemey (from Bartlett) have
been awarded scholarships by the
Chicago chapter of the Society of
Industrial and Office Realtors®.
They were chosen by a faculty com-
mittee as the outstanding U of I
undergraduate real estate students for
the 1990-91 academic year.
Outlook Day
The Office of Real Estate Research
conducted its Real Estate Outlook
1991 program on January 8 at the
Hyatt Regency Oak Brook. Approxi-
mately 50 representatives of the bro-
kerage, development, lending, regula-
tory, and academic communities
heard four prominent speakers' views
on issues affecting real estate markets
in Illinois and the country.
William Bryan, Director of the
University of Illinois Bureau of Eco-
nomic and Business Research, spoke
on the state of the the economy and
its likely impact on real estate. John
Weicher, Assistant Secretary for Poli-
cy Development and Research with
the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, discussed the
impact of thrift reform on the housing
sector. RESCORP president Norman
Katz, a Chicago developer with expe-
rience in revitalizing troubled proper-
ties, spoke on affordable housing.
Terry Alexander of Boelter Environ-
mental Consultants in Chicago
discussed recent legislation and other
activity in the environmental area.
The 1991 program was the 5th
Outlook Day sponsored by the
Office of Real Estate Research.
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The Standard Criticisms
In a recent paper produced by the Heri-
tage Foundation, John Scanlon analyzes
the criticisms often directed against ten-
ant ownership. He cites resistance from
politicians who claim that ownership
responsibility is beyond the understand-
ing of public housing tenants, from local
government officials and other bureau-
crats who risk losing authority and
autonomy, and from unions and labor
organizations whose contracts (to pro-
vide maintenance for the publicly-owned
properties, for example) are threatened.
The argument that public housing
residents are incapable of handling
replace each unit sold to its tenants with
a new unit of public housing. Scanlon
maintains that this requirement, which
was designed to address fears that privati-
zation would reduce the stock of low
income housing, actually exacerbates the
problem of shortages by imposing an
effective barrier to privatization.
Legitimate Concerns
The truly compelling arguments are not
those critical of the privatization concept,
but rather are those concerned with the
restrictive manner in which privatization
schemes are administered. For example,
restrictions that HUD places on the resale
No other private condominium or cooperative owners
must fulfill requirements even remotely comparable
to those placed on public housing dwellers.
responsibility fails, however, in light of
the successes of many tenant-managed
housing projects. Such projects seem to
be successful even when they are not
characterized by the type of high profile
leadership encountered in some early
privatization undertakings. The argu-
ment that privatization requires exces-
sively high rehabilitation costs fails to
recognize the long-term cost saving that
results from terminating government
maintenance obligations.
Critics also claim that the real housing
problem facing the nation's poor is a
shortfall of available units, not a lack of
ownership opportunities. They say that
public policy should focus not on the
sale of public housing, but on the con-
struction of new low-cost dwellings.
According to Scanlon, however, a closer
analysis of the facts reveals that public
housing projects carry high vacancy
rates, with approximately ten percent of
the units uninhabitable. Privatization
actually adds to the housing stock, by re-
habilitating otherwise undesirable units
and by decreasing vacancy rates. It is un-
fortunate that politicians included in the
1987 Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act the provision that HUD must
of privatized units assure that many of
the potential benefits of privatization will
not be realized. A unit purchased by its
occupant may be resold only to another
low-income tenant, to the RMC, or to the
local PHA, and the price must be an ad-
ministered price rather than the figure at
which comparable privately-developed
units sell. Such restrictions on the right
to dispose of property significantly re-
duce incentives to the initial purchaser.
Nevertheless, some who claim to fa-
vor privatization offer arguments in sup-
port of resale restrictions. They contend
that in Britain, where there are no restric-
tions on reselling public housing, privati-
zation has created an affordability prob-
lem when public housing estates have
been sold to developers and refurbished
for resale to a more affluent clientele.
Unless there are restrictions on develop-
ment, however, supply adjustments
should respond to these shifts in demand,
alleviating any displacement problems.
Restricting the resale terms for a unit,
like any other form of price control,
creates its own market peculiarities. In
the public housing situation, a dual price
system is created, whereby formerly gov-
ernment-owned property sells at a lower
price than does similar privately owned
property. If a tenant-tumed-owner can
realize only a portion of the value, he is
less likely to maintain or improve his
unit. Prices in such a system eventually
converge; through reduced maintenance
owners disinvest until their properties are
worth no more than the controlled prices,
or devices such as key money and bribes
raise the effective prices of controlled
units to market levels.
Conclusions
While some amount of training and
supervision may be necessary for public
housing dwellers who buy their units,
hud's requirements have proven to be
more a hindrance to privatization than a
catalyst. Government places a burden on
public housing tenants unlike any faced
by other prospective purchasers; wealthi-
er individuals who lack the knowledge to
manage property are not prevented from
buying in private transactions. With the
availability of professional management
services, there is no reason why public
housing tenants should be required to
possess management ability in order to
purchase their dwellings. Success is not
dependent on tenant management; full
ownership rights, including the unimped-
ed right to dispose, provide sufficient
incentives to guarantee the success of
privatization efforts.
Requiring replacement of privatized
units and limiting resale rights may quell
political fears of displacing the urban
poor, but they also slow the growth of
privatization programs. While there is a
need to ensure health and safety when
public housing units are sold to their ten-
ants, privatization seems to be wrought
with oveiTCgulation. Regardless of
whether these standards are enforced to
satisfy special interest groups or to satis-
fy those who feel that property owner-
ship is beyond the capacity of the poor,
the stifling results are the same. HUD's
programs not only create a cloud of pro-
cedures that discourage tenant efforts;
they also effectively obfuscate the eco-
nomic benefits of home ownership, limit-
ing public housing tenants from recogniz-
ing the units they live in as potential
investments. ^
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HUD Response: Don't Underestimate New Consensus on Ownership
David Caprara
ORER LETTER was reluclant tofeature
au article critical ofHUD policy without
providing the opportunity for a response.
In the following paragraphs. Mr. David
Caprara. HUD' s Deputy Assistant Secre-
taryfor Resident Initiatives, agrees with
some pointsfrom the previous article,
rebuts others, and provides evidence that
there may he an optimistic future for
privatizing public housing.
In "Privatization of Public Housing in tiie
U.S.." authors Colwell and Mahue do a
superb job in describing the benefits of
the resident management and homestead-
ing efforts currently underway in public
and assisted housing projects across the
country. In addition to recognizing the
obvious long-term net benefits of privati-
zation, they note that home ownership
empowers public housing communities
with the capacity to tackle such endemic
challenges as family preservation, drug
elimination, and economic revitalization.
Their premise, however, that "privati-
zation has not become more popular"
because of supposed structural inadequa-
cies in the program is certainly not
grounded in fact. As a matter of record,
more than 10,000 public housing and
community leaders attended HUD Resi-
dent Initiatives Conferences last year.
The conferences are held regionally
throughout the country to provide inter-
action between the Department and par-
ticipants, or potential participants, in pri-
vatization programs. HUD's Office of
Resident Initiatives (created by Secretary
Jack Kemp to implement the program)
can hardly keep pace with the inquiries
and requests for help in implementing
new home ownership projects.
HUD has, in fact, addressed many of
the concerns noted in the prior article.
The authors state, for example, that there
has been no "coalition among the parties
affected by the potential changes." Yet
every major national public and Native
American housing trade organization
(such as the Council of Large Public
Housing Authorities) recently signed a
Joint Declaration on Resident Initiatives
with Secretary Kemp. The Declaration
outlines resident management and owner-
ship principles. There have been other
actions as well; in April of 1990 nearly
1,000 resident managers and home own-
ership activists participated in the first
annual National Association of Resident
Management Corporations empowerment
convention. A cottage industry of the
1980s clearly has become a self-help
renaissance in the '90s.
Solid Programs, Satisried Participants
HUD programs provide powerful equity
incentives. An independent evaluation
found 77% of the owners in HUD's
Homeownership Demonstration to be
highly satisfied with the program. Buy-
ers reported satisfaction from building
equity that they could pass on to their
children, and from gaining the ability to
improve their neighborhoods.
We disagree with the criticism of
training requirements; training is essen-
HUD's HOPE initiative advances an anti-poverty
agenda through home ownership and broadened
principles of entrepreneurial capitalism.
HOPE for the Future
Evidence that there is also a political con-
sensus was provided by the landmark pas-
sage of the President's Homeownership
and Opportunity for People Everywhere
(HOPE) initiative in Congress last year.
The HOPE initiative advances an anti-
poverty agenda through home ownership
and broadened principles of entrepreneu-
rial capitalism; it goes far beyond the
1987 homesteading amendments and
prior restrictions imposed by Congress.
HOPE addresses several of the issues
rai.sed by Colwell and Mahue: its govern-
ing principles are local control and eco-
nomic choice. It allows for private man-
agers, and participating home buyers are
free to select from a range of ownership
forms that includes fee simple, condomin-
ium, and cooperative. In addition, the
resale "profit" scheme under HOPE is
superior to that of the 1 987 Act Amend-
ments, which mandate limited equity for
the life of the development. Under HOPE,
the full value of market appreciation ac-
crues to a resident who owns his property
for five years, and a pro-rata forgiveness
of a silent second trust deed (covering
any discount between appraised value and
purchase price) gives an added benefit.
tial in any entrepreneurial venture if the
American dream is to become reality for
low-income citizens. The authors also
dislike the policy on replacing privatized
units, but HOPE deals with this issue
through tenant-based market solutions.
The authors provide a good economic
analysis of public housing ownership.
Clearly their sympathies are with the
residents, and their goal of making own-
ership more "user friendly" for public
housing dwellers is one that we share.
Recently published statutes and regula-
tions on the HOPE program, and regula-
tions for HUD's 5(h) program to be
published in the Spring, will clarify our
commitment to homesteading.
The Kemp team at HUD certainly
advocates maximum flexibility, minimal
government intrusion, and adherence to
proven market principles in unleashing
entrepreneurial sectors and private prop-
erty movements in low-income commu-
nities. We have conferred with counter-
parts in Britain, and even in Moscow,
and are confident that a growing commit-
ment to democratic and market princi-
ples, such as the privatizing of public
housing, will improve the lives of people
from Eastern Europe to East L.A. WL
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Privatization of Public Housing in the U.K.
Michelle A. Mahue
While the analyses and conclusions pre-
sented in this article reflect the views of
the author, the institutional background
on Britain s privatization programs is
drawn heavilyfrom "Privatization and
Housing Under Thatcherism." a forth-
coming article in the JOURNAL OF
URBAN AFFAIRS. Its author. Dr. Ray
Forrest, is currently a professor in the
Schoolfor Advanced Urban Studies at the
University of Bristol in England. He has
published many articles on privatization.
Yet while both Conservative and La-
bour administrations outwardly encour-
aged privatization, the measures proposed
typically were granted little support by
the Labour-controlled housing authorities.
Conservatives have been more of a driv-
ing force, supporting privatization as a
means by which competitive processes
could be introduced into formerly state-
controlled and regulated housing markets.
Their party initially promoted ownership
through the construction of new housing
The ''discounts" offered are as meaningless as the initial
"values" determined by the government . Those
properties that remain unsold are simply overpriced.
Under Margaret Thatcher's guidance,
privatization in the United Kingdom
has taken many forms, from the sale of
shares in British Petroleum and Rolls
Royce to the sale of publicly-owned
housing units to their former tenants. Pri-
vatization of housing has been extensive;
the proceeds from selling public housing
units equal nearly half of the total reve-
nues generated by all other privatization
programs. About ten percent of British
housing was privatized in the last decade,
leaving just under a quarter of house-
holds (down from a peak of one third)
living in state-owned properties.
Historical Perspective
Although the most significant privatiza-
tion activity has occurred in recent years,
the concept of selling public housing is
not a new one in the U.K. Since public
housing first appeared in Britain, its sale
has been promoted to varying degrees.
Postwar housing shortages, induced by
rent control that drastically weakened
private rental markets, led to the creation
of an extensive British public housing
network and a virtual state monopoly
on rental housing that was disquieting to
people of various political views.
and the conversion of private rental units
to owner-occupied dwellings.
More Recent Privatization Activity
During the 1970s, however, the popularity
of these programs waned. Because of
Thatcher's free market philosophy, the
natural focus for a new Conservative
policy became the elimination of public
housing through the sale of council
(government-owned) homes. At the prime
minister's urging. Parliament in 1980 en-
acted a series of measures granting public
housing tenants the opportunity to obtain
favorable financing and purchase their
dwellings. (Since promoting home owner-
ship had proven to be such fertile ground
for generating votes, the Labour Party
gave its support as well.)
The legislation was a tremendous suc-
cess; at the outset, more than a million
tenants accepted the government's offer.
Each property apparently was assigned an
initial value, which was adjusted to
achieve a below-market administered
sales price that decreased as the length of
the tenant's occupancy increased. Nota-
bly, high-quality public dwellings located
in primarily owner-occupied suburbs were
typical of this first phase of home sales.
Following the initial wave of populari-
ty, however, sales slowed. The favorable
tax treatment given to payers of mort-
gage interest (in Britain as in the U.S.)
proved to be a less persuasive incentive
in marginal transactions involving less
desirable dwellings and lower income
tenants. Therefore, in an effort to spur
sales, subsequent legislation increased
the discounts available to tenants. Also,
privatization procedures were revised,
encouraging tenant input and limiting a
local housing authority's ability to delay
or deter the sale of council houses. When
remaining council holdings consisted
largely of less desired high-rise ghetto
projects, policy makers shifted their
emphasis from individual units to trans-
actions involving whole complexes.
The 1980 legislation, which cut fund-
ing for local authorities to construct new
public housing, was followed by the
1988 Housing Act, provisions of which
have served to revive the private rental
sector. Rent control has been lifted on
new private rental units, while council
rents have been increased in the hope
that they may eventually reach market
levels. Most importantly, the 1988 legis-
lation includes "tenant's choice." This
• laudable provision enables any landlord
approved by the central Housing Corpo-
ration to purchase publicly owned hous-
ing if the tenants approve the sale.
Tenant's choice has received mixed
reviews, however. The balloting proce-
dure has been criticized as skewed in
favor of sales; non-voters are treated as
having voted affirmatively. Furthermore,
when faced with possible sales to private
owners, tenants have demonstrated indif-
ference between private and public land-
lords. Even the poorest of British ten-
ants, like the poorest U.S. public housing
residents, have shown a preference for
self-ownership. Consequently, in many
cases tenant groups have petitioned to
purchase their complexes rather than
simply to facilitate, by their approval, a
change from government to third-party
private ownership.
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The Thrill of Victory
Proponents maintain that privatization
reduces tiie government financial bur-
dens and people's dependence on the
state, while allowing more widespread
enjoyment of the benefits of ownership.
Proponents also believe that the privati-
zation of public housing enhances the
social mix of "estates" (the equivalent of
public housing projects in the U.S.). Fur-
thermore, many cite the apparent strong
latent demand among public housing
tenants to purchase their own homes.
Although U.K. housing officials have
been more highly motivated sellers than
have been public housing authorities in
the U.S.. the two countries' low income
privatization programs are generally
quite similar. For example, both nations"
systems build from the foundation of
tenant management. In some British pro-
grams, the local public housing authority
remains the owner of the estate, while
the project is run as a partnership
between the housing authority and the
tenants' estate management board.
In addition to promoting traditional
ownership and tenant management, Brit-
ish authorities have introduced innova-
tive forms of ownership in the effort to
sustain the momentum of home sales.
Tenants can form cooperatives, or trusts,
through which they may purchase their
dwellings and attract private capital for
refurbishing the units. Housing associa-
tions have also emerged, providing
tenants with further ownership options.
These non-profit associations, which rely
on volunteers and on government funds,
may either build new units, renovate
existing ones, or acquire units from local
authorities through voluntary transfers.
Tenants may purchase units outright or
rent the units with the option to buy.
For low income tenants who might not
otherwise be able to afford mortgages
on their dwellings, housing associations
even provide various forms of shared
ownership. For example, a tenant may
purchase a portion of the property
through a typical mortgage arrangement,
renting the remaining portion from the
association. As his income increases, the
tenant may gradually increase his equity,
eventually owning the entire dwelling.
Even while the association owns part of
the estate, tenants provide management.
A Dose of Caution
The fact that both Labour and Conserva-
tives support the sale of state owned
housing does not imply that British
privatization policies have escaped criti-
cism. Forrest claims that while the privat-
ization of housing was initiated as a
means of distributing the benefits of
home ownership to a greater share of
society, Britain's policymakers have lost
sight of the social and economic benefits.
He feels that privatization has instead be-
come a means of generating revenues and
political support. The objectives of gov-
ernment and the public in this situation,
however, are not incongruous. In most
cases, an appropriate sale price, com-
bined with a mortgage interest tax bene-
fit, will provide tenants with sufficient
incentives to purchase dwellings. On the
other hand, the state is not "selling the
family silver," as is often claimed. Obvi-
ously, it pays the state to sell an asset
when the sale value exceeds the present
value of the income that could be gener-
ated by holding and maintaining the
property. The resulting redistribution of
public housing is therefore a movement
toward a higher use, and consequently a
more efficient use, of resources.
Another major criticism of British
privatization efforts is that rather than
leading to a greater social mix of home
owners, they have decreased the social
diversity of ownership. Public housing
sales have been most popular within
estates in high quality areas, where the
level of home ownership is already high.
This phenomenon might be explained in
terms of the administered prices. The
value of a property is the highest price
that a buyer would pay under normal, or
approximately normal, market condi-
tions. Market values of units transferred
in these regulated sales, then, are not the
government's estimates, but rather are the
prices at which the properties would sell
in unregulated transactions. In effect, the
"discounts" offered are as meaningless
as the initial "values" determined by the
government. Those properties that remain
unsold are simply overpriced. ^
ORER News
Data Book Distributed
Jared Shlaes and the Chicago office
of Arthur Andersen & Co. recently
distributed copies of the Chicago
Data Project Data Book to members
of the Midwest chapter of the Ameri-
can Society of Real Estate Counse-
lors. The book was produced by the
Office of Real Estate Research pursu-
ant to a grant awarded to ORER
Director Peter Colwell by the Homer
Hoyt Advanced Studies Institute.
Busy ORER Advisors
Advisory Committee members serve
the professional community and the
public in activities in addition to their
career pursuits and their ORER duties.
Some activities of those who reported
to ORER Letter are as follows.
BEBR Director William Bryan
spent the late fall and early winter in
the Soviet Union, lecturing on eco-
nomic policy at institutes in Baku and
Tbilisi. Joining Bryan on this educa-
tional mission was former ORER
Director A. James Heins. Bryan also
is a member of the Economic Devel-
opment Policy Task Force of the
Illinois State Chamber of Commerce,
and he continues to serve as Editor of
the Illinois Business Review.
ORER Director Peter Colwell
presented "The Value of Agricultural
Land" at 1990's AREUEA meetings
in December. He also participated in
January meetings of the Homer Hoyt
Institute and the Weimar School, on
whose faculty he serves. He is a
director of the Illinois Real Estate
Educational Foundation, and in
(continued on page 15)
The Office ofReal Estate Research makes
every effort to assure the accuracy of all
statements in ORER LETTER articles prepared
by ORER staffmembers. However, the reader
should note that legal and regulatory matters,
which are occasionally addressed in ORER
LETTER articles, are subject to change and to
varying interpretations. ORER LETTER
articles do not purport to provide legal or
investment advice, and the Office ofReal
Estate Research shall not he held responsible
for damages resulting from omissions or
inaccuracies in the ORER LETTER or other
ORER publications.
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Career Stage and Job Performance of the Real Estate Salesperson
fames B. DeConinck and Don Johnson '
The following is an edited version of
ORER Working Paper #83, "The Effect of
Career Stages on the Job Attitudes and
Job Performance ofReal Estate Salespeo-
ple." A single copy ofany paper in the
Working Paper Series will he provided
to any reader who makes a written or
telephoned request to the Office ofReal
Estate Research.
What causes some real estate salespeople
to perform better than others? Why are
some real estate salespeople more satis-
fied with their jobs than are others? Does
the stage of a salesperson's career affect
performance and attitude toward the job?
While motivating salespeople is impor-
tant in all industries, it is especially so in
real estate sales. For example, the real
estate salesperson encounters competition
from within the firm. In addition, unlike
in other sales-oriented industries, territo-
ries are virtually nonexistent in real estate
sales. Because of the complexity in-
volved in selling real estate, it is impor-
tant that each agency develop an atmos-
phere conducive to motivating its sales-
people. The sales manager is responsible
for fostering performance at a level that
achieves both the salesperson's personal
objectives and the objectives of the firm.
The focus of this article is how job sat-
isfaction, performance, and the desire to
remain employed with the agency are in-
fluenced by the stage of the salesperson's
career. Researchers studying other indus-
tries have found that job attitudes vary
with career stage. These attitudes have
been characterized us, job challenge (the
extent to which the job allows for creativ-
ity and provides strong incentives to suc-
ceed), organizational commitment (the
degree of loyalty to the employing firm,
based on acceptance of the organization's
values and the desire to remain a member
of the organization), /o/) involvement (the
degree to which the individual identifies
with the job), and /o/? satisfaction (the
emotional state of liking the job).
Job attitudes are very important to
organizations. For example, research has
shown that greater job satisfaction results
when employees perceive their jobs as
challenging and when they have high lev-
els of organizational commitment. Great-
er satisfaction, in turn, leads to lower
organizational turnover.
Career Stages
The typical career is characterized by
four stages, although an individual might
experience each stage more than once
during the working lifetime by beginning
one or more new careers. Therefore, the
ages of the people in the different career
stages within an industry can vary widely.
For example, one 40 year old real estate
agent may have just begun selling, while
another agent aged 40 has been selling for
fifteen years. The four career stages are
discussed below.
Exploration Stage
The worker in this first career stage is
likely to be younger, and is more interest-
ed in making a general occupational
choice than in committing to a particular
job or firm. It is not unusual for workers
in the exploration stage to change jobs
several times. Relative to workers at other
career stages, they view their duties as
less challenging, have less commitment to
their jobs and organizations, and are less
productive. Still, they desire advancement
opportunities and are concemed with
adapting to organizational norms.
Establishment Stage
During this second stage, the individual's
work life and personal life tend to be sta-
bilizing. The worker, secure in the belief
that the "right" occupation has been cho-
sen, is committed to achieving success.
Relative to workers in the exploration
stage, those in the establishment stage are
more satisfied with their pay and work,
and are less likely to quit their jobs.
Maintenance Stage
In this third career stage, most employees
are interested in protecting the income
and success they have achieved. The mid-
career worker tends to be more satisfied
than are workers in other stages, though
there can be difficulties; the employee's
attitude may reflect a perception that
there is reduced opportunity to move
farther up the organizational hierarchy.
During this period, changes in work and
personal matters often are interconnected.
Personal and family activities may begin
to take precedence over work roles.
Disengagement Stage
This final career stage is a transition from
work to retirement. Employees place less
importance on performing effectively and
more importance on nonwork activities,
such as family and hobbies. They view
their jobs as less challenging and have
less job involvement than do those in the
establishment and maintenance phases.
While the employee in the disengage-
ment stage typically is satisfied, the level
of performance is typically lower than at
the establishment or maintenance stage;
increased job satisfaction (unlike at other
career stages) is not correlated with in-
creased performance. In fact, older em-
ployees, with greater need for security,
might prefer to receive performance-
based rewards rather than intrinsic re-
wards, such as recognition and increased
responsibility. However, workers at this
stage tend to perceive a low relationship
between performance and rewards.
Application to Real Estate Sales
Little existing research examines the
causes of performance and job satisfac-
tion for real estate salespeople, and no
previous studies examine how job atti-
tudes change during the real estate sales-
person's career. To better understand
how attitudes change during the career,
we administered a 60-item career con-
cerns questionnaire (developed by Dr.
Donald Super) to 241 full-time real estate
salespersons in a midwestem state. Ques-
tions cover job involvement, job satisfac-
tion, perceived job challenge, organiza-
tional commitment, and performance
during the four career stages.
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The results show how job attitudes
vary with career stage. Real estate sales-
people in the exploration stage have low
organizational commitment, low job in-
volvement, low perceived job challenge,
and low job satisfaction. However, no
significant differences are found between
the organizational commitment, job in-
volvement, and perceived job challenge
levels of real estate salespeople in the
exploration stage and those in the disen-
gagement stage. Agents in the establish-
ment and maintenance stages score high-
er on these counts. The results also show
salespeople in the exploration stage to
have slightly lower performance levels
than do other real estate agents.
No meaningful differences are found
between the job attitudes of real estate
salespeople in the establishment stage
and those in the maintenance stage.
Agents in the disengagement stage dem-
onstrate lower job satisfaction than do
those in the establishment and mainte-
nance career stages, but differences are
not large.
The results also show that agents in
the exploration stage are less productive
than are salespeople in other stages. It is
interesting that, in contrast to results typ-
ically found in other industries, real es-
tate salespeople in the disengagement
stage demonstrate the highest level of
performance.
Implications for the Industry
To increase sales and minimize the costs
of turnover, the sales manager should un-
dertake different actions depending on
the career stage of the employee. During
the exploration stage, salespeople need
coaching, feedback, and added training:
the sales manager can provide the need-
ed direction and serve as a role model.
Management of new employees is ex-
tremely important in the real estate sales
industry, because selling is a demanding
occupation, and during a sales slump the
agent may be tempted to seek a different
field of endeavor if proper encourage-
ment is not provided.
Salespeople in the exploration stage
are more likely than salespeople in other
career stages to change employers or
even leave the real estate industry. High-
er turnover is not necessarily a problem;
some agents do not have the desire or
ability to be successful in real estate
sales, and terminating their employment
can benefit both the firm and the employ-
ee. Brokerage firms, however, do not
necessarily want to terminate new people
who do not immediately show promise:
given more time these individuals might
become highly productive. Finns must
also weigh the costs, including training
and opportunity costs, incurred in filling
vacant sales positions.
Management needs to develop realistic
job previews for agents in the exploration
stage. If expectations are not realized,
employees with low job involvement and
Firms must recognize the conflicts
between work and family that arise dur-
ing the maintenance stage. Salespersons
in this stage are often among the best
performers in their fiims, so maintaining
motivation among them is very impor-
tant. These employees value job security
and company benefits, and they have
strong community ties. They are less in-
clined to change jobs than are salespeo-
ple in the exploration and establishment
stages. Salespeople in the maintenance
stage have less desire to be promoted
than do those in the establishment stage;
they may view themselves as having
plateaued. Since the agents in the main-
tenance stage are typically among the
Lack of productivity among salespeople cannot be
dismissed with the argument that the firm faces no
commission costs; after all, no sales means no profits.
organizational commitment are more
likely to leave the firm. Job previews can
reduce turnover by providing realistic ex-
pectations; selling real estate can be time
consuming and difficult. If the proper
information is provided by the firm, the
self-selected group of new salespersons
consists of those who would be the most
satisfied and the most committed to the
organization and the profession. Lack of
productivity among salespeople cannot
be dismissed with the argument that the
firm faces no commission costs; after all,
no sales means no profits.
The firm should provide a challenging
work environment for salespeople in the
establishment stage. Straight commission
compensation helps to provide challeng-
es. Research has also shown that opportu-
nity for advancement is important to the
salesperson at this stage. However, there
is a dilemma in that few opportunities for
promotion are present in the real estate
industry, so sales managers must find
creative ways to motivate and reward
productive employees. For example,
membership in the "million dollar club"
provides peer and public recognition of
the salesperson's accomplishments.
top producers, management cannot
afford to lose them to other agencies.
In contrast to previous findings, our
results indicate that salespersons in the
disengagement stage have the highest
levels of sales performance, and are as
involved and satisfied in their jobs as
are salespeople in the establishment and
maintenance stages. An important rami-
fication of this finding is that the real
estate sales industry is atypical, in that
employees who are close to retirement
may be more productive than those in
earlier career stages.
To ensure that these salespeople do
not actually disengage (leave the finn or
profession), the sales manager needs to
let them know that they are valued by
the organization. This message can be
conveyed by placing these experienced
agents in leadership roles, such as assist-
ing in training new salespeople. S
Dr. DeConinck, formerly an Assistant
Professor ofMarketing at Western Illi-
nois University, is now on the faculty
of Central Missouri State University.
Mr. Johnson is an Assistant Professor
ofFinance at W.I.U.
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Czech Scholar Discusses Freeing the Real Estate Markets
Early in the Fall of 1989, ORER LETTER
interviewed Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity' s Austin Jajfe on housing in Eastern
Europe. Our timing was both bad and
good: several Eastern Bloc nations un-
derv,'ent changes in government hePA'een
the interview date and the delivery of
our Fall 1989 issue, but the results have
highlighted the accuracy ofsome of
Jaff'e's projections. For example, he
indicated that among the first nations to
open its political and economic .systems
would he Czechoslovakia.
That country has indeed become more
open, electing a former dissident to its
presidency and even joining the U.S. -led
alliance in the Persian Gulf. Another
aspect ofwarmer relations betM'een our
countries has been an increase in cultu-
ral and educational exchanges. A partic-
ipant in one such exchange program is
Jaromir Ryska. a Fulbright Scholar
conducting research with the University
of Illinois Department ofArchitecture.
Dr. Ryska was educated at the Techni-
cal University ofPrague, completing an
M.S. in the School of Engineering and a
Ph.D. in the university's Building Re-
search Institute. Since 1980, he has been
an Associate Professor at the Academy
ofApplied Art in Prague. Yet while his
professorial interests involve construc-
tion and computer aided design. Dr.
Ryska also holds a position with his
country' s Ministry ofJustice as a real
estate appraiser. A goal during his
ten-month stay in Urhana is to study
American appraisal techniques.
In the following pages, this learned
and enthusiastic visitor shares with
ORER LETTER readers his views on to-
day's Czechoslovakia in an economic
and historic context, with a particular
focus on property rights and the coun-
try's real estate markets.
Now that there have been democratic
initiatives, will Americans be better able
to understand the economic and political
problems ofEastern Europe? I think
that Americans still have trouble under-
standing some of the problems of the
Eastern Bloc because they are not famil-
iar with the history of Middle and Eastern
Europe. Czechoslovakia is a small and
unique country, slightly smaller than Illi-
nois in area but with 4.5 million more in-
habitants. It is not. contrary to what many
Americans tend to think, indistinguish-
able from the other Eastern European
countries. I'm not being critical; before I
came to the U.S. I didn't know that there
were differences between Illinois and
Massachusetts. Yet while U. S. regions
may differ by climate or industry, the
people do not feel that they belong to dif-
ferent countries. The small states of East-
em Europe, on the other hand, have their
own peoples, all with their own languag-
es and strong nationalist urges. There is a
long history of wars and shifting borders.
I don't think too many Americans
would distinguish between Pole, Serb,
Czech, and Slovak, but those people cer-
tainly view themselves as different. They
remember their histories; Czech history
dates from the 9th century. Between the
5th and 7th centuries the Slavs swept
over the area of Bohemia. The dominant
group among these Slavs was the Czechs,
who have continued throughout history to
battle the Germans for independence.
The Golden Age for Bohemia was the
14th century, when Czech King Charles
IV became Holy Roman emperor and
moved the imperial administration to
Prague; Charles University, one of
Europe's oldest, was established there in
1348. But when the Austrian Habsburgs
gained the Bohemian crown in 1526, and
particularly after the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy was established in 1867. Bohe-
mia was reduced to a province of Austria.
Slovakia had been annexed by Hungary
in the 1 1th century. The Czech and Slo-
vak nations, with their separate histories
and cultures, were artificially connected
at the end of World War 1. The Slovaks
formed their own state again in 1939
when Hitler annexed Bohemia, but in
1945 the Soviets reestablished the
Czechoslovak Republic, and in 1948
they instituted communist rule.
Under this regime, the once-vibrant
market economy deteriorated. Reformers
in the Czech Communist Party tried to
establish "socialism with a human face,"
but their efforts were interrupted by in-
vading Warsaw Pact troops in September
of 1968. Continued political opposition,
particularly by intellectuals, and the
weak economies in the Soviet Union and
throughout Eastern Europe, led to the
"Velvet Revolution" in 1988.
While we hope to learn from the polit-
ical and economic institutions of the
West, a democratic Czechoslovakia may
evolve differently than, for example, the
U.S. did, because our citizens have a
different view of their role in the world.
Czechs have been fighting for indepen-
dence since the beginning of their histo-
ry. Our national character was perhaps
best expressed by Jaroslav Hasek's "The
Good Soldier Schwiek." He destroys the
orderliness of the old-fashioned govern-
ment, but he does not destroy the solidar-
ity that binds our people together.
How has property traditionally been
owned in your country? The Czecho-
slovak Republic was established in 1918
on the principles of democracy, private
ownership, and free markets. Our first
state president was Tomas G. Masaryk,
a democratic philosopher and friend of
Woodrow Wilson. Under that democratic
system, rights to both real and personal
property were protected by the govern-
ment in much the same way that they are
protected in the U.S. Questions involving
title, or evidence of ownership, were set-
tled by local courts. Documents relating
to transfers were prepared by lawyers or
notaries. Mortgage lending, assessment,
and taxes were based on the same princi-
ples as in the United States.
What happened when the Communist
Party assumed state power in 1948?
All property, except for small items of
personal property, was nationalized. The
government became the owner of all
major enterprises, with production and
development regulated through central
five-year plans. Since that time, more
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than 9/10 of our agricultural land has
been farmed by state collectives. Athe-
ism was the official government philoso-
phy, and all education was provided by
the state. The free market was destroyed,
and gross national product plummeted.
Because there had previously been
such well-developed property rights, the
legislative act of nationalizing property
provided interesting outcomes. Title to
land officially rested with an original
"owner," but property records were
amended to show a "user." typically a
collective farm. The owner could not
transfer land by itself, but it was possible
to transfer an entire farm (buildings and
other improvements along with the land),
and the transfer was permitted without
transfer tax on the land portion. Of
course, since the owner did not have the
right to use his land, it is difficult to de-
fine exactly what was being transferred.
The greater percentage of Czechoslovaki-
an land is still under this type of private
ownership. The state acquired land most-
ly through owners who left it to the gov-
ernment in their wills, and through sei-
zures from war criminals and the like.
An individual could own buildings,
but could not own enterprises. Therefore,
a family could own its house, under a
type of ownership called "personal own-
ership." The size of a personally owned
house was restricted to five rooms, not
counting a kitchen, or to 779 square feet
of living area plus 78 square feet for each
kitchen. The owner could transfer this
type of real property just as an owner in
your country would. Of course, since the
owner had the right to use the property, it
was at least clear that something of value
was being transferred. In fact, a transfer
tax is paid in Czechoslovakia when own-
ership of a private home is transferred,
just as such a tax is paid in the U.S.
Since 1948, individuals have not been
permitted to build apartment houses in
Czechoslovakia. As with farm land,
people who owned apartment buildings
before 1948 are generally still the "own-
ers," but the rights to use have been giv-
en to state organizations. The type of
ownership that applies to these older
apartment buildings is called "private
ownership;" transfer of this type of inter-
est occurs only through inheritance. The
government must now solve the problem
of dealing with the private ownership
rights of people who emigrated after
1948. Those who stayed in Czechoslova-
kia remained the owners, if not always
the u.sers, of their land, but the old law
under the communist system required
that property be taken from anyone who
emigrated, and given to the state.
But even a capitalistic system takes aban-
doned property. Why should those who
emigratedfrom your country he treated
differently? Because they typically did
not want to emigrate: they did so only
because of the political and economic
such as soldiers, policemen, and govern-
ment executive officers. Newly-built
apartments were owned only by the gov-
ernment, or by state-sanctioned coopera-
tives. Few resources were devoted to
providing or improving housing for ordi-
nary citizens, so we had to resort to the
"self-help" described by Dr. Jaffe. Under
self-help, each user of a house had to do
construction work to make the property
suitable for his use. Because of a lack
of specialization in the building trades,
there was low productivity. The time
required to build a house under that type
of system was from three to five years,
and the state encouraged this inefficient
housing system by providing loans for
Our Congress has been devoting far more discussion to
whether our country should he called the Czech-Slovak
Republic or the Czechoslovak Republic than it has
devoted to matters of property law.
conditions. Many who left wanted to
keep their property, and would willingly
have paid taxes or maintenance costs, but
the law did not permit them to. Instead,
these properties were sold to party loyal-
ists for a fraction of their fair values.
So now our Congress debates the resti-
tution laws. There are two basic argu-
ments; one is a moral argument, stating
that we have an obligation to provide res-
titution for property taken by the commu-
nists. The other is the so-called economic
argument, stating that the cost of such a
program would weaken the government
treasury at a time when our country must
prepare to compete in world markets.
My view is that there is only one argu-
ment, and that it is both moral and eco-
nomic. We must respect property rights,
and pay restitution for property that was
taken, if we are ever to attract capital.
Restitution might not seem like a major
issue, but it is a gesture showing that all
property rights are protected.
What kind of housing did the government
provide to those who did not emigrate?
New townhouses were built, but primari-
ly for people connected with the regime.
self-help building projects at interest
rates as low as 1%, far below inflation.
Unfortunately, the 1988 revolution
has not yet brought improvements; the
housing crisis that Jaffe spoke of is still
a reality. Our housing, and our industrial
buildings as well, look like buildings
look after a war. In fact, Czechoslovakia
was damaged less by World War II than
by communist rule. And the situation
will get worse in the coming years.
There was a "baby boom" between 1972
and 1976; as these youngsters reach
adulthood they will need places to live.
Old buildings are difficult to repair, and
while people do not like the less durable
"panel," or prefabricated, buildings
constructed in recent years, there are
not even enough of these structures.
Czechoslovakia needs a new housing
policy. The younger generation, which
played such a vital role in the recent
changes, prefers family houses or small
apartment buildings to the large, unat-
tractive state housing complexes. If a
government cannot provide land and
enact zoning for the housing that people
need, then that government cannot con-
tinue to receive the people's support.
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Will the revolution eventually bring
about meaningful changes? The new
Czech government, and representatives of
many political movements, favor democ-
racy and an economic system that is both
free internally and open to world markets.
To achieve such economic and political
freedoms, we must have laws that protect
real and personal property. To protect
property rights, we must respect property
rights, and there can be no exceptions. Of
course, among the rights that we must
respect are the legitimate property rights
of government, such as eminent domain.
Two years after the revolution, many
questions remain. Our Congress has been
the dwelling, and it is extremely low
(typically about $5 for a family house).
Until very recently, the only appraisal
methodology used was the cost approach.
Reproduction cost (computed by the
square foot method) adjusted for depreci-
ation was added to land value to deter-
mine the price or the transfer tax. The tax
is higher in connection with a purchase
(5-10%) than with an inheritance (1%).
No tax is paid in connection with the
transfer of land used by cooperative
farms; such land is "sold" at an adminis-
tered price equal to $.002 per square foot.
At the beginning of 1991 we amended
the laws that control appraisal practices.
Forty years of communist rule changed peoples' views
on work and on property. In return for their inefficient
work, the communist regime guaranteed people that
their basic needs would he met.
devoting far more discussion to whether
our country should be called the Czech-
Slovak Republic or the Czechoslovak
Republic than it has devoted to matters of
property law. They have passed property-
related laws without much planning or
discussion, and then have found it neces-
sary after the fact to provide for changes
and exceptions. We must have clear laws
to spell out property rights.
Have the political changes affected real
estate in other ways? Because I have
worked for many years as an appraiser
for our court system, I can answer this
question with some authority. Until 1988,
appraisal reports were needed only for
transfers between individuals; one pur-
pose of an appraisal was to establish the
transfer tax to be paid in connection with
a purchase (of course, these were not
true market transactions) or inheritance.
Transfers of non-residential buildings,
or of enterprises, were mostly between
state-sponsored organizations at prices
even less reflective of market realities
(for example, land was transferred at a
stated value of zero). Appraised value is
not the basis for our annual property tax;
that tax is based primarily on the size of
Under the new law, an appraiser must use
all three classical techniques in estimat-
ing value for all properties, including
those owned by the government. The new
system looks impressive on paper; the
law even recommends use of the market
and income approaches to the extent that
they are used in Western countries.
Yet how can we meet these guidelines'?
How can we value the income stream of
an apartment building when there is not a
free rental market? The appraiser's ability
to estimate real estate values should not
be affected by politics. Even our long-
favored cost approach is difficult to use
in our inflationary environment, because
of the unusually high demand for build-
ings and other durable goods.
How are rents established? Rent levels
in state buildings are set by the govern-
ment. And even when an original owner
regains his property through the "restitu-
tion law," he is permitted to raise rents
only by a few percent, an inadequate in-
crease given the high costs that the owner
must bear in repairing a building that was
for so many years neglected by the state.
Of course, appraisal theory tells us that
we are valuing a bundle of rights rather
than a physical object, but that bundle
should include the right to charge rent
that allows a reasonable return on invest-
ment. In addition, the use of a building
cannot be changed. We are to value a
property according to its highest and best
use, but since existing uses cannot be
changed, no one knows what a given
property's highest and best use would be.
The idealistic assumption that we can
immediately attract Western capital if we
appraise buildings by Western standards
is not valid. Potential investors from
Western countries will not put faith in
value estimates based on assumptions
that do not reflect free market realities.
Poland provides a good example of the
problems created under such a system;
it has put much effort into attracting out-
side capital, but only 5% of privatized
government property has been sold to
investors from the West.
I think there are many reasons for the
reluctance of Westerners to invest in the
newly democratized countries of Eastern
Europe. Among these reasons are the
old-fashioned technology, the poor con-
dition of buildings, and the still-uncertain
political and economic situations. Per-
haps the major reason, however, is the
human factor. Forty years of communist
rule changed peoples' views on work and
on property. In return for their inefficient
work, the communist regime guaranteed
people that their basic needs would be
'met. Average food consumption in
Czechoslovakia has been equal (in quan-
tity, though not in quality) to that in the
U.S., and the state provided low-cost
housing, small cars, and weekend houses.
Enacting a new political and economic
order will be easier in some Eastern Eu-
ropean countries than in others. For ex-
ample, the former East Germany should
be able to adapt to a Western way of life
in a relatively short time. There is no lan-
guage barrier, and the people of the two
Germanys have really always thought of
themselves as one nation. Yet even in
East Germany there is much need for
Western advice and expertise, because
the people there just do not understand
the market-oriented approach to business.
East Germans want a Western standard
of living, and we'd like that in Czecho-
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Slovakia as well, but in both countries the
people want Western paychecks with a
communist approach to working. We
were abused by the communist leader-
ship, but it was also easy to live without
responsibility. Everything was given to
the people "from above."
How will your country and its neighbors
change these attitudes? My personal
view is that there are two approaches, one
of which could not work and the other of
which might work. A gradual, step-by-
step approach would be like a war of at-
trition; I am not sure that our leadership
is professionally and emotionally pre-
pared for such a difficult job. The other
possibility is what I would call "shock
therapy," it would involve recognizing
immediately that the state is bankrupt.
This very drastic approach could pro-
vide a more workable solution, given the
Czech national character. We have cer-
tainly endured shocks before in our histo-
ry, having been ruled by foreign kings
and by communists backed with Soviet
tanks. Perhaps we again need a time like
that of "The Good Soldier Schwiek," in
which we can criticize our government
while working to improve it, and to
improve our competitive position in the
world economy. Of course, there would
be resistance to such an approach, both
from the government and from large seg-
ments of the population. But "shock ther-
apy" might allow us to build a Czecho-
slovakia (I do not favor separate Czech
and Slovak republics, which would be
economically weaker) that could join
with Western Europe in 1992.
What are the conditions of the Czech
market? We can divide our market into
three parts. First, there are the interior
market relationships. Over the past forty
years, we have enjoyed very low unem-
ployment and other government benefits.
The price we paid for these benefits,
however, has been a monopoly by large
state enterprises. There was little govern-
ment support for small firms, so there
was little innovation. Industry used old
technologies, so workers do not have the
skills needed in the modem world.
Interior market problems created, in
turn, problems in the second area, our
import/export sector. Our export base has
consisted of raw materials (coal and tim-
ber, for example), glass, and heavy ma-
chinery (which tends to be outmoded and
inefficient). We have had to import most
of our goods, but difficulties with exports
left us with little to pay for imports.
Solutions to some of our problems may
lie with a third component, that of part-
nerships with foreign enterprises. There
are incentives to both sides for such joint
ventures. Czechs would like access to
Western currency and markets, while
Westerners like inexpensive land and oth-
er low-cost inputs that Czech enterprises
On 60 MINUTES afew weeks ago, Soviet
commentator Vladimir Posner said that
there would he food in Soviet stores if
people in the USSR had been able to buy
land and work it. Do you agree with this
once-vocal communist, who now .sounds
like a capitalist? There would not
have to be a food shortage in the USSR;
soil in the Ukraine is like Illinois soil.
But no one wants to work harder if the
state takes the largest share of output and
pays everyone the same wage. There is
incentive to produce only if people can
keep the fruits of their labor. Of course,
the distribution system would have to
be privatized as well; potatoes rotted in
Czechoslovakia was the setting of a big communist
experiment that failed. Now we want the chance to
experiment again with democracy.
could provide. Prices are currently held
artificially low for Western investors by
the exchange rate levels, and while such a
situation would be inadvisable as a long-
run policy, it might be good in the short
run if the result is that investment is
attracted from the West. Without such
investment, and the management exper-
tise that accompanies it, we will have too
little economic growth.
Unfortunately, there are barriers as
well. People who have been the top man-
agers of old Czech enterprises would
expect to hold similar management posi-
tions in joint ventures, and 1 doubt that
Westerners would agree to such terms.
Even greater problems could be caused
by restrictions on sales of Czechoslovaki-
an real estate to foreigners. Under current
law, the Ministry of Finance must ap-
prove the price in any sale of real estate
to a foreign investor: the Ministry expects
our properties to sell for the same prices
that similar buildings would cost in
Western countries. Will this system
change? Will investors simply avoid
Czechoslovakia? Will the Ministry of
Finance become corrupt, accepting bribes
to approve property sales to outsiders?
At this time we do not know the answers.
Soviet fields because they could not be
harvested and delivered to markets.
In Czechoslovakia, and throughout
Eastern Europe, there are people who
used to be communists but who now
sound like capitalists. Some of them
have genuinely changed their views, and
they now support the market reforms.
But some have simply learned how to
keep their privileged positions.
What role can the West play in your
country's future? Western firms can
help in meeting housing demand and
building the industrial base. Czechs are
industrious people; companies willing to
take the risk of starting operations in our
country have the potential to earn high
returns. One of our jobs as a nation will
be to minimize the risks for outside firms
so that they will be willing to invest.
Czechoslovakia was the setting of a
big communist experiment that failed.
Now we want the chance to experiment
again with democracy. If we have free
markets with the protection of property
rights, I feel that our economic life can
greatly improve, and that there can be
even better relations between our coun-
tries, in the near future. B
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The Economics ofAccelerated Principal Repayment
Philip J. Rushing \
Financial writers in tiie popular press
periodically advise readers to accelerate
their mortgage repayment schedules. The
advice comes when these financial gurus
rediscover the "magic" of repaying loans
more quickly by increasing the monthly
payments. The borrower allegedly realiz-
es a net savings if a loan is retired early,
since less total interest is paid.
A good example of an article contain-
ing such advice appeared in the Chicago
Tribune on January 31, 1988. Columnist
Robert Bruss applied the prepayment
concept to a $98,500 loan with a 10.25%
interest rate and level planned monthly
payments for 30 years. The monthly
payment under such a plan is $882.66
throughout the life of the loan, but the
amount that is interest progressively falls
while the amount that is principal reduc-
tion rises. In the first month $841.35 is
interest and $41.31 is principal reduc-
tion, while in the second month $841.00
is interest and $41.66 is principal.
Paying Fewer Interest Dollars
The advice offered is to add $41.66 (the
second month's scheduled principal
reduction) to the first month's regular
payment, for a revised initial payment of
$924.32. In the .second month the bor-
rower would be a month ahead of sched-
ule on principal reduction, so a second-
month payment of $925.03 would pro-
vide the scheduled third-month provision
for interest and principal ($840.65 and
$42.01, respectively, for a total of
$882.66) plus the fourth month's sched-
uled principal reduction of $42.37.
While the loan payment computations
presented are unassailable, the logic of
the conclusions drawn is not. Bruss pro-
ceeds to state, "This avoided the second
month's $841 interest payment plus the
fourth month's $840.29 interest, a total
interest saving (emphasis added) of
$1,681.29 in just two months." The writ-
er perceives a savings because the bor-
rower who faithfully followed, to its con-
clusion, the plan described would repay
the entire $98,500 principal in 15 years
rather than 30. We are asked to believe
that because fewer payments would be
made, the borrower would realize a true
financial benefit. However, before the
borrower starts looking for a new car to
buy with the "interest savings" generated
by such a plan, he or she might be wise to
examine the issue more closely.
In discussing the above plan, which
might be called the "jump ahead" plan,
the author could have been even more
dramatic and pointed out that the total in-
terest "saving" would amount to a whop-
ping $158,878.80. Indeed, by paying cash
for the house, the owner would "save"
$219,257.60 in interest. This "saving"
occurs because a loan requiring payments
of $882.66 per month for 30 years causes
the owner to pay a total of $3 1 7,757.60.
The $219,757.60 in interest is the differ-
ence between $317,757.60 and the
$98,500 principal borrowed.
Bruss could also have shared the less-
entertaining observation that a borrower
can cut the term in half simply by reject-
ing the 30-year loan in favor of a 15-year
loan in the first place. In fact, loans of
shorter duration frequently carry lower
interest rates and origination fees, there-
by providing the potential for genuine
savings (however, see box below left).
Of course, the 15-year loan requires sub-
stantially higher level monthly payments
($1,073.60 vs. $882.66) than does the
30-year loan. However, the "jump ahead"
plan, with initial payments only slightly
higher than the 30-year loan, requires
gradually increasing outlays. Indeed, by
the end of year 15, the monthly payment
rises from the initial $924.32 to more
than $1,700.
Wrongly Ignoring Present Value
Perhaps most importantly, under any of
the three loan possibilities discussed (the
30-year level-payment loan, the 15-year
level-payment loan, and the 30-year
"jump ahead" plan with repayment over
15 years), the present value of all pay-
ments, discounted at the 10.25% interest
rate, is exactly the $98,500 borrowed.
A borrower would not necessarily
realize genuine savings from a shorter-
term loan with a lower interest rate. For
example, the borrower placing high
value on the privilege of spreading
payments over the longer period could
derive less satisfaction from the lower-
rate, shorter-term loan if the interest
rate differential were not substantial.
In fact, if there were high unanticipated
inflation prior to year 30, most bor-
rowers with lower-rate 15-year loans
would regret that they had not accepted
longer maturities.
Interest Rate
30-Year Rate
15-Year Rate
^,,--'—
"^
Yield Curve
"^
15 Years 30 Years
Time Remaining to Maturity
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Therefore, in present value terms (the
only meaningful way to analyze the is-
sue), a borrower should be indifferent
with regard to any of the loan packages.
Prepaying $1.00 in principal during the
amortization period's first month "saves"
$3.06645833 in interest over the remain-
ing term of the loan ($.1025/12 x 359
months), but the present value of the
extra dollar of repaid principal (in month
one or any other month) is exactly one
dollar. If you borrow $98,500 you repay
$98,500, or, stated differently, "What
you see is what you get."
Consider the issue in a slightly differ-
ent way. If the borrower could invest
money at 10.25%, then he could obtain a
30-year loan and, each month, place the
$190.94 difference between the 15-year
payment ($1,073.60) and the 30-year
payment ($882.66) in an account earning
10.25%. At the end of year 15, the ac-
count would contain the exact amount
needed to repay the balance due on the
30-year loan. (For simplicity, tax on
interest paid or earned is ignored.)
Unintended Gifts to Lenders
In addition to simply breaking even in
present value terms by prepaying, the
borrower actually does the bank a favor
and gets nothing in return. The accompa-
nying figure illustrates a yield curve. The
vertical axis measures interest rates and
the horizontal axis shows time to maturi-
ty for a financial instrument. The curve's
upward slope indicates that long-term
rates are higher than short-term rates.
(Because it has tended in recent decades
to occur more frequently than has its
downward-sloped counterpart, we call
the upward-sloping curve a normal yield
curve.) A borrower reduces risk for the
bank by repaying a 30-year loan in 15
years, but does not get the benefit of the
lower interest rate the bank would gladly
have accepted on a 15-year exposure.
Increased mortgage loan payments
involve opportunity costs; the funds ex-
pended are unavailable for other purchas-
es. The cost of added principal reduction,
then, is the foregone alternate use for the
funds. Since the typical household might
view housing as its single biggest invest-
ment, foregone investment opportunities
might be interesting to consider.
Principal reduction represents a risk-
free investment at the mortgage loan
interest rate: the borrower invests with
100%' certainty of obtaining that rate. If
the borrower had a risk-free investment
alternative offering 10.25%, he would be
indifferent between making extra princi-
pal payments and making the alternative
investment. (Again, possible tax effects
are ignored.) Of course, if there were a
risk-free alternative offering more than
10.25%, the borrower would forego extra
principal reduction in favor of the profita-
ble risk-free alternative. But even if the
only investments offering returns above
10.25% carried risks, the borrower would
be wise to skip extra payments on the
loan and place available investment funds
into the alternative investment if its risk-
adjusted return exceeded 10.25%.
Accelerated payment represents sound
financial logic only if the loan interest
rate represents the best risk-adjusted
investment opportunity. The higher the
interest rate, the higher is the borrower's
potential savings.
Philip J. Rushing, an Adjunct Professor
ofFinance at the University of Illinois.
ORER Research Associate, and real estate
investor and consultant, is a previous
contributor to the ORER LETTER.
ORER News
(continued from page 7)
March he spoke to the American So-
ciety of Real Estate Counselors' Mid-
west chapter on "The Environmental
Crisis and Real Estate Values."
Lydia Franz was recently elected
to a new term as a Director of the
National Association of Realtors®.
She chairs NAR's Public Affairs Sub-
committee and works actively with
Realtor® professional standards at
the national level. She also serves on
important lAR committees, including
the Advisory Council of past lAR
Presidents, and recently retired after
many years as a director of the
Barrington Chamber of Commerce.
Charles Hill has been appointed to
the Illinois Real Estate Administra-
tive and Disciplinary Board. He also
directs the Chicago Federal Home
Loan Bank's Affordable Housing
Program and serves on the Governing
Committees of two insurance pro-
grams, the Illinois FAIR Plan and the
Illinois Mine Subsidence Fund. He
and his wife recently accompanied a
University of Wisconsin law student
group on a trip to West Africa.
Gerald Perlow is the current Presi-
dent of the Illinois Association of
Realtors®, serving a term that will
end in September. He is a member of
the appraisal committee of the Na-
tional Association of Realtors®, and
is the liaison representing Illinois in-
terests to the Resolution Trust Corpo-
ration. He will soon begin teaching
appraisal techniques to accountants
through a program administered by
the Illinois CPA Society.
Activities of other Advisory Com-
mittee members will be presented in
futvire issues of the ORER Letter.
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Illinois Real Estate Markets
Privatization of Illinois Land:A Historical Note
Michelle A. Mahue and Peter F. Colwell
Government has long experienced prob-
lems in establishing appropriate prices for
public property. Even the initial govern-
ment sales of Illinois land appear to have
been stifled by artificially high legislated
minimum sale prices. In a 1958 mono-
graph, noted appraiser Walter Kuehnle
estimates values as of 1829 for two tracts
in Illinois and Wisconsin. His report, pre-
pared with the help of some U of I faculty
members, provides fascinating details on
early U.S. and Illinois real estate policy.
In settlement of Revolutionary War
debts, all state-owned land (including that
in Virginia's Illinois territory) was ceded
to the then-new federal government.
Federal authorities were able to sell some
large tracts to private speculators, but to
sell the majority of the holdings they had
to rely on a more retail oriented approach
whereby sections or half sections could be
auctioned. The government instituted a
minimum per acre price of $2.00 on credit
or $ 1 .64 in cash, coupled with a five year
exemption on property tax. Selling was
brisk between 1816 and 1819. but by 1820
sales lagged and credit defaults were
abundant. Responding to slow sales, the
government reduced the minimum cash
price to $1.25 per acre and reduced the
minimum parcel size. An accompanying
elimination of the credit system, however,
drastically hurt sales.
At that time the northwestern Illinois
and southwestern Wisconsin areas stud-
ied by Kuehnle were largely frontier,
located on the fringe of the path of west-
ward settlement. Tracts already settled
were among the highest quality available,
but such tracts were spatially configured
such that the government could not con-
nect the developable areas with roads.
Illinois land offices reported that even
some first-rate land remained unsold for
long periods, often as long as 12 years.
In 1824. and again in 1826. the legisla-
ture petitioned Congress to reduce the
mandated price, with graduations accord-
ing to quality type. Kuehnle cites an 1828
letter in which a Vandalia clerk explains
to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office that area land sales had failed to
reflect the population increase because
immigrants could not afford the mini-
mum prices, and because prospective
buyers saw prices as unreasonably high
but felt that the government would even-
tually adjust them downward.
In 1828. the Congressional Committee
on Public Lands recommended adoption
of the Dutch auction format in the sale of
public land. The price was dropped to
$1.00 per acre, with an added $.25 per
acre price reduction for every two years
the property remained unsold. If land fell
to a minimum price of $.25 per acre, it
was to be sold to the state at that price
plus survey costs. Eighty acre homestead
claims could also be obtained in return
for 5 years of occupancy and cultivation.
Soon after this recommendation was
made, the Senate passed the Resolution
of 1828. requiring local land offices to
classify unsold lands according to quality
type and to estimate values. First-rate
land was valued at $1.00-$ 1.25 per acre.
less desirable property at $.50-$ 1.00, and
remote and untillable land at $0-$.125.
(There was so little demand for untim-
bered prairie tracts that some properties
could not even be given away.)
Just south of the area Kuehnle studied
lay the Illinois Military Tract, a large
piece of land the government had held to
)
award as compensation to War of 1812
veterans. Kuehnle found this tract,
bounded by the Illinois and Mississippi
Rivers, to be reasonably comparable to
the subject properties. Prices for tim-
bered sections sold in private transactions:
by their war veteran owners typically
ranged from $.33 to $.94 per acre.
Based on the comparable prices, land
office reports, and local economic and
geographic conditions. Kuehnle's apprai-
sal indicates values for parcels in the two
subject tracts of $.30-$.40 per acre, pric-
es much lower than those legislated by
government at that time. ,
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Eminent Domain: Lessons From the Past
Henry J. Mimneke
Eminent domain is the government's
power to take private property for public
use. Through eminent domain, states and
the federal government sometimes obtain
land to provide such public facilities as
parks, post offices, and rights of way for
highways. The application of eminent
domain is frequently controversial. By
learning from historical institutions, we
can more effectively resolve present-day
eminent domain controversies.
Though government takings have oc-
curred throughout history, the term emi-
nent domain appears to have originated
in De Jure Belle et Pads ( 1625). Author
Hugo Grotius wrote that a king could
rightfully deprive his subjects of their
land through a compensated taking only
if the taking were for a purpose that
provided some benefit to the public.
The Constitution of the United States
approaches eminent domain in a slightly
different manner: the Fifth Amendment
states that "no person shall he. . . de-
prived of. . . property without due pro-
cess of law. nor shall private property be
taken for public use without compensa-
tion." One difference between the two
views lies mainly in the words use and
purpose or benefit. Interpreting the
intended meaning of these words is the
key to the constitutionality of eminent
domain provisions.
Even though the Constitution does not
specifically grant eminent domain pow-
ers, it also does not specifically prohibit
them. Federal courts did not question the
public taking of land for a new national
capital, and eminent domain was soon
recognized outside the District of Colum-
bia as well. State governments believed
that their sovereign powers, and the fact
that the Constitution did not prohibit their
taking of private property, justified the
use of eminent domain. Provision for
eminent domain was therefore included
in many early state constitutions.
Defining the Limits
More recent eminent domain issues deal
not with government's taking power, but
rather with the definitions of public use
and just compensation. In 1984, the city
of Duluth wished to revitalize land it had
acquired through abandonment and tax
forfeiture. Local officials located a firm
interested in constructing a paper mill if
the city would provide the site, but the
firm required more land than the city had
available. The aovemment assembled a
^HAMp.
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Grads Preview Central Station
Gerald Fogelson, whose Fogelson
Properties is a partner in developing
Central Station, was the featured
speaker at the Alumni Luncheon held
April 26. Fogelson, who serves as
chairman of Central Station Develop-
ment Company, discussed the back-
ground and progress of the massive
project that will connect Chicago
lakefront and downtown areas.
Seventy U of I alumni and guests
attended the event, which was held at
the Chicago Yacht Club. Thanks go
to Gene Stunard, who again arranged
for use of the Club's facilities. The
Office of Real Estate Research orga-
nizes spring and fall luncheons each
year for University alumni working
in fields relating to real estate.
U of I Alumnus Honored
Sheldon Good has been appointed
the first chairperson of the new
National Association of Realtors®
National Real Estate Auction
Committee. Sheldon Good & Co.,
of which he serves as CEO, has long
specialized in the auctioning of real
estate. Good was also recently named
1991 Realtor® of the Year by the
Chicago Board of Realtors®.
ORER Letter is pleased to report
this Good news about an individual
who has long been a generous sup-
porter of ORER's activities.
New Course To Be Offered
The changing real estate marketplace
is the focus of a new course. Real
Estate Issues, to be offered to U of I
students in the coming fall semester.
The course will be taught by Donald
Rundblom, an Adjunct Lecturer in
Finance and ORER Research Asso-
ciate. Rundblom's long career in real
(continued on page 3)
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Commentary
tract of adequate size by combining its
previously acquired holdings with land
condemned through eminent domain.
The condemned land contained small
businesses, homes, and a food production
plant that had discontinued operations.
By arguing that the paper mill would
boost employment, and that the con-
demned property was located in a "margi-
nal" area, the city successfully defended
claims that it had not met a public use re-
quirement (Diiluth V. Minnesota, 1986).
Detroit had earlier used eminent do-
main in transferring ownership of much
of the Poletown area to General Motors,
which wanted to construct an assembly
plant. The acquired property was not in
an area that was "marginal" or in need of
revitalization; the justification offered for
the taking was simply that the gross eco-
nomic benefits (such as employment) of
the proposed facility satisfied the public
use requirement of eminent domain
(Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
Detroit. 1981).
Both of these cases focus on whether
taking private property other than for
such traditional purposes as roads or
parks is appropriate. In each case the
answer lies in interpreting the meaning
of public use.
The Origin of Takings in the US
We can better understand the current def-
inition of public use, and the meaning in-
tended by the framers of the Constitution,
by looking at the historical development
of the public use concept in the US.
Our study begins with the enactment of
a group of early state eminent domain
statutes known as the mill acts.
Prior to the American Revolution,
owners of land adjacent to non-navigable
rivers and streams were generally able,
under colonial laws, to construct dams to
power mills. The intent was to encourage
the building of mills to help the farmers
who would use them and to promote
nearby growth. After the Revolution, and
after the concept of eminent domain had
been established in the new federal and
state constitutions, mill acts were enacted
in many states to preserve riparian own-
ers' traditional rights to build dams.
The acts were classified as eminent
domain laws because constructing dams
caused "takings" through the flooding of
property upstream. Neighbors were pro-
tected by the provision that a mill owner
was to compensate owners of property
flooded by the dam. Even though in
some cases the results could be viewed
as reallocating land from one private use
to another, the constitutionality of the
mill acts was not immediately ques-
tioned. Since each state had adopted its
own constitution, the treatment of mills
differed from state to state, yet each state
had to address the public use and just
compensation issues.
Public Use and the Mill Acts
The definition of public use lay at the
heart of the analysis because of the con-
stitutional provision that government
could take property only for public use.
A strict inteipretation would be that land
could be taken only for direct govern-
ment use: a weaker interpretation would
be that legislators could take (through
laws like the mill acts) private property
for the use of government-regulated
enterprises without violating federal or
state constitutions.
When mill acts were first enacted, the
mills in existence were grist mills and
saw mills. Grist mills provided a neces-
sary service (the grinding of com) to the
public, for fees regulated by the govern-
ment. In early America, a taking related
to a grist mill could therefore be consid-
ered a taking for a public use. While
such a view of public use was much
different from the stricter interpretation,
there was still government involvement
through regulation of rates and enforce-
ment of provisions that mills had to
follow. Public use, then, was defined
through government regulation rather
than simply government ownership. This
definition of public use is how, in mod-
ern times, we justify taking private prop-
erty for the benefit of public utilities.
Saw mills were also important to early
communities, but unlike grist mills they
were not viewed as necessities, since
much lumber continued to be cut by
hand. Yet. in some cases, saw mills were
required to serve their communities at
regulated rates. Since regulation was
ORER Letter I page 2
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only present in certain cases involving
saw mills, takings relating to these mills
broadened the definition of public use
slightly from that applied to grist mills.
Public use, then, could be government
ownership, govemment regulation, or
even the possibility of such regulation.
After the early state constitutions were
written, mills for other purposes became
widespread, and the new mills were also
covered under the acts. Constitutionality
questions arose as land was flooded by
dams built by riparian owners not only
for grist or saw mills, but also for iron
mills and in anticipation of future de-
mand for water power. Owners of flood-
ed lands claimed that their properties had
been taken for private, rather than for
public, use. In Boston and Roxhury Mill
Corp. V. Newmann (1832), the court saw
direct use by the public as too harsh a
test. Its ruling for the corporation indi-
cated that the necessary legal test could
be met through a benefit to the public.
That ruling introduced the idea, then,
that public use means public benefit. In
Scitdder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co.
(1832), the court ruled in favor of a
company that wanted to build dams for
industrial use; the judges felt that manu-
facturing activity would raise property
values and open markets for the region's
farm produce. Similar cases were upheld
based on expected economic benefits.
So the interpretation of public use had
broadened drastically, no longer requir-
ing direct use by the public or even gov-
emment controls. Courts held that emi-
nent domain could be invoked if there
were simply an expectation of public
benefit, such as success by private indus-
try. Eminent domain, then, had become
a tool for reallocating property from one
private use to another. The courts likely
were promoting the young nation's
growth and prosperity, and though the
early jurists may not fully have under-
stood the economic implications, their
willingness to allow these privately fi-
nanced acquisitions guaranteed that any
changes would be from lower to higher
land uses (since the price paid by the
ultimate user had to exceed an estimate
of market value). The courts" accompa-
nying interpretation of public use. how-
ever, seems excessive relative to the
Constitution's public use implications.
This changing interpretation did not go
unnoticed. Some states believed the ex-
panded mill act protections to be uncon-
stitutional because, with the exception of
public mills, they promoted takings to
benefit private users. These states' deci-
sions could also have supported the view
that drafters of the mill acts had intended
to include only grist and saw mills, since
other uses for mills had not yet been
anticipated. The early cases in which the
acts were found unconstitutional were
decided in the late 1 850s. States that did
not find mill acts unconstitutional may
have held views similar to those held in
Massachusetts.
The Massachusetts Doctrine
To avoid constitutionality questions,
Massachusetts treated the mill acts not as
eminent domain laws, but as conflicting
rights laws. The Massachusetts Doctrine
held that land could be damaged without
there being a taking; as Justice Gray, an
early US Supreme Court jurist from
Massachusetts, noted: "// is an integral
part of this doctrine that no land is taken
under the mill acts: that the mill owner
acquires no right to flood the upper land,
as the owner may protect it by dikes. . .
(although) dikes might well cost more
than the value of the landflooded. . ."
Also, since the compensation was not
awarded by the public, and the act was
not considered a taking, it could not be
considered an application of eminent
domain (Murdock v. Stickney, 1851).
The constitutionality of this approach
was upheld when questioned under the
14th Amendment's due process and equal
protection provisions (Head v. Amoskeag
Manufacturing Company, 1885).
The Massachusetts Doctrine promoted
the use of land to its full advantage. An
owner who would not incur the cost of
building a dike did not place an excep-
tionally high value on his land; the use of
the land therefore accrued to the owner
who valued the rights the most. This
legislation could be enforced because, as
Justice Gray stated, "a mere regulation is
constitutional when enacted in behalf of
the general welfare." The view of the
ORER News
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estate has taken him from lending
institutions in Chicago to major firms
on Wall Street; he now has his own
mortgage banking, consulting, and
development practice. He will draw
on his many contacts in industry in
creating a roster of guest lecturers for
many of the topics to be discussed.
Although a syllabus has been de-
signed, the topics actually covered
may change with market conditions
in the coming months. The course is
open both to advanced undergradu-
ates and to graduate students.
Director Travels
In late May, ORER Director Peter
Colwell participated in meetings of
the Homer Hoyt Advanced Studies
Institute at the Institute's headquar-
ters in Florida. He also participated
in the National Association of Real-
tors® Academic Advisory Group
Meeting and the midyear meetings of
the American Real Estate and Urban
Economics Association, both held in
Washington, DC. Colwell has also
been involved in a recent series of
research seminars on urban change
sponsored by the Center for Urban
Affairs and Policy Research at North-
western University in Evanston.
Dean Departs
Dean John Hogan of the College of
Commerce has accepted a new posi-
tion as Dean of the College of Busi-
ness Administration at Georgia State
University. He and his wife. Adjunct
Professor of Finance Anna Craig,
will move to Atlanta this summer.
ORER extends best wishes to them.
Secretary Splits
Brenda Bishop, who served for many
years as ORER secretary, has left the
Office to prepare for her family's
move to the Philadelphia area. Her
husband Paul, a recent Ph.D. gradu-
ate of the University's Department of
Economics, has accepted a position
with the WEFA econometric consult-
ing group. Best wishes to Brenda.
Paul, Alan, Alex, and Brandy.
ORER Letter I page 3
Commentary
mill acts as a conflicting rights issue
instead of an eminent domain issue also
promoted the broad definition of public
use as public benefit. Through the mill
acts and Massachusetts Doctrine, then,
public use had evolved from a pure
notion of direct use by the public into
a much broader concept.
Back to the Future
In recent times, courts have seemed to
embrace the broadest historical defini-
tion of public use from the mill acts and
the Massachusetts Doctrine, equating
public use to gross public benefit (it was
never suggested that net public benefit
This market value concept does not take
into consideration subjective value that
an owner might place on a particular
property. Under the mill acts, courts in
most states awarded damages equal to
market values if agreements could not be
reached by mill owners and the owners
of damaged tracts. In each such case, the
court formed a committee of disinterested
persons to determine if the application
were indeed a public use and to estimate
damages, but the court had the final say
regarding both questions.
New Hampshire approached the mill
acts much like Massachusetts did. but
took the concept of compensation a step
It may be time to look at who pays the compensation,
who receives the benefits, and how much compensation
is paid. The past may provide some guidance.
should be considered). Even states with
constitutions distinguishing public use
from public purpose have recently
viewed public use as equivalent to gross
public benefit. Poletown is a good exam-
ple; justification for reallocating from
one private use to another was that job
creation would provide an economic
(public) benefit to the community. (A
dissimilarity between the Poletown tak-
ing and the Massachusetts Doctrine/mill
acts, however, is that the subsidy to GM
did not result in the land's being put to a
higher use; the ultimate user paid a price
below that which the sellers would have
required in private transactions.) Since
public use in recent eminent domain
applications seems to bear a strong link
to the historic evolution, we might next
consider how the concept of compensa-
tion was addressed in the Massachusetts
Doctrine and the mill acts.
Just Compensation
The Fifth Amendment requires just com-
pensation when property is taken. The
amount of compensation required is the
property's "fair market value," generally
described as the price that could be
obtained in an arm's length transaction.
farther. If the parties could not agree,
a New Hampshire court referred to the
committee's findings and provided com-
pensation at a level 50% above market
value. The portion exceeding market val-
ue was to ensure a surplus (and perhaps
to compensate subjective value) to the
owner of land damaged in a forced ex-
change. A legislated compensation pre-
mium was enforced because the state felt
that too low a percentage would encour-
age excess takings, while too high a per-
centage could prevent takings and there-
by impede growth. The 50% premium
may have been an attempt to transfer the
net benefit of the taking (the difference
between the acquirer's willingness to pay
and the amount actually paid) from the
taker to the individual suffering damage.
Another important issue is who pays
the "just" compensation. Under current
eminent domain practices, the govern-
ment provides payment for land that is
taken. (In the Poletown case, the govern-
ment bought the land and then sold it at a
lower price to GM.) Compensation under
the mill acts, on the other hand, was
paid not by government, but by the mill
owners who received the benefits that
accrued from the takings.
The Past and the Present
If the provisions followed under the New
Hampshire mill acts were applied today,
eminent domain might, in many cases,
be unattractive, and the result would be
a more efficient allocation of land. The
additional 50% compensation would pro-
vide greater benefits to injured parties,
at the expense of the takers, so land use
would change only if a buyer valued the
land substantially more than did the
current owner. In the Poletown case, for
example. GM could have obtained land
from unwilling sellers only by paying
50% premia instead of receiving a tax-
payer-financed discount. Each transac-
tion would have involved direct compen-
sation from the new user to the old. If
GM had felt burdened paying market
value to each willing seller and market
value plus the required premium to each
unwilling seller, it could have sought
land elsewhere. Policy makers must not
forget that programs such as the old New
Hampshire plan force buyers to pay pric-
es in excess of sellers' reservation prices,
and thereby move land from lower to
higher uses, while takings such as
Poletown 's have the opposite effect.
The public use concept has become
ever more encompassing, and its current
broad definition will not be easily nar-
rowed. Even in the early 1900s, the con-
stitutionality of public use as public ben-
efit was upheld based on the extensive
history of rulings under the mill acts. To-
day, with even more extensive historical
precedents, it seems even more unlikely
that the public use concept could be con-
strained. In Poletown. only two of seven
Michigan Supreme Court justices evi-
denced concern about the broad interpre-
tations. Yet if public use indeed is equiv-
alent to public purpose or benefit, then
it may be time to look at who pays the
compensation, who receives the benefits,
and how much compensation is paid. The
past may provide some guidance.
Mr. Munneke is a Ph.D. student in the
U of I Department ofEconomics. He
completed this paper while enrolled in
the University's graduate real estate
principles course. A list of his sources
is available from ORER.
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Rho Epsilon Students Enjoy Active Spring
The University of Illinois Rho Epsilon
chapter sponsored six professional meet-
ings and two field trips during the 1991
Spring semester. These events provided
chapter members with opportunities to
hear the views of market participants and
to visit the operations of major real estate
organizations.
"Real Estate Development" was the
topic of the first professional presenta-
tion, held on February 26. The speaker
was U of I alumnus Jeff Bowles of Chi-
cago's McHugh-BowIes Development.
Another Illinois graduate spoke to the
membership on March 5. Kevin Maxwell
of The Prudential Mortgage Capital
Company shared his "Mortgage Lend-
ing" experiences with the students.
The chapter took its first field trip of
the semester on March 8; eight student
members and Professor Laura Quigg
visited St. Louis. At Metropolitan Life
Real Estate Investments. Darlene Derma
and Illinois alumnus Michael Schack dis-
cussed the marketing and history of Met-
ropolitan Square, U of 1 graduate Wendy
Timm, who met with the visitors at First
Interstate Mortgage Company, presented
a case study of St. Louis Union Station.
Turley Martin Company's Keith Zeff
spoke on "Full Service Real Estate" at
his company's offices.
Two graduates of the U of I visited the
chapter on March 19. Steve Schmitz and
Brigid Mattingly of Cushman & Wake-
field's Chicago office spoke on the city's
"Commercial Brokerage" environment.
Mike Cissell of Kraft General Foods
addressed the membership on April 9.
The topic of his presentation was "Cor-
porate Real Estate."
The second field trip of the semester
was scheduled for April 12. Seven stu-
dent members of the chapter and Profes-
sor Philip Rushing visited three real es-
tate organizations in Chicago. The first
stop was the Baker & McKenzie law
office, where University of Illinois alum-
nus Peter Hess hosted the group. Two
other Illinois graduates, Frank Donato
and Rich Stem, met with the students at
Real Estate Research Corporation. The
final visit of the day was to the offices of
Genesis Realty Investors, where U of I
alumnus Ross Berman was the host.
Illinois graduate Barry Katz of Omni-
bus Harbor Realty in Chicago visited the
campus on April 16. His discussion topic
was "Asset Management."
The final professional activity of the
semester was held on May 1 . Michael
Wolin of Price Associates in Chicago
spoke on "Real Estate Appraisal." Fall
1991 officer elections and a pizza party
followed the meeting.
The chapter maintained a strong active
membership roster; eight new student
members joined 95 returning students to
bring the active membership total to 103.
There are also six faculty members and
six honorary members from the Cham-
paign-Urbana professional community.
Those who served as spring officers
are: Christopher Tiemey (Senior in LAS
Economics/Finance from Bartlett), Presi-
dent; Jeffrey Mitchell (Junior in LAS
Economics from Alton), Vice President;
James Kerrigan (Senior in LAS Econom-
ics/Finance from Hinsdale), Treasurer;
and Elizabeth Bunte (Senior in CBA
Finance from Champaign), Secretary.
Outgoing Vice President Jeffrey
Mitchell has been elected President for
the Fall 1991 semester. Those who will
serve with him as fall officers are:
Michael Hoadley (Sophomore in CBA
Finance from Elgin), Vice President;
Michael Fine (Senior in LAS Finance
from Park Forest), Treasurer; and Rusty
Long (Senior in CBA Finance from
Champaign), Secretary.
U of I alumni play a prominent role in
the chapter's success. Illinois graduates
have responded enthusiastically to
requests that they serve as speakers on
campus, and to requests that they host
or help organize field trips. Alumni also
welcomed five student members of Rho
Epsilon to the Spring 1991 Alumni
Luncheon. The Office of Real Estate Re-
search commends, and extends a special
note of thanks to, the many outstanding
alumni (and the many other fine individu-
als who have given generously of their
time and resources) for their support of
these important educational activities. B
ORER News
New Face in the Office
Our new secretary is Shirley Wells.
Shirley had served as a temporary
secretary in other University offices
in recent years after raising three sons
and working for many years in
private industry. We extend a warm
welcome to Shirley.
Rho Epsilon May Affiliate
with Lambda Alpha
Rho Epsilon may change its organiza-
tional affiliation at the national level.
Since 1983, the fraternity has been
affiliated with the National Associa-
tion of Realtors®, which has provid-
ed administrative services for Rho
Epsilon. However, University of
Illinois Professor Roger Cannaday,
who serves as the real estate fratemi-
ty's current national president, has
announced that the organization
currently is negotiating with Lambda
Alpha for the provision of such
services.
ORER Advisors' Activities
Don Ursin has served as Vice Chair-
man of Lutheran Social Services of
Illinois since retiring as President of
Coldwell Banker Residential. As a
Church Site Specialist, he uses his
real estate expertise in helping
the Evangelical Lutheran Church of
America to sell excess real estate
across the country. Ursin is also a
Director of the National Association
of Realtors®, and serves on the Illi-
nois Association of Realtors® Legal
Issues Committee and the Advisory
Council of Past Presidents.
Dave Rittmiller is a member of the
RE/MAX 100% Club of top sellers.
Rittmiller continues his longstanding
commitment to real estate education;
he is Past Dean of the Illinois Real-
tors® Institute and serves on the
Institute's Board of Governors, and
is Past President and a Director of
the Illinois Real Estate Educational
Foundation. He is also a member of
the Illinois Association of Realtors®
Nominating Committee, and serves
on Bradley University's National
Alumni Board.
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ORER Housing Affordahility Workshop
On August 10, 1990. the Ojfice ofReal
Estate Research sponsored a Housing
Ajfordability Workshop on the University
of Illinois campus. The Workshop was de-
signed to bring together peoplefrom the
professional, regulatory, and academic
communities to exchange information in
an open forum. Those in attendance were
Gary Clayton. Beth Llewellyn, and Mary
Schaefer of the Illinois Association of
Realtors®: Realtors® Larry Garwood of
Danville and Kathryn Miller of Cham-
paign; Charles Hill of the Federal Home
Loan Bank of Chicago: Illinois Real
Estate Commissioner Albert Suguitan:
and Jan Brueckner, Roger Cannaday.
Peter Colwell, Peter Donhowe. Michelle
Mahue. Laura Quigg. Donald Rundhlom.
and Joseph Trefzger of the University of
Illinois. Many interesting viewpoints were
shared by those in attendance. The fol-
lowing comments provide insights into
the housing affordability issue as seen by
knowledgeable observers who follow the
housing marketfrom varying perspec-
tives. Because many individuals contrib-
uted to the discussion of each major topic
covered, the following statements are
printed without attribution.
"We hear that there is an affordabihty
crisis in this country. But we have heard
for years that there is a crisis. Can a crisis
persist for such a long time, or are there
chronic issues that should be addressed?"
"Before they had vaccines, doctors used
remedies that caused problems worse
than the diseases they were treating. We
need solutions to affordability that are
more like vaccines, less like bleeding."
"I'm all for 'progressive" programs, but
why does 'progress" always have to mean
interfering with market solutions?"'
"Prices reflect financing availability.
Even if there are few homes available
for sale, if financing is hard to obtain the
sellers have to lower their asking prices."
"Affordability indexes should be based
on constant quality. Otherwise, houses
seem less affordable if newer dwellings
offer more features. We define 'starter
house" a lot differently than we used to.""
"There is an income distribution issue;
I know a lot more people than I used to
who own two or three homes, but 1 also
know a lot more families than I used to
who can't afford starter homes."
"In some countries the worst and cheapest
housing is the new housing; they create
brand new slums. Here the newest hous-
ing is almost always the best and most
expensive; the filtering process allows the
poor to live in housing that was built with
features desired by the more affluent."
"Builders standardize their products. So
even if a local area adopts a lenient code,
a lot of builders will follow nearby areas"
stricter standards, and they won"t have
cost savings to pass along to buyers."
"Where 'inclusionary zoning" is enacted,
developers must provide housing for 'low
to moderate' income households by sell-
ing some units for less than they cost. To
minimize their losses, they always target
the moderate rather than the low income."
"In France, there is a private insurance
system instead of building codes."
"You can't build low-priced housing;
after meeting all the government regula-
tions a builder can"t cover his costs
unless he charges at least $48,000 for a
bare-bones house. That greatly exceeds
the limits for the low-interest loan
programs that have been proposed."
"A skilled person could use second-hand
materials to build a comfortable house. _
But the public sector doesn't allow that."' I
"Winnetka's school teachers and firemen
can't afford to live in Winnetka."
^
"There are people paying as much in
rent as they would pay on loans, and
their credit ratings are good. But with
children to support they cannot save
enough for the needed downpayments."
"We used to let people put down $200
plus 'sweat equity.' These programs
worked; there were few foreclosures."
"The fixed payment loan compensates
the lender for expected future interest J
rate increases. Inflation will cause pay- "
meats to fall in real terms, but that is the
opposite of what we should encourage if
our concern is affordability today."
"Prices are, in fact, at high levels relative
to historic standards. They can't keep
rising ad infinitum, so there may be
something to the Mankiw and Weil
thesis that housing prices will decline
in real terms as the baby boom ages."
"If there aren't two earners, the family
probably cannot afford to buy a house.
Some of our social problems may reflect
the fact that both parents must work if
the family is to have decent housing."
"Some communities want to exclude
low-priced houses that don't generate
much tax revenue. To live in those com-
munities, a lot of people have to buy
more housing than they would like to."
"One effect of large lot zoning is to price
out the poor. The zoning commission re-
quires quarter acre lots, so the builder has
to build expensive houses to maintain a
capital to land ratio that produces profit."
"Industry adds its own costs. We have
strict requirements on permissible build-
ing materials because the lumber, plumb-
ing supply, and electrical supply indus-
tries lobby for higher code standards."
"What is the minimal standard of hous-
ing that a family needs? A century ago,
several immigrant families would live
together in a crowded basement without
sanitary facilities. No one wants to see
poor people living that way today, but
our 'slums' offer housing much better
than the poor occupy in third world
countries, and much better than the poor
in our own country occupied not so
many years ago."
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Housing Affordahtlity: Some Thoughts from a Couple of Skeptics
Peter F. Colwell and Joseph W. Trefzger
Farfrom reflecting social problems,
higher housing prices are among the
most effective signals in redirecting hu-
man migration. For example, California
is seen as a very desirable place to live;
the economy is stable and diversified,
and the natural and man-made environ-
ments are attractive. If subsidies held
prices in check, even more people would
try to move to our most populous state
(and fewer young Califomians would
move to less congested areas).
Higher prices also reflect the progressive
substitution in recent decades of capital
for labor in housing. For example, hous-
es used to require painting, but many of
those built today have costlier exterior
finishes that are easier to maintain. Most
have aluminum storm/screens or sealed
double-glazed windows instead of bulky
wooden units attached and removed with
the changing seasons. We pay more for
housing capital, but pay less for the ser-
vices of tradesmen (or expend less of our
own efforts) in maintaining our homes.
It is not logical to say that housing is less
affordable in some parts of the country
or state than in others. There are always
households at the margin, ready to move
if the mix of home prices/home ameni-
ties/locational amenities/job security/
income is more favorable in another re-
gion. In a mobile society, relative hous-
ing prices reflect the market's perception
of the benefits of living in particular are-
as. A dwelling with specified physical
features would sell for less in Decatur
than in Los Angeles, but would provide
its owner with access to a less diversified
economy, less friendly weather, and a
less expansive set of cultural options.
Even within a region people wrongly
assign "affordahility problem" labels.
Suppose that two cities located near each
other are similar in economic and demo-
graphic terms. However, in City A the
residential areas surround the employ-
ment center, so average commuting dis-
tances are minimized, while in City B the
workplaces are located relatively farther
from residences. If the average house val-
ue in City A is higher than that in City B,
the issue is not affordahility, but rather a
rational substitution of housing costs for
commuting costs.
Declining home ownership can be ration-
alized as arisingfrom something other
than affordability problems. Some poten-
tial huvers max view houses as unwise
sionally prepared multi-media presenta-
tion to show the planning commission
what the house will look like at various
stages of completion. This requirement
obviously would increase the cost of a
house without adding any features that a
reasonable home buyer would value.
Assume that the supply of land is
fixed (the case represented by a vertical
supply curve). A lowered demand curve
for land intersects a lower point along a
vertical supply curve: the result is an un-
We pay more for housing capital, hut pay less for the
services of tradesmen (or expend less of our own efforts)
in maintaining our homes.
additions to their portfolios. A properly
managed portfolio contains assets whose
values react differently to changing eco-
nomic events. Lower rates of ownership
do not necessarily provide evidence that
housing is less affordable. Households
might find renting to be an effective hedg-
ing technique, similar to short selling in
some asset markets.
Consider a portfolio consisting of
human capital (job skills) and a house.
If a sour economy forces the individual's
employer, the area's only major firm, to
close, her job's value evaporates and the
home value plummets. Housing is a less-
than-optimal portfolio addition for any
individual whose return on human capital
parallels changes in real estate values.
(Should builders, architects, and real
estate brokers own their homes?)
E.xcessive government regulation is not
always an obstacle to affcrdahUity
.
Buyers confronted with higher improve-
ment prices because of restrictions can
still afford their desired bundles if they
pay less for their desired parcels of land.
Consider a case in which government
decrees that anyone who wants to have
a house built must now pay for a profes-
changed quantity of land sold, but with
each parcel selling at a lower price that
exactly offsets the higher cost of build-
ing the home.
Of course, while the quantity of land
is fixed, the supply curve for buildahle
sites could be non-vertical, even horizon-
tal (if each vacant parcel could be put to
competing uses that were not subject to
the new presentation requirement). A
lower demand curve for land intersects
a horizontal supply curve farther to the
left; a smaller quantity sells (for a partic-
ular use) at a constant price per parcel. In
this case, the higher building price is not
offset by cheaper land: the price of the
package increases.
Regulation does, however, disrupt the
market' s ability to provide solutions.
Society's poorest members used to have
refuges; they could live in flop houses or
in shantytowns of tar paper shacks. Of
course, no compassionate person would
suggest that such places provide suitable
family dwellings. Yet is it not troubling
that some people sleep in cars or on heat
grates, while government "protects"
them from living in new buildings with
wall studs spaced 48 inches apart? j||
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The Economic Role of Foreclosure Rules
Charles M. Kahn
The following is an edited version of
forthcoming ORER Working Paper #85.
Its focus is on economic analysis: legal
points are discussed only briefly. A more
detailed explanation of the legal issues
surrounding foreclosure can hefound
in the longer version of the paper, or in
MORTGAGE LENDING: THE RISKS OF
FORECLOSURE LAWS, by Terrence
Clauretie (ORER LETTER. Spring 1990).
A single copy ofany paper in the Working
Paper Series will be provided without
charge to any reader who makes a
written or telephoned request to ORER.
This article examines the economic con-
sequences of various legal arrangements
for dealing with default on a secured
loan. It shows that even though default is
rare, the rules for handling default can
have significant impact on interest rates.
Our system of mortgage law provides
opportunities for a borrower in default to
redeem (to reestablish his standing with
the lender by paying the amount owed
plus applicable penalties). The first such
opportunity is provided by the equitable
right of redemption (the right under com-
mon law to repay, up to the date when le-
gal proceedings begin, any money owed).
A second opportunity is provided through
a statutory right of redemption (the added
right under state legislation to repay,
during a specified period after the legal
proceedings, any amounts owed).
The term foreclosure is often used
informally to mean the lender's act of at-
tempting to take ownership. Technically,
however, foreclosure means foreclosing,
or terminating, the borrower's equitable
right of redemption. Of course, foreclos-
ing the equitable right leaves the party
who buys the property at the foreclosure
sale facing uncertainty if a statutory right
remains. In this paper, foreclosure is em-
ployed in the more informal sense; its use
designates any and all legal steps taken
by the lender in securing the possession
of mortgaged real estate.
Although the techniques for creating
security interests and for foreclosing on
defaulted loans can vary from state to
state, the legal implications are well
established. Yet lenders foreclose in rela-
tively few cases of nonperformance; the
affected parties more typically negotiate
extended terms or reduced payments.
In general, such renegotiation provides
significant benefit to the nonperforming
party. Even if no formal renegotiation oc-
curs, lenders often engage in forbearance
(voluntarily delaying foreclosure to give
the borrower extra time) and thereby pro-
vide the nonpaying debtor with benefits
similar to those gained in renegotiation.
It might seem, then, that legal and vol-
untary restrictions on lenders would pre-
vent borrowers from paying serious heed
to the possibility of foreclosure. It should
not be assumed, however, that the fore-
closure concept has no effect on borrower
performance simply because foreclosure
occurs so infrequently. The mere poten-
tial to act gives the lender an advantage;
threatening to foreclose tilts the outcome
of renegotiation in the lender's favor.
Rules that redistribute the bargaining
power in foreclosure affect the market
for loans. Reforms favoring defaulting
debtors enhance the rights of both future
borrowers and those with existing loans,
although they affect the cost only of loans
originated after the legislation is pro-
posed. The ironic effect can be ultimately
to worsen significantly, rather than to
improve, the situation for new borrowers.
The Basics Of Foreclosure Practices
Foreclosure is governed by state law,
and different states can observe different
procedures. The four possible methods
are strict foreclosure, judicial foreclosure
(public sale), foreclosure by power of
sale, and foreclosure through the deed in
lieu method. Strict foreclosure involves
the lowest level of legal intervention (the
lender, or mortgagee, is automatically
decreed full owner of the property when a
borrower, or mortgagor, defaults). Public
sale involves the highest level of interven-
tion (a court must settle title questions
and approve each step of the procedure).
Some states allow deficiency judg-
ments when foreclosure sale proceeds
do not cover outstanding loan amounts.
Because it provides a lien against other
assets of the borrower, the potential for a
judgment enhances the lender's bargain-
ing power when a loan is renegotiated.
The impact of foreclosure can be ana-
lyzed through two key factors: the ulti-
mate distribution (how remaining value
is divided between mortgagor and mort-
gagee) and the transaction costs (how
much the total pie shrinks as a result of
the process). Judicial procedures entail
delay and legal fees, and thereby carry
significant transaction costs. Allowing
deficiency judgments pushes the ultimate
distribution of costs toward the mortgag-
or; allowing redemption periods allocates
more costs to the mortgagee.
An Example
Assume that someone buying a house for
$100,000 (its market value) knows that
there is a ten percent chance he will lose
his job soon. If he retains the job, he will
place a high personal, or subjective, value
on the right to live in the house. If he los-
es the job, the value to him will be much
less (because of the distance to a new job
• or the greater relative burden of mainte-
nance costs to someone unemployed).
He obtains a one-year loan at 10%
interest, with a 10% downpayment. (The
unusual one-year repayment period sim-
plifies the mathematics of our analysis.)
At the end of the year, when $99,000
($90,000 principal plus $9,000 interest)
is due, he can repay or default (or, just
as the lender can merely threaten to fore-
close, the borrower might merely threat-
en to default). The path he chooses
depends on the cost of defaulting and
the benefits of remaining in the house.
Suppose that if he keeps his job, the
benefit to him of continued occupancy
(the capitalized sum of his subjective
values over a series of future periods) is
$120,000; if he loses his job, continued
occupancy is worth $105,000. Suppose
also that selling costs of $10,000 would
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have to be paid by the nominal owner or
a foreclosing lender; therefore, the net
value to the borrower is $1 10.000 if he
retains his job and $95,000 if he does
not. If he loses his job, then the borrower
finds it attractive to default, or at least to
threaten to do so: he owes more than the
property is worth to him. Furthermore,
because of the $10,000 selling cost, the
house is worth only $90,000 to the bank,
and although it has the right to foreclose
it may find doing so unwise. The bank
may prefer to negotiate with the borrow-
er, settling for an amount greater than the
$90,000 foreclosure value but less than
the $99,000 it is owed.
Theories Of Bargaining
Economists, psychologists, and game
theorists have developed many theories
on how people negotiate. Yet despite the
richness of the available theories, the
conclusions we reach in analyzing nego-
tiations are not very sensitive to the par-
ticular bargaining models we choose if
we follow two logical principles. First,
we assume that if mutually advantageous
opportunities remain, negotiation will
continue. Second, the more powerful the
threats a party can make, the more we
assume he gains by bargaining. The
simplest bargaining theory consistent
with these two principles might be called
the split the difference (STD) model.
It works as follows. Any bargaining
situation begins with a recognition of the
outcomes that can arise if an agreement
is reached. Then the parties note the
threat point, the outcome that will arise
if no agreement is reached. Suppose that
an owner who would willingly sell for as
little as $90,000 negotiates with a poten-
tial buyer willing to pay up to $1 10.000.
(These dollar figures are the respective
reservation prices, which are based on
subjective factors specific to the bargain-
ing parties.) Let $x represent the transac-
tion price determined in the bargaining
process. Each possible outcome provides
$(x - 90.000) of net present value to the
seller and $( 1 10.000 - x) to the buyer.
The threat point is no sale at all, in which
case there is no net benefit; the seller
retains a house he values at $90,000 and
the buyer keeps his $1 10,000 in cash.
The STD model predicts a result that
evenly divides the gains achieved by
moving from the threat point to a nego-
tiated outcome. The total value to both
parties of making a trade is $( 1 10.000 -x)
-I- $(x - 90.000) = $20,000. Because any
potential gain should be divided evenly.
STD predicts that the house will sell for
$100,000. The seller gains $10,000 (get-
ting $100,000 for an asset worth $90,000
to him) and the buyer gains $10,000
(paying $ 1 00,000 instead of $ 1 1 0,000).
Note that if the buyer's reservation
price were to increase, the transaction
price would increase, but only by half
as much. If the owner's reservation price
were to decrease, the sale price would
What values might $x plausibly take?
The lender would have no incentive to
negotiate an $x below $90,000, and the
borrower would have no reason to agree
to an $x above $95,000, so $x ultimately
must fall between $90,000 and $95,000.
This renegotiation yields net benefits
of $(95,000 - X) and $(x - 90,000) to the
borrower and banker, respectively, for a
total of $5,000. STD predicts an even
split between the parties; under threat of
default the banker agrees to reduce to
$92,500 the balance due. By paying this
amount, the borrower is $2,500 better off
than if he lost a house worth $95,000 to
him, and the banker is $2,500 better off
than if he foreclosed and got $90,000.
Reforms favoring defaulting debtors can worsen
significantly, rather than to improve, the situation
for new borrowers.
fall by half of the amount. As the buyer
becomes more eager to buy. the owner's
threat not to sell becomes more potent,
and the transaction price increases. Of
course, if the buyer knows that the owner
is eager to sell, the threat not to sell
becomes less potent and the price falls.
If the seller's reservation price were
$1 10.000 and the buyer's were $90,000,
then STD would simply predict that no
sale could occur. Bargains are consum-
mated only if they benefit both parties.
Renegotiation Of Defaulted Loans
STD can be applied to the loan example
discussed earlier. In the event of default,
the bank nets $90,000 and the borrower
gets nothing. Of cour.se. if the borrower
has kept his job. then he has no desire to
default. His $1 10.000 net subjective val-
ue exceeds the $99,000 he must pay to re-
tain ownership; STD predicts that he will
not default or even threaten to default.
If the borrower loses his job, however,
then his $95,000 subjective value serves
as an incentive not to pay; his threat to
default may induce the banker to renego-
tiate. Renegotiation results in the borrow-
er's paying not $99,000, but rather $x.
Of course, an actual renegotiated loan
agreement would not likely state that a
specified amount of principal had been
forgiven. An identical effect would in-
stead be achieved through such indirect
means as a lower interest rate or longer
repayment period. Institutional factors
help to explain such obfuscations. For
example, banking regulators penalize
nonperforming loans but not renegotiat-
ed loans, and banks prefer not to publi-
cize that renegotiation is possible. But
regardless of the label attached, the new
agreement will be economically equiva-
lent to a reduction in the balance due.
Impact On The Initial Loan
The spread between a competitive
bank's lending and borrowing rates must
include a premium to account for possi-
ble default costs. Furthermore, because a
borrower who does not actually default
might threaten to do so in order to force
renegotiation, the rate spread should also
include a renegotiation premium.
In the case discussed above, default
does not occur since renegotiation is to
both parties' advantage (although the
bank would benefit even more if the loan
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were simply repaid under the original
terms). Our assumption is that renegotia-
tion will occur ten percent of the time
(recall the ten percent likelihood of job
loss). Each renegotiation forces the bank
to realize an effective interest return that
is below the stated rate.
We might assume that the bank deals
with many identical borrowers, and that
ten percent of them lose their jobs and
renegotiate. Thus, while each loan has a
stated interest rate of 10%, that rate is ac-
tually paid by only ninety percent of the
boiTowers; the rest of the loans are rene-
gotiated. Each such loan provides the
bank with an effective interest rate of
$2,500/$90.000 = 2.78%. Since the lend-
er does not know in advance which loans
will be renegotiated, the expected return
on each loan is (.9 x 10%) -i- (.1 x 2.78%)
= 9.28%. The 10% stated rate therefore
includes a .72% renegotiation premium.
Time Is Money
Our example resembles the case of non-
judicial foreclosure with no deficiency
judgments permitted. If default were to
occur, the lender would easily acquire
and then sell the house, and no further
recovery from the borrower would be
permitted. This scenario is effectively
how default and foreclosure proceed in
many states. How would the picture
change under alternative procedures?
Consider the effects on the above loan
if a state with no statutory redemption
rights decided to institute a six-month
redemption period. It might seem that,
since foreclosure so rarely occurs, this
type of legislation could have little effect
on the mortgage market. Yet such legis-
lation, by affecting the threat point, can
alter the effective interest rate even on a
loan that never enters foreclosure.
The revised law allows the debtor to
occupy the house for six added months,
without making any payments, before he
must either repay the loan or else default
and face eviction. If the relevant discount
rate is 10%, the borrower who defaults
gains approximately $4,750 (one half
year's worth of 10% of the $95,000 net
value); that is the benefit to him of living
in the house for six months, without in-
curring holding costs, before losing pos-
session. After he extracts $4,750 from the
property, his remaining value is $90,250.
Meanwhile, the banker must delay by
half a year his realization of the $90,000
net foreclosure proceeds; thus he receives
$85,500 ($90,000 reduced by one half
year's lost interest revenue at 10%). The
extended statutory period reduces the
borrower's loss and increases the lender's
loss if default occurs. The main effect of
the legislation, then, is to alter the bar-
gaining power in the borrower's favor.
If the threat to default leads to renegotia-
tion, the total benefit to be shared is
$(90,250 - X) -H $(x - 85,500) = $4,750.
If the total is split evenly, then each
party should gain $2,375 in the renegotia-
funds, loans after the reform would con-
tinue to have the same expected effective
rate. The stated rate would simply rise
until the bank's average effective rate,
based on expected renegotiations, re-
turned to 9.28%. A stated rate of 10.57%
leaves the effective rate unchanged;
(.9 X 10.57%) + (.\x- 2.36%) = 9.28%.
Once the adjustment is made, the bank
is unaffected by the new law; it receives
the same expected return under either le-
gal regime. Nonetheless, the distribution
of returns is dramatically different; every
borrower pays a higher initial nominal
rate, but only those who renegotiate real-
ize an eventual reduction in costs. There-
fore, while the law reduces the costs for
Bargains are consummated only if they benefit both parties.
tion. In default the bank would receive a
house worth a net total of $85,500; after
renegotiation it is paid $87,875 ($85,500
+ $2,375). The borrower pays $87,875
for a property worth $90,250 ($87,875 +
$2,375) to him. The delay in foreclosure,
and the resulting change in bargaining
power, shift the renegotiated interest rate
effectively to - $2,125/$90,000 = - 2.36%.
The initial expected rate drops half a per-
centage point, from 9.28% in the earlier
example to (.9 x 10%) -K.l x - 2.36%) =
8.76% with the legislated grace period.
Long Run Effects
If the foreclosure reform had been unex-
pected, banks would suffer reduced prof-
its through increased default threats and
renegotiations. But the losses would oc-
cur only in the short term; in the longer
run, new loans would incorporate higher
renegotiation premiums in response to
borrowers' increased bargaining power.
It is through this response by lenders
that foreclosure refonn designed to help
debtors can actually harm their positions.
In the pre-refomi case, the expected
return on the loan was 9.28%. If this rate
had been set in a competitive market for
borrowers who do threaten to default,
it increases costs for those who do not.
Risk Aversion
We have considered only one aspect of
the uncertainty a borrower faces: the ten
percent chance that his subjective value
in the house will decline. A second,
separate aspect of the loan contract is
the borrower's ability (rather than moti-
vation) to repay. The right to default
provides an implicit form of insurance,
because the borrower would more likely
default after a job loss, when he would
be less able to pay. This implicit insu-
rance exerts its own impact on foreclo-
sure relief legislation.
To see that variation in subjective
value and variation in ability to pay are
separate issues, consider a borrower who
receives a promotion and is transferred
to a distant city. The subjective value the
owner places on the house decreases, as
it does when there is a job loss, but his
ability to repay the loan increases.
Banks typically need not be concerned
with individual-specific risks. If one
borrower's chance of losing a job is not
closely correlated with job losses for oth-
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er borrowers, the banker can use the law
of averages in evaluating the risk asso-
ciated with each borrower's job loss. A
dollar received from a borrower who has
lost his job is worth no more or less to
the banker than a dollar obtained under
any other circumstances. In other words,
the banker is risk-neutral with respect to
individual-specific risks. If there is corre-
lation between the risks various borrow-
ers face (for instance, if all borrowers in
a region work in the same industry), then
the banker must take certain precautions.
Yet while the bank treats all dollars as
equally valuable, the borrower does not;
a dollar saved when he has no job is
more valuable to him than a dollar saved
when he is employed. (We describe the
borrower as lisk averse. He feels more
pain from a $ 1 loss in wealth than he
feels happiness from a $ 1 gain in wealth,
so the impact of a decrease in his home's
subjective value is greater when he is
unemployed than when he is employed.)
The banker therefore can profitably in-
corporate some insurance for the borrow-
er into the loan contract. The renegotia-
bility feature provides this insurance.
After a job loss, renegotiation triggers a
lower payment than the borrower faces
if his job is secure and the house is more
valuable to him. The insurance element
makes the loan more valuable to the bor-
rower than one for which he makes the
same payment whether employed or not.
Foreclosure relief laws affect this insu-
rance aspect of the loan contract. Compe-
tition among banks assures that the aver-
age effective return is unchanged by the
reform, but the distribution of payments
is affected dramatically. The lender must
charge a premium, in the form of a high-
er stated interest rate, for the insurance
component of the right to default. The
result is to lower further the effective
cost to those who renegotiate and raise
further the cost to other borrowers.
(An alternative to this system might be
for insurers to offer explicit insurance
against job loss. However, the borrow-
er's ability to quit or take leaves of ab-
sence would create agency problems that
could render such coverage unworkable.)
The effect of foreclosure reform on
borrower welfare depends on the degree
of insurance that the initial contract pro-
vided. If the borrower was fully insured
(implicitly) against loss prior to reform,
then the legislation leaves him worse off
by increasing his contract rate without
providing additional benefits, if the initial
arrangement provided inadequate insu-
rance, then the increased variability in
payments is useful to the borrower, since
the periods when he pays the higher stat-
ed rate are likely to be those when he is
able to pay, while his payments would
decrease when he is less able to pay.
Deficiency Judgments
Another issue to be considered is the use
of deficiency judgments. States vary in
If there is no default risk, competition
will drive the stated interest rate on loans
down to the effective competitive rate.
In the long run we would expect the
stated interest rate to fall to 9.28% if the
state made deficiency judgments easy
for lenders to obtain and borrowers had
enough money to pay the judgments.
This reduction in the stated interest
rate does not mean that the institution
of deficiency judgments provides good
economic results. Deficiency judgments
can destroy the insurance aspect of the
loan. Under threat of a judgment, the
borrower must remit a constant amount
to the bank, regardless of his ability to
pay, until his wealth is exhausted.
The benefit or cost to society from a change in foreclosure
rules depends on whether the changes improve or worsen
the implicit insurance provided to the borrower.
the ease with which the banker can sue
for funds remaining unpaid after foreclo-
sure. Deficiency judgments have an
effect opposite that of foreclosure relief;
they increase the lender's bargaining
power if default is threatened and thereby
reduce the implicit insurance. Again, the
effect is much stronger than might be in-
dicated by the infrequency of foreclosure.
Suppose that courts allow deficiency
judgments, and that the procedure's net
cost to the bank is $500. If the borrower
defaults when his subjective value in the
house has fallen, the amount netted by
the banker is $98,500 (the $99,000 loan
balance minus the cost of obtaining the
judgment), and the payoff to the borrower
is - $9,000 (the additional funds the bor-
rower must pay beyond the $90,000 the
banker nets by selling the house). This
situation is worse for the borrower than
paying off the loan directly, which would
provide a payoff of - $4000 (the $99,000
loan balance minus the $95,000 value he
places on the house). Borrowers subject
to deficiency judgments never find it
worthwhile to threaten to default, as long
as they have other resources equal in
value to their mortgage loan obligations.
Summary And Comments
In the short run, foreclosure relief pro-
vides a windfall gain to the borrower,
whose bargaining strength is increased.
In the long run, stated interest rates on
loans will adjust to include renegotiation
premia. The long run benefit or cost to
society from a change in foreclosure
rules also depends on whether the
change improves or worsens the implicit
insurance provided to the boiTower.
This article highlights only the major
points of the economics of foreclosure.
We have simplified the description of
the foreclosure process to allow the read-
er to focus on the bargained outcomes,
and have ignored such considerations
as bankers' desire to discourage renego-
tiation and foreclosure's impact on in-
centives to maintain property. A more
complete analysis might also address
regulatory rules regarding nonperform-
ing loans, the possibility of risk aversion
on the part of bankers as well as debtors,
and the possibility that borrowers might
obtain explicit job loss insurance. H
Dr. Kahn is a Professor ofEconomics at
the Universiry of Illinois.
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The Economic Role of Statutory Redemption
Michelle A. Mahue
The history of mortgage law presents a
series of pendulum-like shifts in lender
and borrower rights. The pre- 17th centu-
ry mortgage contract granted full convey-
ance of pledged property to the lender. A
debtor who defaulted as a result of great
hardship, however, could petition the
king for a right to repay the loan and
reclaim his land. By 1625. courts were
enforcing this equity of redemption even
in the absence of hardship. Thus while
the lender (mortgagee) became the legal
statutes. From 1838 to 1860, the legisla-
ture enacted a series of significantly dif-
ferent foreclosure laws, with mortgagor
protection levels inversely related to eco-
nomic cycles. Those who opposed statu-
tory relief for borrowers warned that such
reforms exacerbated economic crises by
discouraging future loans. Proponents
countered that lowans were losing their
property to preserve the credit markets.
After 1860, Iowa foreclosure law
remained fairly stable, no longer follow-
The creation or lengthening of statutory redemption
periods requires lenders to charge option premiums, and
thereby causes the credit supply curve to shift inward.
owner after a default, the bonower (mort-
gagor) retained the right to repurchase
the property. To reduce the uncertainty
placed on a lender by the possibility of
redemption, the courts began requiring
repayment within a reasonable time,
thereby creating the creditor's right to
foreclose on the equity of redemption.
This aspect of English common law was
followed by early US courts as well.
Development of Mortgage Legislation
US law shifted in favor of existing bor-
rowers with the 19th century creation
of the statutory right of redemption. In
response to problems faced by debtors
during times of economic hardship, state
legislatures began instituting these time
periods during which redemption rights
could be exercised after foreclosure sales
had been held.
Statutory redemption periods originat-
ed when mortgagors were predominantly
farmers, whose ability to repay reflected
climate or market factors largely beyond
their control. Iowa's experience is
instructive; a 1985 Iowa Law Review
article by Patrick B. Bauer discusses the
political and economic forces that shaped
the state's foreclosure and redemption
ing economic fluctuations. During the
Great Depression, however, Iowa enacted
moratorium laws that delayed judicial
foreclosures by up to three years, and it
limited the use of deficiency judgments.
Current Trends in Mortgage Law
In recent years, there has been a national
trend to reduce, or even eliminate, statu-
tory redemption periods. A new mortgage
foreclosure law passed by the Illinois
General Assembly in 1987 partially fol-
lows the national movement. (Pressure
from lending institutions and the state bar
association to eliminate statutory redemp-
tion had gathered steam early in the ex-
pansionary 1980s, but bureaucratic lags
delayed the action.) The law eliminates
postsale redemption for most types of
properties, although it retains a thirty day
redemption period for residential parcels.
In addition, the 1987 law retains the pro-
cess of judicial foreclosure, and actually
increases courts' responsibilities in fore-
closure proceedings. For example, the
judge may now decide the method of
foreclosure sale, so brokered transactions
could come to replace auctions.
As the nation now faces a recession,
history indicates that the trend away from
borrower protection may diminish, if not
reverse itself. Lawmakers do appear,
however, to have recognized that debtors
have incentives to favor protracted, and
probably inefficient, redemption proce-
dures. Whether borrowers' statutory
redemption rights are again strengthened
likely will depend heavily on the length
and severity of the economic decline.
Statutory Protection: Pro and Con
Arguments presented by critics and pro-
ponents of statutory redemption periods
reflect the tradeoff involved in giving the
borrower an extended occupancy period
while repayment to the lender is delayed.
Backers of the 1987 Illinois law argued
that redemption periods increase the
costs and inefficiency of foreclosure,
because the infrequently-used right un-
necessarily constrains bidding at foreclo-
sure sales. Opponents of statutory relief
further contend that permitting the bor-
rower more time to act creates a wealth
transfer, in that costs are borne by all
mortgagors while only those facing fore-
closure receive benefits. They also cau-
tion that grace periods fail to provide
meaningful protection in times of hard-
ship, since few debtors exercise redemp-
tion rights when both their personal
resources and their access to funds for
refinancing are diminished.
Statutory redemption's defenders
counter that the process provides some
protection for borrowers, particularly if
deficiency judgments can be levied, by
preventing hasty foreclosure sales during
periods of declining values. They further
state that although statutory redemption
may not cure price inadequacy during
depressions, it still serves to promote fair
sale prices during more normal times.
An Economic Analysis
Economic theory provides insights that
negate some of the arguments of both
proponents and critics of longer statutory
redemption periods. For example, those
who believe that statutory redemption
leads to higher sale prices are incorrect.
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At the same time, the wealth transfer
feared by critics is minimal; lenders offer
terms that reflect the low incidence of
default. The argument that debtors sub-
ject to foreclosure rarely have the funds
to redeem is also fallacious.
The point that members of both camps
seem to be missing is that the right to
default is an option for the borrower. An
investor declines to exercise an option
when it is "out of the money," so a debt-
or does not exercise the option to default
if the value of the mortgaged property
remains greater than the amount owed.
A longer statutory redemption period al-
lows more time for the option to become
"in the money," and financial theory tells
us that a longer life makes any option
more valuable. In fact, since the redemp-
tion right is transferable, a secondary op-
tion market could conceivably develop,
subjecting those who buy at foreclosure
sales to even greater potential losses
through an organized mechanism for ex-
ercising the options. Mortgage bankers,
option exchanges, or private firms could
emerge as brokers in redemption rights.
The creation or lengthening of statuto-
ry redemption periods requires lenders to
charge option premiums, and thereby
causes the credit supply curve to shift
inward. Lenders adjust nominal interest
rates to reflect the added carrying charg-
es and opportunity losses they incur
when foreclosure is delayed. As a result,
mortgagors must accept smaller loans at
higher interest rates. Because they create
a more valuable option for the borrower
at the expense of the buyer at the foreclo-
sure sale, statutory redemption rights
actually depress foreclosure sale prices.
Who Should Regulate?
The importance of statutory redemption
is a function of who regulates lending
activity. If legislators choose to regulate,
then they enact longer or shorter statuto-
ry redemption periods. Such laws pro-
vide for inflexible regulation; changes in
legislated redemption periods are sticky,
because debtors tend to seek extended
relief during economic downturns,
whereas banks tend to lobby for short-
ened redemption periods in times of ex-
pansion. This system induces responses
that may be too slow when economic
conditions change.
Still, Bauer favors statutory relief. He
holds that decisions regarding mortgage
regulation involve value judgments that
should be left solely to elected represen-
tatives. He concedes that debtors balance
protection against higher costs of credit,
but comments that secure rights of re-
demption are particularly valuable to ag-
ricultural borrowers. A farmer would find
it very difficult to plan for contingencies
if his rights as a borrower were subject to
frequent, unpredictable changes.
Ohio State University's Edward J.
Kane argues, however, that such a mon-
opoly of regulatory power is inefficient.
Kane views regulation as a service pro-
vided to a market, and sees regulators as
businesses competing for market share.
Kane argues for competition among regu-
lators, because he feels that efficiency
can be achieved only if there are multiple
suppliers from which the regulated par-
ties can choose. He notes that administra-
tive agencies at various levels of govern-
ment often are chosen to serve as regula-
tors because their reputational capital
creates consumer confidence. Inefficien-
cy enters the process, however, when
they issue self-serving reports that pro-
vide taxpayers with too little information
on which to judge performance.
The efficiency question is not easily
resolved. Because the mortgage market
is affected by frequent economic and
technological changes, an ill-conceived
system of multiple regulators could foster
continual, unpredictable adjustment of
the features found in loan contracts.
While the adjustments might be minor in
relation to those brought about by legisla-
tion, the instability thereby created might
offset the benefits of greater efficiency.
To provide greater flexibility, legisla-
tures can allow courts a more active role,
as has occurred in Illinois. Courts can, for
example, expand or rein in mortgagor re-
lief by altering the interpretation of what
actions are "reasonable" as economic
conditions change. However, there are
potential criticisms of greater court in-
volvement. Changes may be as infrequent
as those provided by statute, since a body
of law must evolve through precedent.
Backlogged dockets may also contribute
to instability in the foreclosure process.
Furthemiore, while courts have some
freedom of action, judges may lack the
expertise or time to fulfill their new re-
sponsibilities. Illinois lawmakers at least
recognized the inefficiency of regulation
solely through statutes. Still, simply giv-
ing the courts more power probably falls
short of Kane's vision of competition.
No Regulation Is the Best Regulation?
As an alternative to any type of govern-
mental regulation, lawmakers might
allow private remedies. For example, if
lenders were allowed to develop their
own foreclosure and redemption proce-
dures, each contract could be tailored to
the borrower's individual needs. Lenders
would have to use care to avoid agency
problems resulting from a borrower's
ability to trigger protection under the
contract, such as by quitting a job.
Of course, it could be argued that leg-
islation has been enacted precisely be-
cause lenders have failed to meet the
needs of borrowers, so a relatively free
market would not provide solutions. In
light of the common use of workout fi-
nancing, however, and the well-accepted
view that banks do not like to foreclose,
such an argument would not be convinc-
ing. Furthermore, competition in a free
market would tend to defeat cartels or
other forms of abusive activity.
Questions regarding the costs and
benefits of competition among regula-
tors, and of the proper role of legislated
redemption provisions, can adequately
be answered not by politicians, bureau-
crats, or the courts, but only by the
market itself. |
The Office ofReal Estate Research makes
every effort to assure the accuracy of all
statements in ORER LETTER articles prepared
by ORER staff members. However, the reader
should note that legal and regulatory mailers,
which are occasionally addressed in ORER
LETTER articles, arc subject to change and to
vaiying interpretations. ORER LETTER
articles do not purport to provide legal or
investment advice, and the Office ofReal
Estate Research shall not he held responsible
for damages resultingfrom omissions or
inaccuracies in the ORER LETTER or other
ORER publications.
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The Illinois Economy
William R. Bryan
The decline suffered by the Illinois econ-
omy during the late 1970s and the 1980s
has essentially ended during the last two
years; dominant downward trends have
halted. There is even some evidence of a
reversal in the decline in the manufactur-
ing sector.
One way of viewing changes in a re-
gional economy such as that of Illinois is
to focus on comparisons with the nation.
If the behavior of a regional economy
bears a consistent relationship with the
national economy, it is possible to fonn
judgments regarding future regional
developments on the basis of national
forecasts. This article examines recent
changes in the relationship between
economic developments in Illinois and
those in the nation as a whole.
At the outset, it is worth noting that
changes in trends have been identified
on the basis of very little data. Hence, in
the fullness of time there is a reasonably
high probability that specific conclusions
stated in this analysis will turn out to be
wrong. The shift of these trends, howev-
er, is of sufficient interest and importance
to be followed closely.
Trends Prior to 1985 and Since
For an extended period prior to 1985, the
Illinois economy was declining relative
to that of the nation as a whole. As a
consequence, Illinois grew more slowly
during periods when the US economy
was expanding, and declined more rapid-
ly during periods of national recession.
These trends are revealed in statistics
relating to gross state product, employ-
ment, and personal income.
Gross state product (GSP) is a measure
of the value added to the market price of
goods and services by economic activity
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performed within Illinois. From 1972
through 1985. clearly there was a decline
in the state's share of gross national
product, or GNP (see Figure 1 ), though
the 1972-1978 interval showed a less
pronounced decline than did the later
years in the period. Since 1983. Illinois'
share of GNP has stabilized on balance.
However, the identification of a change
in direction of movement in the Illinois
economy may be premature. It could be
argued that only 1986 and 1987 were
counter to the long term trend, and that
adverse forces reasserted themselves in
1988. after which the trend appears simi-
lar to that of the early 1970s.
Illinois' employment has declined as
a portion of national employment for
1972-1990 as a whole. As with GSP/
GNP, the pace of decline has slowed
since 1985 (see Figure 2), and the graph
of the most recent years appears similar
to that of the early 1970s, so again it may
be premature to conclude that trends
have changed. If future months" data
show stability or increases, it will appear
that 1985 marked the end of Illinois' rel-
ative weakness in employment growth. If
they show continued declines, the 1985-
1988 period will appear to have been a
flash in the pan.
Reflecting experience relating to
employment, income growth in Illinois
has strengthened. Though the state's
portion of total personal income in the
nation has declined since 1972 (see Fig-
ure 3), the declines were most rapid in
the period ending in 1983. Since 1984,
the pace of relative decline has slowed.
New Sources of Strength
While the service sector is said to be
the most rapidly expanding area of the
Illinois economy, it turns out that the
state's service sector is growing more
slowly than that of the US. Consequently,
Illinois' share of employment in services-
producing industries has continued to
drift lower. Surprisingly, the recent
sources of economic strength in Illinois
are its chief sources of weakness in years
past: durable manufacturing, machinery
in particular. Although there were sharp
declines in Illinois' share of 1972-1983
employment related to machinery produc-
tion, the declines reversed during the next
few years (see Figure 4). Since 1986, the
state's share of employment in machinery
production and other durable goods
industries has actually moved higher.
Recent Developments
GSP continued to decline relatively more
than GNP during the recent recession.
However, the recent trend appears more
like that of the eady 1970s than that of
the early 1980s. The decline in employ-
ment has been even greater than the
decline in real GSP. though durable goods
production has been a surprising sector of
recent relative growth.
There may be additional reasons for
optimism concerning the Illinois econo-
my, and the real estate sector in particu-
lar. Household spending has held up rea-
sonably well in recent months. Purchases
of durables rebounded in the first quarter,
with automobile sales and expenditures
on housing leading the way, and a moder-
ate expansion in retail spending is expect-
ed to persist into the near-term future. ":
Dr. Bryan is Director of the University of
Illinois Bureau ofEconomic and Busi-
ness Researcli and Editor of the ILLINOIS
BUSINESS REVIEW. He served as Direc-
tor of the Office ofReal Estate Research
from August 198S through January J 990.
Readers Respond to Winter Issue
In "Privatization of Public Housing in
the US," (ORER Letter. Winter 1991 ),
Peter Colwell and Michelle Mahue
defend privatization as a solution to
many problems typically associated
with public housing. Some readers,
however, disputed the authors' view
of Kenilworth-Parkside as a privatiza-
tion success story. One critic stated
that privatizing Kenilworth-Parkside
was much more costly than originally
had been estimated, but that tenant
ownership is a focal point of Secretary
Kemp's housing policy, so HUD could
not allow such a highly visible project
to appear to have failed.
Expenditures for kitchen and bath
improvements, for example, have been
roughly twice those of other renovated
public housing facilities. Moreover,
continuing rent subsidies and a man-
agement contract with the District of
Columbia, coupled with potential
property tax abatements and reduced
utility fees, will add to the cost of
privatizing the project. Privatization
opponents in Congress, such as Rep.
William Clay (D-MO), claim that
the cost overruns cast doubt on the
feasibility of public housing privatiza-
tion programs in general.
While the authors do not deny these
excesses, they counter that some of the
costs reflect efforts to comply with
HUD regulations, and others would
have been incuned regardless of
whether the project had been sold.
They view the problems as an indict-
ment of excessive regulation, not as
evidence that privatization is infeasi-
ble. As the article suggests, these
regulations and their accompanying
high costs are unnecessary; an equity
stake, coupled with unrestricted trans-
ferability on resale, is enough to
assure the success of privatization.
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Cramdowns: The Contract Giveth, the Court Taketh Away
Michelle A. Mahue
It has long been common for lenders to
agree to "workout" arrangements, under
which financially troubled borrowers'
payments are restructured or portions of
principal are forgiven outright. Such nego-
tiated settlements can result in more desir-
able outcomes for both parties than might
be realized if default were to occur.
Of course, a borrower might reject the
workout offer and file for bankruptcy. The
number of personal bankruptcy filings in
the US has more than doubled in the last
decade. Some experts feel that filings will
continue to increase because the stigma
has largely been eliminated, and because
the ratio of consumer debt to household
income has risen in recent years, even
during periods of high interest rates.
A corporate borrower might seek debt
relief through the federal bankruptcy
code's Chapter 7, under which the court
cancels all unsecured debts, or through
Chapter 1 1 , under which such debts are
restructured. A restructuring imposed by
the court over the lender's objections is
known as a cramdown. Home lenders
have tended to face fewer bankruptcy-
related problems than have other lenders;
traditional interpretations of Chapter 13
(under which an individual's debts are re-
organized rather than forgiven) have held
that debt relating to a principal residence
must be repaid despite the borrower's
bankruptcy. Therefore, even after being
adjudged bankrupt and possibly holding a
home with depreciated value, the borrow-
er typically has had to repay the mortgage
lender in full.
In recent months, however, cramdowns
have been applied in Chapter 13 proceed-
ings. In the fall of 1990, two federal ap-
pellate courts ruled that a Chapter 13 filer
is entitled to a restructured mortgage loan
if the balance owed exceeds the home's
value. The code thereby has been reinter-
preted to state that a home lender's secur-
ity interest is the lower of the remaining
loan principal balance or the current mar-
ket value of the underlying property.
Through such a forced renegotiation,
the court splits the loan principal into two
portions: secured and unsecured. Since
the secured portion is likely to be less
than the balance owed under the original
agreement (otherwise the boiTower would
not seek the court's assistance), the lend-
er must then join other unsecured credi-
tors in an attempt to recoup remaining
sums owed. In the cramdown cases to
date, lenders typically have received only
20% of their unsecured claims.
Because cramdowns impose costs on
lenders' existing portfolios, they endan-
ger borrowers' future access to funds,
and the courts may have exacerbated the
problem. For example, some courts have
held that the borrower must maintain pay-
ment of the original debt service, though
for a shorter period given the reduced
principal. While such a plan preserves
the lender's current inflows, it upsets the
cash flows of mortgage-backed securities
and, in turn, hinders the sale of loans to
the secondary market. Furthermore, lend-
ers may find it difficult to collect from
private mortgage insurers and the FHA,
which have maintained that cramdown
loans are impaired, but not in default.
With the increased bargaining power
provided by judicial intervention, the
borrower can use the threat of a cram-
down to extract more favorable terms in
an informal workout situation. This adju-
dicated shift in bargaining strengths may
cause the outcome of a workout negotia-
tion to be inefficient. Even if a cram-
down does not actually occur, the lender
must bear additional costs as a result
of the borrower's increased power in a
potential Chapter 13 proceeding.
While the decisions on home loan
cramdowns set binding precedents only
for two federal appellate districts (Illinois
is not affected), the trend seems to be
toward making home lending a riskier
activity. The trend can be reversed only
by the Supreme Court, or by Congress.
Trade associations have lobbied for laws
to preserve the lender's secured interest
if bankruptcy occurs. But if the recent
past provides clues, it may be some time
before such legislation is introduced, i^
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The Price of Zoning
David E. Mills
Zoning originated as a tool to provide
comprehensive urban planning. The real-
ity, of course, has always been some-
thing different from that original ideal.
Zoning practice is more about acquiring
and swapping property rights than it is
about planning per se. Reduced to sim-
plest terms, the laws and institutions of
zoning merely create a line of division
between the private rights of land owners
and the collective rights of communities.
What a land owner is free to do with his
land the community is bound to accept;
what the land owner is forbidden to do
with his land the community is entitled
to be spared.
Comprehensive planning would
require that the assignment of rights
be stationary, complete, and beyond
dispute. The fact that none of these con-
ditions are met explains why most of the
action in land use regulation these days
does not involve planning. Negotiation
and litigation are the main events in the
zoning arena.
Zoning and Exchange
The economic rationale for zoning is to
remedy market failure arising from exter-
nalities among land uses. By restricting
or excluding uses with undesirable spill-
over effects, zoning has the potential to
improve the use of land under a zoning
authority's jurisdiction. In theory, zoning
can extract more social benefit from land
than would a regime of laissez-faire.
Yet while zoning is sound in theory,
the economic performance of zoning has
been disappointing. One reason for this
disappointing performance has been the
tendency for zoning officials to quash
mutually advantageous exchanges of
property rights between land owners
and communities. If the spillovers from
nonconforming land uses were small in
relation to the private gains that would
accrue to the land owner if such uses
were permitted, then zoning-based
restrictions would penalize everyone.
Suppose there is a land owner who
wants to build a convenience store at the
edge of a residential area in a city. The
land is zoned for residential uses exclu-
sively. A convenience store on the site
would create spillovers like noise, traffic,
and so forth, but gaining the right to build
the convenience store would be worth
$100,000 to the land owner. (That is,
the land owner's next best development
option would be worth $100,000 less.)
ORER News
Scholarship Assistance
^
Available to Minorities
1989 amendments to the Illinois Real
Estate License Act created a program
to provide financial assistance to
individuals of racial minority status
who wish to pursue courses of study
in the real estate field. The Illinois
Minority Real Estate Scholarship
! Program is funded through fees
I
paid by holders of Illinois real estate
I
brokers' and salespersons' licenses.
i The legislation, which was sponsored
I
by Senator Emil Jones (D-Chicago),
appoints the Office of Real Estate
Research to administer the program;
ORER does so under the guidance of
an advisory committee of minority
real estate professionals. Those cur-
rently serving on the committee are
Chicago Realtors® Dempsey Travis
(chairperson), Alvin Pearson, and
Frank Williams.
Black, Hispanic, and Native Amer-
ican residents of Illinois are eligible
for financial assistance in support of
activities ranging from pre-license
training to professional designation
programs to collegiate study. Appli-
cation forms are available from most
local boards of Realtors® in the state,
and from the Office of Real Estate
Research. Questions regarding the
program can be directed to ORER.
Fall Alumni Luncheon
The Office of Real Estate Research
has organized another luncheon for
University of Illinois alumni working
in fields relating to real estate. The
event will be held at the Chicago
Yacht Club on Friday, November I
.
Thanks to Gene Stunard for again
providing access to the Yacht Club.
The speaker will be Charles H.
Wuitzebach, a Managing Director of
(continued on page 3)
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Commentary
Suppose further that, for the sum of
$60,000, the land owner and the city
could undertake measures to reduce the
spillovers and to compensate any parties
unavoidably affected.
Consider the options open by law to
the zoning commission in a case like this.
In permitting the nonconforming land
use, the zoning commission would con-
sign the community to suffering $60,000
in damage from the spillovers. Yet in
denying the land owner the right to build
the store, it would deprive him of a devel-
opment opportunity worth $100,000.
Neither choice would be very appealing.
Instead of completely banning or un-
conditionally accepting the offending but
It's Hard to Squelch a Good Deal
Economic history and our experience
teach us that mutually advantageous
exchange is hard to suppress. Contempo-
rary zoning practice affords a good illus-
tration of this principle. As it evolves
and matures, zoning practice moves ever
closer to the notion of "zoning for sale."
An illustration involves Jim and Ted
Pedas, developers who plan to build an
office building a few blocks down Penn-
sylvania Avenue from the White House.
Stymied by the District of Columbia
zoning ordinance, which precludes struc-
tures as tall as the ten stories they pro-
pose, the Pedas brothers sought to strike
a deal with the District Zoning Commis-
The problem with zoning is that it gives and takes
what instead should he bought and sold.
remunerative land use, would it not be
better for the zoning commission to sell
the land owner the right to develop the
land, for a price that compensates the
community for spillovers'? Any price be-
tween $60,000 and $100,000 would put
both the land owner and the community
in better positions than they would be in
absent the development. It is ironic that
selling the zoning is not an option. The
commission can give property rights of
the community to the land owner, or it
can keep these rights, but ordinarily it
cannot sell them.
The opposite problem also occurs; a
permitted land use might create spillovers
that are large in relation to the financial
loss the land owner would suffer if new
restrictions were imposed. In such a case,
the community and the land owner alike
would be made better off if the communi-
ty could just buy the land owner's right
to practice the offending use. Yet the ri-
gidity of zoning can keep the community
from acquiring new rights in a transaction
that does not penalize the land owner.
The problem with zoning is that it gives
and takes what instead should be bought
and sold.
sion. In exchange for permission to
proceed with their plans, the brothers
offered the Commission a jumble of side
payments and incentives: $1 million
for low-income housing in the District,
another $ 1 million for scholarships for
DC residents, and so on. Once the stakes
were raised high enough, the Commis-
sion agreed to lift restrictions and to
allow the developers to proceed.'
The Pedas case is not an isolated
incident. Cutting deals, or establishing
"linkage," has become a prominent fea-
ture of zoning practice throughout the
country. The city of Los Angeles exact-
ed a new $20 million facility for its Mu-
seum of Contemporary Art from Bunker
Hill Associates. In exchange, the devel-
opment firm received the right to devel-
op an eleven-acre, mixed-use project in
a prime section of the city.2 In other
cases local governments have exacted
municipal infrastructure, such as roads,
parks, and schools, from developers in
exchange for rights to develop land.
Requiring tangible contributions to
enhance the general welfare of commu-
nities as a condition for granting devel-
opment rights is, of course, a form of
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exchange. This exchange arguably bene-
fits ail parties involved. When the Pedas
brothers sought relief from the zoning
restrictions along Pennsylvania Avenue,
they asked the community (the District
of Columbia) to relinquish its collective
right to an unimpaired view of the sky
and to a less congested environment.
Naturally the community, whose inter-
ests the Zoning Commission looks after,
demanded something in return. What the
community got is better than nothing
and, depending on the effectiveness of
the District of Columbia Zoning Com-
mission as an arbiter of community val-
ues, may be better than maintaining un-
impaired views and less crowded streets.
scarce, zoning increases the value of the
land to which these rights are attached.
By denying development rights to most
land owners, a community makes those
rights worth much more to the fortunate
land owners who can obtain them.
This situation naturally invites rent
seeking efforts by land owners, develop-
ers, and other agents hoping to capture
scarce and valuable rights. As is true
of rent seeking in other settings, rent
seeking in zoning creates social costs by
squandering resources. Resources like
time and money devoted solely to captur-
ing the spoils of zoning create no value in
and of them.selves, and therefore could
have been deployed elsewhere in the
By exchanging a community's property rights for cash,
we might keep zoning officials more accountable to all
constituencies, rather than just to the most vocal.
Exchange of this nature is a form of
barter that serves to dodge the legal bar-
riers to explicitly salable zoning. Yet the
open sale of development rights for cash
could be no worse, and might be better,
than a community's dealing for such
amenities as museums and sidewalks.
The value to the community of tangible
exactions may be considerably less than
the cost borne by land owners or devel-
opers. By adopting the practice of ex-
changing a community's property rights
for cash, we might keep zoning officials
more accountable to all constituencies
in the community, rather than just to the
most vocal.
Zoning and Rent Seeking
Barriers to the sale of zoning have anoth-
er unfortunate consequence: the dissipa-
tion of zoning's social benefits through
rent seeking activities. (Rent seeking is
the pursuit of the above-normal returns
that can accompany restricted economic
activities.) Zoning affects land rent be-
cause it restricts owners' development
options. By making some kinds of prop-
erty rights (e.g., rights to build tall office
buildings along Pennsylvania Avenue)
economy to produce valuable goods and
services.
It is possible, in theory at least, for rent
seeking to dissipate the entire social divi-
dend created by zoning. (The situation
is not unlike one in which the quarreling
and litigating of heirs dissipates a disput-
ed inheritance.) In these instances it
could be argued that laissez-faire with
spillovers galore is better than zoning.
Rent seeking does not always totally
destroy the prize. Yet nearly all rent seek-
ing activity imposes social costs, and
efforts to gain favorable zoning are no
exception. To sketch out some possibili-
ties, we can consider two kinds of rent
seeking efforts that zoning might invite.
Zoning practice is complicated, diverse,
and ever-evolving, so these illustrations
do not exhaust the possibilities.
Zoning "Contests"
In the 1970s, the city of Petaluma in
northern California set out to limit
residential growth by rationing building
permits. Annual quotas on the number
of permits were established, and home
builders were invited to compete for
the limited number of available permits
(continuedfrom the first page)
JMB Institutional Realty in Chicago
and former Senior Vice President of
Prudential Real Estate Investors.
Wurtzebach holds a Ph.D. in Finance
from the University of Illinois. He
served for many years on the faculty
of the University of Texas at Austin,
and is the co-author of a popular real
estate textbook. His topic will be
"Emerging Trends in Institutional
Real Estate Investment."
A registration form appears on
page 15. There will not be a general
mailing to alumni to announce this
upcoming luncheon. Anyone with
questions about the luncheon, or
about registration procedures, should
write or telephone the Office.
Yavas Joins ORER Staff
An economist whose work focuses on
markets facilitated by intermediaries
and agents has joined the ORER staff.
Dr. Abdullah Yavas, a recent Univer-
sity of Iowa graduate, will serve as
a post-doctoral research associate.
His research efforts will focus on
economic analysis of the real estate
brokerage industry. Interested readers
can look forward to his articles in
future ORER Letter issues.
Dean Search
Professor Paul Hartman of the Uni-
versity's Department of Economics
served as Interim Dean of the College
of Commerce and Business Adminis-
tration during the summer of 1991.
Professor Howard Thomas of the
Department of Business Administra-
tion has been appointed Acting Dean
of the College for the I99I-1992
academic year. A search is under
way for a permanent replacement for
former dean John Hogan, now at the
helm of Georgia State University's
College of Business Administration.
Advisory Committee Update
Dean Thomas has appointed two new
members to the ORER Advisory
Committee. They are Terri Murphy,
a Realtor® from Libertyville, and
(continued on page 7)
Summer 1991 ORER Letter page 3
Commentary
by presenting their cases to a citizens'
evaluation board. Builder proposals were
rated numerically on the basis of archi-
tectural designs, site plans, and other
features, and only those projects with the
highest ratings were allowed to proceed.
In many other localities zoning authori-
ties do implicitly what the Petaluma plan
did explicitly: converting zoning proce-
dures into contests in which development
rights are given out as prizes. A commu-
nity that awards permits in this manner
invites rent seeking efforts by those
hoping to win and. inadvertently, imposes
social costs. The resources expended by
developers in attempts to win these zon-
ing contests (for instance, the fees they
pay for architects, planners, lawyers
and other consultants, and outlays for
eye-catching design features) exceed the
value they add to the community. The
expending of such resources does not
make the prizes distributed more valua-
ble; it only affects who wins them. When
tallying the social cost of zoning contests,
we must add all the costs incurred by los-
ers and much or all of the costs incurred
by the winners.
This wasting of resources is hardly a
nickel-and-dime affair. Contestants for
zoning changes in San Francisco must
meet stringent architectural requirements
that greatly inflate the cost of develop-
ment. One developer is quoted as having
stated, "... the design costs for the
[approved] building were double what
they normally would have been." -^
It is rent seeking of this nature that
actually can dissipate all the land rent
created by zoning. Consider a simple
and highly stylized illustration. If zoning
causes a scarcity of development rights
for an intensive land use, then there is a
surplus of parcels standing to profit from
acquiring the desired zoning. Favorable
zoning therefore becomes a prize, and
land owners hoping to win this prize are
drawn to engage in rent seeking.
Suppose the surplus of parcels is on
the order of four-to-one; only one parcel
in five will be awarded the favorable
zoning. Suppose further that the sought-
after zoning is worth $1 million to the
land owner who wins it. If each land
owner figures that (with sufficient effort
and expense) his chance of gaining the
prize is as good as anyone else's, then
each will spend up to $200,000 in the
effort to win. (An owner who feels that
obtaining the desired zoning is an "even
bet" in which anyone's chance of win-
ning is 1/5 will pay up to 1/5 of the $1
million prize in order to compete.) The
sum of what the owners collectively
pay to consultants, attorneys, and others
exhausts the prize; there are four losers
and one winner, but the gains and losses
cancel out in the social accounting. The
community would have been better off,
and no one would be the worse for it, had
the prize simply been auctioned to the
highest bidder.
response, but excessive development
brought on by "first-come-first-served"
zoning is nonetheless costly.
Something similar happens when own-
ers fear that the community will confis-
cate rights that lie too long unexercised.
We might think of this situation as "use-
it-or-lose-it" zoning. An argument can be
made that preemptive development, like
zoning contests, dissipates all of the land
rent created by zoning in the first place
(see "Is Zoning a Negative-Sum Game?"
Land Economics. February 1989).
Zoning Reform
It should be apparent that buying and
selling zoning, rather than taking it or
Nearly all rent seeking activity imposes social costs,
and efforts to gain favorable zoning are no exception.
"First-Come-First-Served" Zoning
The preemptive timing of development
is another mechanism for rent seeking
in zoning. Communities are more open
to zoning changes in some periods than
in others. If the likelihood that a land
owner can get a favorable zoning change
decreases as more and more such changes
are approved, then a different kind of
contest emerges. This contest is a race to
get inside the door before zoning authori-
ties abruptly close it; we might think of
the outcome as "first-come-first-served"
zoning.
In this scenario land owners rush their
development plans to avoid being pre-
empted by others. There are social costs,
mainly in the form of excessive develop-
ment for extended periods. Development
is excessive, from a social point of view,
when it depresses prices and rental rates
for developed properties to levels below
their long-run marginal costs. In markets
exhibiting this feature, some services are
worth less to occupants than they cost,
and hence should not have been supplied.
The prematurely developed properties
eventually become economic, as demand
grows and prices and rental rates rise in
giving it away, would greatly diminish
the frittering away of resources brought
on by rent seeking efforts. Of course,
buying and selling are not costless
activities, but they would conserve
resources as compared to the processes
we use to ration scarce and valuable
property rights today.
The goal of land use regulation ought
to be the open and efficient exchange of
property rights. Obstacles remain to the
emergence of a consensus on improving
the way we regulate land use, but en-
croaching "linkage" is an encouraging
first step. It reveals and dramatizes that
both land owners and communities un-
derstand implicitly that opportunities for
mutually advantageous exchange exist.
The next step is to refine the institutions
to facilitate exchange. |
Footnotes
1
.
The Washington Post. p. A 1 . April 30, 1 99 1
.
2. The Wall Street Journal, p. 33, April 18, 1984.
3. The Wall Street.fonrnal. p. 35, March 5, 1986.
Dr. Mills is a Professor ofEconomics at
the University of Virginia.
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SPECIAL SECTION: RACEAND HOUSING
An In-Depth Look at Integration Maintenance Programs
Peter F. Colivell and Michelle A. Mahue
Imagine a quota system that not only lim-
its the minority population ofa metropol-
itan area, hut sets ceilings for the num-
ber ofminority dwellings in a neighbor-
hood, a city block, or even a building.
The program also limits owners' rights
to sell by dictating which races may pur-
chase homes in specific areas. Groups of
minorityfamilies no longer are able to
live near one another; cohesive commu-
nities unravel as social, political, and re-
ligious bonds weaken. Yet the theoretical
basis for this program is the socially de-
sirable goal ofmaintaining integration.
The previous paragraph describes a
quota program that actually is enforced
in Singapore. In that country, the ethnic
Chinese majority hasfound housing quo-
tas to be useful tools for weakening the
social and political power ofa growing
Malay minority. Of course, such an
obvious manipulation of housing to limit
minority influence would be vehemently
opposed in the US.
Or would it? The following article
examines the use of integration mainte-
nance programs (IMPs), or "affirmative
marketing." in home sales. Affirmative
marketing is an obvious misnomer:
rather than providing opportunities, the
programs intend to restrict minorities'
options. The most powerful tool brought
to hear by proponents has been Jawbon-
ing: blacks are encouraged not to locate
in targeted neighborhoods where whites
are encouraged to buy. While such activ-
ity can impose psychic damage, it does
not alter the fundamental price structure
that governs the spatial distribution of
races. Indeed. IMPs have not been suc-
cessful in achieving their purported goal
of maintaining racial balance: in effect,
these programs have served only to im-
pede truly equal housing opportunities.
In some of Chicago's south suburbs. In-
tegration Maintenance Programs (IMPs)
have been implemented to manipulate
black suburbanization. Promoters of IMPs
state that white prejudices will work to
maintain segregation, so government in-
tervention is necessary to achieve some
"ideal" level of integration. Beneath the
stated goal of maintaining integration,
however, lurks a discriminatory side to
these programs. The failure of IMPs to
succeed, as well as the philosophical
guise of "affirmative" marketing, may
explain why opposition from the black
community has been so weak.
William Simpson of the Chicago Far
South Suburban NAACP comments that
the rhetoric and political game-playing
that have allowed IMPs to progress to
their current status have prevented blacks
from looking more closely at the impact
of these programs; the national NAACP
and other Chicago-area branches have yet
to voice opposition to IMPs. Moreover,
Simpson explains that although many
blacks have the financial means to be
unaffected by the programs, it is only a
matter of time before the true nature of
"affirmative" marketing is revealed.
Proponents insist that the sacrifice of
some freedom in residential choice is a
small price to pay for the benefits of inte-
grated living. Opponents, however, hold
that IMPs are designed to prevent "clus-
tering" in given areas. The directed inte-
gration that would result if IMPs actually
succeeded would cost blacks not only the
freedom to locate near friends and family,
but a voice in political decisions as well.
IMPs reportedly attempt to facilitate
integration by encouraging blacks to
migrate to areas without significant black
population, while discouraging their
moving to integrated areas. (Prospective
white buyers theoretically receive an
opposite treatment.) Critically refened to
as "minority scatter plans," IMPs strive to
disperse black suburbanization, diluting
black political power. Such dispersal
would be equivalent to a form of gerry-
mandering; instead of redrawing maps,
vested interests would work to redistrib-
ute constituents so that a minority group
never could become a majority in any
jurisdiction.
IMPs also can be criticized for the dif-
ferential treatment that black and white
prospective home buyers receive. Under
IMPs, housing market information pro-
vided to buyers often differs according
to race. While there have been several
suits against such "steering" by brokers,
little legal opposition has been brought
against IMPs per se. Similarly, there is a
fine line between the goals of IMPs and
those of illegal quota programs.
Political Motivation
IMPs grew from a belief that, in the
absence of organized intervention, all-
white areas will resegregate (become all
black) as black households move to the
suburbs. The political implications of
black suburbanization are very different
from those of black decentralization
within cities. Many suburbs are so small
and homogeneous that they could quick-
ly become predominantly black, and
under black political control. It is ironic
that several suburbs that once were
among the most open are those which
now fear resegregation and therefore
discourage black entry. IMPs typically
are implemented not in communities
with low percentages of black residents,
but rather in communities where black
populations are expected to rise from
their current 10-20% levels.
White political leaders may accept
the discrimination inherent in IMPs for
Machiavellian reasons. By stating that
the programs maintain "neighborhood
stability," politicians calm the fears, and
retain the votes, of certain constituents.
Moreover, the views that these programs
represent are packaged in palatable
ways. No longer do hate-spewing white
racists man the barricades; now both
black and white social engineers extol
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the virtues of integration while manning
barricades to hold integration at the levels
they deem appropriate. There is the same
negative effect on open housing, but the
rhetoric is very different.
Legal Issues
Since political maneuvering has enabled
local officials to enact IMPs. it appears
that abolishing IMPs is a task that must
be left to the courts. The most thorough
legal examination of IMPs began in 1988
when the Greater South Suburban Hous-
ing Center sued the Greater South Subur-
ban Board of Realtors® (GSSBR).
The area represented by the Center and
tion about the client, including race. Con-
cerned that the Center's marketing efforts
entailed steering, the GSSBR removed the
listings from the MLS and filed an ethics
complaint against the Center's broker.
The Center then filed suit, charging
that the GSSBR violated the Fair Housing
Act by restricting access to the MLS. The
court, however, determined that the ac-
tions of the Realtors® were not discrimi-
natory. The Center's claim that the MLS
breached its contract by excluding the
listings was dismissed because the MLS
had retained the right to exercise discre-
tion in accepting listings. Charges of tor-
tious interference also were dismissed,
The directed integration that would result if IMPs
actually succeeded would cost blacks not only the
freedom to locate near family members and friends,
but a voice in political decisions as well.
the GSSBR is the portion of Cook County
that is south of the Chicago city limits
and east of Harlem Avenue. During the
1970s, the black population in areas di-
rectly south of the city experienced rapid
growth, while the proportion of black
residents in the southwestern suburbs
remained negligible. By 1980 several
previously all-white communities, such
as Country Club Hills and Hazel Crest,
had become about 12% black.
The Center's IMP was created in re-
sponse to a perception that prejudice and
panic peddling had resegregated specific
neighborhoods within Park Forest.
During the same period there were an
increasing number of foreclosures in the
community that left homes abandoned
and vacant. The Center began a program
under which these properties could be
acquired, rehabilitated, and resold. It
purchased three of these homes and sub-
sequently enlisted a broker to sell them
in compliance with the IMP. The plan
provided that an extra sales effort was to
have been made to prospective white
buyers. No requirements were placed on
the MLS or on other brokers, other than
that any broker who showed the house
was to supply the Center with informa-
because there was no proof of malicious
intent in the Realtors'® actions.
The GSSBR and the National Associa-
tion of Realtors® (NAR) countersued,
charging that it was the Center that had
violated the Fair Housing Act through its
differential treatment of black and white
clients. The Realtors® also claimed that
limitations on brokers" activities and on
the use of "for sale" signs violated the
First Amendment as well as the Fair
Housing Act. GSSBR and NAR charged
that the Center's data reporting require-
ment also violated clients" rights to priva-
cy, due process, and equal protection.
The Center maintained that its objec-
tive was not to restrict access to housing,
but to expand home buyers' options by
providing information to groups that
otherwise would not receive or seek the
information. The court determined that
integration was a national policy goal that
could be attained through special means.
It found that the broker hired to carry
out the Center's target marketing was
not denied the right to sell the homes to
certain clients, and that the program did
not cause the broker to reduce his efforts
to sell the townhouses. The court held
that the Realtors® did not prove that the
Center's program was discriminatory,
and that the Realtors® lacked standing to
bring charges of Civil Rights violations.
Hazel Crest "s ban on "for sale"' signs
was found to violate the First Amend-
ment and the Illinois Constitution (bans
in University Park and Glenwood had
been repealed before the trial began). Lo-
cal officials failed to prove that the signs
j
encouraged panic selling or that the ban
reduced public anxiety about the commu-
nity"s racial stability. Yet other suburbs'
limitations on the size and use of "for
sale" signs were found to be acceptable.
The court held that anti-solicitation
ordinances, which restricted brokers from
communicating the desire to sell, rent, or
list property with owners who chose not
to be contacted, were not discriminatory.
The ordinances were found to violate the
First Amendment, however, since the
definition of solicitation was so vague as
to place undue restrictions on brokers.
Similariy, data collection ordinances
that had been enacted by Matteson and
Glenwood (but were altered before the
trial) were found not to violate the Fair
Housing Act. Furthermore, Realtor®
claims that the ordinances violated
home seekers' rights were not upheld.
The case was appealed to the US
7th Circuit Court, and in June 1991 a
decision was rendered. The 7th Circuit
affirmed the lower court's findings that
the actions of neither the GSSBR nor the
Center violated the Fair Housing Act.
While the appellate court agreed that the
First Amendment was violated by the
ordinances governing the use of "for
sale" signs, it reversed the lower court's
decision that the anti-solicitation statutes
were unconstitutionally vague. The
appellate court held that the intent of the
solicitation restrictions was not to protect
home owners from blockbusters, but to
protect their right to privacy. Since this
higher court felt that there would be little
confusion among brokers as to what ac-
tions would be considered solicitation, it
found the ordinances to contain adequate
definitions. It reversed the lower court,
however, in finding that the $60 fee for a
sign permit in Country Club Hills was
not justified by administrative costs, and
that it thereby was unconstitutional.
page 6 ORER Letter Summer 1991
wommentaiy ORER News
Implications
These court decisions are both troubling
and curious; they are not merely economi-
cally incorrect, but would appear to be
"politically incorrect" as well. The courts
have adopted the notion that there really
are two types of steering. "Invidious"
steering to promote segregation violates
the Fair Housing Act. Yet "benign" steer-
ing, the court's ruling would seem to say,
does not violate antidiscrimination laws
since this form of racially motivated mar-
keting attempts to promote integration.
Although the IMP did not explicitly
deny anyone the right to view or purchase
homes and the court found no substantial
evidence that the Center's goal deviated
from the promotion of integration, there
is reason to look beyond the rhetoric of
affirmative marketing proponents. Given
that an objective of the Center is to limit
growth in the area's black population, one
may surmise that the Center's actions are
based on an implicit racial policy.
Robert Butters, an attorney with NAR,
comments that the appellate court failed
to recognize evidence that revealed the
discriminatory nature of the program.
When the communities asked owners to
join lists of those who did not wish to be
contacted by brokers, these residents were
told that the program had been designed
to promote racial stability, not that it ex-
isted to protect privacy. Furthermore, the
Center used more invasive techniques to
encourage homeowners to join the list
than brokers would have used in advertis-
ing their services. If the protection of
residents' privacy is the goal of the anti-
solicitation ordinances, then why are
there no restrictions on activities of other
solicitors or on other forms of direct
advertisement? Similarly, with respect
to the sign restrictions, if the ordinances
were designed to promote aesthetics, as
local officials maintained, then why were
there no regulations on the use of garage
sale signs or political signs? While the
trial court recognized that the purpose
of these restrictions is to maintain the
racial status quo of the communities by
constraining the activities of brokers, the
appellate court discussed only the e.\ post
reasoning that the ordinances protect
privacy and promote aesthetics.
The NAR feels that the courts erred in
judging that the Realtors® lacked stand-
ing to file suit. Butters explains that since
the Center's IMP effectively slows the
real estate market, there is injury to
brokers. Furthermore, by encouraging
sales to white buyers, IMPs may deny
black brokers, whose clients typically are
black, opportunities to earn commissions.
Butters notes that the courts based their
decisions on the premi.se that a broker
will perform a given set of activities for
all clients, but will perform additional
services for affirmative marketing clients.
In actuality, a broker can expend only so
much energy marketing a house. Forcing
the broker to concentrate her efforts on a
certain group reduces the effort she can
devote to other groups.
Butters .sees a further inconsistency
in the courts' decisions; he asks why,
if the Center is allowed to make a con-
scious outreach to the underrepresented,
thereby promoting a social goal, affirma-
tive marketing is not mandatory for all
brokers. Such special marketing methods
are allowable for non-profit and govern-
mental entities, but are prohibited for
competitive businesses.
The Realtors® already have petitioned
for an en banc rehearing by all of the 7th
Circuit's judges. Though such requests
rarely are granted, the judges have asked
the Center for a response, indicating
some interest. Should this attempt fail,
the Realtors® are prepared to petition the
Illinois Supreme Court on First Amend-
ment grounds.
At what point does benign steering
become invidious? The issues surround-
ing affirmative marketing are far from
resolved. It appears that in order for the
discriminatory effects of IMPs to receive
further legal examination, a black home
buyer or other party who has suffered a
similar "injury in fact" must be involved
in a suit. Given that the expressed goal of
these programs is consistent with national
social policy, it may be some time until
such a suit is filed. Until then, we can but
hope that other members of the judiciary
will recognize the problems that ensue
when people feel that they can attempt
to micro-manage integration without
violating fair housing statutes.
(continued from page 3)
Arlen R. Speckman, a Realtor® from
Kankakee. Murphy and Speckman
replace outgoing members Lydia
Franz of Barrington and David
Rittmiller of Peoria. ORER thanks
Franz and Rittmiller for their many
years of service on the Committee.
Murphy produces the Murphy on
Real Estate column for Copley News-
papers, and hosts a radio program by
the same name. She is incoming vice
chairperson of NAR Publications and
a contributing author to Real Estate
Today. She is also president of the
Illinois Women's Council of Real-
tors® and vice chairperson of the Illi-
nois Association of Realtors® (lAR)
Continuing Education Task Force.
Speckman is active in professional
activities at both the state and nation-
al levels. He represents Illinois as a
Director of the National Association
of Realtors®, and serves on the lAR
Advisory Council of Past Presidents.
Speckman chairs lAR's Legal Issues
Committee, is vice chairperson of the
Nominating Committee, and serves
on the Redistricting Task Force.
Two Committee members whose
activities have not been reported
recently are Illinois Association of
Realtors® Executive Vice President
Gary Clayton and Illinois Real Estate
Commissioner Albert Suguitan.
As the top ranking lAR staffer,
Clayton serves as staff liaison to
many Association committees, inclu-
ding the Board of Directors and the
Advisory Council. A story on his
career, which has taken him from the
top ranks of the Illinois law enforce-
ment community to his current posi-
tion with lAR, appears in the August
1991 issue of Illinois Realtor®.
Suguitan chairs the state's Real Es-
tate Administrative and Disciplinary
Board, Education Advisory Council,
and Complaint Review Committee,
and is an ex-officio member of the
Illinois Real Estate Appraisal Review
Committee. He also serves as vice
chairperson of the National Associa-
tion of Real Estate License Law Offi-
cials' Industry Liaison Committee.
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Economic Views of Segregation and Integration
Peter F. Colwell
The extreme levels of racial segregation
that have been found in the residential
sectors of many American metropolitan
areas can be viewed as a gigantic social
experiment. Most observers would agree
that the experiment has been a failure, a
factory of social discord. It is unfortunate
that the recognition that something is
dramatically wrong with segregation
does not lead us to a set of effective,
just, and politically palatable solutions.
By understanding the economic forces
that shape the racial compositions of our
neighborhoods, however, we can help
to assure that people will not combat
segregation with ill-conceived programs.
Actions allegedly designed to battle
racial segregation are particularly trou-
bling if they fail to reduce segregation
while producing unwanted side effects.
To help explain the economic forces
that determine neighborhoods" racial
characteristics, the following article pro-
vides an economic analysis of segrega-
tion, followed by an economic analysis
of integration.
Integration Maintenance Programs
One failed policy has been affirmative
marketing, as discussed in the previous
article. Affirmative marketing strategies
are devoid of any consideration of the
price mechanism or the workings of
markets. Proponents of integration main-
tenance programs (IMPs) have failed to
recognize the clear economic explanation
for racial patterns we see in many com-
munities, and therefore have failed to
understand that market processes render
it unlikely that IMPs can be successful in
maintaining targeted integration levels.
Bureaucrats show great hubris in imagin-
ing that their jawboning, or verbal activi-
ty by their agents, can modify the spatial
allocation of housing.
The improbability of success is due in
part to the fact that the programs do not
address the economic causes of segrega-
tion, or of the related concepts of block
by block racial transition and tipping.
If policy makers ignore the role of the
pricing mechanism, then there can be
little hope for a successful government
program to support housing integration,
short of telling people where they can and
cannot live. Even if policy makers recog-
nize the role played by the price struc-
ture, politically plausible government in-
tervention bears little chance of success
in ultimately controlling market forces.
In 1970, when an IMP was introduced
in Park Forest, Illinois, the population of
this southern suburb of Chicago was less
than 3% black. In 1980 the community
was about 12.7% black, and by 1990
the fraction had grown to almost 30%.
This rapid growth to a level substantially
above the black share of the region's pop-
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ulation suggests that programs designed
to control racial balance have not been
successful. Some black families will find
methods to circumvent impediments
placed in their way by IMPs. If they can
afford housing in areas in which they
truly would like to locate, then they will
find brokers or owners who would rather
sell properties to the most willing buyers
than to participate in the steering and
fine-tuning associated with IMPs.
Even though the rapid growth in black
population indicates that Park Forest's
program has not succeeded, one might
suspect that the community's percentage
of black residents would be even higher
in the program's absence. During 1977
an IMP was implemented in adjacent
Park Forest South (now called Universi-
ty Park). This community's IMP subse-
quently was eliminated, and the years
that followed saw the suburb's popula-
tion shift from integrated to predomi-
nantly black. Because the two commun-
ities otherwise display many similarities,
one might infer that Park Forest's IMP
has served to deter black home buyers,
though it would appear to have done so
to a limited extent, if at all.
Economics of Segregation
The economic explanation for the spatial
distribution of various ethnic and racial
groups is the price mechanism. Segrega-
tion and racial transitions are attributable
to a price structure created by consumer
preferences: while consumers do not
necessarily get their most preferred
racial patterns, the patterns that emerge
do reflect consumers" prefeiTcd out-
comes, given their budgets.
To simplify the analysis, we can as-
sume that within a housing authority's
jurisdiction there are two groups. These
groups can represent any two religious,
racial, or ethnic types. For puiposes
of analysis, but without attempting to
portray any specific community, let us
assume that the two groups are whites
and blacks. If whites prefer segregation,
then they will be willing to pay more for
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homes located on sites in the interior of a
white neighborhood than for sites on the
boundary adjacent to a black neighbor-
hood. If blaci^s also prefer segregation,
then there will be higher prices for sites in
the interior of a black neighborhood than
for sites in the boundary area adjacent to
a white neighborhood.
Figure 1 illustrates the presence of
these preferences, under which interior
sites command much higher prices than
do sites on the boundary. White buyers'
willingness to pay (WWP) for property in
the white neighborhood is shown to the
left of the vertical line that marks the mid-
dle of the boundary area: black buyers'
willingness to pay (BWP) in the black
Segregated neighborhoods may be
explained by a preference for segregation
on the part of one of the two groups. Seg-
regation results when one group prefers
segregated housing regardless of whether
the other group prefers segregation, pre-
fers integration, or is neutral with regard
to integration. Yet a neighborhood price
structure characterized by a price premi-
um for interior sites does not necessarily
imply that one group believes itself to be
superior to the other group. Blacks might
pay more for interior sites than for boun-
dary locations because they prefer to live
surrounded by black neighbors, or might
value being close to religious, recreation-
al, or shopping establishments whose
Blacks and whites, like other ethnic groups, have lifestyle
concerns that may give them reason to pay premium
prices for interior locations in their submarkets.
neighborhood is shown to the right of the
boundary area's midpoint. The exaggerat-
ed jump in each group's willingness to
pay for interior sites indicates the premi-
um paid by each group for segregation.
(Figure 1 is a representation of the Bailey
Boundary Model, developed by Martin J.
Bailey in his famous article "Note on the
Economics of Residential Zoning and
Urban Renewal." Land Economics,
August 1959.)
The two groups pay equal prices for
parcels along the boundary when there is
no tendency for neighborhood change. In
the particular example shown, however.
the premium that white buyers are willing
to pay for interior sites exceeds the pre-
mium that black buyers are willing to
pay for interior sites. Consider a case in
which either a black household buying
near the boundary in the black neighbor-
hood, or a white household buying near
the boundary in the white neighborhood,
would pay $45,000 for a house. In the
white neighborhood's interior area (the
area farther from the boundary), however,
houses sell for $60,000. while in the in-
terior of the black neighborhood a similar
home sells for $50,000.
activities are directed toward black house-
holds. Blacks and whites, like other eth-
nic groups, have lifestyle concerns that
may. at times, give them reason to pay
premium prices for interior locations in
their submarkets.
Market Adjustments
Figure 1 shows a case in which there is
no tendency for the boundary between
the neighborhoods to shift, because the
boundary price in the white neighborhood
equals the boundary price in the black
neighborhood. This result holds regard-
less of whether prices in the interior are-
as are equal for the two ethnic groups.
How does the market react to a
change in one group's demand for hous-
ing? Figure 2 illustrates that an increase
in the region's black population causes
BWP in the submarket no longer to
match WWP at the boundary. The expan-
sion in black population increases hous-
ing demand among black households,
causing the BWP curve to shift upward.
Prices in the black neighborhood then
exceed those in the white neighborhood
at the boundary (and also in the interior
in the example shown, though this latter
result would depend on the degree of
increase in black buyers' demand). With
the boundary price in the black submar-
ket above that in the white submarket,
property is bid away from the white sub-
market (owners on the white neighbor-
hood side of the boundary sell to higher-
bidding black buyers), and the boundary
shifts. This movement causes supply in
the white submarket to decrease and.
consequently, causes prices to increase.
The accompanying increased supply of
housing in the black submarket causes
prices there to fall, though not to their
original level. (The arrows in Figure 2
illustrate the directions of the changes.)
Although the new boundary will be
located so as to equate prices on both
sides, there may be a tendency for still
further change. A stable allocation
requires not only that boundary prices
Figure 2: Unequal Prices at the Boundary
$ BWPWWP T i
Distance to Boundary Distance to Boundary
in White Neighborhood in Black Neighborhood
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be equal, but also that the interior price
in neither market exceed the cost of new
construction. For example, if WWP in the
interior exceeds the cost of building a
new house, then an incentive exists for
developers to build additional housing
in the white submarket, and the added
supply will shift WWP downward. An
accompanying leftward shift in the boun-
dary (reflecting the resulting black will-
ingness to outbid whites for boundary
parcels) increases supply for the black
submarket and forces BWP downward
until boundary prices again are equal.
The new allocation is a stable equilibri-
um: boundary prices are equal and there
is no further incentive for the construc-
tion of new homes.
In the real world, the process of a shift-
ing boundary between the groups and that
of an expanding urban region due to new
construction can occur almost simultane-
ously. The theory that segregation will be
maintained through transitions in housing
allocation is consistent even though the
groups may hold a variety of preferences.
Even if one group prefers proximity to
the other or is neutral, segregation will
be maintained as long as the other group
prefers segregation. If both groups, how-
ever, either are neutral or prefer integra-
tion, then integration will result.
Impediments to Change
The competitive market forces driving
neighborhood change can be weakened
by the practice of exclusionary policies.
These impediments can exist in areas
where one group may not like doing busi-
ness with the other group, or where one
group illegally colludes to keep the other
group from buying in a specific area.
Collusion typically would involve
informal agreements among neighbors
not to sell to members of the other race.
Sellers are more likely to abide by such
agreements if they have religious or long-
standing social ties to their neighbors, if
there is a governmental or other institu-
tional co-conspirator, or if sellers fear
reprisals for violating the unwritten rules.
For example, there have been cases in
which access to public utilities was with-
held from blacks who moved to white
neighborhoods, and cases in which white
religious leaders urged solidarity to pre-
serve population bases needed to support
churches or parochial schools. When the
most fervent opponents of integration
have been unable through persuasion
or institutional assistance to obtain the
cooperation of sellers, they have resorted
to threats and even to violence (both
against unwelcome buyers and against
uncooperative sellers).
Of course, the existence of collusion
does not guarantee that market outcomes
will be altered. For example, OPEC's
success in controlling oil prices clearly
has been undermined by some countries'
unwillingness to abide by their produc-
tion ceilings. In a similar vein, a few
white sellers who are willing to face
whatever sanctions may be imposed can
destroy the effect of an anti-black cartel.
A seller who sees the potential for sub-
Figure 3: Willingness to Pay Based on Neighborhood Racial Mix
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stantial profit in exploiting the boundary
price differential is likely to pursue his
economic self-interest rather than to bow
to other individuals' wishes or threats.
When price discrimination or an exclu-
sionary policy interferes with the mar-
ket's equilibrating process, arbitrageurs
(specialized market participants who buy
in one submarket and sell in the other,
profiting from the price differential in
the two submarkets) may enter the fray
and facilitate neighborhood change.
Their transactions, however, are limited
by the strength of sellers" collusive
agreements and by sellers' willingness
to limit the markets for their properties.
Arbitrageurs or other investors who
specialize in such boundary-shifting
transactions often are critically referred
to as "blockbusters."
Absent such market impediments as
exclusionary collusion, a gradual block ,
by block boundary transition will occur. -I
The existence of effective collusion,
however, maintains a price differential at ,
the boundary and results in sporadic ra- I
cial transitions rather than in the gradual
changes characteristic of market process-
es. These sporadic changes occur in areas
where collusive agreements or segrega-
tion preferences are weakest.
Economics of Integration
While the economics of segregation
explains the overall pattern of a commu-
'
nity's racial composition, it does not ful-
ly explain the details of neighborhood
transition at the boundary and elsewhere.
Instead of experiencing the rapid changes
from all-white to all-black suggested by
the boundary movements discussed
above, neighborhoods often integrate
more gradually and then "tip," quickly
becoming resegregated. The economics
of integration explains the existence of
neighborhoods that remained integrated
for relatively long time periods, but then
underwent rapid resegregation.
The first step in analyzing neighbor-
hood transition is to describe BWP and
WWP in neighborhoods with various
racial mixes, as shown in Figure 3. Price
again serves as the principal allocative
device. The shapes of the BWP and WWP
curves illustrate just one set of possibili-
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ties, and are not intended to characterize
preferences in any specific community.
The WWP in Figure 3 shows the maxi-
mum price that a white buyer will pay,
based on the particular neighborhood's
racial mix. The curve's overall upward
slope therefore indicates that a white
buyer is willing to pay a premium to live
in a predominantly white neighborhood.
The hump in the curve, however, shows
that white households actually prefer a
certain level of integration to 100% white
occupancy.
The various BWP curves are derived in
a similar manner. Reading from right to
left, we see that each BWP curve is virtu-
ally tlat. with only a slight rise as the pro-
portion of black residents increases from
zero to a more integrated level. While
this slight incline illustrates that a black
buyer prefers not to be one of a very few
black residents in a neighborhood, the
gradual decline in BWP as the black per-
centage increases indicates that a black
buyer, like a white buyer, pays a premi-
um for some level of integration.
Economics of Tipping
Figure 3 illustrates a possible explanation
for tipping, the phenomenon in which
racial change initially is protracted, but
then is very rapid after a "tipping point"
has been reached. The figure depicts a
neighborhood within a region into which
more and more black residents begin to
move. A period of gradual neighborhood
change is followed by a rapid conversion
to 100% black.
Assume that black willingness to pay
is initially at the low level depicted
by BWPq; whites outbid blacks for all
parcels and the neighborhood is 100%
white at point A. As black population in
the region increases, black demand in the
neighborhood rises to BWPj, and blacks'
willingness to pay meets that of whites at
point B. Allocation B is unstable, though;
if the market were initially segregated, it
would stay that way rather than moving
to point B. because at this low BWP level
whites outbid blacks at the margin (i.e.,
in moving from zero percent black to a
positive black population). If history
conspired to produce a mix at point B.
then even a minor change from that mix
would allocate all housing in the neigh-
borhood to a single race: blacks outbid
whites as the black population percentage
increases, and whites outbid blacks as the
white population share rises.
As black population in the region
continues to increase, higher demand
causes prices to be bid up in the black
submarket; there is an upward shift in
BWP to BWPt. Like point S, point C
would not represent the allocation that
would result if the neighborhood were
initially segregated. If the neighborhood
were initially segregated, then the alloca-
tion would be at point D. D represents
a stable situation that would remain
in effect until the region's population
changed. If blacks had not lived in the
neighborhood previously, then they
would begin moving there until equil-
ibrium point D had been reached.
As black population in the region rises
further, BWP moves from BWPt to BWP3.
Point E, where BWP3 is just tangent to
the WWP curve, represents the infamous
tipping point. Should black demand in-
crease beyond that point, BWP would lie
entirely above WWP; blacks would outbid
whites for all parcels, as along BWP4. The
neighborhood would "tip" to become all-
black, as shown by point F. At the tipping
point, where BWP is just tangent to WWP,
gradual integration stops. Any additional
upward shift in BWP would cause the
neighborhood to resegregate quite rapid-
ly, with blacks as the only residents.
Tlie Experience ofOak Park. Illinois
Neighborhood transitions, then, need not
always be gradual. If neither group exhib-
its a preference for some level of integra-
tion, then transition may be as rapid and
complete as in the case discussed with
respect to the example represented by
Figure 2. On the other hand, a neighbor-
hood in which integration is possible does
not always have a tipping point.
Consider a high income area with high
quality housing. At a high white popula-
tion percentage, whites might be neutral,
or nearly so, to more black residents; the
WWP might be flat, at least over the rele-
vant range. The more interesting story
9involves black households in the high in-
come end of the market. Because blacks
are a generally disadvantaged minority
group, there would be relatively fewer
black buyers who could afford such
housing. While this small group might
occupy a substantial fraction of the hous-
ing originally allocated to high income
blacks, as the quantity of high priced
housing for blacks expanded, there
would be progressively fewer buyers
remaining who could afford such homes.
This result would be shown graphically
by a drastic decline (as we read from
right to left) in the BWP curve as the
percentage of black households in the
neighborhood increased.
As BWP shifts upward due to a rising
regional population of high income
blacks, the neighborhood experiences
rapid initial integration. From then on,
however, only gradual increases in the
percentage of black households may
be achieved as demand rises. Such a
situation might characterize Oak Park's
integration experience. Following a
rapid initial influx of blacks into this
high quality, high income community,
the rate of racial change apparently
slowed considerably. Census informa-
tion on Oak Park Township shows
black representation having grown from
.2% in 1970 to 10.8% in 1980 to neariy
18% in 1990. Black population growth
in the 1970s averaged more than 439%
per year; during the 1980s, the growth
rate dropped to 6.3%. It is true that this
slowdown occurred after the introduc-
tion of an integration maintenance
program. Perhaps the true source of the
slowdown, however, was the ordinary
workings of the market. H
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Home Equity Assurance Programs
Michelle A. Mahue
Home equity assurance programs alleg-
edly protect home owners from property
value reductions caused by neighbor-
hood influences. When the Chicago city
council considered the controversial con-
cept in a pioneering 1988 effort, some
supporters of equity assurance were indi-
viduals fearing specific physical threats
to the values of their homes. Examples
of these threats were lakefront erosion,
noise from O'Hare, and disamenities
caused by night games at Wrigley Field.
However, the programs have come to be
Racial Implications
Before the Chicago plan came to a final
vote, and before Madigan's bill was
approved, all references to racial change
were carefully removed from the propo-
sals. Still, critics claim that the basic
premise of equity assurance smacks of
racism. They argue that these programs
perpetuate the myth that racial integration
leads to "white-flight" and lowers proper-
ty values, and they caution that the plans
prevent blacks from purchasing homes
in certain neighborhoods.
Supporters originally feared specific physical threats to
the values of their homes, but the programs have come
to he most popular in predominantly white areas that
face uncertain future racial mixes.
most popular in predominantly white
areas (such as some neighborhoods in
the city's northwest and south sides) that
face uncertain future racial mixes.
The Chicago plan, narrowly approved
by the city council, was vetoed by May-
or Eugene Sawyer. But equity assurance
programs had also been discussed at the
state government level, and House
Speaker Michael Madigan introduced
the equity assurance concept in the Illi-
nois General Assembly. With Governor
Thompson's encouragement, the plan
was approved in 1988 by both legislative
houses. The state's Guaranteed Home
Equity Assurance Program authorizes
municipalities to hold referenda on
whether plans should be created in their
areas. If a referendum passes, then a
commission is appointed to administer
the local program and a fund is created
from a surtax levied on all home owners.
The maximum tax rate that can be levied
is $.12 per $100 of equalized assessed
valuation. To qualify for coverage, an
owner must pay a $125-$175 fee for an
appraisal by a city-approved appraiser,
and must agree not to sell the home for
at least five years.
Proponents, however, say that home
equity assurance programs protect both
black and white home owners against
financial loss and blockbusting, thereby
stabilizing neighborhoods from adverse
change. The plans lack any elements of
steering or explicit racial preference, the
proponents assert, but are designed to
protect against the "panic peddling" that
often accompanies changes in neighbor-
hood racial composition. The programs
allegedly provide psychological benefits;
some owners have stated that the peace of
mind they received from equity insurance
kept them from fleeing their neighbor-
hoods. Supporters add that the perceived
increase in neighborhood stability renders
it unlikely that a plan's insurance fund
would ever be called upon to pay claims.
Current Status
While the equity assurance issue lay rela-
tively dormant for a period following ap-
proval by the state, the idea recently has
gathered steam in Chicago under Richard
Daley's mayoral leadership. For example,
Daley has offered equity assurance as a
remedy to those who live near the site of
his proposed Lake Calumet airport. In
November 1990 voters in ten south side
precincts approved home equity assu-
rance plans. Three equity assurance
offices now operate in Chicago under
the Illinois statutory guidelines.
The director of the city's Southwest
Home Equity Assurance Program states
that an average of 100 home owners per
month have joined the plan since her
office opened in April 1990. The office
is concerned primarily with marketing
the program through informational meet-
ings in churches and libraries. Yet de-
spite steady enrollments, the marketing J
efforts, and the encouragement offered *
by proponents, equity assurance plans
are not as popular as might be expected. A
Opponents have argued that equity '
assurance creates a tax that benefits
those who leave the participating neigh-
borhoods rather than those who stay.
They note that someone who has real-
ized a loss in value must sell his house in
order to collect the insurance proceeds.
Proponents counter that, by providing
an element of market stability that will
entice prospective buyers to purchase
homes there, a program benefits the
owners who remain in a neighborhood.
It is interesting to contrast the market-
ing philosophy of Chicago home equity
insurance administrators with that of
Oak Park's administrators. The Oak Park
program's membership peaked at 150
households soon after the program was
created (in connection with the suburb's
integration maintenance efforts) by a
1977 local ordinance. Its participants
now have dwindled to 99, most of whom
are original members. Because property
values in the area have risen steadily,
no claim has ever been filed against
the fund. In fact, administrators are so
confident in the fund's solvency that the
surtax to finance the program was elimi-
nated in 1984. Funhemiore, administra-
tors no longer promote the program, cit-
ing that the speculation and uncertainty
caused by such promotions could trigger
a "where there's smoke, there's fire" J
response among home owners. I
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To the extent that Oak Park's program
and other equity assurance plans were
meant to restrict integration in certain
neighborhoods, they have failed. The
black population percentages have
increased in most of the included areas.
In fact, many of the owners taking part
in the programs are minorities.
Administrative Shortfalls
The administrative burdens that equity
assurance programs place on both partici-
pants and local commissions are bound to
lead to controversy. The requirements
under the Illinois law are illustrative. The
law stipulates that an equity assurance
program participant who makes a "good
faith effort" to sell is assured of receiving
at least the value established in the initial
appraisal, provided that he has main-
tained the property. A five-year resident
who decides to .sell files a "Notice of In-
tent to Sell" with the commission. Within
sixty days of receiving this notice, the
commission may reappraise the home
(the guaranteed amount is to be reduced
by any loss in value resulting from poor
maintenance). If a ninety-day selling peri-
od does not yield an acceptable offer,
then the owner files a "Notice of Intent to
Claim." He then lists the home for sixty
days with a broker of his choice, but at a
price approved by the commission.
During the sixty days that the home
must remain on the market, the partici-
pant must forward all purchase offers to
the commission. If an offer exceeds the
guaranteed value, then the commission
will approve the sale. An offer less than
the guaranteed value could be either re-
jected by the commission, in which case
the owner would continue to try to sell
the house, or accepted by the commis-
sion, in which case the fund would pay
the owner the difference between the
offered price and the guaranteed price.
No benefits could be disbursed, however,
until the sale had been completed and
title had passed to the subsequent owner.
If an owner improved his home, or if
inflation increased the property's nominal
value by at least $5,000, then the owner
could request a reappraisal, the cost of
which would be .split with the equity as-
surance program. The owner then would
have two certificates: one guaranteeing
the original value and one guaranteeing
the increased value. If he chose to sell the
house less than five years after issuance
of the second certificate, then the original
value still would be guaranteed. Five
years after the issuance of the second
certificate, the guarantee of the improved
value would become effective.
Though Chicago's Southwest program
will not begin handling claims until at
least 1995, the director expects there to
be few problems. The complex rules and
the difficulty of determining standards for
adequate maintenance and sales efforts
may, however, provide fertile ground for
complaints and, ultimately, lawsuits.
ket conditions rather than against region-
al or national economic crises, yet it
might be quite difficult to distinguish lo-
cal conditions from regional or national
trends. The Illinois legislative guidelines
state that a 5% or greater decline in the
median value of existing homes in the
nation, state, or municipality constitutes
a trend not considered specific to the lo-
cal market. This 5% threshold was deter-
mined primarily through political negoti-
ation rather than economic analysis.
In case of a severe decline in the na-
tional housing market, a local commis-
sion may suspend coverage to protect its
fund's solvency. If insolvency occurs, the
fund may borrow against future tax reve-
Past failures of government-sponsored insurance plans
should lead to the question of who ultimately would bear
the cost if any of these programs did, in fact, fail.
Questionable Benefits
Home equity insurance is not simply ill-
conceived with respect to administration;
it does not provide what it is supposed to
provide. The programs guarantee nominal
values of participants' homes, whereas
owners should be concerned about real
losses. Suppose that an owner joined an
equity assurance program in year 0, when
his house was appraised at $100,000.
If he sold for $80,000 in year 5, the pro-
gram would reimbur.se the $20,000 reduc-
tion in nominal value. Yet the owner
would feel shortchanged if inflation had
cau.sed other products, including proper-
ties in other areas, to rise in price.
Suppose instead that a neighborhood's
average home value rose 15% over the
five year required holding period, while
increased traffic flow through a poorly
designed intersection caused a few homes
near the intersection to appreciate only
5%. Since an equity assurance program
does not protect against relative value
declines within a neighborhood, the
owners near the intersection would not
be compensated for their 10% real losses.
Furthermore, these plans are designed
to protect only against local adverse mar-
nue to regain financial stability, and stop
registering new members. Still, critics
contend that the funds are undercapital-
ized and that many would be bankrupt if
they had to pay even a few claims. Such
adverse neighborhood conditions as en-
vironmental problems, traffic, and crime
are likely to affect entire areas rather
than a few individual homeowners. It
therefore is likely that many owners
would sell their homes and file claims
for compensation at the same time. Such
a case of "catastrophic loss" certainly
could cause an affected guarantee fund
to become insolvent, and the commission
would have to exercise its option to
borrow funds secured by future tax reve-
nues. Potentially higher property taxes
might then further reduce the home
values in the affected neighborhood.
If enough equity insurance programs
became in.solvent, perhaps the city or
state would be called on to contribute
funds. While these programs appear to
offer a value-enhancing service, past fail-
ures of govemment-.sponsored insurance
plans should lead to the question of who
ultimately would bear the cost if any of
these programs did, in fact, fail. M
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Race-Based Home Lending
Peter F. Colwell and Michelle A. Mahue
Recognizing economic issues involved
in the development of integrated and seg-
regated communities, some affirmative
marketing strategists have embraced the
use of race-based loan subsidies. Com-
munities that have provided such subsi-
dies fear becoming resegregated, so they
offer incentives to white home buyers
who wish to purchase in integrated areas
and, at least in theory, to black buyers
who wish to purchase in predominantly
white areas. The incentives are designed
to protect a community from tipping.
more costly than those in the integrated
neighborhoods, however, the benefits
provided to black buyers would appear
to be extremely limited.
There is substantial doubt, in fact,
that the study actually shows the Shaker
Heights program to have been effective.
Only one of three neighborhoods where
subsidized loans were available to whites
attracted a number of white buyers: a
troubling question is what happened in
the other two neighborhoods. It appears
that factors other than subsidized loans
Since homes in the areas covered by the regional loan
program are considerably more costly than those in the
integrated neighborhoods, the benefits provided to black
buyers would appear to be extremely limited.
The economic effects of these finan-
cial incentives are explored in a recent
working paper by economist Brian A.
Cromwell of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland. "Prointegrative Subsidies
and Their Effect on Housing Markets:
Do Race-Based Loans Work?" examines
the impact of the Fund for the Future of
Shaker Heights. The Fund was created in
1986 to help stabilize a Cleveland sub-
urb's racial composition; it provides a
low-interest loan of up to $5,000 to each
qualified borrower. The reported results
indicate that the program was successful,
in that the rate of nonwhite growth in
the area covered by the program slowed
during the 1986-1990 period.
The results of the study also reveal
that only four of the 75 loans made
during 1990 were to black households.
Thus, the fund seemingly is used primari-
ly to support white demand in integrated
areas. Program administrators maintain,
however, that black buyers are not denied
opportunities, since blacks who choose
to buy in any of six predominantly white
neighboring communities may qualify
for loans under a regional program. Since
homes in these areas are considerably
attracted the white households to the
neighborhood where "success" has been
measured, but that these buyers nonethe-
less happily accepted the subsidies.
Undertakings of this nature, while per-
haps well-intended, obviously are subject
to criticism from many directions, and the
reader might wonder why a program of
questionable effectiveness that subsidizes
whites choosing to live in predominantly
black neighborhoods is politically palata-
ble. The answer no doubt is complex. It
may be the case that voters accept with-
out question any program that purports to
foster integration in housing.
Yet if a society offers price incentives
based on race, then some individuals will
seek to gain a particular racial status sim-
ply to garner the fruits of the incentive
programs. An effective cure for potential
abuses would be a national race registry.
Such a reference system could protect
minorities, promoting them as members
of society entitled to extra attention under
the law. Yet identification by race (such
as in South Africa's recently eliminated
program) is exactly what disadvantaged
racial groups have fought against in their
quest for equal opportunity.
Income-Based Subsidies
Some communities have embraced
"inclusionary zoning" as a solution
to the housing affordability problem.
Under inclusionary zoning, any de-
velopment involving upscale homes
must also include a specified number
of housing units for low or moderate
income residents. To keep prices of
the required units within the allowed
range while meeting stringent code
requirements (and keeping the less
expensive units from creating nega-
tive externalities for the expensive
homes), the developer typically must
charge the lower income buyer less
than a unit's production cost.
Assume, for example, that a devel-
oper meets the inclusionary require-
ment by charging $50,000 for a house
that costs $75,000 to build. If the
bargain unit is accompanied by full
alienation rights, then a buyer may
freely sell after acquiring ownership.
The buyer sells the residence for
$75,000 and pockets $25,000 (minus
transaction costs) simply for having
qualified as "moderate income."
Of course, some inclusionary zon-
ing advocates recognize this potential
problem. Their proposed solution is
to restrict resale: the buyer of a unit
created under inclusionary zoning
may sell the unit only at the original
price (possibly adjusted for inflation).
A curious result is that the buyer of a
subsidized unit faces progressively
less financial loss upon resale as the
property falls in value to the subsi-
dized price. For example, a family
that pays $50,000 for a unit worth
$75,000, but can resell only for
$50,000, maximizes its welfare by
ignoring needed maintenance (or
even engaging in such destructive
behavior as removing and selling the
kitchen cabinets) until the property
has deteriorated in value to $50,000.
Advocates of better housing for
low income families might wish to
look more critically at a practice that
either transfers developers' wealth
to individuals who have done nothing
to earn it, or else motivates buyers to
create instant urban blight.
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(continuedfrom the back page)
I believe in integration personally and
professionally. But integration of our
neighborhoods should reflect individuals'
choices to live where they want to live.
Like the authors of the earlier articles, I
have trouble seeing proponents of IMPs
generally as benign but misguided. There
is an IMP in the Beverly area, where I
live, and I have vehemently opposed it.
The program is said to promote stability,
but what kind of stability is there if my
son cannot choose to buy a home a block
away from the one in which he grew up.
because there are too many of "his kind"
in the neighborhood already? IMPs are not
the road to bringing minorities into the
2 1st Century in matters of housing.
Many of the IMPs that exist are in areas
that never had outreach programs to
welcome minority buyers. Public servants
who now support so-called integration
maintenance in those areas have simply
moved to the next phase of denying hous-
ing rights to blacks and other minorities;
it's too hard today to get away with
redlining and other types of overt discrim-
ination. Officially sanctioned denial of
housing rights to minorities has proceeded
steadily, in one form or another, through-
out our country's history.
For example, when you teach housing
finance at the University, do you tell the
students that for many years black fami-
lies could not obtain FHA loans, and that
black veterans of World War II were not
even permitted to obtain VA loans? My
family moved to Flint, Michigan in the
1940s, and in 1948 my parents decided to
buy a home. The area they selected was,
by definition, a "changing" neighborhood;
as black families began moving north for
factory jobs, they had to integrate neigh-
borhoods, because there typically were no
all-black communities to move into. My
family paid $6,800 for a frame house.
Your younger readers won't think that
sounds like a lot to pay, but white buyers
of similar houses were paying prices clos-
er to $4,000. Then my stepfather, a vete-
ran, had to get a 6% loan; a VA loan,
which he had earned the right to obtain
but was forbidden to seek, carried a 4.5%
rate. There was a conspiracy against men
who had honorably served this nation.
Think of the nest egg that my family
could have saved had it been allowed to
pay market value for the house, and to
finance at a market rate. Think of the
added equity that my family would have
accumulated if we had been treated fairly
in that housing transaction. Then multiply
these effects by the number of minority
families who have been treated unfairly
in this manner over the years, and you
can see the wealth that has been siphoned
from people of color in the United States.
The equity question is especially impor-
tant; home equity buildup is the method
by which most of us can trade up to better
houses, and acquire substantial savings
for retirement, starting businesses, or
paying for our children's educations.
My own education was sidetracked
when some white high school administra-
tors in Flint expelled me for not follow-
ing unwritten rules that applied only
to black students. If I didn't understand
discrimination prior to that event, I have
understood it since. As a black American,
a Realtor®, and a parent, I am determined
to help erase discrimination from our
housing landscape. Yet I also understand
the economics of real estate, so I cannot
support government-directed integration,
even when it is conceived by individuals
with good intentions who promote their
programs as a legitimate form of repara-
tion to those who have been wronged by
housing policies of the past. H
Good Guys Win One
Dr. Edward Krug ("Fish Story; The
Great Acid Rain Flimflam," ORER
Letter, Fall 1990) appeared recently
on the television program 60 Min-
utes. CBS repeated a December 1990
segment on acid rain, in which Krug
noted, as in the ORER Letter piece,
that the problem has been overstated.
After the earlier showing a high EPA
administrator had attacked Krug's
scientific credentials. A subsequent
review supported the validity of the
work of Krug and others involved
in the National Acid Precipitation
Assessment Project, and prompted
the re-airing by CBS. Although EPA
has since issued a formal apology,
Krug is suing the agency. The inci-
dent was the subject of the article,
"Scientific McCarthyism at the
EPA?" by Warren Brookes in the
May 1, 1991 Washington Times.
Krug is a consultant in Winona,
Minnesota who also serves as Direc-
tor of Environmental Projects for
the Committee for a Constructive
Tomorrow in Washington. DC. He
will share some of his environmental
views in future ORER Letter issues.
Good Guys Lose One
The budget ax has fallen on a source
of funding for the Office of Real
Estate Research. Under emergency
legislation. Governor Edgar has
transfeiTcd $ I million from the Real
Estate Recovery Fund to the General
Revenue Fund. (This transfer has
reduced the Recovery Fund balance
close to the statutory level that could
trigger an automatic assessment
against holders of Illinois real estate
(continued on the last page)
Reserve seats for
U of I Real Estate Alumni Luncheon - November 1, 1991
.
persons to attend the U of I Real Estate Alumni Luncheon at the Chicago Yacht Club. Enclosed is my check for $25 for each person attending.
payable to the Office of Real Estate Research.
Name_ Year Graduated Phone
Position and Firm
Names of Others Attending With Me
ORER appreciates your advance registration and payment. Your response by October 20 facilitates our planning and helps to assure that there will be seals and meals
for all who wish to attend. Please mail this form, with reservation payment, to: Office of Real Estate Research, University of Illinois, 304-D David Kinley Hall,
1407 W. Gregory Drive, Urbana, IL 61801.
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Race and Housing: A Minority Perspective
Frank J. Williams
Frank J. Williams is a Chicagoan who has
dealt personally with issues of race and hous-
ing throughout his life. As a black youtli in
the 1950s, and more recently as a Realtor®,
he has seen that programs allegedly designed
to benefit minorities can have consequences
that are detrimental to minority interests.
Williams is President of F.. J. Williams
Realty, which heformed in 1971 after work-
ing in real estate sales since 1966. He is a
broker, appraiser, and property manager
who holds the GRl. CRS. and CRB designa-
tions. He also teaches real estate courses
and advises the Illinois Minority Real Estate
The preceding articles reach the heart of
many questions that we must address in
dealing with housing problems faced by
people of color. While I generally agree
with points made throughout the series
of articles (for example, 1 too have ques-
tioned the practicality of equity assurance
programs), space limitations compel me
to respond primarily to the discussion
of Integration Maintenance Programs
because of my long experience with these
programs and strong opposition to them.
1 applaud the authors for speaking with
IMPs are said to promote stability, but what kind of
stability is there if my son cannot choose to buy a home
near the one in which he grew up, because there are too
many of "his kind" in the neighborhood already?
Scholarship Program. In 1990 Williams
was President of the Chicago Board of
Realtor.s®: he is only the second minority
to have held that prestigious position.
ORER LETTER asked Williams, as one
who can speak eloquently and powerfully on
real estate issuesfrom a minority perspective
.
to respond to the previous articles. We are
pleased with Williams' general agreement
with our positions, but Williams had agreed
to review the articles without prior knowl-
edge cf their conclusions, and we had agreed
to prim his response regardless of its content.
SO many parties in order to understand
the issues and viewpoints that affect the
debate. I must correct their assertion,
though, that only the Far South Suburban
branch of NAACP has spoken out against
IMPS. The South Side NAACP, which is
the predominant Chicago area chapter, •
took a strong position against IMPs when
the debate was raging in the early and
mid 1980s. I know because I was Presi-
dent of the South Side branch at the time.
(continued on page 15)
(continuedfrom page 15)
licenses.) Interest on the Recovery
Fund is paid into the Real Estate
Research and Education Fund, a pri-
mary source of support for ORER.
Current plans are for ORER to
draw on its savings in order not to
have to reduce services to constitu-
ents or to increase charges for publi-
cations. Additional budgetary surpris-
es, however, might force such moves.
New Studies Available
Two new ORER Working papers are
available. Paper # 85 is "An Analyti-
cal Critique of 'Impacts of Develop-
ment on DuPage County Property
Taxes'," by Peter F. Colwell. In the
paper, Colwell criticizes a study
completed for the county's Regional
Planning Commission by the DuPage
County Development Department.
The study and two critical analyses of
its findings (one by Colwell, the other
by Dr. Edwin Mills of Northwestern
University) have been the subjects
of considerable recent controversy
among real estate interests and public
officials in DuPage County.
Paper #86 is "Inter-Store Externali-
ties and Space Allocation in Shop-
ping Centers," by Jan K. Brueckner.
A single copy of any paper in the
Working Paper Series is provided
without charge to anyone who sub-
mits a written or telephoned request
to the Office of Real Estate Research.
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University of Illinois at Urbana-Chainpaign
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Air Rights^ Solar Rights^ and Efficiency
Peter F. Colwell
The 1991 Nobel Prize in Economic Sci-
ence was awarded in October to Profes-
sor Ronald H. Coase of the University
ofChicago. Coase is best known for
work that has provided afoundation for
the economic analysis of legal issues.
His classic "The Problem ofSocial
Costs" (JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOM-
ICS, 1960) is among the mostfrequently
quoted articles in both the legal litera-
ture and the economics literature. It is
from that article that economists have
developed thefamous Coase Theorem.
The Coase Theorem states that
regardless of the initial assignment of
rights, in the absence of transaction
costs the market will reach an ejficient
allocation of resources. The assumption
regarding transaction costs may be
rela.xed; as long as the transaction cost
is a lump sum and is sufficiently small
that it does not destroy the net gain pos-
sible through negotiation, its existence
does not keep the marketfi'om achieving
the efficient allocation of resources.
The Coase Theorem is important to
the real estate field because it provides a
frameworkfor the analysis ofproperty
rights. Thefollowing article applies the
theorem to the problem of allocating the
use of air space above a parcel of land
when the owner ofan adjoining parcel
.
values access to direct sunlight. The
central analytical points presented,
as well as much of the diagrammatic ap-
proach, are drawnfrom Ralph Turvey's
article. "On Divergences Benx'een Social
Cost and Private Cost" (ECONOMICA.
1903).
Air rights are property rights that extend
indefinitely upward directly above the
surface of a parcel of land. The use of
the air space above land traditionally has
been considered part of a real estate own-
er's "bundle of rights." Solar rights con-
sist of a land owner's right to receive di-
rect sunlight: the concept of solar rights
is a newer and less well-defined aspect
of property law. Where they exist, solar
rights are created by public limitations
on air rights; one property's access to
sunlight is assured only if adjacent par-
cels' use of air space is limited. These
public limitations typically consist of set-
back requirements and height restrictions
in zoning ordinances.
An interesting question is whether
statutory control in the form of zoning,
which allegedly helps neighboring prop-
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North Joins ORER Advisors
Acting Dean Howard Thomas of the
College of Commerce has appointed
William D. North to the Advisory
Committee of the Office of Real
Estate Research. Mr. North is a Uni-
versity of Illinois and Harvard Law
School graduate with a distinguished
background in the real estate field.
He has held partnerships in major
Chicago law firms, and has in recent
years served the National Associa-
tion of Realtors® as General Counsel
and Executive Vice President. He
recently retired from the latter post.
Mr. North is a past Director of the
U of I Alumni Association and a Life
Member of the U of I Foundation. He
is also a member of Lambda Alpha.
ORER joins the Advisors in welcom-
ing him to the Committee.
Wurtzebach Speaks to Alumni
The Office of Real Estate Research
organized another luncheon for Uni-
versity of Illinois alumni working
in fields relating to real estate. The
event was held on November 1 at the
Chicago Yacht Club. Eugene Stunard
\
once again airanged for the use of the
Club's facilities. Approximately 75
alumni and their guests heard fellow
U of I alumnus and JMB Managing
Director Charles Wurtzebach discuss
"Emerging Trends in Institutional
Real Estate Investment."
The luncheons provide alumni
with the opportunity to see old
friends and cultivate new friends, and
to hear the views of the prominent
individuals who serve as speakers.
ORER organizes a luncheon each
Fall and each Spring. Questions on
registering or on the scheduling of
future luncheons can be directed to
the Office.
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erty owners, provides for an efficient al-
location of resources. A zoning ordinance
creates restrictions that allow affected
parcels to be used only as specified or in
less intensive ways; they cannot be used
more intensively even if neighboring
owners do not object. Yet it should be
obvious that someone who does not like
or need sunlight gains no benefit from a
governmental edict that neighboring own-
ers cannot block the sun's rays. If air and
solar rights were defined unambiguously
and were transferable through private ne-
gotiation, then the market's allocation of
the use of the air space would be efficient
regardress of how the rights were defined
or initially distributed. Private control of
land use, then, would yield an efficient
allocation of limited real estate resources.
Public control of land use in this context,
however, generally is inefficient.
Possible Allocations
The legal standard that traditionally
has prevailed in most jurisdictions is an
extreme one: air rights are absolute and
solar rights are nonexistent. Of course,
people with solar collectors and others
who place high values on sunlight would
favor the opposite extreme: treating solar
rights as absolute, with air rights nonexis-
tent beyond a minimal level. Any distri-
bution of rights between these extremes
could be produced by particular zoning
restrictions or, if negotiation were permit-
ted, by a given set of market conditions.
We define the air rights attendant to
a parcel of land by extending imaginary
lines from the earth's center through the
property's boundaries. The conflict
between air and solar rights is illustrated
in Figure 1 ; the only way to guarantee the
solar rights of a parcel's owner is to limit
the height of any structure built by neigh-
boring owners on adjacent tracts.
The central assumptions in the follow-
ing examples are that rights are transfera-
ble and that transferring them is a costless
activity. It is concluded that the resulting
allocation of the air space is efficient
regardless of the initial distribution of
rights. An implication is that government
should not attempt to control behavior if
the transferring of rights does not entail
substantial costs.
Absolute Air Rights
We can analyze a situation in which |
solar rights do not exist and air rights
are absolute by considering two adjacent
properties, Pn. the parcel located to the
north, is owned by N, who places some
value on access to sunlight. The parcel
that borders Pn to the south is Pg, owned
by S. who values the ability to construct
tall buildings.
Figure 2 depicts the marginal costs
incurred by northern parcel owner N,
labeled MC/v, and the marginal net bene-
fits (benefits minus added construction
costs) gained by southern neighbor S,
labeled MBs, for a range of heights H^ .
of buildings constructed on Ps. As S I
builds progressively taller structures, the 1
net benefit that he receives from each '
additional story becomes progressively
less; therefore, MB^ falls with greater
building height. The slope of MB^
depends on construction costs, which
tend to rise on a per-story basis as height
increases, and on the added income that
S derives from each added story. MBs
illustrates the present value of the added
future net cash flows generated for S by
each additional story of building height
minus the added construction cost; this
quantity is each story's marginal net
present value.
The added discomfort caused for N
becomes progressively greater with add-
ed height Hg; MCn increases. The slope
of MC/v depends on the extent to which
N engages in sunlight-intensive uses;
it is steeper if a swimming pool, solar
collector, or cultivated area is situated
on Pn- Because the only individuals who
potentially can be affected in this exam-
page
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pie are N and S, A/C/v represents the
marginal external costs to society
resulting from the shading of Pn by
additional building height on Ps.
Given the costs and benefits of con-
structing each additional story of build-
ing height on the southern property, S
maximizes his net benefits with a 20-
story building. At this height, the margi-
nal net benefit to S is zero; his marginal
construction cost equals his marginal in-
come (the latter quantities are not shown
on the graph).
Recall that the law is assumed to give
S the right to build to any desired height.
However, if negotiation is possible, and
if there are no transaction costs, then the
two parties will reach an agreement that
calls for a 10-story structure to be built
on Ps. The gain that N would realize in
limiting the Ps building height to 10 sto-
ries is the reduction in N"s cost, the area
under the A/C/v curve between 10 stories
and the 20 stories to which S otherwise
would build. The loss imposed on S by
this negotiated restriction is the area un-
der MBs between 10 and 20 stories. The
area under MC^ in that range of heights
clearly is greater than the corresponding
area under MB^. The amount by which
N"s gain exceeds S's loss is the shaded
triangle in Figure 2. Therefore, owner N
can induce owner S to build no higher
than 10 stories by paying S some portion
of the value represented by the area of the
shaded triangle.
The specific price that N will pay is
shorter buildings, results in a loss to the
loser that exceeds the gain to the winner;
there would be no way to fully compen-
sate the loser from the winner's gains.
The limitation on air rights described
above could be achieved through a solar
easement. Generally speaking, an ease-
ment is the right to use the property of
another for some limited purpose. N"s
solar easement, therefore, would be the
right to receive light from above some
number of stories. If such an agreement
were negotiated, the price paid by N
would compensate S for building only to
the prescribed height; above that height
N's easement rights would prevail. S
could use the air space in the easement
Private control of land use would yield an efficient
allocation of limited real estate resources. Public
control of land use in this context, however, generally
is inefficient.
uncertain; all we know is that it is in the
parties" mutual interest to agree on a
price at which they share the net gain.
Such a price is certain to exist if there are
no transaction costs. No outcome other
than a mutually agreed-upon 10 stories
could provide a more efficient allocation
of the air space over the two parcels.
Moving in either direction, to taller or to
Celebrities and Property Rights: A Material View; T Stands for "Timber!"
While air rights are well defined in the American legal system, rights to unimpeded views or to
picturesque views have not been similarly protected. Typically, these rights are not acquired with
the purchase of land, but may be acquired through a covenant or the purchase of an easement.
Popular singer Madonna was involved in a recent lawsuit over an issue less sexy than those
typically associated with her. but still controversial. A neighboring Malibu property owner had
filed the suit in 1987, before the singer bought the house. He claimed that shrubbery now belong-
ing to Madonna blocked his view of the city below and had caused the value of his formerly $3.5
million home to decline by $1 million. Madonna countersued, accusing him of trespassing and of
verbal abuse. In December 1990. a California Superior Court rendered a decision, citing an exist-
ing covenant which ensures an unobstructed view to all lots in the neighborhood. Madonna was
ordered to trim the hedges and trees surrounding her estate.
Closer to home, one may recall a dispute between Mr. T and his Lake Forest neighbors con-
cerning the actor's landscaping preferences. In 1986, after the town's Building Review Board
stopped Mr. T from installing two large "T"s on his five-car garage and from whitewashing a six
foot stockade fence around his property, it was unable to stop him from removing trees from his
land. While local residents were outraged at the sight of Mr. T and his landscaping crew chain-
sawing several hundred trees, the board found that the only law broken was an unwritten code of
aesthetics, since there was no existing covenant constraining the celebrity's actions. In the end, a
tree-protection ordinance was passed, but it came too late to be of use in saving the trees belong-
ing to Mr. T.
area for purposes that essentially had
no impact on the passage of sunlight to
Pn. A sun deck or thin antenna could be
constructed; a building or sign, however,
could not occupy the easement area.
Absolute Solar Rights
A different situation is presented by a
legal environment that initially entitles
property owners to receive sunlight un-
impeded by obstructions on proximate
sites. In this case, owner S initially
could build a structure no higher than
3 stories, as shown in Figure 3.
If N's solar rights subsequently could
be limited through negotiation to allow
an expansion of the southern building to
10 stories, the gain by owner S would be
equal to the area under the MBs curve
between 3 and 10 stories. The loss by
N would be the smaller area under the
MCn curve between 3 and 10 stories.
The difference between these magni-
tudes, the shaded area in Figure 3, indi-
cates the amount by which society could
gain through an agreement to limit N's
solar rights. In the absence of transac-
tion costs, a price would be set some-
where between the winner's gain and the
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loser's loss, such that society would gain
relative to the case with no negotiation.
It might seem that an easement would
once again be the appropriate device to
limit rights. Imagine an easement specify-
ing that S has the right to cast a shadow
on N"s property during certain times of
the day and the year. The agreement
thereby would provide S with limited air
rights, constraining the solar rights of N
in accordance with their agreement.
In this example, then, as in the first,
10 stories is efficient since any movement
toward taller or shorter height would cost
one party more than the other would gain.
The efficient allocation of the air space is
achieved regardless of the initial distribu-
tion of rights. The difference between
the case in which S has the right to build
higher than 10 stories (so N must offer in-
ducements to S) and that in which N has
the right to restrict height (so S must offer
inducements to N) lies in who gains and
who loses; it is merely a distributional
question. The existence of this distribu-
tional question does not indicate that one
party has been treated unfairly, because
the prices that the two owners initially
had paid for the parcels in question would
reflect the .specific rights received in the
transactions, including solar or air rights.
Therefore, neither party is disadvantaged
by the initial assignment of rights.
Public Sector Constraints
We can extend the lessons of the Coase
Theorem through an example in which air
rights are clearly defined and transferable,
but only within limits specified by local
zoning authorities. If this regulatory
intervention has an impact, the result
will be to introduce inefficiency into
the process of allocating resources.
To be efficient, the zoning rule must
allow transactors in each unique situation
to negotiate to the efficient allocation.
This kind of sensitivity can be attained by
a regulatory body only if the regulation is
designed to be irrelevant, which is to say
that any constraint imposed must be non-
binding. For example, if zoning pennitted
buildings no taller than 12 stories, then
the regulation would not be an impedi-
ment to N and S in reaching their agree-
ment to build to the efficient height of
10 stories. In this situation, as in the first
two, the market would determine the op-
timum building height if private transac-
tors were allowed to operate free of con-
straints imposed by the public sector.
Consider instead the costs that would
be involved if zoning were to constrain
building height below the efficient level.
Market participants seeking efficient out-
comes would attempt to find ways around
the inefficient constraints. For example,
developers often are granted variances,
which allow them to deviate from zoning
restrictions. Acquiring a variance, how-
ever, may involve contributing to politi-
cal campaigns and making significant
payments for professional assistance.
Lawyers must attend zoning meetings
and lobby decision makers, architects
must produce sketches of proposed devel-
opments, and public relations firms must
promote the developments as opportuni-
ties to create jobs and generate municipal
tax revenues. In effect, the cost of acquir-
ing a variance may be likened to a tax j
on the property owner, although the cost |
clearly is not a tax because the public
sector does not get to collect the revenue i
thereby generated. The cost clearly is a \
transaction cost, however, which, if sub-
stantial, prevents the transactors from
attaining the efficient outcome.
Figure 4 illustrates this concept. Sup-
pose that zoning sets limit Hz on build-
ing height. If that limit is 7 stories, then
the allocation will be inefficient relative
to the 10-story outcome illustrated in .
Figures 2 and 3. The incremental cost |
of obtaining a variance is represented
by MCy. each increment is more costly
than the last because it is increasingly
expensive to persuade officials to devi-
ate farther from their usual standards.
These costs decrease S's benefit from
added building height to MB^ , which
equals MB^ - MCy. N still faces a margi-
nal cost curve of A/C/v, and still may ne-
gotiate building height with S within the
limits permitted by zoning or available
through a variance. While S otherwise
would find it attractive to pay for a vari-
ance allowing 13 stories, negotiation be-
tween the two parties ultimately would
yield a variance-constrained optimal
height Hy of 9 stories. Because H\- is
less than the 10-story efficient height,
society would realize the loss represent-
ed by the small shaded area in Figure 4.
This area is the sum of the efficiency
loss from building only 9 stories rather
than 10, plus the transaction costs (in
the form of the legal and administrative
expenses) of obtaining the variance to
build 9 stories instead of only 7. Zoning
thereby is shown to be inefficient. |
This article ignores interesting
distributional questions that arise
with a change in entitlements. For
example, consider the potential for
wealth effects involved in a movement
from air rights to solar rights. Such a
switch of entitlements would grant the
northern property owner greater
wealth, while the southern property
owner would have less. These wealth
effects, in turn, would possibly cause
the MCn to be higher and the MBs to
be lower. Thus, there would be a lower
efficient building height.
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Impact of Regulation on Appraisal Education and Research
Donald R. Epley
Real estate appraisal has long been char-
acterized by a lack of licensing require-
ments or of other regulatory barriers to
entry. Individuals therefore could work
as appraisers without having met even
minimal standards of competence or ethi-
cal behavior. Professional organizations
awarded designations to members who
met specified standards of character and
training, in order to assure the public of
quality and to provide competitive ad-
vantages to those who held the designa-
tions. Most appraisers felt that the educa-
tional programs and policing activities of
groups such as the American Institute of
Real Estate Appraisers and the Society
of Real Estate Appraisers gave adequate
protection to users of appraisal services.
Heightened Public Concerns
When the savings and loan crisis became
fodder for the evening news, however,
reports proHferated that inadequate ap-
praisals had contributed to the problems
of many failed thrifts. Widespread con-
cern over appraisal practices brought
about a response from Congress in the
Financial Institutions Reform. Recovery,
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). One
result of the passage of this 1989 law is
that appraisers soon will have to be certi-
fied or licensed by their states in order to
perform many types of appraisals.
The state laws that have been enacted
to specify requirements for appraiser
licensing and certification have focused
new attention on the educational environ-
ment in the real estate appraisal field. In
this era of regulatory change, what role
should academic institutions play in pro-
viding appraisal education, either at the
pre-certification level or in continuing
professional training? Further, will the
requirements under federal and state
laws influence the quality of appraisal
courses taught by institutions of higher
learning in the future? Will the two lev-
els of laws create positive or negative in-
centives for the real estate appraiser on
the faculty of an academic institution to
conduct meaningful appraisal research?
Two points must be evaluated as we
seek answers to these questions. First is
the age-old issue of whether real estate
appraisal is a profession or a trade. The
second involves incentives for academics
to conduct future research in appraisal.
Profession vs. Trade
An evaluative criterion that has been
applied is the type of vendor that offers
the required education. One can argue
that a required course delivered by an
institution of higher learning prepares the
student for a profession since the course
must meet accreditation standards. Ac-
cording to the accrediting bodies, courses
designed by trade groups for their mem-
bers may not meet the standards imposed
on accredited colleges and universities.
In light of this criterion, should real estate
curricula at institutions of higher learning
teach applied courses in appraisal?
The answer is that we must. A course
in residential property valuation and one
in income capitalization must be offered
in a real estate curriculum for a number
of reasons. Lending institutions, appraisal
firms, governmental agencies, and other
potential employers seek to hire entry
level employees with knowledge of the
appraisal process. In turn, students
demand appraisal courses that impart
practical skill at a level comparable to
that possessed by students of accounting.
Like accountants, real estate appraisers
must have real-world knowledge and
must be able to pass competency exams
that stress practical applications rather
than theoretical underpinnings.
Additionally, many college real estate
programs are underwritten by industry
money. Programs that receive these funds
must walk the fine line between offering
the theoretical coverage requisite to aca-
demic integrity and offering the more ap-
plied emphasis often preferred by tho.se
who hire appraisers.
The Role of Research
The dichotomy between theory and
application tends to be more extreme
when research is the issue. Research is
motivated by the structure of rewards
available to university faculty members.
Reward need not be in monetary terms;
it can relate to other incentives such as
pride of authorship.
The issue is whether real estate aca-
demics will experience sufficient moti-
vation and rewards to produce future
appraisal research. This question can be
addressed through a series of hypotheses
that are, while untested in a scientific
sense, strongly supported by observa-
tions of recent trends.
H] : Major innovations in appraisal con-
cepts during the last 25 years, especially
in the area of income capitalization,
have originated in the academic litera-
ture. The most significant innova-
tion in appraisal since Ellwood has been
the expanded use of discounted cash
flow (DCF) analysis. DCF originated
in the economics discipline and was
borrowed by academics in finance and
accounting and. subsequently, by those
in real estate. Explanations and applica-
tions of the concept have been greatly
enhanced by academic research.
H2: Real estate academics who teach
in PhD-granting academic institutions
receive inadec/uate rewardsfor research
contributions in appraisal. Institu-
tions that grant only BA and MBA de-
grees tend to recognize all types of refer-
eed research, including work published
in the Appraisal Journal. Institutions
that grant doctorates typically view the
Appraisal Journal as "trade" oriented,
however, since the preponderance of re-
viewers are non-academic. Consequent-
ly, tenure and subsequent promotions at
the most prestigious universities may be
difficult for academics specializing in
real estate appraisal to achieve unless
their research is aimed at higher level
publications, such as the Journal ofReal
Estate Research, the AREUEA Journal.
or the Journal of Real Estate Finance
and Economics.
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//j; Professors who teach real estate
appraisal have less credibility among
practicing appraisers if they do not them-
selves hold professional designations.
Educators who have not received the in-
dustry stamp of approval (designations)
may have less credibility with practition-
ers and may experience a more difficult
time in gaining the industry's acceptance
of their research results. Non-designated
academics who focus their research on
theoretical matters of interest to the aca-
demic journals must take care to assure
that they are aware of the concepts and
procedures favored by the industry. A
like situation exists in accounting. The
that full-time appraisal academicians
generally will not be able to hold certifi-
cation in the states in which they teach.
Projected Impact
To the extent that these hypotheses are
correct, there is not much room for opti-
mism regarding the potential for high-
quality academic research to advance the
real estate appraisal field. The academic
appraiser's colleagues do not view ap-
praisal as a discipline worthy of the same
attention as other finance and economics
topics, and rewards may be few from the
most rigorous academic publications.
Therefore, there is little institutional
The task is to provide rewards that create more
motivation so that academics who would like to
specialize in real estate appraisal can conduct
ongoing innovative research.
related hypothesis would be that the PhD
who is also a CPA has more credibility
with practicing accountants than does an
academic colleague who is not a CPA.
H4: The number of real estate educators
with professional appraisal designations
will remain small. The appraisal asso-
ciations' evaluation systems generally
do not accept full-time teaching of, or
research in, appraisal toward fulfilling
practical experience requirements for
designations. The admissions committees
typically adopt very conservative and
protective attitudes that restrict academ-
ics from acquiring industry credentials.
//j.' State certification requirements will
not allow real estate educators to count
teaching or research as experience. The
result is thatfew full-time appraisal aca-
demics will be able to peiform appraisals
in their states. The Appraisal Founda-
tion's guidelines allow states to accept
full-time faculty experience in meeting
the field experience requirement. The
trend among state lawmakers, however,
seems to be the imposition of restrictive
regulations that do not treat academic
work as experience. The result will be
motivation for top researchers to devote
their energies to studying the problems of
real estate appraisal. Further, because the
required state certification will not come
easily to full-time academics, there will
be little opportunity for appraisal profes-
sors to engage in the challenging and fi-
nancially rewarding consulting projects
that once helped to attract bright minds to
the field. An implication is that the path-
breaking research that should be done
by universities with the most substantial
resources will decline in the future.
The current recession and its squeeze
on higher education budgets may cause
difficulties for real estate education as
well. Enrollment in real estate classes
tends to correlate with the state of the
economy; as the real estate job market
continues at a low ebb, real estate course
enrollments certainly will not rise. Fur-
ther, the American Assembly of Colle-
giate Schools of Business (AACSB), as
the top accrediting body for programs of
study in business, does not require an ac-
credited curriculum to include any course
work in real estate. Since everything we
teach therefore is, to an extent, elective,
budget pressure will be intense to justify
everv real estate course offering. Uncer-
tainty regarding the demand for teaching
services will further discourage academ-
ics from pursuing appraisal and other real
estate areas, and the quality of education-
al programs will suffer as a result.
Solutions
The task is to provide rewards that create
more motivation so that academics who
would like to specialize in real estate ap-
praisal can conduct ongoing innovative
research. Several or all of the following
suggestions could be useful in bringing
about such an end:
• The newly created Appraisal Founda-
tion will have a sufficiently large endow-
ment to fund a research agenda involving
qualified academics on a continued basis.
The Foundation should formulate an
agenda and commit the needed money.
• Further, the Appraisal Foundation
should support the role of the academic
appraiser by promoting teaching and
research as important branches of the
appraisal profession. To date, the Foun-
dation has not ruled on educators' role.
• If the appraisal process is inadequate
or is improperly applied, as was alleged
during Congressional testimony on FIR-
REA, then the major users of appraisal
services must prevent a recurrence of
these problems. Federal housing agen-
cies, secondary mortgage market partici-
pants, and the six regulatory agencies
covered under FIRREA should promote
and fund research agendas that address
their individual areas of concern.
• The Appraisal Institute, American
Real Estate Society, and American Real
Estate and Urban Economics Association
should promote the need for required real
estate education with the AACSB.
These opinions axe offered in order to
stimulate discussion that eventually will
lead to meaningful action. B
Dr. Epley holds the Robert W. Warren
Chair in Real Estate at Mississippi State
University. He is a member of the Educa-
tion Committee of the Appraisal Institute,
and has been awarded the Institute's MAI
designation. Professor Epley has written
widely on appraisal in both academic
and iudustiy publications.
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Impact of Regulation on Appraisal Quality
Peter F. Colwell and Joseph W, Trefzger
The Real Estate Appraiser Reform
Amendment to FIRREA, enacted by
Congress in August 1989, specifies that
each state must regulate its practicing ap-
praisers through licensing and certifica-
tion. The law was originally to have tak-
en effect in July of 1991. Administrative
difficulties have delayed implementation
nationally until January 1992. and Illi-
nois and some other states have request-
ed further extensions. In any event, the
imposition of regulation on the long-
unregulated appraisal field is imminent.
the quality of the best appraisals. This
contention is wrong; regulatory standards
will serve to constrain appraisal quality at
the high end. They will do so by limiting
appraisers' legal liability. If an appraiser
has produced an estimate of value that
meets the accepted minimum standard,
as developed by the Appraisal Standards
Board and amended by the state govern-
ment and/or any federal agency involved,
then that practitioner has a very strong
defense against any claim that the apprai-
sal is defective.
Analytical ability will become less important to
success than will the containment of costs to an
officially prescribed, and therefore legally
defensible, level of acceptability
.
To be in compliance with the federal
law, a state's criteria for licensing and
certification must be no less strict than
standards that have been promulgated
by the Appraisal Foundation's Appraisal
Standards Board and Appraiser Qualifi-
cation Board. Because state legislatures
will augment the Appraisal Foundation
standards with any additions that they
wish to make, state statute will govern
the minimum requirements followed by
appraisers in each jurisdiction. In addi-
tion, federal agencies that utilize apprai-
sals are free to augment the Appraisal
Standards Board guidelines with their
own additions. The minimum standards
that apply to a given appraisal assign-
ment therefore may be more stringent
than those dictated by state law alone.
A Change for the Better?
The appraisal establishment long argued
against regulation on the grounds that the
professional associations could more ef-
fectively establish standards and monitor
appraisal quality. Yet some members of
the profession now contend that the new
regulatory approach will raise the quality
of the worst appraisals while not limiting
Therefore, an appraiser will not find
it profitable to do more than to meet the
minimum standard. Appraisers who
follow higher standards of diligence and
thoroughness will be driven from the mar-
ket by those who incur only the costs of
being in regulatory compliance. Analyti-
cal ability will become less important to
success than will the containment of costs
to an officially prescribed, and therefore
legally defensible, level of acceptability.
This result is an application to appraisal
of the phenomenon known to monetary
economists as Gresham's Law: "Bad
money drives out good." The same phe-
nomenon applies to building codes and
subdivision regulations, and has implica-
tions for regulation in such wide-ranging
fields as medicine and architecture.
Those who expect the best appraisers
to thrive in a competitive marketplace by
exceeding the regulatory standards are
likely to be disappointed. If minimum
standards are needed because users of ap-
praisal .services cannot discern unaccepta-
ble quality from acceptable quality, then
it must be conceded that clients cannot
discern definitionally acceptable quality
from truly good quality. gj
New ORER Papers Available
Several additions have been made
to the ORER Working Paper Series.
Papers # 87, "Intermediation as a
Coordinating Mechanism," and #88,
"Market Makers vs. Match-Makers,"
both were written by Abdullah
Yavas. Peter F. Colwell's "Land
Value Effects of Revenue-Neutral
Property Tax Reform" is paper #89.
"The Economic Role of Foreclosure,"
by Charles M. Kahn and Abdullah
Yavas, is paper #90; an abbreviated
version appeared in the Spring 1991
ORER Letter. The last of the recent
working paper entries is "The Micro-
economic Foundations of Locational
Obsolescence," by Peter F. Colwell
and Joseph W. Trefzger.
A single copy of any paper in the
working paper series is provided free
of charge to anyone who submits a
written or telephoned request to the
Office of Real Estate Research.
Articles Reprinted
"Career Stage and Job Performance
of the Real Estate Salesperson," by
James DeConinck and Don Johnson
{ORER Letter, Winter 1991), appears
in October 199rs issue of Texas
Realtor®. Peter Colwell's series of
articles on Vacancy Management
{ORER Letter, Summer 1989 -
Spring 1990) was reprinted in the
May/June 1991 Journal of Property
Management. ORER is pleased that
these prominent industry publications
have chosen to share our articles with
their readers.
Busy Real Estate Faculty
The 1991 Fall semester has been
a busy period for the full-time real
estate faculty members at the U of I.
On November 13 ORER Director
Peter Colwell presented his critique
of a DuPage County property tax
study to the county's Regional Plan-
ning Commission. On November 20
he presented a seminar entitled "A
Potpourri of Real Estate Pedagogy"
to faculty at the University of
Wisconsin at Madison. He was the
(continued on page 13)
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Does Managerial Compensation Affect REIT Characteristics?
Joseph E. Finnerty and Hun Y. Park
The following is an edited version of
ORER Working Paper #80. "Managerial
Compensation and the Characteristics of
Firms: The Case ofREITs." A single
copy of the longer version of this paper,
or ofany paper in the Working Paper
Series, will be provided without charge
to any reader who makes a written or
telephoned request to the Office ofReal
Estate Research.
The potential for an agency problem ex-
ists whenever an agent is paid to perform
a task for a principal. Because the agent
tries to maximize his own wealth, there
is an inherent conflict between the goals
of the agent and the goals of the princi-
pal if the compensation system does not
motivate the agent to maximize the prin-
cipal's wealth as well. An article in an
earlier issue of this publication discussed
agency problems in the context of
managing income-producing real estate
{ORER Letter. Winter 1990). Among
other assets whose management is
subject to agency problems are business
enterprises and investment portfolios.
While agency problems cannot be
prevented in fiduciary relationships, their
impact can be mitigated through properly
structured compensation arrangements.
A number of studies have applied agency
theory in examining the impact of
compensation on the potential conflicts
between owners and managers, and on
the values of the managed assets. Two
interesting issues are whether the well-
documented January Effect is caused by
managerial incentive schemes and how
managerial incentive schemes affect the
characteristics of organizations, such as
corporations or mutual funds, in which
agents manage assets for principals.
Real Estate Investment Trusts, com-
monly known as REITs, are such types
of organizations. Like a mutual fund or
a closed-end stock fund, a REIT is an
investment company (a professionally
managed pool of money supplied by
many investors). REITs are characterized
by their investment focus on diversified
portfolios of real estate equities, mort-
gage loans, or combinations of these,
REITs provide an interesting opportunity
to test the January Effect and organiza-
tional characteristic issues because of
the nature of their performance incentive
arrangements.
Managerial Compensation Schedules
In general, there are two types of perfor-
mance incentive fees: symmetric and
asymmetric. Under the symmetric perfor-
mance fee schedule, the manager receives
January Effect. It seems to apply particu-
larly to the common stocks of smaller
firms; these size-related January Effects
have been well-documented. The Janu-
ary Effect is so profound that it cannot
be rejected at reasonable levels of statis-
tical significance (it is not likely that the
effect could be explained by random oc-
currences alone). Furthermore, the obser-
vation of this effect is not confined to the
United States; it occurs in most of the
industrialized world, even though inves-
tors in foreign countries are likely to be
There exists a significant January effect in Japan even
though there is no tax on capital gains, and even though
the Japanese tax year does not end in December.
a bonus or penalty depending on whether
the portfolio return is higher or lower
than the return on a benchmark portfolio,
such as the Standard & Poor's 500, On
the other hand, under an asymmetric
incentive fee schedule, the manager re-
ceives a bonus if the managed portfolio's
.
return exceeds the benchmark return,
but is not penalized if he underperforms
the benchmark. When other types of
investment companies have incentive
fees, they almost always are symmetric,
but the REIT industry is an exception. Ac-
cording to a survey of the National Asso-
ciation of Real Estate Investment Trusts
(NAREIT), about half of the organiza-
tion's members have performance incen-
tive fee arrangements of various types, all
of which are of the asymmetric variety.
This one-sided incentive fee structure
provides a unique opportunity to investi-
gate agency related issues through REITs.
January Effects
Market observers long have noted a
tendency for investors who hold certain
types of assets to realize abnormally high
measured returns early in the calendar
year. This phenomenon is known as the
less aware of the potential for January
Effects than are American investors
because of the publicity that has accom-
panied the phenomenon in this country.
Nor is the effect confined to common
stocks; a recent study by Colwell and
Park documents that significant January
Effects exist even with respect to real
estate related investments.
What, then, causes this widely-
observed phenomenon that seems to
affect so many types of assets? Some-
thing obviously is causing upward pres-
sure on prices at the beginning of the
year. Even though the predominant hy-
pothesis has focused on tax-loss selling
pressure, tax implications provide only a
partial explanation. For example, there
exists a significant January effect in Ja-
pan even though there is no tax on capi-
tal gains, and even though the Japanese
tax year does not end in December.
An alternative explanation that has
been suggested, but has not previously
been tested, relates to gamesmanship on
the part of professional portfolio manag-
ers. This approach, commonly called the
window dressing hypothesis, is attribut-
ed to incentive compensation paid to
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portfolio managers. If compensation is
based on the portfolio's calendar year
performance as computed at the end of
the year, then there may well be a hunt
at the beginning of the year for bargains
among smaller and riskier assets per-
ceived to be undervalued. This activity
can be viewed as a type of game to in-
crease expected compensation. Because
the game begins for all managers almost
at the same time, buying pressure in the
first few days of January has the potential
to drive market prices upward. Later in
the year, if the strategy has been success-
ful, the manager will be able to move into
larger and safer assets in order to lock in
portfolio returns.
REIT Characteristics
Another issue is the impact that mana-
gerial incentives have on organizations'
characteristics. Do managers who are
compensated, in part, through perfor-
mance incentive fees build different types
of organizations than do managers who
do not receive incentive compensation?
As noted above, the performance in-
centive scheme characteristic of REITs is
unique in that it is asymmetric, involving
bonuses but not penalties, whereas that
of other types of investment funds is
symmetric. An asymmetric system can be
viewed as providing the manager with a
call option. The value of a call option is a
function of five variables: the underlying
An asymmetric compensation system, involving
bonuses but not penalties, can be viewed as providing
the manager with a call option.
We have tested the window dressing
hypothesis by classifying REITs as those
that offer specific performance incentive
fee (PIP) schedules and those that do not.
as reported in the NAREIT survey. Data
on the returns earned by these REITs have
been obtained from the daily file of the
Center for Research on Security Prices
(CRSP) tapes for the 1980-1988 period.
We have measured the risk-adjusted
excess return on each REIT in a capital
asset pricing model framework.
The excess returns in January are sub-
stantially higher than those in any other
month for both groups of REITs. The
average January excess return for REITs
offering performance incentive fees is
3.34%; that for the REITs without incen-
tive fees is 2.61%. However, while this
difference in returns appears to be consid-
erable, it is not statistically significant.
In fact, not only in January, but in every
month, the difference between the two
groups' returns lacks statistical signifi-
cance. Therefore, the window dressing
hypothesis, which attempts to explain
the January Effect as a function of mana-
gerial reaction to performance incentive
schemes, is statistically rejected.
asset value, the riskiness of the underly-
ing asset, the exercise price at which the
asset can be purchased with the option,
the risk-free interest rate, and the expira-
tion date on the option. If we assume that
managers possess superior information,
then we must deem it likely that they
will attempt to use that information to
maximize the values of their call options,
thereby maximizing their own well-being
rather than the wealth of equity owners.
This conflict between the interests of the
manager and those of the owner induces
suboptimal managerial action; for exam-
ple, managers may be inclined to increase
the riskiness of assets held, because the
value of a call option increases with the
volatility of the underlying asset.
We have analyzed accounting data on
the REITs whose quarterly financial state-
ments are included in the COMPUSTAT
data base. After screening the raw data
for missing values, we constructed a
working data set consisting of the 34
REITs for which there were at least five
years worth of COMPUSTAT observations
over the 1980-1988 period. We have
found that several factors explain 85.3%
of the total variation in the data. Among
the identified factors are the size of the
investment portfolio: the rate of growth
in portfolio size: the level of dividends
paid; the use of leverage (borrowed
funds); the amount of debt that is con-
vertible into equity: the liquidity of the
assets held in the portfolio; and the
degree to which returns on the portfolio
assets relate to returns on the broader
market, a measure known as "beta."
We also have found that the REITs
that have PIFs are larger; pay greater
dividends: and have higher leverage,
greater liquidity, more convertible debt,
higher levels of growth, and higher betas
than tho.se that do not. Using only these
factors, we have attempted to predict
whether or not a given REIT is character-
ized by a performance incentive fee. Of
the 34 REITs in the sample, we correctly
classified 1 7 of the 1 9 that have perfor-
mance-based compensation and 14 of
the 16 that do not. In other words, know-
ing only a few characteristics, we could
identify with a high degree of accuracy
which REITs offered incentives to their
managers. Thus. REIT characteristics
systematically vary depending on the
existence of performance incentive fees.
Conclusion
Two agency related issues have been
addressed. The first is whether the Janu-
ary Effect is caused by the gamesman-
ship of portfolio managers reacting to
perfonnance incentives. We have found,
based on REIT data, that significant Jan-
uary Effects exist regardless of whether
there are incentive fees. REITs offering
their managers PIFs have greater abnor-
mal returns than do REITs without PIFs,
but the difference in the average returns
is not statistically significant. The win-
dow dressing hypothesis for the January
Effect therefore is not supported.
The second issue is whether or not
PIFs lead to different organizational
characteristics. Performance incentive
fees are found to have a significant
impact on the REITs' characteristics.
Dr. Fiuiierty is a Professor ofFinance,
and Dr. Park is an Associate Professor
ofFinance, both at the University of
Illinois at Urhana-Champaign.
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Michael Lea Discusses Failed Thrifts^ Failed Policies
Michael J. Lea is a financial consultant
in San Diego. He served on the Cornell
Universityfaculty after completing a
PhD at the University ofNorth Carolina
in 1978. Lea later was the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation' s Chief
Economist. In 1987 he joined other
FHLMC officials in assuming leadership
of Imperial Savings in San Diego. Lea
served as the institution's Treasurer and
Senior Vice Presidentfor Finance &
Capital Markets. When Imperial was tak-
en over by the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion in 1990 he remained to assist ETC
in liquidating the institution' s assets.
Lea currently is working with fellow
economist Douglas Diamond on an
analysis ofEuropean housing finance for
the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion. In the following interview. ORER
LETTER discusses with Lea the downfall
of Imperial Savings and the state of the
housing finance industry.
How did the former Senior Vice Presi-
dent of one of the largestfailed S&Ls
end up working for RTC? The RTC
felt that my background with Imperial
would help in dealing with problems
faced by the agency. My working
relationship with our regulators in San
Francisco had always been good: I think
they viewed Imperial's management as
having been forthright with them. I also
think they recognized that Imperial had
significant talent that could help in sell-
ing assets and in running the organiza-
tion until it could be sold.
Before problems had set in. Imperial
was a highly visible institution, one of
the ten largest thrifts in the nation, and
it enjoyed a reputation as an innovator.
Like many other S&Ls it was bankrupted
by the interest rate environment of the
early 1980s, and it tried to grow out of
negative earnings and capital positions
with high-yield investments. Imperial
actually did fairly well in this endeavor,
except in two areas. One was the junk
bond market, which was devastated by
both the closing of Drexel and the trou-
bled economy. The second was automo-
bile loans purchased from other financial
institutions, for which the promised credit
enhancement turned out to be inadequate.
In retrospect. Imperial was too thinly cap-
italized given its risky assets, although it
was in compliance with all regulatory re-
quirements until the passage of FIRREA.
The RTC took control of Imperial in
February 1990, after the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) rejected our capital
plan. We felt that we had been taking the
proper steps. Our focus had been on
downsizing; we sold $2 billion in assets
during -the last six months of 1989.
Did the RTC's action come as a surprise?
No; Imperial and the regulators were well
aware of the market value of the institu-
tion. In fact, two years prior to the issu-
ance of Bulletin TBI 3 we were meeting
the requirements that the OTS imposes
today. Imperial did a full mark-to-market
under different interest rate scenarios and
provided the results to OTS: they regu-
larly received our quarterly figures and
therefore knew the market values of the
institution's assets. Our capital plans took
into account expected losses, including
our forecast that more than half of our
auto loan portfolio would default. We
showed that despite those expected losses
there was reasonable expectation that
over five years we would meet the capital
standards and show positive earnings.
But OTS felt it was too risky to allow Im-
perial to remain under private ownership.
An important issue is whether the
values determined by a mark-to-market
process should be used by regulators in
deciding whether an institution should
be closed; in Imperial's case, there likely
were both overstatement and understate-
ment problems. For example, marked-to-
market values of thinly traded assets that
we held might have overstated prices that
could have been received in real transac-
tions, particularly if huge portfolios were
to be liquidated instantaneously. On the
other hand, relying on marked-to-market
asset values ignores the intrinsic fran-
chise value of a going concern.
Did FIRREA cause Imperial's demise?
In many respects, yes. FIRREA changed
the rules of the game, forcing the sudden
liquidation of risky assets in thin mar-
kets. In addition, thrifts were expected to
raise additional capital at the same time
that their earnings potential was reduced, |
an impossible task even in good markets.
The issue is the degree to which thrifts
are empowered to pursue profitable strat-
egies. The rules obviously have changed
under FIRREA. The 1989 law was de-
signed to do two things: first, to provide
the mechanism and funding for cleaning
up the thrift mess and getting rid of in-
solvent institutions: second, to strengthen
the surviving institutions so that a similar
crisis could not occur again. Based on
what has happened to date, I feel that
FIRREA did a poor job on both counts.
In some respects it has been a step back-
wards, because it largely restricts thrifts
to lending in a mortgage market charac-
terized by excess capacity and low profit
expectations.
And also characterized by a duration
matching problem. That is definitely
true historically, and the problem is not
necessarily eliminated with adjustable
rate loans, as many people have learned.
The future of the industry is in jeopardy
,
if institutions cannot attract investors
^
so they can strengthen their capital posi-
tions and compete as viable financial
intermediaries. Thrifts have to compete
against banks, but a bank can do every-
thing a thrift can do and much more.
Historically, thrifts received special tax
benefits, and they had relative advantag-
es over banks on the liability side of the
balance sheet. Now the tax advantages
are gone and, relative to banks, thrifts
face asset disadvantages and have no
liability advantages. Therefore, a thrift
charter has no value.
As a consequence, no one is willing
to put new capital into marginal thrifts.
One reason is the questionable value of
a charter. A second reason is uncertainty
with regard to what the regulations will
be. The notion that legislators and
regulators can change the rules might
be called "sovereign risk;" the attendant
danger applies to banks and thrifts alike.
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If a sudden and massive change in the
rules can wipe out your investment, then
you will require a much larger risk pre-
mium. An extreme case occurred when
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) permitted capital maintenance
plans in order to get new capital into the
industry, but then a year later the new
OTS refused to honor the plans that had
been negotiated and refused to return the
money of those who had put up the new
capital.
So when you talk about sovereign risk
you're really talking about 5th and 14th
Amendment issues, the taking ofproperty
wiihout compensation or due process.
Yes, directly in some cases and indirect-
ly in others. A change in the rules can
significantly affect the expected income
stream from an investment. FIRREA crip-
pled the thrift industry in many ways.
One is that weak institutions can't get
the capital necessary to survive, so a vast
number of thrifts will be taken over by
the RTC; 600 already have been taken
over, and another 300 are slated to go.
That number represents about a third
of the institutions in the industry, with
in excess of $700 billion in assets.
That $700 billion is supposed to re-
flect market values that will accrue to the
government. Of course, that point brings
us back to the question of true liquida-
tion values versus ongoing intrinsic
values. If they try to cram $700 billion
in assets down the gullet of the capital
markets all at once, they'll be lucky to
get $400 billion. It's a supply and de-
mand phenomenon. There is a large sup-
ply of assets of some types, such as com-
mercial and multi-family loans, but there
is little demand for these assets, partially
because surviving financial institutions
are also trying to sell assets of this nature
or will not provide funding for third par-
ty purchasers. Many institutions. Imperi-
al among them, have large portfolios of
performing loans for sale, but the market
has all but disappeared.
Did the Tax Reform Act of 1986 have an
impact? Tax refomi had an exacerbat-
ing effect. It reduced returns and encour-
aged equity investors to divest their hold-
ings. The timing was not right; tax reform
came at a time when the market was
characterized by overbuilding, which in
turn was spurred by an excess supply of
insured savings deposits.
I believe that a major cause of the thrift
problem was the large increase in insured
deposit limits that took place at the same
time that the technology to broker money
across the country was developed. Bro-
kered deposits are not themselves a cause
of the thrift problem, but they are a symp-
tom of what went wrong. Through depos-
it brokering, huge sums of money were
funneled into truly marginal development
projects. Even in the best of times a lot of
the real estate loans and direct real estate
gave RTC an impossible job to do. and
then created impediments for them to
contend with in attempting to do that
job. Examples of those impediments
include restrictions that the RTC not dis-
turb distressed markets and that it hold
back certain types of assets for afforda-
ble housing groups. These laudable
objectives are inconsistent with the
goal of speedy resolutions.
So the problem is not that there were
terrible management mistakes? There
have been management mistakes, but
these may have followed from RTC's
conception and the impediments we just
discussed. The agency has picked up its
Thrifts face asset disadvantages and have no
liability advantages. Therefore, a thrift charter
has no value.
investments made by depository institu-
tions offer marginal expected returns.
Add a recession and a glut of properties
on the market, and marginal projects
become huge losers.
What kind ofjob is the RTC doing in sell-
ing the assets of the institutions it has tak-
en over? The agency had a very slow
pace of institution sales in the first nine
months of its existence, and while the
pace has since accelerated, the results
are not what had been expected. Many
of the problems result from the way
the organization was created. Congress
had such a poor relationship with, and so
little trust in, the FHLBB that it decided to
shut the agency down. It then created a
whole new bureaucracy, most of which is
staffed by the FDIC, to take over the Bank
Board's duties and run the failed thrift
institutions. So for political reasons
we created one of the world's largest
financial institutions overnight: it is not
surprising that this institution has been
fraught with problems.
We are talking about an institution
that controls more than $200 billion in
assets and 400 sites nationwide. Congress
pace in resolutions. From its inception
through July of this year, RTC resolved
467 of the 633 institutions it had taken
over. However, in order to complete
these resolutions, it has had to retain
most of the problem assets; through July
of 1991 only 47% of the assets of failed
institutions had been sold, transferred, or
repaid. And the majority of asset reduc-
tions have involved securities, so RTC
has been left with a huge portfolio of
loans, real estate, and other assets.
Two of the major problems that the
RTC has faced in marketing assets are
largely beyond the agency's control.
First, the recession and the credit crunch
have greatly reduced the demand for any
assets other than government-guaranteed
securities. Second, FIRREA reduced the
demand for thrifts by emasculating the
thrift charter; nobody wants to buy a
whole institution (the assets and liabili-
ties), so the only reason anyone is inter-
ested in a thrift is for its deposits, branch
network, and customer base.
What is salable? Other than securities,
the most attractive assets are the branch
systems and mortgage loan servicing
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operations. Unfortunately, the values of
these assets depreciate rapidly after an
RTC takeover. For example, it took more
than one year for the RTC to sell Imperi-
al's branch network and servicing portfo-
lio. During this time, the association's de-
posit and loan balances declined, and the
market for these assets became saturated.
Great American, also based in San Diego,
sold its California branch network to
Wells Fargo at the beginning of 1990 for
a premium in excess of 5%. A year later
the RTC sold Imperial's branch network
for a premium of less than 1%.
In the context of recent S&L sales, a
"premium" means a discount in terms of
the liabilities assumed. A buyer that takes
mortgage loans, received in the transac-
tion; the buyer in effect purchases the
loans. Because the deposits often carry
above-market rates, buyers demand cash
to pay off customers who will withdraw
funds as soon as rates are lowered to mar-
ket levels. In addition, buyers demand,
and RTC provides, "putback" provisions
for all loans purchased. If the buyer can-
not sell the assets for a price greater than
the RTC's selling price within a given
period of time (usually 180 days), then
the buyer can put the assets back to RTC.
What is the alternative? The RTC must
recognize that it is in the long-term asset
management business, and it must pursue
It is a wash from the standpoint of the federal balance
sheet if insured deposits are paid off with new T-Bills;
government-guaranteed debt is not increased. But tax
money is saved to the extent of the interest rate differential.
on retail deposits in excess of the value
of assets received must be compensated
for agreeing to repay those excess liabili-
ties. In the simplest case the RTC would
give the buyer cash in an amount equal
to those net liabilities. But if the buyer
valued gaining access to the failed insti-
tution's customer base, then it might pay
a 2% premium; it would receive $98 mil-
lion for agreeing to repay $100 million
more to depositors than it receives in
cash or assets. The $2 million difference
is a premium paid by the buyer for access
to that customer network.
Because thrift asset values have been
battered, however, RTC has found it very
difficult to get buyers to take anything
other than deposits. So about half of
the resolutions to date have been either
"liquidations." in which depositors are
directly repaid, or "insured deposit trans-
fers," in which deposits are transferred to
other depository institutions, along with
cash. The rest of the resolutions have
been "purchase and assumption" transac-
tions. These are the cases in which the
amount of cash received by the buyer
in return for assuming the liabilities is
reduced by the value of assets, typically
the goal of maximizing long-term values.
The first step that it should take is to find
the cheapest funding for the assets it
holds. Doing so typically will involve
substituting Treasury borrowing for high
rate deposit liabilities. If government
owns the assets, then government has
to finance those assets. It is a wash from
the standpoint of the federal balance
sheet if insured deposits are paid off with
new T-Bills; the supply of government-
guaranteed debt is not increased. But
taxpayer money is saved to the extent
of the interest rate differential.
Yet RTC is not doing that, because of
another constraint on its activities. Con-
gress didn't want to fully recognize the
cost of the S&L crisis, so FIRREA initially
provided only $50 billion for RTC's reso-
lution efforts, and Congress has not been
particularly forthcoming with additional
funds. The government's own estimates
placed the total cost of resolution at $100
billion, $250 billion taking into account
expected interest payments over time.
The result of the underfunding has been
delay in selling institutions and in paying
off high rate debt. So the government's
cost of carrying assets is higher than it
should be, and the time it takes to sell
institutions and/or assets is longer than
it should be. As a result, the franchise
values of acquired institutions are dimin-
ished. The premium that buyers would
pay for deposits and mortgage loan ser-
vicing erodes the longer RTC holds them.
Does this strategy represent speculation
aboutfuture asset values? No; it re-
flects the reality of what is salable in to-
day's economic and credit environment.
But there are other ways of dealing with
the assets. For example, RTC can try to ^
sell whole institutions, the way FSLIC
did, rather than just selling deposits. The
FSLIC deals had some real merit to them;
they facilitated the transfer of entire asset
portfolios back to the private sector, with
the use of incentives such as yield main-
tenance for the purchasers.
Under yield maintenance arrangements
the regulator agrees to provide a spread
over the buyer's cost of funds to compen-
sate for negative earnings on the least
attractive elements of the portfolio. The
amount of incentive can vary deal by
deal, but in every case the amount of
yield maintenance is reduced over time.
This reduction provides the buyer with
incentives to manage the less attractive
assets properly so they eventually can be
resold. Selling whole institutions can be a
better value for the taxpayer than selling
assets piece by piece.
You favor private sector management.
Why can't the public sector do the job?
The issue is one of incentives. We want
the assets in the hands of people who are
motivated to manage them rationally.
Managers of thrift assets should have in-
centives to maintain the properties and to
get the best value for the taxpayers upon
sale. These goals cannot easily be accom-
plished in the public sector, which does
not provide proper incentives.
Let's say that the taxpayers own a
property. Should more money be invest-
ed? Should it be sold today or a year
from now? The correct answer will vary
based on the asset or the market. A pub-
lic sector manager might be motivated
by the agency's budget constraint or by a
desire to minimize his own potential for
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headaches. The private sector provides
proper incentives for individuals who
make such decisions. The owners of pri-
vate organizations can share upside gains
with managers through performance
bonuses. The lack of incentives doesn't
mean that public sector managers won't
make correct decisions; they may do so
for altruistic reasons, for example. But as
economists, we know that the incentives
are not right.
With regard to securities, the RTC has
done a reasonably good job; the majority
of assets sold recently have been securi-
ties. They're easy to value and relatively
easy to auction off. Once a system was
in place to handle securities sales, they
Congress that itself was to blame for
creating the mess but wanted to point the
finger at somebody else. RTC was set up
in an environment in which regulators
were lambasted before Congress for their
actions, so it's difficult for RTC people to
make decisions, or even to delegate deci-
sion making.
For most types of assets RTC requires
four layers of review before a sale can
be consummated. For example. Imperial
wanted to sell a Boeing 747 that it leased
to a major airline. We had to first get the
transaction approved in the RTC's sub-
regional office in Costa Mesa, then in the
regional office in Denver, and then in the
national office in Washington. We also
There should be a universal banking charter, a national
intermediaries charter, which would give thrifts the same
basic powers, capital requirements, and regulators as
those that apply to banks.
were able to bypass a lot of the impedi-
ments of a tiered decision making struc-
ture. When it comes to non-security
sales, however, RTC has been schizo-
phrenic. The attitude throughout the
organization is to sell at any price, yet
it is afraid to sell because Congress
second-guesses RTC's decisions.
Doesn't "selling at any price" conflict
with RTC's mandate not to interfere with
markets? It does. As I've stated, how-
ever, on one hand RTC has a mission,
while on the other hand it faces some
constraints that make it impossible to ac-
complish that mission. The most severe
constraint is to avoid interfering with the
markets. But the private sector knows
what assets are out there, so I don't think
the magnitude of asset sales causes sig-
nificant uncertainty in the market. The
uncertainty is caused by RTC's manage-
ment of those assets. In a Journal of Fi-
nance article last summer Ed Kane sug-
gested that this constraint was a delaying
tactic that allowed Congress to escape
blame while placing the onus on RTC.
The RTC continually is being second
guessed. It was created by a vindictive
had to have the transaction and docu-
ments reviewed both through RTC and
through an outside law firm. That process
took about six weeks, and in the mean-
time the deal fell through; Imperial still
owns the aircraft. We had a good offer,
but we couldn't deliver because of the
inefficient decision making structure.
Since each decision is second guessed,
all decision making funnels up to the top
level in Washington. As a consequence,
delay is legendary within the RTC. There
is no mechanism or incentive for local
managers to make decisions or take
responsibility. They get no rewards for
doing so, and they don't want to be con-
stantly overruled. So it's easier to defer to
the next guy up the ladder. Congress set
a precedent for dealing with regulators it
didn't like in its treatment of Bank Board
officials. People on Capitol Hill left little
doubt that they would scrutinize every
action the RTC takes.
How can we get ourfinancial intermedi-
aries on the road back to health ? I
have four major suggestions. First, there
should be a universal banking charter,
a national intermediaries charter, which
(continuedfrom page 7)
featured speaker at November meet-
ings of two Central Illinois profes-
sional organizations, addressing the
Champaign-Urbana Apartment Own-
ers' Association on "Private Sector
Alternatives to Building Codes" and
the Appraisal Institute's Central Illi-
nois chapter on "Privatizing Assess-
ment, Zoning, and Eminent Domain."
On December 4 Colwell was
intei-viewed by William Simpson of
the Far South Suburban NAACP on
the cable television program Black
Conversations. The interview's focus
was Colwell's economic analysis of
racial issues relating to housing, as
discussed in the Summer 1991 ORER
Letter. He also has been appointed
to serve as a Director of the Homer
Hoyt Advanced Studies Institute; he
has for many years been a Fellow of
the Institute and a member of the fa-
culty of its Weimer School. Colwell's
action-packed Fall was the storm
before the calm. During the coming
1992 Spring semester, he will take a
sabbatical from his duties with both
the Finance Department and ORER.
Roger Cannaday has been named
Director of Graduate Studies for the
U of I Department of Finance. He
continues as national president for
Rho Epsilon and as faculty advisor
for the University of Illinois chapter.
Cannaday also will serve as Acting
Director of ORER during the 1992
Spring period. His article, "The
Effect of Listing Price on Cash
Equivalence," written with Colwell
and U of I graduate Mark Sunderman
(now on faculty at the University of
Wyoming), will appear in a forth-
coming Appraisal .Journal issue.
Laura Quigg presented her paper
"Empirical Testing of Real Option
Pricing Models" to a November 21
meeting of University of Illinois
finance faculty and graduate students.
She will also present this paper at the
January meetings of the American
Real Estate and Urban Economics
Association, and will be a discussant
on two other papers that are to be
presented at the meetings.
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would give thrifts the same powers, capi-
tal requirements, and regulators as those
that apply to banks. This action would
strengthen the thrifts' position by elimi-
nating the need for the thrift charter. We
would find it easier to attract investors
to marginal thrifts, and might expand the
set of purchasers for failed institutions.
Second, we should seriously consider
alternative disposition strategies for
failed institutions and their assets. One
strategy that deserves a close look is the
"good bank, bad bank" concept, which
was used successfully by Mellon Bank.
The idea is that a problem institution's
deposits, branch facilities, and earning
assets are sold prior to a regulatory take-
resolution process on budget. The notion
that we can somehow keep the process
off budget and hide it from the deficit is
ludicrous; it costs taxpayers real money.
Consider how another country has han-
dled this situation. Hungary has its own
S&L crisis, different in form but similar
in structure to ours. One large savings
bank has been the country's primary
mortgage lender. Like US home lenders,
it loaned on a mismatched basis; when
deregulation was instituted in the late
1980s the fixed rate mortgage (FRM) rate
averaged 3% while the cost of funds had
risen to 20%. According to World Bank
housing finance specialist Bob Buckley,
the drain on Hungary's economy has
Favors were sold to the elderly through the deregulation
of interest rates on deposits in the '70s, and by the
expansion of the deposit insurance system in the '80s.
over in order to eliminate delays that
erode the franchise value. The premium
generated by the sale of the good bank
provides capital for the bad bank. The
managers of the bad bank therefore have
upside potential; their goal becomes
proper management in order to maximize
liquidation values.
My third suggestion is that we try to
learn from the 1988 FSLIC deals. Those
resolutions were far from perfect; there
were tax benefit giveaways and some
clear cases of undervaluation in light of
the risks retained by the taxpayers. Those
losses are sunk costs; we can't worry
about them now. But the notion of selling
whole institutions rather than pieces has
a lot of merit. If we can use creative
approaches, such as yield maintenance
combined with risk-sharing, then healthy
institutions will be interested in manag-
ing problem institutions' assets, not just
in taking over their deposits. I am confi-
dent that we would find properly struc-
tured sales of whole institutions to be
more cost effective than selling pieces.
Finally, we have to accelerate the re-
placing of high cost liabilities with Treas-
ury borrowing, and to place the entire
been about 3% of gross domestic product.
The government has put the associated
losses on its own balance sheet and borne
the cost until inflation can be reduced.
The Hungarian government has admitted
that the low FRM rates benefited borrow-
ers and that the country now must raise
taxes or cut services in order to pay for
those benefits. This approach has generat-
ed much discussion about who really
should pay, since it's clear who the bene-
ficiaries were. Yet while the Hungarian
government has explicitly recognized the
cost, our Congress has never explicitly
recognized that the US has a serious
problem and that the taxpayer is going
to have to pay.
I'm visualizing how your recommenda-
tions would play in the media. Entrepren-
eurs who took over thrifts would take a
lot of heat: they'd he called "vultures,"
and all of their actions would he second-
guessed. It seems that the way to correct
the problems is to force a puhlic admis-
sion of where the fault really lies. It has
become popular to blame Keating and a
few other visible evil-doers, hut there is
little chance ofserious thrift reform until
the puhlic realizes the culpability of Con-
gress. The industiy is beset with structu-
ral problems: the federal government
was the S&Ls' creator and long-term
protector, hut these institutions eventual-
ly were thrown to the wolves by Con-
gress. I agree with your statements, but
I think it's highly unlikely that Congress
will admit blame. Furthermore, the US
case is more complex than Hungary's,
because the benefits have been more
diffuse. There are people with low rate
FRMs issued in the 1970s, savers who re-
ceived high rates due to excessive growth
in depository activity in the 1980s, and
the developers who built shopping cen-
ters that stand empty in Arizona. Certain-
ly a few evil-doers may have benefited.
Benefits have been distributed widely,
however, while the focal point for bear-
ing the cost will have to be the taxpayer.
But explaining the S&L crisis to the
taxpayer is difficult, and the issue is
complicated by the nature of our political
system. Congress dispenses favors the
benefits of which are highly specific, but
the costs of which are paid by tax dollars.
Favors go to those who make campaign
contributions, or to those who at least
show support at the polls. Favors were
sold to the elderly through the deregula-
tion of interest rates on deposits in the
'70s, and by the expansion of the deposit
insurance system in the '80s. These
actions also curried the favor of home
buyers by expanding mortgage credit at
below-market rates, and curried the favor
of generous campaign donors in the real
estate and S&L communities.
The recent Keating Five hearings
showed that the problem is more perva-
sive than the S&L issue. It is interesting
that Senator Cranston defended himself
by raising the broader question of how
our political system runs. The costs
associated with frequent reelection cam-
paigns force the people who make our
most important policy decisions to solicit '
huge contributions; a scenario like that
sets the stage for problems like the S&L J
mess. Some form of public campaign '
financing might be needed to remove the
incentives for elected officials to be so
mercenary. I'll leave it to the political
scientists to tackle that issue.
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Students Enjoy Rho Epsilon, New "Real Estate Issues" Course
The 1991 Fall semester presented real
estate students at the U of 1 with abundant
opportunities to interact with the profes-
sional community and to hear diverse
views on the current state of the real
estate environment.
Rho Epsilon again sponsored several
speakers and a field trip. In addition, the
Department of Finance offered a new
course. Real Estate Issues, designed to
bring the insights of prominent real estate
practitioners into the classroom. The
course was taught and coordinated by
University of Illinois alumnus Donald
Rundblom, a real estate entrepreneur
whose professional background includes
positions with major Chicago lending
institutions and Wall Street investment
banks. Rundblom arranged for speakers
from throughout the country to visit the
campus and speak on their areas of exper-
tise in connection with the class coverage
of particular topics. Each of these visits
was jointly sponsored by Rho Epsilon.
The first event of the semester was
the September 1 1 visit by University
of Illinois alumnus Terry Hendrickson,
from Commonwealth Title Insurance in
Chicago. He spoke on "Problems in the
Title Insurance Industry."
The next event was held on September
16. Rundblom himself assumed the role
of guest lecturer to present his views on
"Private Sector Development Issues."
On September 17 an informational
meeting was held for current and prospec-
tive Rho Epsilon members. Those in at-
tendance had the opportunity to talk with
the chapter officers and meet the members
of the real estate faculty.
Bruce Knight of the Champaign City
Planning Department was the visiting
speaker on September 23. His topic was
"Public Sector Development Issues."
Two representatives of Prudential
Realty Group visited campus on Sept-
ember 30. Peter Ruggiero and U of 1
alumnus Kevin Maxwell discussed
"Mortgage Lending and Equity Sales
in Today's Environment."
"The State of the Life Insurance
Industry: Real Estate's Role" was the
topic of the October 2 presentation by
Gary Riggs of Allstate Insurance.
Professor Roger Cannaday, who serves
as national Rho Epsilon president and
U of I chapter advisor, accompanied 16
students on an October 4 field trip to
Chicago. The group attended Lambda
Alpha International's forum on interna-
tional real estate issues. Program partici-
pants included Illinois alumni Howard
Builta, Eugene Stunard (who organized
the event), and Charles Wurtzebach.
Illinois alumnus Alex Ruggieri of
Resource Realtors® discussed "Commer-
cial Real Estate Brokerage and Invest-
ment" during his October 15 visit.
Tom Marvinack of the Resolution
Trust Corporation provided insights on
"Real Estate and the RTC" on October 1 6.
The October 2 1 speaker was Andrew
Berman of Standard & Poor's New York
City offices. He discussed "The Rating
Agencies and Real Estate."
Dan Smith of rating agency Duff &
Phelps addressed the students on October
28. The topic was "Securitization and the
Secondary Market."
Illinois graduate Jeff Davis of
Cambridge Realty Capital, Ltd. was
the October 29 speaker. He discussed
"Investment Banking and Real Estate."
Lehman Brothers representative Bob
Liebig was the guest lecturer on October
30. He spoke on "Wall Street's Role in
Real Estate."
A busy Ward McDonald shared his
expertise on "Environmental Issues: A
Legal Perspective" on November 6. The
U of I alumnus and Champaign attorney
also teaches the real estate law course
offered by the Department of Finance.
Minnesota environmental scientist
Edward Krug, who is also affiliated
with the Committee for a Constructive
Tomorrow, presented "Environmental
Issues: A Scientific Perspective" on
November 1 1
.
Another graduate of the University
of Illinois visited to speak on November
18. Sheldon Good of Sheldon Good &
Company, who pioneered the use of
auctions in non-agricultural real estate
sales, discussed "Real Estate Auctions."
Peter Hess, yet another alumnus of the
U of I, visited the campus on November
25. The Chicago attorney, a partner with
Baker & MacKenzie, spoke on "Current
Real Estate-Related Legal Issues."
Still another University of Illinois
alumnus, Richard Ennis of Ennis, Knupp
& Associates, was the December 2
speaker. His topic was "Pension Funds
and Real Estate."
A Rho Epsilon business meeting was
held on December 5. Officers for the
1992 Spring semester were elected, and
a pizza party followed.
On December 6 Paul Gillespie of
the Joseph J. Blake Company visited
campus. The U of 1 alumnus spoke on
the subject of "Real Estate Appraisal."
The final event of the semester was
held on December 9. Again assuming
the role of guest speaker, Don Rundblom
shared his views on "Foreign Investment
in US Real Estate."
Those who served as Fall 1991 Rho
Epsilon officers are: Jeffrey Mitchell,
Senior in LAS Economics from Alton,
President; E. Michael Hoadley, Junior
in CBA Finance from Elgin, Vice Presi-
dent; Michael Fine, Senior in LAS
Finance from Park Forest, Treasurer;
and Russell Long, Senior in CBA
Finance from Oregon, Secretary.
Mitchell and Hoadley will continue
next semester in their respective roles
as President and Vice President. Other
Spring 1992 officers are: Sharon
Masterson, Senior in CBA Finance from
Westchester, Treasurer; and Marvin
Sledge, Junior in CBA Finance from
Chicago, Secretary. |
The Office ofReal Estate Research makes
every effort to assure the accuracy of all
statements in ORER LETTER articles prepared
by ORER staff members. However, the reader
should note that legal and regulatory matters,
which are occasionally addressed in ORER
LETTER articles, are subject to change and
to vaiying interpretations. ORER LETTER
articles do not purport to provide legal or
investment advice, and the Office ofReal
Estate Research shall not be held responsible
for damages resultingfrom omissions or
inaccuracies in the ORER LETTER or other
ORER publications.
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Thought for the Day
How Many Days Are in a Year?
Philip J. Rushing
The answer is not as simple as it would
seem. The typical reply is 365. though if
we like to be more technical we can note
that every fourth year is a "leap year"
with 366 days, so that on average each
year has 365.25 days. A boiTower
calculating a mortgage payment might
well respond "Who cares?" since the
number of days in a year should be
irrelevant to the computation. A banker
trying to maximize revenue, however,
might answer "360 and 365."
I came upon this issue recently while
applying for a commercial real estate
loan. A mortgage payment is the product
of the original loan principal times a
mortgage constant (K), defined as
K =
(1 +/)«-! (1)
where / is the periodic (usually monthly)
interest rate and n is the total number of
periods (usually months).
Generally accepted business practice
determines a monthly interest rate by
dividing the nominal annual rate by 12
(the implicit assumption is that a year,
regardless of how many days it contains,
is 12 months long). Thus, if the annual
rate is 10% and the tenn is 20 years,
then / in the above equation is .10/12,
or .00833333, and since there are 240
months in 20 years, /; is 240. Substitu-
ting these / and n values into equation
Office of Real Estate Research
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
304-D David Kinlev Hall
1407 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, Illinois " 61801
( 1) yields a mortgage constant of
.00965022. On a $1,000,000 loan, the
monthly payment would be
$1,000,000 X .00965022 = $9,650.22,
I was puzzled to find that the bank's
computed payment on my recent loan
was significantly greater than the pay-
ment I had calculated with the technique
described above. I can allow for a bit
of rounding error, but the difference in
question clearly exceeded the acceptable
limits. On inquiry, I was told that my
calculator and I were assuming 365 days
in a year, while the bank computes a
daily interest rate based on 360. That
response left me even more puzzled,
since it should not matter how many days
we assume are in a year; indeed, equation
( 1 ) incorporates no assumption regarding
the number of days in a year.
For example, assume a 260-day "year."
We can multiply the daily interest rate
of .10/260 = .00038462 by the 260/12 =
21.66 days in each month to compute a
.00833333 monthly rate. It should come
as no surprise that this "monthly" rate
equals the rate computed when we made
no assumption regarding the number of
days in a year. If payments are computed
on a monthly basis, then it does not
matter how many days we assume are in
a year as long as we treat consistently the
numbers of days in a month and months
in the year.
1
'J
i
Consistency is the key. Consider he
the loan payment would be computed
under what 1 am told is "standard banl
ing practice." First, assume 360 days i #
a year. The daily interest rate is thus
.10/360 = .00027778. To get a monthlij
rate, however, assume a 365-day year.
"
The result is .00027778 multiplied by
the 365/12 = 30.4167 days in a month,
for a total of .00844914, which exceed
.00833333. Substituting this / value int
equation (1) yields a mortgage constan
of .00974247 and a resulting payment
that is higher by $92.25 per month than
that which was previously computed:
.00974247 x $1,000,000 = $9,742.47.
The present value of this increase in
monthly payments is $9,559.37! Of
course, the annual percentage rate is
no longer 10%; it has been increased
surreptitiously to 10.138968%.
An informal survey indicates that
some, but not all, lenders use the "360
and 365" procedure. At least one major
!
accounting firm suggests that its S&L
clients use this approach as a "revenue
enhancement procedure." Since truth in
lending laws do not apply to commercial
real estate loans, caveat miitiiatitr (let the
borrower beware). g
Dr. Rushing is an Adjunct Professor of
Finance at the University ofIllinois and
an active real estate investor.
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lisk Reduction Through Home Ownership
^eter F. Colivell
t is often asserted that home ownership
)rovides social benefits. Proponents of
)wning rather than renting suggest that
:ommunities with higher percentages
)f owner occupied homes have better
ichools and public services, and that they
ixhibit the elusive "pride of ownership."
But how does ownership affect the
ndividual home owner? An intuitive
esponse is that although ownership
provides possible income tax benefits, it
ixposes the owner to price risk, because
he owner is "'locked in" to the property.
s this intuitive response correct? Is it
jnwise for a family to own its dwelling?
Economics is a discipline that provides
inswers to some questions that cannot be
tddressed through intuition. Economics
herefore is not always a science of com-
non sense; we sometimes must accept
he conclusions of economic analysis,
:ven if those conclusions seem peculiar,
f we accept the underlying assumptions,
rhe risk reducing aspect of home owner-
ship represents a case in which careful
inalysis produces counterintuitive con-
:lusions. The correct, although surpris-
ng, answer to the above questions is that
Dwnership reduces price risk; an increase
jr decrease in the price of housing leaves
:he home owner better off than he or she
ivas before the change. As the paragraphs
;hat follow demonstrate, owning a home
s actually good for you.
The Budget Constraint
Each household has unlimited desires for
goods and services; who among us does
not wish for more of the things that we
like to own and consume? This statement
does not suggest that people are selfish
or irresponsible; one of the "goods" that
a family "consumes" might be its support
of charities. At the same time, income is
limited. A household maximizes its well-
being (in economics terminology, its
"utility") by purchasing the bundle of
goods and services that it most prefers
from among those mixes of housing and
other goods that it can afford to buy with
its limited income. (It is possible for us to
approach the problem through an analysis
in which only one good other than hous-
ing is considered; this method permits the
two dimensional graphical presentation
shown on pages 4 and 5.)
The household's well-being must be
maximized subject to a budget constraint:
expenses must exactly equal income.
The family can spend no more than it
earns. Our analysis covers the period of
time (perhaps a few months) over which
the household plans its major consump-
tion outlays. The period begins immedi-
ately after the individual has purchased a
house. The entire income earned during
the period is assumed to be spent during
the period on housing and other goods in
the consumption bundle.
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Final ORER LETTER Issue?
The Office of Real Estate Research is
facing a funding crisis that threatens
the organization's most important
ongoing programs. In its effort to
deal with the state's fiscal situation
Springfield has redirected into the
state's general revenues considerable
sums from accounts that fund ORER
activities. Following a taking of $1
million from the Real Estate Recov-
ery Fund (on which ORER receives
interest) last August, the state redi-
rected $140,000 from the Real Estate
Research and Education Fund (which
holds ORER's accumulated balance)
on February 1 . The impact felt by
ORER is equivalent to what a house-
hold would feel if it lost 40% of its
income and 70% of its savings at a
time when interest rates were low.
Major changes in personnel poli-
cies must be instituted. Peter Colwell
has resigned, as of August, as ORER
Director to return to full time teach-
ing in the Department of Finance
since ORER no longer can provide
Director salary support. The post
doctoral research associate position
will not be filled when Abdullah
Yavas departs in August. Graduate
student support will be cut substan-
tially, no research grants will be
awarded, and the ORER Letter may
have to cease production. Readers
may have noted that this issue is
printed on less expensive paper;
every cost reduction helps. Still,
typesetting, printing, and mailing
costs remain substantial, and over
the longer term it appears that ORER
will lack the personnel to produce a
viable publication. Under current
financial realities a likely scenario
would be cutting back to semiannual
issues or terminating publication of
the ORER Letter altogether.
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Obvious Case: Rising Prices
What if, at the beginning of the period,
home prices change? It is intuitively
appealing that a home owner is better
off if, after the house purchase has been
completed, there is a relative increase in
home prices. In other words, it may seem
obvious that the owner benefits if home
prices in the market area rise relative to
the average prices of other goods in the
bundle consumed by the household.
Yet the reason why the owner is better
off may not be clear to those who rely
on intuition alone. Consider the fact that
the owner can sell the house at a profit
relative to the purchase price, but that
a replacement home within the market
area will be accordingly more expensive.
A more refined intuitive answer might
be that the owner gains because he can
sell the house, move to an area where
home prices are lower, and buy an essen-
tially identical replacement house for a
lower price. But this response is also in-
correct; a similar home would sell for a
lower price only if the new community
offered a less attractive physical environ-
ment or a less diversified economic base
(see "Housing Affordability: Some
Thoughts from a Couple of Skeptics,"
ORER Letter, Spring 1991).
The true reason why an increase in the
price of housing leaves the home owner
better off is that a new mix of housing
and other consumption goods becomes
affordable. The owner has the chance to
sell the house at the increased market
price, buy a reduced quantity of replace-
ment housing, and spend the difference
on other goods: an increase in a good's
price relative to the prices of other items
may cause us to prefer to consume less
of the more expensive good and consume
more of other goods. (The concept of
"more" or "less" housing should not be
measured in terms of size alone. In this
discussion, and in the graphical analysis
that follows, "more" housing should be
seen as an increase in housing services:
an improvement in size, location, quality,
or other features.)
The analysis in the preceding para-
graph assumes that transaction costs are
low enough not to affect the home own-
er's decision. What if there is an increase
in the price of housing, but transaction
costs (brokerage and other costs relating
to the transaction itself, rather than to the
price of the commodity) are too high to
allow the owner to change to a consump-
tion mix that provides greater satisfac-
tion? Then the owner maximizes well-
being by remaining in his or her present
house. In other words, "staying put," and]
thereby consuming unchanged amounts
of housing and other goods, is always
one of the consumption choices availa-
ble to a home owner; an increase in the
price of housing cannot move the home
owner to a lower level of satisfaction
even if transaction costs are high. It
should be intuitively clear that a change
in relative prices causes a new consump-
tion bundle to become more attractive
than the original mix, but that high trans-
action costs could prevent the more at-
tractive mix from being affordable. The
right to "stay put" is a form of residual;
it accrues to someone with an ownership
interest, but not to a renter.
Not-So-Obvious Case: Falling Prices
Perhaps it is not intuitively appealing
that an owner becomes better off if the
relative price of a home decreases. Yet
the owner benefits because, once again,
the mix of affordable consumption bun-
dles expands. The owner has the oppor-
tunity to sell the house owned at the
beginning of the period, replace it with
a greater quantity of housing, and spend
relatively less on other goods. A reduc-
tion in a good's price relative to prices
of other goods may cause us to prefer to
buy more of the cheaper good and less
of other available commodities.
But what if a decline in the price of
housing is accompanied by such high
transaction costs that the owner cannot
justify realigning consumption to include
more housing and reduced quantities
of other goods? As in the case of a hous-
ing price increase, the owner is free to
remain in the current house, and thereby
to consume unchanged amounts of hous-
ing and other goods.
Conclusions and Caveats
The paragraphs above demonstrate that
a price increase or decrease can benefit
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a home owner: ownership therefore
provides protection from price risk. An
owner is not necessarily better off than
a renter, but rather is better off than he
would have been as an owner if prices
had not changed. Ownership therefore
can be viewed as a form of hedging.
Renting, on the other hand, is a form
of speculation. A renter benefits only
if prices fall and housing becomes less
costly; a price increase benefits landlords
at tenants' expense.
Of course, an owner would be even
better off if he could correctly foresee an
impending decline in home prices and
could wait to buy until after the price fell.
The analysis above also ignores portfolio
impacts. A home owner with a business
tied to the price of housing (a builder or
broker, for example) could suffer such
severe income loss from a decline in the
local property market that no different
consumption bundle could duplicate the
prior level of well-being. H
But Let's Not Overdo It
Joseph W. Trefzger
Ownership is good for the owner and,
many would argue, for the community.
But is ownership so desirable for society
that some people should pay for others'
homes? Imagine two households with
similar incomes. At the beginning of last
summer neither owned its dwelling unit,
and each had $5,000 in savings. House-
hold A used the money as a down pay-
ment on a "starter" house. Household B,
with a much lower preference for own-
ing a home, took a $5,000 European
vacation. The story has a happy ending
for Household B; federal officials may
give our world travelers back their
$5,000 if they will use the money to
buy a home. Household A does not get
$5,000 if it takes an expensive trip.
This unequal treatment is just one
problem with the President's proposal,
as outlined in the State of the Union ad-
dress and elaborated in House Bill 4150,
to give income tax credits to "first-time
home buyers." It is true, of course, that
many federal programs benefit certain
segments of the population: some estate
tax provisions help the rich, food stamps
assist the poor. Consider, though, that
today's rich could be among tomorrow's
poor, while a poor person might be one
sweepstakes entry away from wealth.
A current home owner, however, cannot
become a first-time buyer.
One's eligibility for the benefits rests,
in effect, on fortuitous timing. Indeed,
under the plan someone who bought a
house on January 3 1 , 1992 would get no
benefit, while someone buying one day
later would receive tax credits of up to
$5,000 (maximum of $2,500 per year for
two years, with carryforward provisions).
Furthermore, much of the benefit surely
would accrue to people who would have
bought houses anyway. The plan would
be open only from February through
December of 1992; some of those who
would benefit likely were in the midst
of the buying process when the plan was
proposed, while many other families
would be unable to arrange their finances
to get the benefits in such a brief period.
And those too young or otherwise unable
to buy in 1992 would receive no benefit,
but would help to pay for other people's
houses through higher future taxes.
A better alternative would be an
expanded application of the penalty-free
LRA withdrawal concept (also promoted
by the President, but, again, only for first-
time buyers). If the housing sector needs
to have its pump primed, then all citizens
should have the chance to participate.
TTie law could permanently allow penal-
ty-free withdrawals from IRAs and other
tax favored retu-ement plans if the money
were applied toward home equity. This
provision would permit first-time buyers
to begin building equity, while letting
owners repay mortgage debt (or make
larger down payments on new homes)
with pre-tax dollars. The housing sector
would receive its boost, the results would
be much more equitable, there would be
no violation of the IRA philosophy of safe
long-term investment, and the supply
of loanable funds would be essentially
unchanged (since withdrawals would in
many cases be offset by loan repayments
to the same group of institutions).
RNews
Share Your Views
ORER Letter readers in Illinois might
wish to inform their legislative repre-
sentatives and Governor James Edgar
that ORER is an organization worthy
of the state's continued support.
Readers outside the state might wish
to inform the Governor that ORER
performs valuable service in real es-
tate education and presents the state
in a positive way to a nationwide
audience. The Office of the Governor
is located at 207 Capitol Building.
Springfield, IL 62706.
Readers' Support Encouraged
The financial crisis offers a unique
opportunity for ORER's constituents
to have a profound impact on the or-
ganization's programs. A contribution
to the Office of Real Estate Research
can be for unrestricted use or directed
to a specific activity. A directed con-
tribution could support the ORER Let-
ter, research assistantships for gradu-
ate students, summer research grants
for faculty, post-doctoral research
fellowships, course development,
or equipment and software enhance-
ment. Because ORER is part of the
University, contributions generally
are tax-deductible. Readers who
would like to discuss ORER needs in
more detail are encouraged to call the
office. Checks can be made payable
to University of Illinois Foundation-
ORER, and sent to the address shown
with editorial information on page 2.
Alumni Luncheon Scheduled
Another luncheon has been scheduled
for U of I alumni working in fields re-
lating to real estate. The event will be
held on Friday, April 24 at the Chica-
go Yacht Club. Thanks go, as always,
to Gene Stunard for arranging for
the use of the Yacht Club's facilities.
The speakers will be Richard Hanson,
Vice Chairman, and Mike Szkatulski,
Executive Vice President, of Stein
& Company. They will discuss "The
McCormick Place Expansion." The
cost is $25 per attendee, and there is
an additional charge for parking. A
registration form appears on page 15.
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Risk Reduction Through Home Ownership:A Graphical Presentation
The discussion presented in the preceding
pages explains, in general terms, why home
ownersliip reduces price risli. Tlie following
discussion, along with the accompanying
graphs, provides a more technical explana-
tion of the risk reduction benefit that accrues
to a home owner. The analysis is derived, in
part, from pages 59-63 ofDavid Friedman's
PRICE THEORY (2nd Edition, 1990, South-
western Publishing Company).
Budget
As noted in the preceding discussion, if
there were no limit on spending, then a
consumer would buy unlimited amounts
of all goods. With limited income, how-
ever, the consumer can buy only those
bundles that do not violate the budget
constraint: consumption cannot exceed
income. The consumption bundles avail-
able in the marketplace are shown in Fig-
ure 1. The vertical axis shows the quanti-
ty of housing available, and the horizon-
tal axis shows the available amount of a
commodity composed of all other goods
(hereafter, the "other good").
The figure also shows a diagonal line
that represents the budget constraint of a
particular consumer (whom we designate
Ms. O. a home owner). Ms. O can buy
only those combinations of housing and
the other good that appear in the graph at
points on or below her budget constraint.
Consumption bundle a, for example, is
too costly for Ms. O to purchase. She
could purchase bundle b or bundle d,
but each of these bundles leaves some
income unspent. She can also attain bun-
dle c, which lies on her budget line and
therefore has a cost equal to income.
The amount of the other good that Ms.
O could buy if nothing were spent on
housing is shown at the extreme end of
the budget line along the horizontal axis.
If the price of a standard unit of the other
good is assumed to be 1 , and if Ms. 0"s
income is /, then she can buy, at most,
/ units of the other good, as shown in
Figure 1 where the budget constraint
intersects the horizontal axis. The other
end of the budget constraint is the maxi-
mum quantity of housing affordable if
nothing else is purchased. To compute
this amount, we divide income by the
Figure 1
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quantity of other good = :
amount spent on housing. We designate
Pj as the initial unit housing payment
(including interest on debt and the oppor-
tunity cost of equity) and h as the amount
of housing bought. Therefore, /Jj/? is
the total housing expenditure per period,
so Ms. O can buy at most I/p^ housing,
shown in Figure 1 where the budget inter-
sects the vertical axis. The budget con-
straint connects these two extreme points.
If z represents the quantity of the other
good purchased, then the equation that
describes the budget constraint (income •
equals expenses) is
In this equation, the amount of housing
or of the other good can vary from zero
to a level representing 100% of income
(the remainder is spent on the alternate
choice). We can determine the amount of
housing that should be purchased for any
given level of income and any given level
of the other good purchased:
h =
I
~P\
1
P\
The slope of the budget constraint line,
then, is
-\lp\.
Preferences
Figure 2 shows the same axes and budget
constraint as Figure 1. It also shows two
indifference curves. An indifference
Figure 2
curve represents all combinations of two
consumption goods that leave a given
consumer equally well off.
If Ms. O receives diminishing margi-
nal satisfaction from each good, then as
she possesses more of a particular good
each additional unit provides less added
satisfaction. For example, throughout all
possible ranges Ms. O will trade housing
for the other good, but as she possesses
progressively less of the other good she
must receive progressively more hous-
ing to induce her to agree to trade con-
stant increments of the other good. An
indifference curve for two goods there-
fore has a convex shape (it is curved as
shown in Figure 2).
Another important characteristic of
indifference curves is that consumption
bundles represented by higher indiffer-
ence curves are preferred to bundles rep-
resented by lower indifference curves,
since more of each good is preferred to
less. For example, it is clear that Ms. O
prefers consumption bundle /in Figure 2
to bundle e, because/contains more of
both goods than does e. She is indiffer-
ent between bundles/and g\ these bun-
dles are on the same indifference curve,
so although they contain differing levels
of the two goods they provide Ms. O
with equal satisfaction. Therefore,
bundle g is preferred to bundle e even
though bundle g has less housing;
its greater quantity of the other good
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more than offsets the difference. (Since
bundle /clearly is preferred to bundle e
while bundles/and g provide equal satis-
faction, ^ must be preferred to e.)
Choice
Ms. O chooses a consumption bundle
that maximizes her satisfaction within the
constraints imposed by her income. In
terms of the geometry of Figure 2, she
tries to reach the highest possible indif-
ference curve, which is the curve tangent
to (touches only at one point) the budget
constraint. So Ms. 0"s preferred choice
is shown in Figure 2 as the bundle con-
taining //] of housing and rj units of
the other good. The horizontal distance
between -j and / in Figure 2 represents
the period's housing cost (p\h^) to Ms. O
for that preferred bundle. (A total of / is
spent, of which rj is the expenditure on
the composite commodity.)
Increased Housing Price
An increase in the housing price leaves
Ms. O better off. If the unit price of hous-
ing rises from pj to pj after Ms. O has
purchased /?j of housing, then the new
budget constraint must go through the
consumption bundle previously chosen,
as shown in Figure 3, because Ms. O can
continue to consume /j] and rj. The hori-
zontal intercept of the new budget con-
straint is Ms. O's previous expenditure
on the other good, rj, plus the added
money available if Ms. O sells the appre-
ciated house and spends the proceeds on
Figure 3
Figure 4
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the other good.
The important point is that the new
budget constraint intersects the old one at
the initial choice point, so the new budget
constraint must intersect the initial indif-
ference curve. It follows that there must
be an indifference curve that is tangent
to the new budget line yet is higher than
the initial indifference curve. This result
is shown in Figure 3. The new choice is
{zj. h2). representing less housing and
more consumption of the other good.
So given the new budget realities, Ms. O
sells her house and buys a reduced quan-
tity of housing. It is significant that she
maximizes her satisfaction by doing so.
Decreased Housing Price
Though the result may seem counterintui-
tive, a decrease in the price of housing
also leaves Ms. O better off. If the price
falls from/7] top3, then, again, the new
budget constraint must intersect the bun-
dle originally chosen, as shown in Figure
4. because Ms. O can continue to con-
sume /(j and T]. The horizontal intercept
of the new budget constraint is rj plus the
money available if Ms. O sells a depre-
ciated house and spends the proceeds on
the other good. Again, the new budget
line intersects the old budget at (zj, /?j),
so the new budget constraint must inter-
sect the initial indifference curve, and the
curve tangent to the new budget must be
higher than the initial indifference curve.
The new choice is (z-^, Z^), representing
more housing and less of the other good;
Ms. O is better off if she sells her initial
house and buys an increased quantity of
replacement housing.
Rental Risk
A renter realizes a significant gain in
well-being if the price of housing falls,
but suffers a considerable loss in well-
being if the housing price increases. We
can expand Friedman's analysis with a
graphical presentation of how a renter is
affected by changes in the housing price.
Figure 5 shows the case of a renter, Mr.
R, who, like owner Ms. O, initially con-
sumes /!j of housing and zj of the other
good. If the price of housing falls, then
Mr. R is better off; the lower housing
price appears geometrically as a higher
vertical intercept for the budget con-
straint, and Mr. R consumes (r*, /;*).
Yet Mr. R faces the risk that the price
of housing will rise, and that his highest
attainable indifference curve will corre-
spond to (-', h'). Mr. R lacks the residual
rights that accrue to ownership: as prices
change he cannot choose to continue
consuming the original bundle. |
Figure 5
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Lessons from Long Ago and FarAway
People sometimes wonder how earlier socie-
ties would havefared if they had possessed
our technology. Did ourforebears wonder if
future generations would possess their wis-
dom? The following brief articles describe
some land ownership and taxation practices
followed in ancient Israel and in medieval
Islamic culture. Our ancestors have provided
us with some interesting lessons.
Land Ownership in Ancient Israel
Wayne T. Pitard
Ancient Israelite law, which dates in
written form from the first millennium
BC, treated the ownership of land as a
privilege that was to be accompanied by
a strong social responsibility. This rela-
tionship was based largely on ancient
Israel's dualistic understanding about
who owned the land. In the legal materi-
al found in the Hebrew Bible/Old Testa-
ment, it is always assumed that all the
land of Israel ultimately belongs to God.
At the same time, however, it is under-
stood that God granted the land to the
people of Israel, with earthly ownership
to be divided among the various Israelite
clans and families.
This dual ownership had a very signif-
icant impact on the way that the land
(particularly farm land, since Israel was
largely an agricultural society) could be
used. The owner did not have absolute
rights to all that the land produced. Since
God was viewed as the ultimate owner
of the land, those who came particularly
under his care— the landless poor,
the widows and orphans— were to be
allowed part of the produce of the land.
For example, any passer-by was permit-
ted to enter a field and eat his or her fill
without being molested, although the
visitor was not allowed to carry any pro-
duce out of the field. More significantly,
during harvest time the owner was not
to strip all of the crop from his land, but
instead was expected to leave a portion
to be gathered and used by the poor.
In addition, a tax of one tenth of the
produce grown was also imposed on
each land owner. (Produce, in this con-
text, refers both to crops grown and to
livestock raised on land.) This tax was
divided among the temple and its person-
nel; the king and his court; and the poor,
who were, by law, to receive the income
of one tithe in every three. The land
owner was to distribute the tithe for the
poor directly to the poor in the local set-
tlement; assistance to the poor was not
funneled through the bureaucracy of the
temple or the royal court.
A second element of land law in
ancient Israel relates to the notion of pri-
vate ownership. There was a very strong
feeling that property should not be sold
outside the clan whose member owned it.
The Land Tax Under Islamic Law
Michelle A. Mahue
The notion of a tax on land is not a
product of contemporary society. To
the contrary, a land tax, or kharaj, was
added under early Islamic law, along
with a trade tax, to the welfare and head
taxes mandated in the Koran. In "Fiscal
Policy in Early Islam" {Public Finance,
1989), Ahmad Oran and Salim Rashid
explain that the land tax, originally
implemented shortly after the death of
Mohammed, was more than a revenue
generator. The tax was designed to
The writings of -prophets such as Isaiah strongly
condemn those who purchased land from other
clans during times of economic hardship and
thereby created enormous estates for themselves.
Laws were developed to help prevent
land owned by a member of one clan
from falling into the hands of a different
clan. If an owner were forced to sell
his or her land, it was considered the
responsibility of the nearest relative to
purchase it, if at all possible. (A woman
could become the owner of land through
inheritance if there were no male heirs,
but any woman who owned land could
marry only within her own tribe.) Only
if no one in the clan were able to buy it
could the owner sell land to an outsider.
The attempt to keep the land in the
hands of families did not always succeed.
The writings of prophets such as Isaiah
strongly condemn those who purchased
land from other clans during times of
economic hardship and thereby created
enormous estates for themselves.
The strong emphasis on social equity
and the maintenance of family property,
while not always successfully practiced
in ancient Israel, was a major theme of
the legal tradition of this culture that has
so strongly influenced our civilization. H
Dr. Pitard is Associate Professor of
Biblical Studies in the Program for
the Study ofReligion at the U of I.
further the public good and promote
equity among wealth classes. It is
interesting that the tax originally was
applied only to non-Muslims, though it
later was extended to Muslims as well.
The kharaj was based on three
primary criteria: the quality of the land,
the type of crops cultivated, and the
type of irrigation used. The irrigation
criterion allowed for land irrigated by
rain to be distinguished from land
irrigated through channels or with the
aid of mechanical equipment. The
assessment based on these three criteria
was applied variously to an owner's total
land area or cultivated land area, or was
in some cases related to crop yields. The
kharaj could be paid either in money
or in commodities. However, if money
were used to satisfy the tax bill, then a
fourth criterion, proximity to markets,
also was to be considered. Oran and
Rashid comment that these criteria
reflect a concern for the equitable
distribution of the tax, based on an
individual farmer's transportation and
production costs.
Thus, the kharaj would seem to have
approximated an ad valorem tax. Yet the
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kharaj also bore some resemblance to a
use tax, in that it allowed for gradations
for various types of crops. Growers of
wheat and barley, which were the crops
most heavily consumed in Islamic
society, were taxed at rates of four and
two dirhans for every jareeh (the area
needed to grow 100 palm trees, slightly
less than an acre), respectively, while
sugar beets were taxed much more
heavily. These different tax rates might
reflect land quality, but also may have
provided incentives for land owners
to grow barley or wheat instead of beets.
The kharaj also was somewhat like an
improvements tax, since the assessment
could relate to the profit per unit that the
owner was able to extract from the land.
In contrast to land taxes applied in
non-Islamic countries in the Middle East
at that time, the kharaj allowed for
flexibility in the manner of payment.
There were regional differences, and the
method of collection typically was left to
the discretion of the assessor, A portion
of each parcel was exempt from the tax,
and further reductions in assessments
were common (and were not based
solely on ability to pay). Taxes were
forgiven in cases of hardship, and full
exemptions also could be granted in
the event of property damage that was
beyond the owner's control, such as
damage caused by erosion or flooding.
In instances such as these, it was the
state's responsibility to repair damage
to the land, if possible.
Combined with the tax incentives to
farm certain crops, the generous allow-
ances provided to land owners under
Islamic law demonstrate that revenue
collection was not necessarily the only
objective of the kharaj. Rather, the tax
would seem to have been designed to
stimulate land owners to behave in the
interest of society through encouraging
certain types of output. |
Ms. Mahiie. a pension analystfor the
State of Illinois, wrote this article while
serving as an ORER Research Assistant
and completing an MBA at the University
ofIllinois. ORER thanks Dr. Salim
Rashid of the U ofI Department of
Economicsfor helpful comments.
Low and High Tax Revenues
Ibn Khaldun
It should be shown that at the beginning
of a dynasty, taxation yields a large reve-
nue from small assessments. At the end
of the dynasty, taxation yields a small
revenue from large assessments.
The reason for this is that when the
dynasty follows the ways of Islam, it im-
poses only such taxes as are stipulated by
the religious law, such as charity taxes,
the land tax, and the poll tax. These have
fixed limits that cannot be exceeded.
...When tax assessments and imposts
upon the subjects are low, the latter
have the energy and desire to do things.
Cultural enterprises grow and increase,
because the low taxes bring satisfaction.
When cultural enterprises grow, the num-
ber of individual imposts and assess-
ments mounts. In consequence, the tax
revenue, which is the sum total of (the
individual assessments), increases.
When the dynasty continues in power
and their rulers follow each other in suc-
cession, they become sophisticated. The
Bedouin attitude and simplicity lose their
significance, and the Bedouin qualities of
moderation and restraint disappear. Royal
authority with its tyranny and sedentary
culture that stimulates sophistication,
make their appearance. The people of the
dynasty then acquire qualities of charac-
ter related to cleverness. Their customs
and needs become more varied because
of the prosperity and luxury in which
they are immersed. As a result, the indi-
vidual imposts and assessments upon the
subjects, agricultural labourers, farmers,
and all the other taxpayers, increase.
Every individual impost and assessment
is greatly increased, in order to obtain a
higher tax revenue. Customs duties are
placed upon articles of commerce and
(levied) at the city gates. Then, gradual
increases in the amount of the assess-
ments succeed each other regularly, in
correspondence with the gradual increase
in the luxury customs and many needs of
the dynasty and the spending required in
connection with them. Eventually, the
taxes will weigh heavily upon the sub-
jects and overburden them. Heavy taxes
become an obligation and tradition, be-
cause the increases took place gradually.
and no one knows specifically who in-
creased them or levied them. They lie
upon the subjects like an obligation and
tradition.
The assessments increase beyond the
limits of equity. The result is that the
interest of the subjects in cultural enter-
prises disappears, since when they com-
pare expenditures and taxes with their
income and gain and see the little profit
they make, they lose all hope. Therefore,
many of them refrain from all cultural
activity. The result is that the total
tax revenue goes down, as individual
assessments go down. Often, when the
decrease is noticed, the amounts of
individual imposts are increased. This is
considered a means of compensating for
the decrease. Finally, individual imposts
and assessments reach their limit. It
would be of no avail to increase them
further. The costs of all cultural enter-
prise are now too high, the taxes are
too heavy, and the profits anticipated
fail to materialize. Finally, civilization is
destroyed, because the incentive for cul-
tural activity is gone. It is the dynasty
that suffers from the situation, because
it profits from cultural activity.
If one understands this, he will realize
that the strongest incentive for cultural
activity is to lower as much as possible
the amounts of individual imposts levied
upon persons capable of undertaking
cultural enterprises. In this manner,
such persons will be psychologically
disposed to undertake them, because
they can be confident of making a profit
from them. H
The above passage isfrom THE MUQAD-
DIMAH: AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTO-
RY, written in 1377 by the Islamic philoso-
pher and historian Ibn Khaldun {who bases
his discussion of taxes on the earlier works of
Abu YusufYa'kub). The three-volume work
was translated in 1958 by Franz Rosenthal,
and this translation was abridged in 1967 by
N.J. Dawood. The text above is takenfrom
pages 230 and 231 of the abridged version
(Princeton University Press, copyright 1981
:
reprinted with permission). The material is
from the second volume of the original work.
ORER LETTER thanks Abdullah Yavasfor
bringing the book to our attention.
Winter 1992 ORER Letter page 7
Viewpoint
Experts' Views on Real Estate Issues
In the Fall 1991 semester, the U of I
Department ofFinance added REAL
ESTATE ISSUES to its list of real estate
course offerings. This new class intro-
duces students to issues that shape the
real estate environment, and to people
who deal with these issues. Instructor
Don Rundblom drew on his many years
ofprofessional experience in assembling
a blue-chip roster of visiting speakers
representing various fields of expertise.
E.xcerptsfrom comments of those who
agreed to he quoted appear below.
Terry Hendrickson, Commonwealth
Title, on "Problems in the Title Insu-
rance Industry." Title insurance was
conceived about 1 15 years ago when
lawyers and abstractors saw that title
searches could not solve all problems
relating to title. Since property records
are maintained on a local basis, title insu-
rance began on a local level. Then 25 to
30 years ago some regional firms merged
and began operating nationally, often
by acquiring local firms. Title insurance
grew dramatically in recent years with
the advent of the secondary mortgage
market. A mortgage security would be
impossible to sell if the first lien on each
underlying loan were not insured.
Title insurance differs in many ways
from life or property coverage. It insures
against past events rather than future
events, and the insurer collects a single
premium rather than a series of premi-
ums; that single premium protects the
insured party for as long as his interest
remains. Claims are most likely to occur
in years 2-7 of a policy's life, but prob-
lems may arise after 20 years or even
longer. Title insurers are small relative to
life and casualty companies. The largest
title insurer's net worth is $130 million,
and the net worth of the whole industry
is just over $1 billion. Every day title
companies insure risks totalling several
times their net worth. A title insurer gen-
erally won't risk more than 50% of its
surplus on a given deal: firms reinsure
larger risks and pay claims pro rata.
Twenty years ago title insurers typi-
cally paid only 3^% of their revenues
in claims; relative to other insurers that
"loss ratio" was very low. The payout has
risen with the recent litigation explosion,
but is still lower than other insurers expe-
rience. One reason for the industry's high
operating cost structure is the significant
investment that title insurers must make
in maintaining title records, or "plants."
Another is the commission structure for
title insurance agents. They search and
examine records and write the policies,
in return for which they retain 50% or
more of the premiums. Misuse of funds
on the part of agents is also a significant
source of loss in the industry.
Title premiums vary considerably
across state lines. A $100 million deal
in Texas or New York would require a
$250,000 premium, because both of these
states have rate regulation; companies
cannot compete on price. In California
the premium payment would be closer to
$125,000, and in Illinois it would be only
$50,000. Premium differences also reflect
risk. One primary area of risk is exposure
to mechanic's liens. In some states me-
chanic's liens can supersede the priority
of recorded first mortgages for up to six
months after the labor or materials have
been provided, and the title insurance .
underwriter is at risk during that period:
Minnesota and Virginia laws are so unfa-
vorable in this regard that some compa-
nies have ceased writing mechanic's lien
coverage in these states.
Donald Rundblom, Continental Diver-
sified, on "Private Sector Development
Issues." The major concern of the
private sector always has been, and will
continue to be, the economic viability of
the transaction. Like the operator of any
other business, a real estate developer
must establish pricing such that the return
earned on invested capital is commensu-
rate with the risk of the undertaking. If
rental revenues are expected to provide
adequate risk adjusted returns, then exist-
ing developers will continue to build, and
new participants will be attracted to the
development industry.
One of the major costs of any new
real estate project is the "infrastructure:"
streets, sewers, and other such features
without which no new development
could succeed. Therefore, the cost of in-
frastructure must be covered either in the
prices charged to tenants or through gov-
ernment subsidies. In the past, the cost
typically was borne disproportionately
by government. One result of this subsi-
dy is that building owners, in a competi-
tive market, were able to charge lower
rents without having to sacrifice returns
on their invested capital. Both tenants'
and developers' short run interests were
served, and capital continued to be
attracted to the development of new
residential and commercial projects.
But we know that there can be no
"free lunch." The incentives that the
subsidies provided caused developers
to take actions that now are being felt
in a number of ways. Consider the
impact on the real estate markets them-
selves. Because the prices, the rents,
were in some cases artificially low, de-
velopment continued to make economic
sense. As long as infrastructure contin-
ued to be subsidized by public sector
contributions, development continued to
grow at a rapid pace, because high meas-
ured returns will attract capital to any
industry. Of course, the incentives were
so distorted that the result has been over-
building in many markets across the
country; some major cities have enough
vacant office space to meet projected
needs for twenty years.
At the same time, unfavorable recent
economic conditions have caused the
trend toward increasing government
subsidy of infrastructure to cease. So the
developers of more recent projects have
been required to pay all costs of the in-
frastructure extensions or improvements
necessitated by their plans. After long
periods of not including infrastructure
costs in their pricing schemes, develop-
ers now must begin to do so. In turn,
they must try to charge higher rents
in order to earn adequate risk adjusted
investment returns. But in the current
market environment rents are at low
levels, and in some areas they continue
to fall because of the economics of
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oversupply. New development activity
therefore has been greatly curtailed, be-
cause for real estate developers the free
ride has come to an end.
Bruce Knight, Champaign City Plan-
ning Department, on "Public Sector
Development Issues." Developers
must work closely with the public sector
in completing new projects. Therefore,
developers should understand the tools
used by the people who regulate devel-
opment. Foremost is the comprehensive
plan, which establishes the regulatory
policies for dealing with development.
The zoning ordinance is a principal im-
plementation tool of the comprehensive
city's role to protect the developer from
risk or to assure that a particular develop-
ment project will earn a profit.
Still, our objective as regulators is not
to stop development, but rather to assure
that procedures are followed to protect
the public's interest. When there is a dis-
pute between the city and a developer,
the reason typically is that the developer
has progressed too far without consulting
the city regarding public sector concerns.
For example, developers sometimes don't
know the zoning restrictions that apply
to their sites, and they can't always get
rezoning. If considerable resources have
been spent in developing the concept and
design, then the developer can suffer a
In any jurisdiction a court can make wholesale
changes in the loan contract when a borrower gets
in trouble; the principal, rate, and term can all
change in a "cramdown."
plan; it specifies permitted uses, restricts
how properties can be developed, and
establishes procedures for dealing with
various development issues.
Another aspect of the public role in de-
velopment is the subdivision regulations,
which control the division of land into
more than one parcel. These regulations
provide for the necessary public facilities
when development takes place and estab-
lish design standards for developments.
They also permit a city to review plans
for subdivisions within 1.5 miles outside
the city limits: this power is called "extra-
territorial jurisdiction." If a subdivision is
planned in an unincorporated area within
1 .5 miles of each of two or more cities,
then all of the cities may have the power
to review the plan, or there may be nego-
tiated boundary agreements that deter-
mine who has the power to review.
The developer's role involves four
primary activities: project conception,
which typically is market driven; initia-
tion of the development process, which
includes financing and design; the
marshalling of resources to complete
the development: and entrepreneurship.
which includes assuming risk. It is not the
loss when we require compliance with
the comprehensive plan. We try to work
with the developer in this type of case, to
suggest changes that would allow the pro-
ject to continue. Of course, there is a cost
to these changes, and in some instances
the developer just abandons the project.
It's often best if the developer buys an
option on land rather than the land itself;
we can then work through initial phases
with less of the developer's money at
risk. The price paid for a parcel should
relate to the intended use. If a developer
commits to a price without knowing
whether the desired use can be approved,
then he can easily pay too much.
Kevin Maxwell and Peter Ruggiero,
Prudential Realty Group, on "Mort-
gage Lending and Equity Sales in
Today's Environment." Life insurers
obtain the funds we lend from life poli-
cies and pension fund contributions; our
liabilities are therefore long term, so we
don't want to invest in 3-month T-Bills.
We are interested in long term debt, in-
cluding mortgages on income producing
real estate. We generally make nonre-
course loans; the borrower pays only
as long as the property generates cash
flows. So we have to know real estate,
and we have to manage our risks.
Life insurers typically make fixed rate
loans, in order match assets with liabili-
ties. Because we typically lend very
large sums, we have to underwrite care-
fully. We analyze properties, borrowers,
lessees, and the structures of the leases.
An owner looks for upside potential, but
to a lender a property is nothing more
than the cash flow that it generates. We
must be able to measure the attendant
risks and determine an appropriate inter-
est rate. The rate falls as the loan to val-
ue ratio falls (it can be no higher than
75%) or debt coverage rises (it must be
at least 1.2). Anything that causes uncer-
tainty causes the rate to rise; rates are
higher in Illinois, where it's hard to fore-
close, than in Texas. Of course, in any
jurisdiction a court can make wholesale
changes in the contract when a borrower
gets in trouble; the principal, rate, and
term can all change in a "cramdown."
Early repayments are not a concern; our
contracts call for penalties that make us
whole if prepayment occurs.
Since commercial loans are now secu-
ritized, we must compete with other se-
curities in the eyes of investors. A mort-
gage on the Sears Tower is like a Sears
bond, in that the same credit stands be-
hind the payments. In a similar manner,
a mortgage on a shopping center is like
an IBM bond, to the extent that the prop-
erty produces safe cash tlows.
The equity side of the business has
changed dramatically in the last ten
years. In the 1980s, investors ignored the
fundamentals. We're going through a
normal and healthy adjustment now, but
no one wants to invest for fear of being
wrong. In the "80s everything was "deal
driven" until the major investors realized
that diversification entails more than
buying office buildings in Chicago, New
York, and LA. Now the market is "client
driven." Investors diversify in economic
terms; they recognize that Texas and
Colorado are both affected by the health
of the oil industry. So now the invest-
ment decision is driven by both market
factors and property-specific factors.
Verification of facts about buildings and
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tenants is extremely important; problems
in the real estate industry today reflect
the fact that people haven't been held ac-
countable for their investment decisions.
On the other hand, people who under-
stand what drives the market can make
money even in the current environment.
Gary Riggs, Allstate Insurance Compa-
nies, on "The State of the Life Insu-
rance Industry: Real Estate's Role."
Life insurance companies have been ma-
jor commercial real estate lenders since
the late 1940s. Almost 25% of total life
insurance assets are mortgages. Allstate
Life lends on all types of income proper-
ties, and we also diversify geographically,
so that problems in a regional economy
won't affect our entire portfolio.
Because most life policies sold prior
to 1980 were of the whole life variety,
it made sense for companies to make
30-year fully amortizing loans. But with
inflation in the early 1980s, life insurers
suffered disintermediation just like banks
did; people borrowed at low rates against
whole life cash values. We began to offer
investment oriented policies, like univer-
sal life and guaranteed investment con-
tracts (GICs). These instruments involve
shorter term liabilities, and our assets
had to match; now we deal with 3-5 year
maturities. By 1986, interest rates were
back in the single digit range, so there
was a lot of lending activity; 1986 was
the biggest year ever for commercial
mortgage lending, with much activity
in both refinancing and new loans.
Under Illinois law an insurer can lend
up to 80% of appraised value, but we
currently follow a more restrictive 65%
standard. We have traditionally looked
for debt coverage ratios of 1 15 to 120%,
but in the current market environment
we look for 130%. We've changed
our underwriting standards because of
overbuilt markets and problem loans.
All lenders are more careful these days,
with respect to appraisals, environmental
assessments, and even engineering
studies, particularly in earthquake areas.
The cuiTent economic environment
also imposes some risks and costs on
lenders that we didn't expect to face
when we made all those loans in 1986.
One is lease rollovers. Leases roll over
in overbuilt markets at lower rents; the
borrower's 130% debt coverage ratio
can easily fall to 100%. Another is losses
on refinancing; we made a lot of 5-year
bullet loans in 1986, and they're coming
due. Good borrowers roll over at low
current interest rates, while a weaker
borrower can't repay and can't refinance
with anyone else. So we have to either
take possession or else grant another
5-year loan of questionable quality.
Like the S&Ls and banks, life insurers
have faced recent difficulties. The rating
agencies were slow to recognize prob-
lems at First Executive, and now they're
overreacting. There used to be several
major life companies with the "Triple
Crown:" AAA S&P rating, Aaa Moody's
rating, and A-i- rating from Best. There are
no such companies today; Allstate has
been downgraded by Moody's. There are
some serious implications; for example,
there could be "bank runs" on some car-
riers, since a pension fund manager owes
a fiduciary obligation to keep GIC money
only with the highest rated insurers.
Thomas Marvinac, Resolution Trust
Corporation, on "Real Estate and the
RTC." The RTC was created in 1989
when Congress passed the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act (FIRREA), with a five-
year mandate to dispose of the assets of
S&Ls declared insolvent by the Office of
Thrift Supervision. In the resolution pro-
cess, RTC becomes the owner of consid-
erable assets, because banks interested in
buying parts of insolvent thrifts typically
do not want real estate or commercial
mortgages. Our job is to manage the re-
maining assets, and to sell them quickly.
These assets aren't like wine; they don't
get better with age. RTC is an overseer;
most of the actual asset management is
provided by private firms that bid com-
petitively to provide the service.
The Chicago regional office oversees
insolvent thrifts in five midwestem states,
but we operate in local markets nation-
wide. Several midwestem S&Ls owned
real estate in the southwest; the Chicago
office's biggest exposure is in Texas.
We don't assign this property to a Texas
office because RTC tries to account for
the cost of resolving each specific insti-
tution. This seemingly cumbersome pro-
cedure helps us internally, and helps in
keeping track of amounts that creditors
may later stand to be repaid.
Originally we would sell only for
cash, but now RTC can provide financ-
ing. At first we sold assets individually,
but now we try to dispose of multiple
parcels in each transaction; the buyer has
to take some bad along with the good.
Our situation is in some ways getting
better. While the cleanup has been costly
to date, and there are still a few S&Ls on
our watch list, most of the serious prob-
lem institutions have been dealt with.
But new problems arise. We do not bid
at any foreclosure sale without getting
an environmental report. Of course, if
we already own a property we're in the
chain of title, and the EPA has not given
RTC any special relief from Superfund.
A factor that we constantly must deal
with is politics. FIRREA permits RTC to
defer payment of local real estate taxes
without being subject to takings. But
local tax collectors haven't read FIRREA,
and if we didn't pay we would create fis-
cal chaos for local areas. So as a policy
we pay taxes in a timely manner. We do
try to get these taxes lowered when the
assessments clearly are too high.
Politics is no less a factor at the feder-
al level. Congress directed RTC to mini-
mize adverse impacts on markets where
RTC is selling a lot of real estate, and
we've experimented with auctions as a
means of doing so. If we work too fast
and depress prices we hurt some of the
taxpayers whose interests we serve. But
now Congress is considering a law to
keep our holding costs down by forcing
us to sell within six months of acquiring
a property. That's hard to do when we
have some assets, like unusable desert
land, that RTC can't even give away.
Andrew Herman, Standard & Poor's
Corporation, New York, on "The
Rating Agencies and Real Estate."
An alternative to direct mortgage lend-
ing is capital market execution through
real estate backed bonds. Investment
bankers often believe that a rating from
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a major rating agency is instrumental in
accessing the capital markets. During
most of the 1980s direct lenders' terms
were so favorable that rated transactions
were not necessarily the cheapest source
of financing. More recently, though,
insurance companies haven't offered high
loan to value ratios or low spreads over
their costs of funds, and the AAA borrow-
ing rate is now competitive with the mort-
gage lending rate offered by life insurers.
So credit analysis has become a very
active field; S&P is one of the few Wall
Street firms doing much hiring.
"Structured finance" is our newest area
of activity; S&P rates bonds backed by
assets held in special purpose entities.
The idea is to allow a weaker borrower
to achieve an investment grade rating
through asset backed financing, and
thereby to access the capital markets
at a lower interest rate than it otherwise
would pay. The borrower segregates
some assets, perhaps a pool of mortgages
or a building, from the rest of its opera-
tion. Debt is issiied secured by these as-
sets, which are held by the special entity.
We deal with two types of structured
commercial mortgage transactions:
pooled and property specific. Pooled
transactions are used by financial institu-
tions trying to create balance sheet liquid-
ity. A lender transfers some high quality
commercial mortgages to an entity that
issues debt secured by the payments. The
institution might be rated no higher than
BBB, so this arrangement holds its bor-
rowing cost down. A pooled transaction
requires analysis of the underlying assets
and a review of how funds flow from in-
dividual mortgagors to the note holders.
The special purpose entity plays an
important role in a pooled transaction. If
the institution tried simply to issue debt
backed by some designated assets, then
its own low rating would necessitate a
high interest cost. Of course, disposing of
some of the best assets owned affects the
institution's future rating, but they pay
that price to meet liquidity needs.
In a property specific transaction we
rate bonds that are issued by a special
purpose entity that holds title to a specific
property. The bonds are secured by the
cash flows generated by the property. To
^RER News
determine the credit quality of the proper-
ty, we must perform an in-depth analysis
of the location, the tenant mix, and the
lease structures. The typical properties
in these transactions have been "trophy"
central business district office buildings
and major regional shopping malls, locat-
ed throughout the US and in the UK. Of
course, since the capital markets have
faced their own difficulties in recent
years, obtaining a rating for a property
specific transaction is a two edged sword.
Dan Smith. Duff & Phelps, on
"Securitization and the Secondary
Market." Businesses went to lending
institutions when they needed cash to buy
buildings. Now real estate lenders have to
get loans off their books for liquidity or
regulatory reasons, so they go to the capi-
tal markets to sell the notes. Rating agen-
cies" role in this securitization process
is to render opinions on credit quality,
which investors rely on before buying the
securities that are created when a lender
sells commercial mortgage notes.
The most important element in struc-
turing commercial mortgage backed
securities is that the underlying assets be
able to generate cash flows even in peri-
ods of economic uncertainty. Other rating
agencies sometimes seem to emphasize
seasoning of the notes and of the underly-
ing properties, and to worry about wheth-
er there is recourse against the borrowers.
Duff & Phelps bases its opinions primari-
ly on basic real estate analysis: we look
at the properties, analyze the leases, and
study the local economies. Seasoning
provides little protection; if an area's
major employer goes out of business, the
fact that a lessee paid five years ago has
no relevance. And the type of borrower
who signed recourse notes in recent years
typically had huge contingent liabilities.
The overriding concern is where the cash
comes from; we focus on the collateral.
We deal with residential mortgage
backed securities as well. These pools
generally are structured by lenders: life
insurance companies, banks, or the RTC.
The loans themselves are unaffected
by the securitization process; borrowers
make their regular payments. But sec-
urities based on these payments can be
Busy Acting ORER Director
Acting Director Roger Cannaday is
Associate Editor for Review Articles
for the new Journal ofReal Estate
Literature. He presented "Optimal
Leverage Strategy: Implications for
Mortgage Contract Terms," written
with U of I alumnus Tyler Yang (now
on faculty at Cal State - Long Beach)
at the January AREUEA meetings.
He will present "The Impact of Rest-
rictive Covenants on Condominium
Value" and chair an Investment Prop-
erty session at American Real Estate
Society meetings in April. He contin-
ues to serve as Director of Graduate
Studies for the U of I Department of
Finance and as national president
(and local chapter faculty advisor) for
Rho Epsilon. He had been promised
an uneventful term at the ORER helm,
but much of his time in recent weeks
has been spent on the ORER financial
crisis. ORER Letter commends
Cannaday's devoted service.
Colwell Addresses AAAS
ORER Director Peter Colwell was
invited to present his paper, "Land
Values in Cook County," to meetings
of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science held in
Chicago on February 8. He will pre-
sent "Security Brokerage Markets
under Uncertainty," co-authored with
U of I alumnus Chunchi Wu (now on
the faculty at Syracuse University), at
Spring 1992 meetings of the Western
Finance Association. He also has
been named to the editorial board of
the Journal ofReal Estate Finance
and Economics. Colwell is officially
on sabbatical for the Spring 1992
semester, but the financial crisis has
necessitated his regular presence on
campus to deal with planning and
administrative questions.
New Working Papers
Four papers have been added to the
Working Paper Series. "Borrower
Mobility, Self-Selection, and the Rel-
ative Prices of Fixed and Adjustable-
Rate Mortgages," by Jan Brueckner,
(continued on page 13)
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created to meet cash flow and risk pref-
erences of a wide range of investors.
For example, $100 million in residential
loans can be structured into $80 million
of securities with senior repayment stat-
us and $20 million with subordinated
status. If a borrower misses a payment,
then the subordinate portion takes the
loss. Subordinate certificates are sold as
high yield securities; they're generally
not rated. But the senior bonds likely
would be rated AA, and would be sold
to pension funds or foreign banks.
Residential and commercial mortgage
backed securities have some different
structural features. For example, home
loans present a prepayment problem,
from liability; how much more clear
could the legislation have been?
But statutes are subject to judicial
interpretation. In 1990 the 11th federal
appellate circuit expanded lender liability
in the Fleet Factors case, ruling that
under CERCLA a secured creditor can be
liable for cleanup costs even if it merely
"participates in the financial management
of the facility to a degree indicating a
capacity to influence" the treatment of
hazardous waste. A lender also faces
potential liability if its involvement is
"sufficiently broad to support the infer-
ence that it could affect hazardous waste
standards if it so chose."
The broadness of the "capacity" stan-
Because of the definitions used, wetlands and endangered
species provisions supported by "environmentalists" can
be used to regulate, in a very arbitrary way, essentially
every acre of land in the United States.
whereas in commercial mortgages there
are prepayment penalties or lockout pro-
visions, and since they're often balloons
the principal payments are fairly predict-
able. So with commercial loans it's easier
to create a series of senior "tranches"
with varying maturities.
I'm sometimes asked why, since we
are paid by the parties that structure these
securities, we don't simply assign a high
rating to everything submitted to us for an
opinion. The answer is that our long term
survival depends on our reputation among
investors. If we lose our credibility, we'll
be out of business.
Ward McDonald, Champaign attorney,
on "Environmental Issues: A Legal
Perspective." Under CERCLA, or
"Superfund," Congress states that owners
and operators of sites where hazardous
substances are found, and those who
transport or dispose of hazardous materi-
als, are the parties responsible for envi-
ronmental cleanup. The law excludes any
party that, without participating in man-
agement, holds an "indication of owner-
ship primarily to protect a security inter-
est." CERCLA therefore exempts lenders
dard causes some legal analysts to fear
that a lender could face liability even
without foreclosing. So commercial real
estate lenders now are terrified of being
secured creditors; they may prefer to
be unsecured creditors, or to take other
assets as collateral. The Bergsoe Metals
case, decided later in 1990 by the 9th
federal appellate circuit, might have
served to temper the earlier decision;
it exempts from liability any lender that
does not "exercise actual management
authority." In fact, after Bergsoe new fed-
eral regulations were proposed to institute
the standard that CERCLA had cleariy
stated, but these never were adopted.
More recent cases generally have fol-
lowed the Fleet "capacity" standard.
The issue is further confused by
various state environmental laws and the
uncertainties of enforcement procedures.
For example, in Illinois a buried farm
storage tank must be registered and regu-
larly inspected, but only if its capacity
exceeds 1200 gallons. In a case in anoth-
er state the regulators found petroleum
contamination on a site and issued a
cleanup order. The developer proved that
the source was underground tanks on ad-
jacent property owned by the state itself.
Not surprisingly, the authorities soon re-
ported that there was much less contami-
nation than had first been believed. The
cleanup order was withdrawn.
There is no way for a lender, or any
party, to be protected from environmen-
tal liability. It doesn't matter that a con-
tract may call for a seller to indemnify
a buyer or lender for contamination that
may be found. Superfund has no privity;
the government will go after the deepest
pocket. Lenders are in the hot seat today,
but after enough lenders go broke the bu-
reaucrats will just go after someone else.
Edward Krug, environmental scien-
tist, on "Environmental Issues: A
Scientific Perspective." The environ-
mental movement is the political Green
Giant that no one wants to anger. Its
extremists manipulate a just cause by
manufacturing crises out of normal eco-
nomic events. Because of the definitions
used, wetlands and endangered species
provisions supported by so-called "envi-
ronmentalists" can be used to regulate,
in a very arbitrary way, essentially every
acre of land in the United States. But
without the efficiencies of a modem
economy, these people wouldn't have
time to worry about snail darters; they'd
be chopping wood and plowing.
We must reexamine the consequences
of land use regulations, in terms of both
science and legality. Under extremist
policies, you can't extract minerals from
your land, and you can't farm it. Even
under communism the government
does not take control without accepting
responsibility, but American owners face
increasing liability while their rights are
stripped away. Is our economy to func-
tion by making records and movies?
Semantics plays a key role. It seems
benign to restrict the use of "wetlands"
or of land where "endangered species"
live. We're told that there has been
severe loss of private wetlands in recent
years, caused by agricultural draining.
It's true that private wetland has been
lost, but only because the government
acquired the land; the wetlands them-
selves are still there. The 1989 EPA
manual defines "wetland" as land wet
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for seven days a year 18 inches below the
ground; even Death Valley would qualify.
Then the burden of proof is placed not on
the bureaucrats who identify a parcel as a
wetland, but rather on the land owner.
There was draining of much wetland,
but it occurred 1 50 years ago, when the
breadbasket of the world was created
out of Midwestern swamps. There is no
pressing need to reclaim lost wetlands;
overall the world is getting wetter, not
dryer. The Great Salt Lake has risen by
20 feet in recent years, tripling its volume
in a period when we allegedly need more
wetlands to combat global drought. The
1988 Illinois water shortage had nothing
to do with wetlands. Droughts follow 30-
year cycles; if not for the Civil War the
big news story of the 1860s would have
been the drought. Droughts caused Indian
tribes to battle over land in the 1500s.
An "endangered species" is defined
as any species, subspecies, or population
deemed threatened. The spotted owl lives
from Canada to Mexico, and it actually
thrives in second growth forests with their
plentiful small prey. Yet we are asked to
view spotted owls living in specific old
growth forests as endangered; it's just a
tool to prevent cutting old growth forests.
You know that construction has been
down, but did you know that lumber pric-
es are up 30%? Every resource extraction
and conversion activity faces restrictions
from extremist environmental policies.
Sheldon Good, Sheldon F. Good and
Company, on "Real Estate Auctions."
In an economic environment with falling
prices and jobs at risk, people are reluc-
tant to buy real estate unless they are mo-
tivated by price, terms, or other factors. If
there is an auction, then anyone interested
in buying is motivated to act by the time
certainty of the auction situation. So the
price paid at auction can be higher than
the price that would be realized in a nego-
tiated sale. Instead of watching a property
sit on the market for months and months,
as can sometimes happen in a traditional
sale, the seller receives the sale proceeds
45 to 60 days after he decides to sell.
A quick sale is very important if the
carrying costs associated with a property
are high, but there are other reasons for
seeking quick sales through auctions. For
example, an owner who wants to realize a
capital gain or loss in a particular tax year
might want to be assured of a completed
transaction by a given date. Or an owner
with a lot of capital tied up in real estate
might need liquidity, and if loans aren't
readily available a quick auction sale
might be the best option. Or a condo
developer might schedule an auction to
assure a lender that every effort is being
made to sell completed units.
Yet auctions can be valuable even
in situations in which there are no time
constraints. For example one partner, or
one heir to an estate, might want to buy
another partner's or heir's interest in a
building, but the parties involved can't
agree on a price. The standard solution
is to get an appraisal, yet an appraisal is
only an educated guess of what a proper-
ty will sell for tomorrow based on yester-
day's values. What more equitable way
could there be to resolve a price question
than to hold a public auction, at which
any partner or heir has the right to bid
against other interested buyers? Or con-
sider a second mortgage holder trying to
decide whether to foreclose and "buy in"
after a default. This lender can arrange
an auction with a minimum price to
determine whether it makes sense to pay
off the first lien and sell the property, or
simply to write off his bad second loan.
The cost of a stand-alone auction is a
minimum of $7,500 to $25,000 for mar-
keting costs, and there is also a brokerage
commission. So the auction format may
be best suited to a large property or a
large group of similar properties for
which sellers can share advertising costs.
Our auctions are typically very successful
for sellers; auction advertising focuses
the market on the property being sold.
Buyers of real estate also benefit from
auctions. In the current soft market envi-
ronment, a buyer doesn't want to make
an offer on a property for fear that the
seller will accept it; everyone is afraid of
paying far more than anyone else would
have offered. But an auction confirms
a buyer's view of the property's value.
Someone who pays $500 more than the
next highest bid knows that he couldn't
have made more than a $500 mistake.
(continuedfrom page ! 1
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is paper #92. "A Simple Search and
Bargaining Model of Real Estate
Markets," by Abdullah Yavas, is
paper #93. Paper #94 is "Optimal
Land Development," by Laura
Quigg. "Empirical Testing of Real
Option Pricing Models," also by
Quigg, is paper #95. A copy of any
paper in the series is available from
ORER; the price of each copy is $4.
Busy Pens at ORER
Several recent works by authors asso-
ciated with ORER have been accepted
for publication in academic or profes-
sional journals. "The Value of Deed
Quality," by Peter Colwell and
Abdullah Yavas, has been accepted
for publication in a coming issue of
the Journal ofReal Estate Finance
and Economics. "Impact of Regula-
tion on Appraisal Quality," by Peter
Colwell and Joseph Trefzger {ORER
Letter, Fall 1991), was reprinted in
the March 1992 issue of The Master
Appraiser, and it is .scheduled to be
reprinted in the July 1 992 Appraisal
Journal and in a forthcoming issue of
the Wisconsin Association ofReal-
tors® Appraisal Section Newsletter.
Yavas Becomes Nittany Lion
ORER research associate Abdullah
Yavas will join the faculty of the
Department of Real Estate and
Insurance at The Pennsylvania State
University in August. Dr. Yavas
specializes in the analysis of real
estate and other markets facilitated
by intermediary agents. Yavas rein-
forces the Illinois-Penn State connec-
tion; U of I alumnus Austin Jaffe is
also on the Penn State faculty.
Congressman Visits Class
Rep. Thomas Ewing (R, Pontiac)
visited campus on February 24. One
of his visits was with Professor Ward
McDonald's Fundamentals of Real
Estate class, where he discussed real
estate related tax legislation. Under
recent Congressional redistricting,
Ewing will represent the University's
district if reelected in November.
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Peter Hess, Baker & McKenzie. on
"Current Real Estate Related Legal
Issues." When you admire a shopping
center, you should think about the com-
plex legal agreements that allowed con-
struction to take place. Lawyers play a
major role in structuring deals, arranging
financing, and dealing with problems
that arise if a deal turns sour. Many pro-
jects are structured as limited partner-
ships because of tax or liability concerns
of the participants. Illinois also permits
an ownership form known as the land
trust; it is not unusual for a land trust
to own a property while the limited part-
nership holds beneficial interest in the
trust. This arrangement keeps the names
of the partners out of the public record,
and it prevents judgments against one
partner from attaching to the partnership.
Construction financing no longer
involves just the local bank. Today there
are likely to be multiple lenders who
share the risk, so there must be an inter-
creditor agreement to spell out each lend-
er's rights with respect to the borrower,
collateral, and other lenders. A commit-
ment is issued after the financial terms
are negotiated, but the lender doesn't pay
any money until the legal documentation
is finalized. There are several legal docu-
ments relating to the loan itself; these
include the note, the mortgage, and the
loan agreement, which states the rights
and duties of the lender and borrower.
The lender today also seeks credit en-
hancement through letters of credit and
personal guarantees, and wants environ-
mental guarantees and assurance that the
building will be built.
The lawyer for the lender must care-
fully review the developer's contracts
with the architect and the contractor, the
contractor's agreements with subcontrac-
tors, and the leases. The interest reserve
provision, to allow for interest payment
during construction, is easy if the loan
carries a fixed rate of interest, but today
we see variable rates, so lenders require
borrowers to hedge, and lawyers have to
understand swaps. The attorney must ex-
amine the title insurance and the survey
of the property. If some of the partners
are corporations, then counsel has to see
the corporate documents.
When a construction loan is "out of
balance" (the amount not yet paid is too
little to complete construction), the lender
must either secure repayment or take pos-
session. In one recent case a lender took
possession of a partially completed shop-
ping center. The project's equity had
come in the form "tax increment financ-
ing;" local government provided infra-
structure with money from bonds to be
repaid through the center's anticipated
property tax revenues. The lender decid-
ed to keep the center small; the village
tried to force the lender to build to the
original scale, but the lender was not a
party to the development agreement. The
village might not have had to default on
the bonds if its lawyer had forced the
lender to join initially in that agreement.
Richard Ennis, Ennis, Knupp &
Associates, on "Pension Funds and
Real Estate." Pension funds tradition-
ally were stock and bond investors. Then
real estate equity became attractive to
defined benefit pension funds in the mid
1970s. Real estate returns had been high
during a period when stocks lost money,
and the funds also saw real estate as an
inflation hedge. Since its returns do not
follow the same cycles as other holdings,
real estate also fit well into the portfolios.
One method by which pension funds
invested in real estate in recent years is
the commingled fund, which provided
property management and also offered
liquidity and diversification. Some were
open ended; they could accept new mon-
ey and always stood ready to repurchase
investors' interests. The typical open end
fund was sponsored by a major insurer
or bank, and it had a few billion dollars
in assets. Some people worried that the
appraisal-based liquidation prices might
not have reflected market values. So the
closed end fund emerged; after raising
capital the sponsor would not accept new
contributions. Investors were not told
what real estate would be purchased, but
the properties were to be sold at specified
dates, such as ten yeas after purchase, so
the liquidation values would be transac-
tion prices. The typical closed end fund
was smaller, with less than $300 million
in assets, and there were more of these
funds, sponsored by firms like JMB.
Some of the bigger pension funds did
not like commingling, so they gave up
some diversification and invested direct-
ly. Co-investment later emerged to blend
the diversification of commingled funds
with the control feature of direct invest-
ing; two pension funds might own a mall
as partners. Hybrid investments, combin-
ing debt with equity's upside potential,
became popular in the early 1980s. The
hybrid was really an attempt by syndica-
tors to pass some taxable returns to their
untaxed pension fund partners. These
aren't common today; recent tax legis-
lation has reduced the benefits of real
estate and also made it harder to allocate
benefits and losses among partners.
Financial theory indicates that real es-
tate should be almost 20% of a portfolio.
But pension funds do not invest heavily
in real estate, and will not in the future.
One reason is that the ERISA prudence
standard frightens trustees away from
illiquid markets that do not lend them-
selves to diversification. The liquidity
once promised by commingled funds has
evaporated during the recent market de-
cline. Most open end funds now have re-
demption queues, and closed end funds
have extended their specified sale dates;
hindsight shows that there were flaws
in the structures of these arrangements.
It is also hard to diversify or to control
investments in a market with high prices
and high transaction costs. There's also
not a corporate veil to limit liability.
Equity REITs may allow pension funds
to get around some of these problems.H
Speakers are presented above in the
order in which they addressed the class.
The Office ofReal Estate Research makes
every effort to assure the accuracy of all
statements in ORER LETTER articles prepared
by ORER staff members. However, the reader
should note that legal and regulatory matters,
which are occasionally addressed in ORER
LETTER articles, are subject to change and
to vaiying interpretations. ORER LETTER
articles do not purport to provide legal or
investment advice, and the Office ofReal
Estate Research shall not be held responsible
for damages resulting from omissions or
inaccuracies in the ORER LETTER or other
ORER publications.
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newsfare learn the basic issues involved
in the ongoing battle between NAR and
municipalities (or housing centers) over
the practices and philosophies of "affir-
mative marketing" for integration in
housing. How can officials claim public
support for programs that the public has
not been able to evaluate intelligently?
People can't tell, from reading main-
stream media articles, that a municipali-
ty's goal of managed housing integration
demonstrates the desire to limit the num-
ber of African American families in the
area, but what other motivation could
such a goal have? Given whites' undenia-
ble dislike for living where there are "too
many" African Americans (as evidenced
by their moving from or declining to
move into such areas), we have to view
policies of "affirmative marketing" to
whites as the 1990s version of (now
illegal) restrictive covenants prohibiting
sale to certain racial or religious groups.
Maintaining "racial balance" in hous-
ing patterns by controlling "clustering"
has been the primary goal of managed
integration since the concept came into
existence. When blacks began exercising
their rights under the Fair Housing Act
of 1968, opponents of integration created
IMPS as a new means, and for the moment
apparently still a legal means, of limiting
housing choice. However, restricting Af-
rican Americans' housing opportunities
directly contradicts the Fair Housing Act.
IMPS have sidestepped the latest legal
challenge, but they cannot escape criti-
cism that they are racially discriminatory.
Why IMPs Are Destined to Fail
If the results of more than twenty years in
the municipalities most involved are any
indication, then there is scant reason for
the confident assessments that have
followed upon the Supreme Court's deci-
sion not to hear the NAR appeal. Under-
standing some of the reasons requires
that we study the racial makeup of the
affected municipalities as measured in
the censuses of 1970, 1980, and 1990;
and that we recognize that the black
community has not yet been permitted
to provide meaningful input.
Of the nine southern Cook County mu-
nicipalities involved in the suit, six now
have majority African American popula-
tions, while two others each have black
populations in excess of 25%. This level
of integration has occurred even though
all nine towns started their MPs when
their black populations were less than
3% (in some cases less than 1%). Two
realities therefore emerge. First, every
community involved in the NAR suit has
crossed over the line at which controlling
the number of African Americans is a
practical possibility. Second, the founda-
tion upon which IMPs are built— that
black families must be prevented from
"clustering"— violates the Fair Housing
Act; IMPs inhibit the very housing choice
rights that the Fair Housing Act bestows.
Eventually our federal courts will have to
recognize this inconsistency.
Additionally, the profit making goal
of the housing industry, and the prepos-
terous nature of any notion that African
American families should avoid living
near each other (including their own fam-
ily members), ensure that IMPs will real-
ize, at best, only minimal and transitory
success. That limited success, along with
numerous failures, will produce problems
for supporters of managed integration
that will outweigh any gains they might
enjoy by limiting black housing choices
for the peace of mind of some whites.
Black Voices Must Be Heard
The important element conspicuously
absent from the debate over managed
integration is the African Americans
themselves. Is it not troubling that the
fight over IMPs has proceeded almost
exclusively between white municipal
officials and a largely white NAR? It
is noteworthy that judges determined
which whites (the municipalities, not the
Realtors®) had "standing" to speak for
what is best for blacks, yet testimony by
African Americans was not permitted.
One thing is certain. The policies that
white municipal officials and their hous-
ing centers may now feel justified in put-
ting into practice will result in increased
opposition and resentment among Af-
rican Americans. The beginnings of the
rising antipathy can be seen in increased
fractiousness between blacks and whites
in so-called "integrated" settings (which
include schools). African Americans will
not docilely accept being excluded from
the free choice of living near kindred
spirits with whom they share cultural
and family ties, any more than whites
would tamely accept such restrictions.
Those who make and interpret our
laws must not forget that all Americans
have the right to live where they choose.
The notion that "clustering" of African
Americans is undesirable for neighbor-
hoods is a monumental insult to black
people across our nation. If managed
integration's proponents feel that they
now have legal approval to deny equal
access to housing, then the black
community must make its voice heard
in the legislative and judicial arenas. |
Mr. Simpson is Editor ofTHE MONITOR,
the newsletter of the Park Forest, Illinois
branch of the NAACP.
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Integration Maintenance: Update and Observations
William Simpson
The Summer 1991 ORER LETTER fea-
tured a section devoted to issues of race
and housing, with particular emphasis
on Integration Maintenance Programs
(MPs). These plans, which exist in sever-
al south suburbs and elsewhere in the
Chicago area, call for special marketing
efforts by brokers to encourage white
buyers to purchase houses in neighbor-
hoods with high percentage black popu-
lations. Realtors® hadfeared that such
activity entailed aform of illegal steer-
ing, hut the 7th federal appellate circuit
ruled in June of last year that IMPs do
not violate the Fair Housing Act. The
Supreme Court recently refused to re-
view the appellate ruling, so IMPs would
seem to have become a permanent part
of the Chicago area housing landscape.
ORER LETTER asked William Simpson,
who had provided remarks quoted in the
Summer 1991 issue, to comment on IMPs
and the Supreme Court's recent action.
His response follows.
In January the Supreme Court refused
to hear an appeal from the National
Association of Realtors® that challenged
opinions issued by the 7th Circuit Court
of Appeals on June 19, 1 99 1 . The 7th
Circuit ruling had dealt with the legality
of "integration maintenance" plans now
being implemented by municipalities in
the southern suburbs of Chicago. The
high court's stance is being widely
interpreted as having given officials in
municipalities with IMPs the go-ahead to
create so-called "affirmative marketing"
housing plans to entice white home
buyers into targeted areas.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision to allow the appellate opinion
to stand, it is not surprising that IMP
proponents have issued confident
statements about the legitimacy of their
Biased News Coverage
For example, we should recognize that
most of the public's knowledge of the
questions raised by IMPs comes to them
through newspaper articles and short TV
bytes. The purposeful management of
black/white ratios in buildings, neighbor-
hoods, and communities has received
considerable attention in the Chicago
area media. The reports have been
prepared by commentators who, by their
slanting of stories, show that they lack a
The notion that "clustering" of African Americans
is undesirable for neighborhoods is a monumental
insult to black people across our nation.
past efforts. They now assert that they
can proceed with, and build on, their
plans to lure whites to specific residential
areas. It might seem that IMP proponents
have reason for optimism, that they are
"off the hook." Conversely, parties who
dissent from programs to manage neigh-
borhood racial composition might appear
to have been set back. Before reacting
with pessimism, however, opponents of
managed integration should analyze some
rarely examined facets of the issue.
panoramic sense of an issue about which
they purport to educate tlie rest of us.
We expect the American media to
provide objective treatment of important
social issues, presenting opinions of all
affected groups. Yet invariably, osten-
sibly "balanced" stories about IMPs cast
the officials who manipulate housing
choice as "good guys" meeting resis-
tance in their laudable endeavors. Rarely
will the reader or viewer of the standard
(continued on page 15,
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Homelessness:A Fresh Look
Peter F. Colwell and Joseph W. Trefzger
For many years Americans have been
told of a growing homelessness problem.
It is a sad fact that there indeed are indi-
viduals, and even families, who face at
least temporary periods when they are
without homes. Perhaps equally sad is
that our policy makers, encouraged by
commentators in the media, address this
serious issue in a counterproductive
manner by insisting that homelessness is
a supply problem resulting from a private
market incapable of producing affordable
housing. In truth, homelessness is almost
entirely a creation of the public sector.
People in all income classes could have
affordable housing; it is not available be-
cause local governments refuse to allow
its provision at the same time they en-
courage homelessness through subsidies.
Still, while regulation is a cause of
homelessness, income also plays an im-
portant role in the debate; Income affects
all consumption decisions; housing is not
an exception. An individual's or family's
purchases are motivated by personal pref-
erences, but are constrained by income
and by the choices available. When
choice is restricted, be it by nature, by
technology, or by government policy,
some consumers' preferences will drive
them to avoid certain classes of purchas-
es. A rational consumer might make a
conscious decision to refrain from buying
caviar, an automobile, or even housing.
Limits on Choice: The Hidden Price
The phenomenon casually referred to as
homelessness, particularly with regard
to single men, often is accompanied by
what might be called shelter dwelling.
Many individuals reside, particularly
during the winter, in homeless shelters
provided by government agencies or by
government-approved private organiza-
tions in cities across the country. While
some observers would think of a shelter
in terms of its physical characteristics, a
shelter is better viewed as a combination
physical structure/administrative appara-
tus that provides a small quantity of hous-
ing at a zero direct dollar price to the
user. The measure of quantity in this con-
text can relate to the amount of physical
space, the types of amenities, the duration
of the occupant's stay, or all of these.
Observers state that there are too few
shelters in some areas, while noting at the
same time that there also are shelters with
empty beds, even on the coldest January
nights. How can these seemingly conflict-
ing observations persist? The answer
lies in the interactions among incomes,
prices, and preferences. If a shelter truly
imposed no price on the occupant, then
no one would be sleeping under bridges
or on heat grates while shelter beds sat
empty, unless those without permanent
homes were irrational. Economists assert
that cases in which large numbers of
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Still Going...
Despite serious financial difficulties
facing the Office of Real Estate
Research, we have published another
ORER Letter. This latest issue is a
combined Spring/Summer edition;
there will be only three 1992 issues.
At this time, it appears that we will
have to restrict mailings of future is-
sues to those with paid subscriptions.
However, contributions toward our
continued publishing efforts would
be gratefully received, and corporate
sponsorship of the ORER Letter
would be most welcome.
Readers of our previous issue may
recall that ORER's future became
imperiled when the Governor and the
General Assembly redirected money
pledged for ORER into the state's
general revenues. In August of 1991
$1 million was taken from the state's
Real Estate Recovery Fund, on
which ORER receives interest; then
in February of 1992 $140,000 of the
$197,000 balance was taken from
the Real Estate Research and Educa-
tion Fund, which holds ORER's
accumulated surplus. ORER and
many others have questioned the
justification for these takings, since
the Funds in question are supplied
by assessments against real estate
licenses rather than by tax receipts.
We again encourage those who
support ORER's position, and who
would wish for ORER's programs to
continue, to share their views with
Governor James Edgar at 207 Capitol
Building, Springfield, IL 62706.
Grads View McCormick Plans
Richard Hanson, Executive Vice
President of Chicago developer Stein
& Company, discussed the planned
expansion of McCormick Place with
(continued on page 3)
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people simultaneously would act irration-
ally are most rare. The reason that availa-
ble shelter space often goes unused is that
the price paid by the user of a "free" shel-
ter is not actually zero.
The occupant of space in a shelter pays
an implicit price, even though the shelter
operator does not charge an explicit fee.
For example, a shelter can be a dangerous
place. An enterprise that places large
numbers of unrelated men (at least some
of whom surely have substance abuse or
mental health problems) in an open sleep-
ing area, while operating on a shoestring
budget, cannot be entirely safe. Those
who stay in shelters sometimes feel that
their belongings, and even their safety,
Private Solutions
Suppose that an entrepreneur could
provide, for a fee, an alternative to
not-for-profit shelters. For example, an
old warehouse could be partitioned into
areas slightly larger than small beds.
Each such area could be surrounded by
chain link fence reaching from the floor
to the ceiling, with a locking gate; this
configuration would be less costly to
construct than partition walls, would
protect a sleeper and his belongings, and
would allow for overall observation by
the shelter's employees. There would be
no sermonizing, as the operator's motive
would be the earning of profits rather
than the saving of souls.
The reason that available shelter space often goes
unused is that the price paid by the user ofa "free'
shelter is not actually zero.
are at risk from fellow guests. There are
also logistical costs; an individual who
would like to occupy a shelter bed might
find it too difficult to travel to an availa-
ble shelter at appropriate times.
Then there are prices that might be less
apparent, but that nonetheless must be
taken into account by rational users of
shelter services. These prices relate to
bureaucratic limitations placed on occu-
pants" freedoms. For example, shelters
generally prohibit the possession of alco-
hol on their premises. A ban on spirits
might actually attract some people to a
shelter, but such a policy creates insur-
mountable obstacles to those who value
highly their ready access to alcohol.
Shelters often prohibit some other types
of possessions as well, or may limit the
quantity of possessions that residents can
bring. Church-affiliated shelters some-
times require guests to attend religious
services. While the casual observer might
feel that a sermon imposes a relatively
benign influence on a shelter occupant,
the requirement of sitting attentively for
the prescribed period might be daunting
to the type of independent individual
living outside of mainstream society.
Alcohol could be allowed or denied
based on the owner's perception of his
customers' demand for various arrange-
ments, much as restaurant owners deter-
mine smoking policies. The shelter oper-
ator might even choose to sell alcohol.
Safe accommodations that offered the
benefit of choice thereby could be made
available even to those people of meager
resources who today's shelters decline
to serve. If a private operator proposed
such a plan, would the necessary permits
be forthcoming? Based on current poli-
cies in existence throughout the country,
the answer is that they would not.
Degrees of Homelessness
Some homeless do not avail themselves
of such housing alternatives as space in
shelters. Voluntary homelessness with-
out shelter dwelling requires that the
homeless party suffer from mental pecu-
liarities, that he live in a favorable cli-
mate, or that he substitute other facilities
for a home or a shelter. The propensity
to choose this extreme form of homeless-
ness depends on the individual's income,
the price of housing in the relevant mar-
ket, and the typical weather conditions.
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It seems strange, of course, to speak
of choosing to be homeless. If shelter is
necessary for survival, then no rational
individual will choose a consumption
bundle with no housing, sleeping on the
street in the bitter cold. There are some
among the homeless, however, who
substitute certain public facilities for
shelters. For example, there are those
who sleep during the day in bus or train
depots, or even in libraries, so they can
remain awake during the perilous hours
between dusk and dawn. Such individu-
als range from the temporarily indigent
to the long-term mentally incapacitated,
whose incontinence often befouls the
chairs and aisleways of public facilities.
that it is illegal for any party other than a
governmental agency or an approved out-
sider to offer very small amounts of hous-
ing. A private party could try to provide
services better than those provided by
government or those typically offered by
charitable groups, but it could not charge
fees. Furthemiore, housing codes prohibit
the creation not only of shantytowns, but
also of single-room occupancy hotels.
Even makeshift "self-help" housing (if it
is too visible) is prohibited. Note that the
sturdy wooden huts built by Chicago's
"mad housers" were destroyed by the city
when the occupants were provided with
apartments; they were not left for the
benefit of other homeless people.
Ifan entrepreneur tried, anywhere in the US, to
charge a slight feefor shelter-like accommodations
with greater safety or increased choices, officials
certainly would close the operation.
To the extent that climate allows for
people to go without housing, and to
the extent that shelters or substitutes are
available, some individuals' preferences
dictate that they consume no housing so
that they can buy more of other items.
For such individuals, the consequences
of homelessness are not severe, and the
benefits of incremental amounts of hous-
ing would be low. These people make ra-
tional choices; they are not disoriented or
incapacitated. It should appeal to intui-
tion, if not to the logic espoused by the
news media, that one who might choose
some small amount of housing when
prices were low could choose homeless-
ness when housing prices are higher.
Getting What We Pay For
In providing shelters and special subsi-
dies for the homeless (and in allowing
unintended uses by the homeless of some
facilities), government interferes with
market mechanisms by creating home-
lessness among some who would not
choose zero levels of housing if their
consumption bundles had to provide for
sleeping accommodations. In fact, local
regulators have a form of monopoly, in
The Bottom-Line Question
The conditions necessary for "affordabili-
ty" to play a significant role in creating
homelessness are extreme, whereas
restrictive housing codes could create
homelessness even if all incomes were
high. If an entrepreneur tried, anywhere
in the US, to charge a slight fee for
shelter-like accommodations with greater
safety or increased choices, officials cer-
tainly would close the operation. How,
then, can we say that our society is com-
mitted to assisting the homeless?
Cases such as mining camps where
workers sleep in shifts prove that mini-
mal housing can be built cheaply and pro-
vided at low prices. Before codes existed,
refuge from the elements was provided
by "flophouses" that had to offer at least
some services to stay in business. We
should not treat today's financially dis-
tressed, substance abusers among them,
with less sympathy. We also have to
reclaim libraries and other public places,
but first must allow an industry that
provides very low quantities (in terms
of space, amenities, or length of stay) of
housing. Opponents of such efforts do
not truly wish to help the homeless. fl
ews
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approximately 65 University of Illi-
nois alumni at an April 24 luncheon.
The event was the most recent in a
series of semi-annual luncheons
organized by ORER for U of I gradu-
ates working in fields relating to real
estate. The luncheon was held at the
Chicago Yacht Club; thanks go, as al-
ways, to Gene Stunard, who arranged
for the use of the Club's facilities.
Colwell Serves CCBA
ORER Director Peter Colwell (cur-
rently on leave of absence because of
ORER's funding problems) has been
elected to a one-year term on the
College of Commerce Executive
Committee. The Committee advises
the Dean on policy matters affecting
the College. Colwell was also a 1990-
91 member of the Committee.
mini Active at ARES
The University of Illinois was well
represented at the 1992 meetings of
the American Real Estate Society
(ARES), held in April in San Diego.
Roger Cannaday, who served during
the Spring semester as ORER's
Acting Director, presented ORER
Working Paper #96, "Condominium
Covenants: Cats Yes, Dogs No." and
chaired a session on Markets: Invest-
ment Property. ORER Staff Associate
Joseph Trefzger presented ORER
Working Paper #9 1 , "The Microeco-
nomic Foundations of Locational
Obsolescence," co-authored with
ORER Director Peter Colwell.
Many University of Illinois gradu-
ates also participated in the meetings.
Among them were Paul Asabere (now
on faculty at Temple University),
Gary Eldred (a consultant in Berke-
ley, CA), Austin Jaffe (Pennsylvania
State University), John Major (Cali-
fornia State University-Hayward),
Mark Sunderman (University of Wy-
oming), James Webb (the Executive
Director of ARES, now at Cleveland
State University), Charles Wurtze-
bach (JMB Institutional Realty in Chi-
cago), and T.L. Tyler Yang (Califor-
nia State University-Long Beach).
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The Choice ofHomelessness: An Economic Analysis
The preceding pages discuss the nature
of the homelessness problem, particu-
larly as it applies to single individuals,
and describe why some people might
prefer to he homeless. The following
discussion provides a more technical
economic rationale for the choice of
homelessness. The reader is reminded
that this analysisfocuses on the home-
less single adult whose personal prefer-
ences, along with income and the choic-
es available through the private market
or through government programs, might
lead to a rational choice of being with-
out a permanent residence. The analysis
does not apply to people who are too
disoriented to make rational choices.
Furthermore , an adult' s decision to
impose homelessness on minors under
his or her care cannot be justified by
the economic logic presented below.
Each person has at his or her disposal
some form of income. While in extreme
cases the source might be only barter
(or perhaps theft), it is assumed in the
following analysis that every individual
has at least a minimal cash income. In
the case of a low-income single adult,
this income could result from part-time
work (through formal or informal
channels in legal or illegal industries),
or might reflect the largesse of private
donors or the government.
As noted in "Risk Reduction Through
Home Ownership" (ORER Letter, Win-
ter 1992), people spend their incomes so
as to maximize satisfaction. The follow-
ing analysis is based on a simple model,
similar to that presented in the Home
Ownership article, in which there are
only two goods, housing and an "other
good" representing all other possible
purchases (including food, clothing, en-
tertainment, and legal or illegal stimu-
lants). The consumer can trade housing
for consumption of the other good.
While the typical consumer would
choose at least some of each good,
single-good bundles are possible.
At one extreme, the consumer might
choose only housing; this solution
would be difficult to implement, though,
since food and clothing are necessary
for survival. At the other extreme, the
individual might choose to purchase no
housing, spending all income on the other
good. This solution is made more likely
by shelters and facilities that substitute
for shelters. It is further facilitated by the
public assistance benefits that some juris-
dictions, including the state of Illinois,
provide to those with status as homeless.
Budget Constraint
Each of the graphs on this and the follow-
ing pages is characterized by a vertical
axis measuring housing consumption.
"Housing" is a slightly simpler concept
here than in the Home Ownership article,
in that the present measure of housing
can involve either owned or rented quar-
ters. Each graph's horizontal axis meas-
ures consumption of the other good that
embodies all non-housing purchases.
Consumption desires are unlimited;
with no constraints on spending a consu-
mer would buy unlimited amounts of all
goods. Of course, someone can buy only
what he can afford. Because income is
finite, a consumer can buy only those
bundles that do not violate the budget
constraint: consumption cannot exceed
income. Budget constraints are illustrated
by the diagonal lines in the various
graphs. Each such line represents combi-
nations of purchases that exhaust the
entire budget; the consumer can buy only
those combinations of housing and the
other good that appear at points on or be-
low the constraint. Consumption bundle a
in Figure 1 , for example, is too costly for
the individual whose budget is shown.
Bundle h, while affordable, leaves some
income unspent. This individual also can
attain bundle c. which lies on the budget
line and thus has a cost equal to income.
The maximum amount of housing that
can be bought if none of the other good is
consumed is shown at the extreme end of
a budget line, along the vertical axis, in
each graph. The other end of each budget
constraint represents the greatest quantity
of the other good that could be afforded if
quantity of other good = :
no housing were purchased. For exam-
ple, if income is /, the price of a stan-
dard unit of the other good is $ 1 , and the
price of a standard unit of housing is p,
then the consumer can buy, at most, 1/p
units of housing or / units of the other
good, as indicated at the extreme points
along the budget constraint in Figure 1
.
Indifference Curves
Figure 1 also contains a series of "indif-
ference curves," each of which reflects
willingness to give up some amount of
one good in exchange for more of the
other. An indifference curve represents
all combinations of two goods that leave
a given consumer equally well off.
Every consumer is assumed to realize
diminishing marginal satisfaction from
a particular good; as more is obtained,
each additional unit provides less added
satisfaction. This assumption ensures
that each indifference curve has the con-
vex shape shown in Figure 1 . A curve
closer to the origin (where the axes
intersect) represents a lower level of
satisfaction, while a curve farther from
the origin indicates higher satisfaction.
In terms of the geometry of Figure 1,
the consumer tries to reach the highest
possible indifference curve, which gen-
erally is the curve tangent to (touches
only at one point) the budget constramt
corresponding to the person's income.
The preferred choice of this consumer,
perhaps someone living in Illinois
during the cold winter months, appears
in Figure 1 as c, the point of tangency
between the budget constraint and the
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middle indifference curve shown. The
individual's tastes dictate the shapes
of the curves; those of someone living
in dangerous weather are not likely to
approach the horizontal axis.
Corner Solutions
Figure 2 shows the same axes as Figure
1 , but includes budget constraints repre-
senting three different levels of income.
Lines farther from the origin represent
higher incomes. The indifference curves
shown might represent the preferred
choices of someone living in Florida's
milder climate. This individual can
forego housing more easily than could
his Illinois counterpart, since even such
housing substitutes as shelters can be
avoided during most of the year.
For each of the two lower representa-
tive income levels, there technically is
no point at which the budget is tangent
to an indifference curve; the budget line
touches a curve without intersecting it
only along the horizontal axis. This
person's satisfaction therefore is maxi-
mized, at lower income levels, when he
buys no housing. An optimal consump-
tion bundle that reflects an indifference
curve's touching the budget constraint
without being tangent and without inter-
secting is known in economics terminol-
ogy as a corner solution; a bundle with
zero quantity of one of the goods is an
example. It is only for relatively higher
incomes in Figure 2 that tangency points
indicate positive levels of housing con-
sumption; at income 73 this individual
purchases a small quantity of housing.
Higher Housing Prices
Figure 3 illustrates how an increase in
the price of housing could affect a partic-
ular person's consumption choices. The
graph shows an initial housing price of
/jj, which corresponds to the higher of
the two budget lines and a positive quan-
tity of housing consumption. If the price
of housing rises to p^, however, then a
more restricted set of bundles is afforda-
ble and it becomes attractive to forego
housing altogether. As a result, someone
with preferences indicated by the indif-
ference curves shown chooses homeless-
ness after the housing price rises.
Encouraging Homelessness
If government provides special benefits
to those who qualify as homeless, then
homelessness can become attractive to
some people who would not select zero-
housing bundles otherwise. Figure 4
illustrates circumstances in which the
consumer initially buys a small amount
of housing, as shown by the point where
an indifference curve is tangent to the
budget. Buying no housing, along with
quantity :^ of the other good, would
leave the consumer with less satisfaction
(on the lower indifference curve).
What would be the effect of a publicly
provided benefit, in the form of cash
payments, to those meeting the jurisdic-
tion's definition of "homeless?" First
assume a payment of .s dollars, which,
when combined with the resources freed
by consuming no housing (to qualify the
consumer as homeless), allows a total
purchase of Zy+s of the other good.
Conference Honors Mills
The Office of Real Estate Research
played a key role in an April confer-
ence at Northwestern University in
Evanston. The event was held in rec-
ognition of the many contributions
that Northwestern economist Edwin
Mills has made to the fields of real
estate and urban economics. The
conferees were leading urban econo-
mists from major university programs
across the country. University of Illi-
nois economics professor and ORER
Research Associate Jan Brueckner
was one of the event's organizers, and
ORER was among organizations that
provided him with assistance. ORER
Director Peter Colwell also participat-
ed in the conference, as did former
Director James Follain, now at Syra-
cuse University.
Cannaday Activities
Professor Roger Cannaday continues
to serve as President of the national
Rho Epsilon organization in addition
to his duties as local chapter advisor.
His term as national president lasts
until late 1992. He has advised the
University of Illinois Rho Epsilon
chapter since 1979, and was named
the nation's Outstanding Chapter
Advisor in 1984. Cannaday also
continues in his position as Director
of Graduate Studies for the Universi-
ty's Department of Finance.
Course Reading Packet Policy
The Office of Real Estate Research
has received several requests from
collegiate faculty wishing to include
ORER Letter articles in course read-
ing packets. ORER Letter articles
are intended to be readily available
for student use. Any original article
appearing in any past or future ORER
Letter issue may be reproduced by a
faculty member (or vendor acting at
the faculty member's direction) in
sufficient quantities to serve student
needs. ORER does not hold the copy-
right to articles identified as reprints
from other publications; professors
wishing to reproduce such articles
should contact the original publishers.
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Because this particular comer solution
lies on the same indifference curve as
the initial bundle, the consumer does not
increase satisfaction by choosing to be
homeless. If more assistance were pro-
vided, however, then choosing home-
lessness would increase satisfaction.
An s' dollar benefit, for example, allows
a consumption bundle containing no
housing and quantity z-^+s' of the other
good. This bundle lies on a higher indif-
ference curve, and therefore is preferred
by this specific individual.
Sheltering the Homeless
Another type of special benefit that gov-
ernment can provide to the homeless is
the operation of a shelter. A shelter is
a measurable quantity of housing with
an implicit value to the user. Consider
someone whose budget and preferences
have led to the choice of h^ housing and
Zj of the other good, as indicated in Fig-
ure 5; the corner solution of zero hous-
ing and r-, of the other good would lie
on a lower indifference curve. Suppose,
though, that anyone lacking a permanent
home now can gain access to a shelter,
provided by the local government,
with such attractive amenities that the
measured equivalent housing quantity
would be hi. The individual then faces
a kinked budget constraint, as shown in
the graph. Selecting the corner bundle
in effect provides the consumer with h-,
housing and :-, of the other good; this
point is on the higher indifference curve,
because the "free" shelter increases his
choices at the public's expense.
Discouraging Homelessness
If, on the other hand, government provid-
ed disincentives, then homelessness
would become unattractive to some who
otherwise would choose zero-housing
bundles. Figure 6 illustrates the case of
someone choosing initially to buy no
housing, as shown by the budget line that
touches (without intersecting) an indiffer-
ence curve only along the horizontal axis,
at a point representing zero housing and
T] of the other good. Assume that local
officials were to penalize homelessness
by imposing a tax of amount t on anyone
without a permanent address. While poli-
cy makers would not likely impose direct
taxes on the homeless, the indirect prices,
such as lack of safety and restricted free-
doms (including the freedom to own
property, since the belongings of the
homeless often are confiscated or thrown
away by municipal workers), borne by
those without homes are tantamount to
taxes on homelessness.
In continuing to choose homelessness,
the consumer would be forced to accept
the bundle represented at the point corre-
sponding to zero housing and z^-t of the
other good, obviously on a lower indiffer-
ence curve. This person could attain
greater satisfaction by buying some hous-
ing in order to avoid the homelessness
tax. Any consumption bundle lying along
the budget line and between the two in-
difference curves shown would leave this
individual better off than if the tax were
paid, though such an outcome would pro-
vide less satisfaction than did the initial
homelessness. This result should not be
surprising, in that such a tax constitutes
a restriction on choice that is bound to
reduce consumers' well-being.
The Restrictive Role of Codes
Housing codes also restrict individual
choice; they allow the purchase of less
than a given quantity of housing (again,
with quantity defined by size, duration
of stay, etc.) only in approved facilities.
The person with preferences shown in
Figure 7 initially chooses h-, of housing
(perhaps a bed in a flophouse) and Zy of
the other good. Assume, though, that a
new local policy permits consumption
of less than /;3 housing only in an ap-
proved shelter. The budget line of the
individual therefore no longer extends
below the height corresponding to hy
choices through the private market are
restricted to those indicated by the solid
segment of the budget line. Yet by, in
effect, choosing the comer solution of
zero housing and z-, of the other good,
the consumer obtains quantity h^ of
shelter housing, less than he actually
desires. (This individual measures the
quantity of housing provided by the
shelter as low because of the attendant
loss in personal freedom.) The move to
a shelter therefore takes this consumer
to a lower indifference curve.
Discouraging Self-Help
Obtaining one's housing through non-
traditional channels is known as self-
help: this phenomenon is observed in
housing procurement by people ranging
from America's poor to most citizens in
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some socialist countries. Self-help is
characterized by small quantities (as
defined throughout this discussion) of
housing with very high per-unit prices.
Tar paper shacks and makeshift shelters
are expensive to build and maintain be-
cause those who construct them cannot
reap the benefits of economies of scale
or specialization of labor, and are likely
to have to continually rebuild because
their structures are vulnerable to nature
and to regulatory actions (since self-help
typically is carried out through the illegal
"underground economy").
These high costs are represented in
Figure 8 by the lower segment of the dis-
continuous budget constraint; the flatter
slope indicates a less favorable tradeoff
between housing and the other good
than would be provided with tradition-
al housing. Whereas someone seeking
housing of quantity h^ or greater has
access to the ordinary channels, lower
quantities can be obtained only through
self-help activities.
The individual whose preferences are
represented would like to consume h-,
housing (indicated by the point on the
highest indifference curve shown). But
his choice through traditional sources is
either to buy li^ or more (for which no
tangency would occur) or else to buy
none (the corner solution, on the lowest
indifference curve shown). The restric-
tion against small housing quantities,
and the attendant higher costs of hous-
ing obtained through nontraditional
channels, dictate that this individual
maximizes his satisfaction with quanti-
ty /;, of self-help housing; the indiffer-
ence curve indicated is the highest at-
tainable under the constraints imposed.
Speakers, Chicago Trip Combine for Active Rho Epsilon Semester
The Spring 1992 semester saw continued
success for the University of Illinois
chapter of Rho Epsilon in the areas of
professional events, alumni relations,
and student recruitment.
Chapter Events
The first professional event of the semes-
ter was held on February 4. U of I alum-
nus Charles Wurtzebach of JMB Institu-
tional Realty in Chicago spoke on "US
Commercial Real Estate: Current Condi-
tions. Future Projections."
The next professional speaker was
Chicago attorney and Illinois graduate
Barry Springer, who spoke to the chapter
on "Eminent Domain, Zoning, and Other
Legal Issues in Real Estate."
U of 1 alumnus Alan Strauss of MCI
Communications visited the campus on
February 25. He discussed "Corporate
Real Estate" with the membership.
Illinois graduate David Barr of Ban-
Real Estate in Champaign spoke at the
March 3 meeting. His topic was "Com-
mercial Real Estate Brokerage."
Two alumni of the University returned
to campus on March 24. Sean Cannaday
and Christopher Tiemey, both with Price
Waterhouse in Chicago, discussed "Real
Estate Appraisal" with the students.
On March 27, Professor Roger
Cannaday and 1 students traveled to
Chicago to visit offices of two major real
estate firms. During their visit to Lincoln
Property, the students met with Illinois
graduates Gerry Kostelny and Carolyn
Brett. At Cushman & Wakefield, U of I
graduate Steve Schmitz organized visits
with Sandy Collins and several other
individuals on the firm's staff.
The speaker on March 3 1 was another
Illinois alumnus, Donald Rundblom. The
U of I adjunct lecturer and former invest-
ment banker, now with the Principal
Financial Group, discussed "Mortgage
Securitization."
Todd Caruso of CB Commercial in
Chicago spoke to the chapter on April 14.
His topic was "Commercial Real Estate."
The final professional event of the
semester was held on April 24. Illinois
graduates Edmund McMahon and Alissa
Schneider of Metropolitan Life Insurance
in Chicago spoke on "Institutional Invest-
ment in Real Estate."
Membership
The semester was another successful re-
cruiting period for the chapter. The initia-
tion of 10 new student members brought
to 78 the active membership count.
Spring semester chapter officers were
Jeff Mitchell, Senior in LAS Economics
from Alton. President; Mike Hoadley,
Junior in CBA Finance from Elgin, Vice
President; Sharon Masterson, Senior in
CBA Finance from Westchester, Treasur-
er; and Marvin Sledge, Junior in CBA
Finance from Chicago, Secretary.
Outgoing chapter Vice President Mike
Hoadley was elected President for the
coming Fall semester, and Marvin Sledge
will return as Secretary. The other Fall
officers are Scott England, Junior in LAS
Finance from Wheaton, Vice President;
and Calvin Cooke. Junior in Urban Plan-
ning from Crystal Lake, Treasurer.
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Historical Notes
Land Practices in Early Illinois: The Mormons in Nauvoo
Calvin N. Smith
When the Mormons settled in Illinois in
1 839, they were keenly interested in land
ownership and development. Much of
that zeal sprang from their belief that
Mormon leader Joseph Smith was a liv-
ing prophet. In his capacity as leader and
prophet. Smith had announced many rev-
elations concerning not only his follow-
ers' spiritual needs, but their temporal
needs as well.
Smith's rise to leadership had begun
nearly two decades before his people
established their Illinois base. As a boy
of 15 in 1820, Smith declared that God
and Jesus Christ had personally visited
him. Over the next ten years, according
to Smith, he was fitted to become the
Prophet of the Last Dispensation through
a series of other visions and visitations.
Not only had heavenly messengers given
him divine authority to establish Christ's
restored church, according to Smith, but
he had been given a new book of scrip-
ture, the Book ofMormon, equal in au-
thority to the Bible. The Book ofMor-
mon underscored many Americans'
implicit belief that America was a land
that was "choice above all other lands"
(I Nephi 13:30). Mormons (more formal-
ly called Latter-Day Saints) were urged
to acquire land and work it, not only to
satisfy the Biblical charge to labor for
one's food, but also to glorify God by
the prudent use of earthly resources.
The First Move Westward
Mormons' claims to divine power did
not sit well with their neighbors. Under
duress, the church moved from New
York state to Kirtland, Ohio in the winter
of 1 830- 1831. Many new converts were
made there, but before long, opposition
arose as well. As the years passed. Smith
announced several revelations indicating
that Missouri was the Mormon "Zion,"
and in 1837 the majority of his followers
moved with him to the area in and near
Jackson County in that state.
Opposition became intense there also;
many non-Mormons were upset by the
mistaken notion that Smith's revelations
directed the church to buy and control all
of the land in the area. Resistance became
violent; the governor even decreed the
killing of Mormons legal. Smith was
jailed, scores of church members (many
of them women) were hunted down and
murdered by mobs, and the remaining
followers fled Missouri in the dead of
winter. Starving and destitute, hundreds
of Mormon refugees streamed across the
Mississippi River into Quincy, Illinois
and surrounding communities. There they
were treated initially with kindness.
The church also had a strong interest
in the Iowa land. Smith's April 25, 1839
journal entry noted that he had "accom-
panied the committee to Iowa to select a
location for the Saints [there]." A satis-
factory site was found, and in the ensu-
ing weeks an agreement was reached
wherein "...the Church purchased the
town of Nashville in Lee County, Iowa
Territory, together with twenty thousand
acres of land adjoining it." Though the
price of the land was relatively high, the
purchase terms were liberal. As Smith
Though the price of the land was relatively high, the
purchase terms were liberal: "two dollars per acre, to he
paid in twenty annual installments, without interest,"
and apparently with little or no downpayment.
Buying Land in Illinois
In April of 1839 Smith escaped his Mis-
souri captors and rejoined his followers
in Quincy. Mormons who had arrived
earlier and scouted the area recommend-
ed the purchase of the nearly abandoned
town of Commerce, approximately fifty
miles upriver. Smith accepted his follow-
ers' counsel and began negotiations, with
Dr. Isaac Galland and a syndicate led by
Horace Hotchkiss, to buy extensive hold-
ings in Commerce and in the so-called
Half-Breed Tract directly across the
Mississippi in the Iowa Territory. Smith
was named sole trustee for the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and it
was in the name of the church that the
purchases were transacted.
Galland 's claims to the 1 19,000 acre
Half-Breed Tract were in litigation and
therefore uncertain, but his claims, and
those of the Hotchkiss group, to the land
in Illinois were solid. On April 30, 1839
Smith and his land committee completed
their first transaction, involving three
parcels in Commerce proper. This land
purchase, which included ferry rights and
hotel privileges, became the nucleus area
from which the community would grow.
later noted in his journal, owner Galland
agreed to sell "about twenty thousand
acres, lying between the Mississippi and
Des Moines Rivers, at two dollars per
acre, to be paid in twenty annual install-
ments, without interest." The huge tract
was apparently obtained with little or no
downpayment required.
On the Illinois side of the river, more
land was acquired via the Hotchkiss
syndicate and through purchases from
Galland and various other individuals.
The land where the business district and
Mormon temple site are located today
was purchased on April 4, 1 840 from
Daniel H. Wells. Initial purchases by
Smith and the committee included much
bottom land which, while fertile, was
close to the swamps. Attendant mosquito
problems led to considerable sickness
from what the settlers called miasma,
but which actually was probably malaria.
A Beautiful Place, For a While
Commerce's name became Nauvoo,
a Hebrew term meaning "a beautiful
place." The state granted a liberal char-
ter, and Nauvoo experienced explosive
growth. The plat of the city decreed that
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each block should contain four lots of
one acre each. Original plans called for
only one home per lot, thereby allowing
each owner room for a large garden and
for raising animals. The original survey
recorded 590 lots, and more were added
as land was annexed to Nauvoo. As early
as June of 1840, 250 houses had been
built and more were under construction.
Lots were priced at $500 on average:
none was to be sold for less than $200 or
more than $800. This plan, designed to
promote equitable treatment, would have
kept the church solvent and the city pros-
pering. But the price structure, particular-
ly the $800 limit on the most valuable
lots, caused unforeseen problems.
Hard money became scarce as a result
of the 1842 recession. Not only did the
values of church holdings plummet, but
a number of lots were provided without
charge to Mormons arriving in Nauvoo
with little or no money. This generosity,
plus the tendency for multiple house-
holds within families to settle on prime
lots (thereby using more valuable sites
more intensively), took a heavy toll on
church income. Newcomers also were
reluctant to buy church-owned bottom
land for fear of illness. These factors put
the earlier land agreements in jeopardy.
Church leaders used innovative meth-
ods in trying to meet the obligations to
sellers of land. Economic disaster was
averted when Galland agreed to accept
land titles that Mormons held in Missou-
ri in exchange for the debt owed to him.
Dealing with the Hotchkiss property was
another matter, though. Hotchkiss had
verbally agreed to exchange his holdings
for land in the Atlantic states, but many
affluent Mormons were slow to uproot
themselves and move westward, and
they were not eager to send hard money
to help the church out of its fiscal crisis.
Galland, who had since joined the
Mormon church, was deputized to go
east to sell some of the land holdings. He
met with limited success, however, and
the church soon was pressed for payment
of the Hotchkiss bill. The land was final-
ly saved for the church when Galland
was able to effect the transfer of suffi-
cient eastern lands at least to pay $6,000
in interest that had accrued on the debt.
As time passed. Smith urged his fol-
lowers, even those in nearby Iowa com-
munities, to settle within Nauvoo. He did
so to create a more cohesive unit from
which to administer the church affairs,
and to provide enough people to quash
rumored plans by non-Mormons to in-
vade the city. It certainly is not the case,
however, that non-Mormons were barred
from, or even unwelcome in, Nauvoo.
Smith went out of his way to welcome
"Gentiles" into the city, as long as they
conducted themselves in an orderly way.
Deadly Trouble in the Prairie State
By the summer of 1844, the city's inhabi-
tants numbered approximately 18,000.
Booming Nauvoo was the second-largest
city in Illinois; only Chicago was larger,
and its population exceeded Nauvoo "s by
only a few hundred people. But trouble
was brewing. Hancock County residents
were suspicious of the growing power
and influence of the church, and were
uneasy about Smith's 5,000-man Nauvoo
Legion. Mormons in outlying areas were
attacked and their properties burned out,
and there was increasing talk of an armed
attack on the city itself.
Agitators such as Warsaw's Thomas
Sharp stirred anti-Mormon sentiment by
publishing inflammatory editorials. The
Nauvoo Expositor, a newspaper critical
of church leaders, brought the situation to
a flashpoint. After the first and only issue
was printed. Smith, using his power as
Nauvoo mayor, ordered the city marshal
to destroy the press. A short time later
Smith and his brother, Hyrum, were
arrested by state officials for "treason
against the state of Illinois" (though no
evidence was presented to substantiate
the charge), and the two men were held
in the county jail at Carthage. On June
27, 1844 a mob stormed the jail and shot
Joseph and Hyrum Smith to death.
Brigham Young took over as church
leader. Non-Mormons, emboldened by
leading Mormons' reluctance to urge
retaliation, gave the church members an
ultimatum: leave Illinois or face an armed
invasion of Nauvoo. The Mormons tried
to sell their land before leaving the area,
but could get little for it. The mob leaders
who were forcing the departure felt that
by simply waiting until the Mormons left
they could take control of Nauvoo and
the adjacent church holdings with little
financial outlay. Under increasing pres-
sure. Young and many of the Latter-Day
Saints left Illinois in the winter of 1846,
crossing the Mississippi on thick ice
created by a deep February freeze. The
group went to Utah and there, through
irrigation and hard work, "made the
desert blossom as the rose."
Some Remained, For a While
Surprisingly, several church members,
including Smith's immediate family,
stayed in Nauvoo. After Young's con-
tingent left for the west, the remaining
Latter-Day Saints kept a low profile in
order to blend with the non-Mormon
populace. Smith's widow, Emma, lived
in Nauvoo's hotel-like Mansion House,
built as a result of an edict that Smith
said was revealed to him in 1841. She
later married a non-Mormon, but over
time she became convinced that her
eldest son by Smith, also named Joseph,
was heir to his father's leadership man-
tle. In 1860 a number of Emma's family
members and about 150 others held a
conference at Amboy in north-central
Illinois. The conferees chose Joseph
Smith, the younger, as prophet and lead-
er of the Reorganized Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, to be head-
quartered in the nearby town of Piano.
The group soon left Piano, however, to
establish operations in the elder Joseph
Smith's promised land of Missouri.
Nauvoo today is a quiet town of about
1,000 residents. Piece by piece, the Salt
Lake City-based LDS church and the
Independence, Missouri-based RLDS
church purchased much of the property
in old Nauvoo. The groups have cooper-
ated in restoring key buildings, including
several original homes and shops. While
most of the bottom land area now con-
sists of well kept empty lots, the restored
buildings that dot the landscape provide
a pleasant reminder of the neat, thriving
city that once flourished on a broad,
grassy plain in western Illinois. |
Dr. Smith is a Professor ofSpeech Com-
munication at Eastern Illinois University.
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U ofl's Laura Quigg Applies Real Options Concept to Real Estate
Laura Quigg is an Assistant Professor
ofFinance at the University of Illinois.
She completed a Ph.D. in Finance at the
University of California at Berkeley in
1990. afterfinishing earlier degrees at
Georgetown and Columbia. Dr. Quigg
specializes in the area of real estate
finance; she teaches the University'
s
Real Estate Financial Markets course.
She also has practical experience in the
real estate and urban economics areas,
having worked in brokerage and in New
York City municipal government
.
In the following interview. Dr. Quigg
discusses the concept of option-based
valuation of land. Her doctoral disserta-
tion is a theoretical and empirical study
of "real options" as applied to real
estate development and valuation. The
interview also provides ORER LETTER
with an opportunity to introduce readers
to this dynamic addition to the Universi-
ty' s real estate faculty
.
The concept offinancial options lias be-
come familiar to most investors in recent
years. We also have long dealt with op-
tions to purcl'.as.. parcels of real estate.
How does the real option concept differ
from options to purchase or sell securi-
ties or other assets? The real option
concept treats ownership itself as an
option. The owner of any tangible asset
has a choice among various legally per-
missible uses to which the asset can be
put, and a choice as to when any of these
uses should be implemented. Examples
of real options include land, oil fields,
and even industrial plants.
Consider the ownership of land. A
land owner has the right-the option-to
construct a building or other improve-
ments at any time. The value of the asset,
the land in this case, is maximized when
the owner chooses the optimal time to
make the improvements. When we see
land sitting vacant, not being put to a
currently productive use, we're some-
times inclined to think that the parcel
should be developed so that the owner
can earn a return. But it may make more
sense for the owner to defer the decision
to build, to "wait and see" what happens
in the local market, or in the world. A
real estate owner has the option to hold
the property for development later.
So is the real option simply the abiliry
to choose the best time to build? The
right to choose the optimal timing for
constructing improvements is only one of
the options included in land ownership.
We might think of a series of options.
One is the option to build the optimal
type of improvement. Another is the
option to replace existing buildings now
or at any time in the future, or to lobby
local regulators for zoning changes; the
real option concept applies to developed
land as well as to vacant parcels. These
options constitute a fundamental compo-
nent of any real estate investment, and
they should be considered in any capital
budgeting model.
Option pricing theory therefore can
explain the existence of vacant land
when there seem to be profitable building
opportunities. My model assumes that de-
velopment can occur on any plot, so there
can be vacan. parcels. In another real
option model, developed by Capozza [see
ORER Working Paper #84], all building
is assumed to take place on the fringes
of cities, contiguous to earlier-developed
parcels. That model does not apply to
vacant land in a developed area.
Could you review the basics of options?
An option is the right to buy (call option)
or to sell (put option) a specified asset
at a specified price called the "exercise"
price. The option's value results from un-
certainty regarding the underlying asset's
future value. Most people have heard
of the type of actively-traded option
sold on corporate stock, which gives the
investor the right to buy a block of shares
of that stock (typically 100 shares) for the
fixed exercise price.
Land is an infinite-lived call option
that gives its owner the right to build a
building or other improvement, which is
the underlying asset, upon payment of
development costs, which represent the
exercise price. Valuing land as an option
is tantamount to taking the expected
present value of the future building price
minus development costs, assuming that
the land is developed at the optimal time.
In an uncertain economy, in which both
future building prices and future con-
struction costs are unknown, this option
has value to the extent that the developer
can adjust the timing of development to
maximize profits. In my study of land
transactions in Seattle, I found that the
prices of investment real estate vary
considerably: the statistical measure of
variation called the standard deviation
ranged from 18% to 28%. The imputed
option premium that resulted from this
price variation was 6% of the land value.
How does the investor deal with the un-
certainty regarding the optimal time to
exercise the option? Option valuation
is based on stochastic processes. We
sometimes define stochastic as "ran-
dom," but the idea is not exactly one of
randomness. A stochastic process chang-
es through time in a particular way, as
described by a set of variables, primarily
a mean level of change and deviations
from that mean. In standard valuation
models, the analyst computes land value
as the present value of future cash flows
that the land will generate, incorporating
the assumption that development is to
occur at a pre-specified time. In the real
option model, the value of land is also
computed as the present value of future
cash flows, but the timing of develop-
ment is not pre-specified; it can change
based on market conditions.
Not only do standard present value
models undervalue the investor's posi-
tion by ignoring the option to wait to
develop at some time in the uncertain
future; they also can lead to incorrect
strategies. Of course, there are holding
costs and other potential costs associated
with waiting; these costs are incorporat-
ed into the real option model. The higher
the holding costs, the sooner it is optimal
to develop.
Is cost treated as a stochastic process
also? The model does allow for cost
to correspond to uncertain, or stochastic.
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future occurrences. We can also model
flexibility in the development process;
if the projected rent that a land owner
could earn on a planned building were
to fall or costs were to rise, then the opti-
mal strategy might be to change plans.
The developer could reduce the scope of
his operation, retaining only a skeleton
work force so that not much more than
the fixed costs would remain. Or the
plans and specifications could be altered,
so that a different building would be
built. In the case of oil fields, if the price
of oil were to drop it might be worth-
while to leave offshore sites dormant but
to continue drilling in areas where the
extraction costs were lower.
value of improved real estate is more
volatile? Yes, if everything else is
held constant then the option increases
in value when real estate prices are more
volatile. Remember that the striking price
on the underlying assets is the cost of
constructing the desired improvements.
The option to build at an unspecified date
in the future is worth more if both devel-
oped real estate prices and construction
costs are more volatile. In the absence of
complicating factors, the option value is
maximized when the variations in both
the improvements value and their con-
struction costs are greatest.
We typically assume that a risky
investment offers its holder the chance
We're inclined to think that vacant land should be
developed. But it may make more sensefor the owner
to defer the decision to build, to "wait and see" what
happens in the local market, or in the world.
So is the type of building that is planned
unimportant, since the plans can he
changed later? I'm not a construction
expert, but from an economic standpoint
we would look at flexibility as another as-
pect of the option value. With some types
of structures the builder loses flexibility.
For example, with steel construction the
whole frame might have to be built at
once, whereas some types of reinforced
concrete construction allow for one tloor
to be built at a time. To the extent that the
design does not require commitment, the
land owner retains the value of the option
to change the plan. From a valuation
standpoint, we must analyze not only dif-
ferences between costs of various types
of structures but also the additional value
the land owner realizes by being able to
make changes. We also have to consider
that concrete takes up more space, for
example with larger support columns, and
thereby reduces the value of the option to
use space in a variety of ways.
We know that options on securities are
more valuable if the underlying assets
exhibit more price volatility. Is the real
option-based value of land greater if the
for large gains only when accompanied
by the risk of large losses, but an option
is not exercised when the investor would
suffer added losses in doing so. An
option to build, or to do anything else,
therefore is an instrument that cannot be
worth less than zero. As in the case of a
stock option, the owner of land holds the
upper part of the distribution of possible
values. The more variability in the price
of the underlying assets, the greater is the
potential profit and the more the option
is worth; more variation in the cost of
building the desired improvements
renders it more likely that a profitable
outcome can be realized. The land owner
exercises the option only when it is
profitable to do so (presumably when
construction costs are low relative to the
value of the developed property).
The investor need not fear excessive
losses, because the most that can be lost
is the investment in the land, the price
of the option. The greater potential for
loss that normally accompanies a risky
investment is immaterial in this case,
because the land owner would not exer-
cise the option if the proposed project
were expected to be unprofitable.
What about possible countervailing
forces? For example, what if variability
somehow affected the whole economy?
This is the type of complicating factor
to which I alluded earlier. To the extent
that increased variability in building
costs or in anticipated future rents
increases the risk-adjusted discount rate,
the present value of the same stream of
rents is lower. As a result, the value of
the building decreases. An option's
value increases as the range of possible
values of the underlying asset widens;
but if, at the same time, the underlying
asset is worth less (if the range of values
centers on a lower midpoint), then the
impact on the option value is ambiguous.
A building's value should be the dis-
counted present value of the expected
future rents. So the impact of an increase
in the possible variation of building
values is ambiguous if that increase is
accompanied by a change in the rate at
which future cash flows are discounted.
If increased variation is accompanied by
discounting at a higher rate, then the val-
ue of the option to build may be lower.
But ifyou ask an appraiser what hap-
pens when risk increases, the response
that you're likely to elicit is that higher
risk increases the overall discounting
rate and therefore ALWAYS reduces
values. What circumstances give rise
to risk that increases value instead of
risk that decreases value? A central
theory in the study of finance is that
prices generally are set by investors who
are well-diversified within the markets
in which they operate. They adjust the
prices that they offer to pay for assets to
reflect the riskiness of the market itself,
but do not require compensation for
asset-specific risk, which is eliminated
through diversification. Of course, a
well-diversified portfolio con^- 's of
many classes of assets, so returns depend
on investment performance in a wide
range of sectors in the economy.
If the increase in risk relates to indi-
vidual assets, and if only market risk is
priced in the discount rate, then option
pricing theory holds that the only impact
brought about by the higher level of risk
should be to increase the value of the
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land. Under these circumstances, asset-
specific risk should not have an impact
on the risk-adjusted discount rate, and
therefore the building value typically
should not be expected to change with
an increase in this risk component.
But it seems that, since real estate returns
tend not to be highly correlated with the
returns on other assets, there should he
no market risk-based adjustment to the
discount rate, and individual asset risk
should be easily eliminated. So volatility
should tend only to increase real estate
values. Some studies show real estate
returns to have low, or even negative,
correlations with returns on other asset
would be difficult for the typical house-
hold to acquire enough wealth to diversi-
fy even against asset-specific risk. The
argument that variability increases option
value holds better for income producing
properties, especially those held by insti-
tutions or other substantial investors.
But a lot ofhome owners with well-
diversified pension plans may not realize
how diversified they are. There are
some "invisible" assets in household
portfolios. Human capital, by which we
mean a person's skills that aid in earning
income, is another asset in this category.
But I'm not sure we can view an individ-
ual investor as being able to hold a diver-
The value of the home owner's largest asset is falling, the
company that sold him life insurance has been downgraded
because of its real estate holdings, and his pensionfund has
lost value because of its real estate investments.
classes. Studies like those conclude that
real estate adds value to a portfolio by
reducing overall risk. In that respect it
seems that individual asset risk should
easily be diversified away, and that since
real estate performs differently from oth-
er assets there shouldn't be much market
risk to incorporate into the discount rate.
I feel that more recent evidence argues
against the "real estate as a countercycli-
cal investment" view, but real estate does
offer diversification benefits.
The option model certainly tells a
story very different from the traditional
appraisers' view. If there is not much
market risk to consider, and if the risk-
adjusted discount rate is insensitive to
increases in the volatility of returns on a
particular real estate asset, then present
values should not fall with increases in
asset-specific risk. Diversification is not
hard to achieve; an investor with relative-
ly little money can buy shares in a mutual
fund that holds a portfolio of stocks,
bonds, and real estate assets. Of course,
if we are dealing with a family home, a
single asset that may account for a large
portion of its owner's portfolio, then the
asset-specific risk should be priced; it
sified portfolio, even given the factors
you mention. It is important for the pen-
sion fund manager (which is the federal
government if we're talking about Social
Security) to strive for diversification.
On the other hand, could we build the
case that some home owners who have
pensions are poorly diversified, since
pension plans have invested so heavily
in real estate in recent years? Yes, I
think so. Look at the current state of the
real estate markets; falling values cause
reverberations all across the country.
The home owner is being hit from every
direction. The value of his largest single
asset is falling, the company that sold
him life insurance has been downgraded
because of its real estate holdings, and his
pension fund has lost value because of its
real estate investments. For those reasons
we might not want to see pension funds
invest more heavily in real estate than
they already do; the typical plan partici-
pant's personal holdings are already more
heavily devoted to real estate than many
people realize. Still, we shouldn't over-
generalize with respect to real estate. I
believe that pension funds and insurance
companies have focused their real estate
investing more recently on mortgage-
backed securities. These assets not only
are insured against default, but also
respond differently to market conditions
than do real estate equities.
A diversified real estate portfolio,
then, perhaps should be defined in terms
of the overall financial picture of the
investor or investors. For example, the
State Universities Retirement System's
portfolio should not hold too much Illi-
nois real estate, or too much in securities
issued by Illinois firms, for that matter.
If the Illinois economy suffers, then so
does the value of housing in the state,
and so do the values of company shares,
the employment base, and the tax base.
So diversification should be in geo-
graphic terms as well, and it should be
on an international basis. Our pension
funds should look to foreign markets,
just as foreign investment entities have
channeled funds to American real estate.
Portfolios structured in this manner
provide true diversification and allow
us to state with more confidence that
increased variability in real estate prices
increases land values.
Let's return to the uncertaintyfaced by
a potential builder. What gives rise to
uncertainty regarding the optimal type
of building? The neighborhood, and
how it ultimately will be developed.
Think of a new industrial or residential
development. The developer has to
get someone to be a pioneer, to break
ground and complete the first deal, so
he sells the first lot to a builder at a low
price. The builder has acquired the op-
tion to hold the land and build on it at a
later time, but let's assume that he starts
building right away. Builders are in the
construction business; they face holding
costs that make it difficult for them to
wait. (The sale contract could even state
that the builder must begin construction
by a specified date.)
But other potential builders may be
able to wait. The developer's option
value therefore can be maximized when
uncertainty is highest, if he can sell lots
to a builder who can wait to build and
will pay a premium for the option. But
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if holding costs on land are so high that
the optimal timing decision is to begin
building immediately, then eliminating
uncertainty from the process maximizes
value. The developer creates certainty by
inducing a top-quality builder to buy the
first lot and build the first house in the
area: then he can charge more money for
each of the other lots.
Suppose that market conditions are such
that a subdivision developer M'ants to
maximize uncertainty. Why wouldn't he
simply hold an auction and sell all the
lots in one afternoon, thereby using the
option premium to ojfset the liquidity
discount? If builders offered prices that
In many instances this "option" does not
legally exist today, or if it does exist it
carries prohibitively high exercise costs,
because in many cases there no longer
is free disposal of land. For example, if
there are underground fuel storage tanks,
or if the land has been used as a dumping
site for dangerous materials, then the
owner no longer can walk away at the
zero price that would be assumed in a
model that included an abandonment
option. The situation is similar to the case
in which someone owns a factory but
can't close it down without making sever-
ance payments to the workers, or owns
an apartment building and can't force
tenants out when their leases expire.
The State Universities Retirement System's portfolio
should not hold too much Illinois real estate, or too much
in securities issued by Illinois firms, for that matter.
did not include the option value, then
arbitrage would occur: investors willing
to waitfor the optimal time would pay
prices that incorporated option values.
You're visualizing downward pressure on
prices because the seller receives liquidi-
ty, but a countervailing upward pressure
because of the option component of val-
ue. It's hard to say which effect would
be stronger. By selling at the maximum
uncertainty time, the developer would be
enhancing the option value. If the buyers
were able to wait before committing to
build, then they would value the real
option that accompanies ownership and
would pay higher prices because of the
uncertainty. But if holding costs faced by
buyers, including arbitrageurs, were very
high, then the buyers would not benefit
from uncertainty, so the developer could
not obtain much option value in the sell-
ing prices of the lots. It might seem that
the model is contradictory, but it isn't.
The option value should be implicit in
the land's value, but its value is small if
developers incur high costs by waiting.
An owner's option that you have not
discussed is the option to abandon.
In markets wherefarmers sell their
development rights, the option to build on
land is priced directly. Could we test the
calculations in your model by looking at
these markets? Given that my model
treats land as having value because it rep-
resents an option to build, we could look
at development rights for an indication,
but some computations would still be
necessary. The value of land represents
the option to build, but it also embodies
the option to continue the current use,
so the option to build is an option to trade
one type of asset (farm land) for another
type of asset (developed land).
Some investors seem to be using op-
tion strategy in their own dealings. One
example is land banking, in which people
buy vacant land to save for future use.
They reduce their risk exposure by trying
to cover holding costs with interim uses,
such as fanning. Even the public sector
can become involved. Local governments
that want to manage "green space" buy
development rights, which are types of
options, on agricultural land. The public
sector thereby holds the option to change
the use: all that's left to the private owner
is the right to continue the current use. H
ORER News
Working Paper Available
As noted above, Roger Cannaday's
study "Condominium Covenants:
Cats Yes, Dogs No," is now available
as ORER Working Paper #96. Copies
are available from the Office of Real
Estate Research; the address and tele-
phone number are listed with editori-
al information on page 2. Each copy
of this paper, or of any paper in the
series, carries a $4 charge.
Scholarship winners
Several University of Illinois real
estate students were awarded scholar-
ships during the 1991-92 academic
year. Jeffrey Mitchell and David
Cohen each received a $2,000
Morgan L. Fitch award through the
Illinois Real Estate Educational
Foundation. The family of Mr. Fitch,
an Illinoisan who became a national
real estate industry leader, endowed a
fund to provide scholarships to out-
standing real estate students at the
University of Illinois. Cohen also
received a $2,000 award from the
Appraisal Institute. The Real Estate
Educational Foundation also granted
REEF Academic scholarships in the
amount of $ 1 ,000 each to Kevin
Fabian and Jennifer Pittacora.
The Society of Industrial and
Office Realtors® Scholarship, funded
by the Chicago SIOR chapter, was
shared by Russell Long and Jennifer
Dick. This $1,500 award is granted
each year to the outstanding under-
graduate student in the U of I real
estate program, as selected by real
estate faculty members. The Chicago
chapter of the Commercial Invest-
ment Real Estate Institute awards a
$ 1 ,000 scholarship each year to an
outstanding student, selected from
among nominees submitted by U of I
real estate faculty, planing to pursue a
career in commercial real estate. The
1991-92 CCIM Scholarship winner is
Stephen Green.
The Office of Real Estate Research
commends these outstanding students
and thanks the sponsoring organiza-
tions for their generosity in support-
ing educational excellence.
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Is the End Really Near?
Edward C. Krug
Anyone with an interest in land use is
affected by our nation's, and the world's,
policies on the environment. Those who
analyze real estate markets therefore
should be aware that the recent "Earth
Summit" in Rio de Janeiro has endowed
"Greenthink" with an official, global
seal of approval. Certain UN bureaucrats
who have appointed themselves saviors
of the world will feel no remorse in
running roughshod over property rights
and our rights to self-determination.
President Bush displayed courage in
the face of overwhelming pressure to
follow the rest of the Rio herd. Still, it
is unfortunate that, while the President
did not break under this pressure, he was
forced to bend. By agreeing in principle
that global warming is a serious problem,
we have given up the moral high ground.
In merely signing the Rio Declaration.
we have allowed the Greens to continue
redefining everything. Carbon dioxide,
the major food for plants, is now "pollu-
tion." Using land productively is seeking
"profit," earning a profit is "greed," and
development is "exploitation." Scientific
experimentation to make our relationship
with nature sustainable is "unnatural."
Vocal parties among the Earth Sum-
miteers insist that an environmental jug-
gernaut is bearing down on us. Believing
themselves to be more intelligent and
virtuous than the rest of humanity, the
Green elite warn, for example, that death
from global warming is imminent if
we do not die first of cancer caused by
ozone depletion or by chemicals in food.
Science vs. Scare Tactics
How, then, should we live? Do we listen
to those who think the world would be
pure and pristine if only we reverted to
carrying spears and wearing loincloths,
or do we instead place faith in science?
A recent Gallup poll, for example, shows
only 19% of US atmospheric scientists
to believe that there is man-made global
warming. In 1990 the USDA had to re-
vise its 1965 Plant Hardiness Zone Map
to reflect increasing cold. All of Tennes-
see and much of Kentucky were in zone 7
in 1965, but today only southern Tennes-
see is so classified. Much of the fear of
global warming follows from temperature
readings taken in urban areas, where ther-
mometers show higher readings because
of such man-made artifacts as concrete
construction. Readings taken over time in
the Arctic show the planet to be cooling.
These and other scientific "silver bul-
lets," any one of which would be fatal to
a scientific theory, have been shot repeat-
be destroyed together by those who
would strive to return mankind to the
totalitarian days of the pre-industrial era.
Good Ideas Gone Awry
Everyone cares about the environment;
we all want clean air and water, and safe
food supplies. But the Green Revolu-
tion's philosophical base has been de-
stroyed and replaced with a counterfeit.
The Scientific Revolution has improved,
not harmed, our relationship with nature.
A recent Gallup poll shows only 19% of
atmospheric scientists in the US to believe
that there is man-made global warming.
edly at global warming; that it still lives
indicates a life derived from something
other than science. We should heed the
60 Nobel Prize winning scientists (whose
beliefs are shared by scores of other sci-
entists worldwide) who signed the Hei-
delberg Appeal prior to the Rio summit,
blasting the dangers of "Greenthink."
Their concern is that irrational forces
who oppose scientific progress will stall
the world's economic and social develop-
ment in the next century. They list the
greatest evils facing us as "...ignorance
and oppression, and not Science, Tech-
nology, and Industry whose instruments,
when adequately managed..." can handle
"...problems like overpopulation, starva-
tion and worldwide diseases."
In the past, sociopaths whose political
ambitions would have subjected their fel-
low beings to economic catastrophe faced
trial for crimes against humanity. In the
1990s, however, such ambitions are laud-
ed by some people who purport to stand
for democracy. Nearly 30 years of phony
environmental crises have provided
ammunition for those whose battle cry is
that we cannot live with modern technol-
ogy. Because political freedom and scien-
tific inquiry are closely related, they must
Environmental activists tell us that
unless we change our ways, the end is
near. Indeed they may be right, but it
is not the environment that is about to
collapse. The end for property rights, for
comfortable dwellings, for democracy,
for a decent standard of living, and for
Western civilization itself is at stake
unless we can forge powerful coalitions
among those willing to let reason guide
them in the fight to support our rights. M
Dr. Krug is a Winona. Minnesota soil
and water scientist who serves as Direc-
tor ofEnvironmental Projects for the
Washington. DC- based Committee for
a Constructive Tomorrow.
The Office ofReal Estate Research makes
eveiy effort to assure the accuracy of all
statements in ORER LETTER articles prepared
by ORER staffmembers . However, the reader
should note that legal and regulatory matters,
which are occasionally addressed in ORER
LETTER articles, are subject to change and
to vaiying interpretations. ORER LETTER
articles do not purport to provide legal or
investment advice, and the Office ofReal
Estate Research shall not be held responsible
for damages resultingfrom omissions or
inaccuracies in the ORER LETTER or other
ORER publications.
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the West and the Southwest could be
developed into safe landfills. Moreover,
closed landfills do not have to be dead
land; housing developments, golf courses,
and conference centers are but three types
of post-closure landfill uses that already
have succeeded. Only politics and envi-
ronmentalists" religious zeal stand in the
way of common sense policies.
Of course, landfills will provide solu-
tions only if technology is coupled with
economics. The focus of the economic
policy should be the private ownership of
landfill sites. Private owners would have
strong incentives to use liners, to install
systems that collect leachate and meth-
ane, and to monitor ground water quality.
It is only on government-owned landfills
that scant attention is paid to such activi-
ties. The reason is simple: unlike the gov-
ernment, private owners face the econom-
ic consequences of damages they create.
Similarly, it is in the interests of private
owners to charge fees that reflect all costs
of collection and disposal, including land-
fill closure and post-closure maintenance
costs. Individuals and businesses can
make rational waste disposal choices only
if disposal fees embody the true costs of
the activity. Such fees should differ for
different types of waste, but politically-
set municipal disposal fees are usually
uniform for all varieties of waste, and
they typically cover only current operat-
ing expenses. This pricing system encour-
ages over-dumping and a lack of attention
to the composition of what is dumped.
The way to overcome the alleged
shortage of landfill sites is to get politics
out of the way; even existing landfill sites
should be privatized. The proper role
of government in this matter is judicial.
If courts held private landfill operators
strictly liable for harms imposed on
others, then operators would internalize
these costs and make appropriate operat-
ing and pricing decisions. They would
foster careful disposal practices by
charging dumping fees reflecting weight
or volume, and would promote efficient
recycling by charging based on the com-
position of items discarded. To overcome
the NIMBY ("not in my backyard") atti-
tude held toward landfill sitings, opera-
tors would have to offer compensation to
owners of land in close proximity. Thus,
areas containing developed residential
and commercial sites would be avoided.
Incineration as a Viable Alternative
Technology also makes it possible for
us to incinerate wastes in ways that do
not harm the environment. We burn only
14% of our municipal solid wastes, and
even the 20% EPA target for 1992 is
dwarfed by the 60% safely incinerated in
Japan. Pollution from incineration is no
longer a problem. Much of the ash can be
put to good use, for example in secondary
road construction, and the rest can be
safely landfilled, though it is ironic that if
we were to incinerate at the same rate as
the Japanese, our need for landfill space
would be cut by almost half. Only the
irrational opposition of environmental
zealots and the NIMBY phenomenon
prevent us from creating sufficient incin-
erator facilities. Yet just as with landfill
siting, NIMBY could be overcome with
compensation, which would be mini-
mized by the prudent choice of sites.
It is puzzling that many who fear a
shortage of landfill sites argue strongly
against incineration. About 40% of land-
fill waste is paper; there is already more
newspaper waiting to be recycled than
demand for recycled paper can absorb.
and toxic bleaches used in recycling
present their own environmental prob-
lems. Paper is a renewable resource; if
we burned paper now sent to landfills,
we would ameliorate two problems at
once, and the resulting energy could be
converted to electricity, reducing our
consumption of fossil fuels.
The state of Maine has moved to pro-
hibit private ownership of new incinera-
tors; rational public policy dictates just
the opposite. If government monitors
compliance to assure that private owners
are held liable for damages they cause,
then we will have safe and effective
incineration. Public agencies that operate
incinerators take less care; private
owners have their own wealth at stake,
while government employees do not.
Conclusion
We should forsake the environmental
priesthood and adopt an integrated ap-
proach to municipal solid waste manage-
ment. Such an approach would include
sensible landfilling and incineration,
along with recycling and packaging deci-
sions based on cost-benefit comparisons.
If we follow that strategy, then the "gar-
bage crisis" of the 1990s will be seen
to be as chimerical as the "energy crisis"
of the 1970s, which was also caused by
faulty government policy. The cure is
simple: eliminate government interven-
tion, privatize to set prices correctly,
and allow individuals, guided by those
prices, to make their own choices. H
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What Garbage Crisis?
Charles W. Baird
The environment is important to Ameri-
cans, but so are such values as common
sense, individual freedom, property
rights, and economic well-being. Realiz-
ing that much environmental hectoring
consists of gross exaggerations, and that
warnings put forth by environmental
activists sometimes contradict scientific
principles as well as readily available
evidence, the public has become more
cautious in evaluating claims made by
the environmental establishment.
The late syndicated columnist Warren
Brookes told a Pacific Research Institute
forum that backers of California's "Big
Green" initiative overstated the risks of
pesticides on fruits and vegetables by a
multiple as high as 21,000. If Big Green
had won, then the extreme pesticide stan-
dards that would have applied to produce
grown or sold in California would have
driven prices paid by the state's house-
holds dramatically higher. Shall we dis-
courage Califomians from eating foods
that, physicians agree, reduce the inci-
dence of cancer in the digestive system?
Environmental extremism has become
the principal means by which collecti-
vists with influence in the environmental
movement hope to achieve their dream
of a thoroughly regulated and planned
economy. The Red Star has burned out,
but the Green Star is rising.
A Quasi-Religion
Consider, for example, the alleged gar-
bage crisis. Congress is debating whether,
and in what form, to reauthorize the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act,
the principal federal waste disposal law.
Because of Green lobbying efforts, it
appears that the Act will be reauthorized
and substantially strengthened. One pro-
vision proposed would be to make recy-
cling, regardless of whether it is cost effi-
cient, mandatory throughout the country.
trines of this religion is the recycling of
municipal solid waste. Landfill sites, the
litany goes, are scarce, and in many cas-
es they are hazardous. Incineration, the
litany proceeds, is unthinkable because
of the dangerous content of the resulting
ash and other air pollutants. There are,
the litany continues, only two legitimate
acts of contrition: consuming less and
recycling. The litany ends with, "Go in
peace, and abstain from plastics. Thanks
be to Mother Earth."
To overcome the NIMBY attitude held toward landfills,
private operators would have to offer compensation to
nearby land owners. Thus, areas containing developed
residential and commercial sites would he avoided.
Environmentalists ' propagandistic
groundwork has included televised film
footage of garbage-laden barges in search
of dumping places, which led viewers to
fear that Americans will drown in munic-
ipal solid refuse unless we reduce our
consumption and take the recycling
pledge. Many environmentalists follow
a new (albeit with ancient roots) "earth
womb" religion, and they see consump-
tion as not only profligate but, indeed,
sinful. One of the most important doc-
The Benefits of Landfllling
The truth is that we face no shortage of
geologically safe potential landfill sites.
Land-poor Japan has 2,400 operational
sites, while in our land-rich country
there are only 4,800. Half of our existing
landfills are due to close in five years,
but landfills are designed to stay open,
on average, for only ten years. Landfill
sites can be environmentally safe and
people-friendly. Vast, empty regions in
(continued on page 15)
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